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**Rule of Experts?
Decomposing Agency and Agendas in Africa's
Development Regime**

**Peter K. A. da Costa
School of Oriental and African Studies
University of London**

This dissertation is submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D) in Development Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London)

8 February 2011

DECLARATION:

I have read and understood regulation 17.9 of the Regulations for students of the School of Oriental and African Studies concerning plagiarism. I undertake that all the material presented for examination is my own work and has not been written for me, in whole or in part, by any other person. I also undertake that any quotation or paraphrase from the published or unpublished work of another person has been duly acknowledged in the work which I present for examination.

Signed:

Peter K.A. da Costa

Date: 2 February 2011

Acknowledgements:

This thesis is dedicated to four 'women' in my life: my mother, Nanette Elizabeth Myola da Costa (08 April 1929 – 02 December 2008); my wife Ciru Mwaura and our daughters, Yassine Myola da Costa and Jarra Katile da Costa. I would never have arrived at this point without them. I am deeply indebted to my supervisor Dr. Subir Sinha who was instrumental in guiding my work, provided me with the required tools of analysis and offered critical insights of the most incisive nature. I am also grateful to Dr. Jeggan Colley Senghor for his consistent support, motivation during difficult times, and perceptive insights; to Prof. S.K.B. Asante for his inspiring comments on my work; to Dr. Paolo Novak for interrogating me on theory and for his unending solidarity; to Dr. Carlos Oya for his encouragement and timely provision of advice; to Prof. Chris Cramer for his support and wise counsel; and to Dr. Nomfundo Xenia Ngwenya for leading by example and paving the way. Last but not by any means least, I am also profoundly grateful to friends, colleagues and family (particularly my in-laws, the Mwaura family of Kenya) for their unstinting support throughout.

Abstract

This thesis has theoretical as well as empirical goals. Theoretically, it develops a working conceptual framework of an African development regime – an institutional configuration of modern power harnessed by leaders and technocrats ideologically committed to progress. Historically, ‘Africa’ has been an ‘invention’, objectified as a continent in crisis and designated the object of external developers. Africans have re-imagined their continent as a distinct geopolitical space, a lived reality of struggles in which unifying discourses of *‘Pan-Africanism’*, *‘United States of Africa’* and *‘African renaissance’* project an alternative African geography of power. In this regime, institutional complexes of expertise – Western-trained African experts, their institutions and interactions – play a pivotal role in advancing the hegemony of dominant development ideas. In the process, it is argued, they have the potential to reconfigure power asymmetries and secure expanded policy space towards pursuing a development agenda considered more authentically ‘African’. The thesis undertakes a historiographical analysis of Africa’s development regime, locating the sub-hegemonic role played by the Economic Commission for Africa, the continent’s premier institutional complex of expertise on economic development issues, from 1958 to 2005. Drawing on life histories of key respondents, critical light is shed on how these experts deploy their ‘African-ness’ alongside recognition as world-class technocrats to create increased room for manoeuvre. The thesis also examines the African Peer Review Mechanism, a sub-hegemonic political technology advancing the globally hegemonic discourse of ‘good governance’ that, it is argued, holds the potential to re-order the balance of power.

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Introduction: Africa – Invention and Lived Reality

Preamble

Addressing a summit of African leaders in Tunis in June 1994, Nelson Mandela, South Africa's first post-apartheid head of state, recounted how – despite Africa's major contribution to the founding of civilisation – the Roman Empire had destroyed Carthage, an African city, and carted off the children of Africa as slaves. This act of aggression, he said, marked the start of a long interregnum during which Africans:

“...were held out as the outstanding example of the beneficiaries of charity, because we became the permanent victims of famine, of destructive conflicts and of the pestilence of the natural world. On our knees because history, society and nature had defeated us, we could be nothing but beggars. What the Romans had sought with the destruction of Carthage had been achieved” (Mandela 1994, p.1).

Many centuries later, with the end of apartheid in 1991 marking the achievement of the total liberation of Africa from white rule, neither Carthage nor Africa had been irreparably destroyed – thanks to the struggles and deeds of prominent African heroes and heroines. These struggles ended the long interregnum, and signalled the beginning of the task of rebuilding the African city of Carthage. Decrying the prevalent image of Africa as a continent wracked by conflict, that would never experience development and growth, whose children would forever be condemned to poverty and dehumanisation, and which would perpetually beg for aid, Mandela added:

“We know it is a matter of fact that we have it in ourselves as Africans to change all this. We must, in action, assert our will to do so. We must, in action, say that there is no obstacle big enough to stop us from bringing about **a new African renaissance**” (ibid, p.3, emphasis added).

In a speech to U.S. business leaders in Chantilly, Virginia in April 1997, Thabo Mbeki, Mandela's successor, unveiled the key pillars of the 'African renaissance' concept: socio-cultural, political

and economic regeneration, and the improvement of Africa's geopolitical standing in world affairs.

“Africa's time has come”, he declared. “We should no longer allow the situation where the world records growth and development and Africa communicates a message of regression and further underdevelopment. **The new century must be an African century**” (Mbeki 1997, p.6, emphasis added)¹.

Within South Africa, Mbeki's advocacy gave rise to a flurry of activity² and excitement³. Outside South Africa, the ‘African renaissance’ discourse was harnessed towards a dual purpose: helping to reposition South Africa as an emerging player in world affairs (Habib and Selinyane 2006); and rallying African leaders behind the vision of a united Africa that could command a larger share of global power and trade.

From ‘African Renaissance’ to NEPAD

In July 2000, with Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo and Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Mbeki attended the summit of the Group of Eight (G8) industrialised nations in Okinawa, Japan. Mbeki and Bouteflika had been mandated by the OAU in 1999 to “engage with African creditors on our behalf on the issue of Africa's external indebtedness, with a view to securing the total cancellation of Africa's debt, as a matter of urgency” (OAU 1999). They made a case for a new debt relief initiative that would benefit African as well as other developing nations, and promised that, in return, Africa would manage its affairs in a more accountable manner. The G8 response was to request a workable plan on the basis of which negotiations

¹ In many speeches featuring the African renaissance, Mbeki regularly cited Roman, Greek and other ‘ideas’ of Africa.

² This included the establishment of an African Renaissance Movement and the inauguration of an African Renaissance Institute in 1999 as a coordinating body of country-based chapters in the movement. At its 50th National Conference, the African National Congress (ANC) adopted the African renaissance as a key ideological component. An African Renaissance and International Cooperation Bill was drafted and sent to parliament in 2000 (Maloka 2000).

³ Vusi Mavimbela, Mbeki's political adviser, described the ‘African renaissance’ as a “third moment” in Africa's postcolonial history, after decolonisation and the democratic transitions of the 1990s. To others, the ‘African renaissance’ was Africa's response to globalisation (Maloka 2000).

towards a new era of reciprocal relations between Africa and the international community could begin.

Mbeki took the lead in developing the plan, and soon unveiled the 'Millennium Partnership for the Africa Recovery Programme' (MAP), a document that emphasised African ownership of a development that was to be achieved in the context of globalisation (Griggs 2003). Meanwhile, Senegal's President Abdoulaye Wade unveiled his OMEGA Plan, arguing that the key to developing Africa was to invest heavily in infrastructure. In April 2001, sensing an opportunity to influence these high-level policy debates, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), a continental 'think tank' headquartered in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, proposed a twin compact – between African leaders and Africa's peoples, and between Africa and the international community – underpinned by ideas of good governance, mutual accountability and policy coherence (ECA 2001).

At a tense conference attended by African finance ministers in Algiers in May 2001, the ECA brokered a compromise between the competing Senegalese and South African initiatives. The 'New African Initiative', which resulted from the subsequent merger of the MAP and OMEGA, soon became the '*New Partnership for Africa's Development*' (NEPAD). Hinged on promises that Africa's leaders will improve governance in their countries, in exchange for additional aid from the developed world, NEPAD is the latest in a long line of continental plans to develop Africa. Its arrival rekindled hope among many that Africa would finally develop. At the same time, its critics despaired that NEPAD would serve only to ease Africa's insertion into an unequal global order.

Development as Public Action

Whether viewed as a nineteenth-century project aimed at creating order from the disorder of rapid urbanisation, poverty and unemployment (Cowen and Shenton 1995), a deliberate mission aimed at remaking the colonial world and restructuring relations between colonies and the metropole (Escobar 1995, p.26), or part of an inevitable historical process of capitalist

expansion built on exploitation of the masses, 'development' has implied some form of intervention to bring about a transition from traditional to modern. The provision of welfare through governmental public action has long constituted a powerful legitimising ideology. In the late 1950s, at the dawn of decolonisation, development held open the possibility that all, regardless of race, history or colonial subjugation, could have a better life (Cooper and Packard 1997).

Africans have long been ideologically wedded to progress. Yet after two decades of postcolonial rule, state-led development strategy under the rubric of 'African socialism' fell short of delivering on the promise postcolonial leaders had invoked to legitimise their rule (Ferguson 1995). Oil-price rises in the early 1970s had provided a ready source of new money for some African states and elites, fuelling new hopes of an industrialised Africa. However, these hopes soon faded as a drastic contraction in global money supply led to higher interest rates, leaving many African countries with huge debts they could not service. By 1980, many African economies were on the brink of collapse. This marked a turning point in the welfare of Africans, and for Africa's world standing: it was the beginning of the 'African crisis' (Arrighi 2002).

Faced with this unprecedented crisis, and disillusioned with how the development project had turned out, African leaders drafted the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action, a "... classic dependency interpretation of the African dilemma" (Owusu 2003, p.1657) which blamed the international community for historical injustices suffered by the continent. In 1985, as their economies continued to decline, African leaders chose the path of compromise, speaking of 'shared responsibilities' and 'genuine partnership' and agreeing to implement World-Bank-proposed structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in return for new funds. By the late 1980s, SAPs had failed to deliver the promised trickle-down growth, registering a high social cost in the process. While questioning SAPs and market-led development, and insisting on the need to rebuild state capacity as the key to restructuring economies, Africa conceded the importance of 'good governance' and 'democracy', key Western conditions for continued aid. By 2001, Africa had

moved away from outright opposition to internationally imposed prescriptions for development, towards a new partnership in the context of globalisation.

'Idea' and Lived Reality

Africa has long been an 'idea', an invention of Western scholarship dating back to Greek times (Mudimbe 1994). Centuries of 'imaginings' have constituted and shaped it in a particular way, its territory, people and economy designated as objects of intervention⁴. The invented Africa has served as a metaphor of absence, a 'dark continent' against which the lightness and whiteness of 'Western civilisation' can be pictured (Ferguson 2006). The agent of this invention is akin to Said's (1978) 'Orientalism' – a Western style of thought, or discourse, for dominating, restructuring, and exercising authority over the Orient (as ontologically and epistemologically distinct from the Occident).

Yet while 'Africa' is a historically and socially constructed category through which today's world is structured, it is simultaneously "...a category that is 'real', that is imposed, that is imposed with force, that has a mandatory quality; a category within which, and according to which, people must live" (Ferguson 2006, p.5). This constructed African "geo-body" is at once dubiously artificial and powerfully real, and there is ample evidence of how negative perceptions of 'Sub-Saharan' or 'black' Africa as a category can shape social reality (ibid).

In rejecting the 'idea' of Africa as an entity devoid of agency and in need of external public action, Africans have re-imagined their continent as a distinct 'geopolitical space' (Escobar 1995)⁵, 'geographic bloc' (Peer 2002) or 'single historical postcolonial bloc' (Bayart 1993)⁶.

⁴ In nineteenth-century Egypt, for example, the development challenge is defined in neo-Malthusian terms as a problem of too many people and not enough land to feed them, and Egypt, its land and its people are rationalised into objects of development (Mitchell 1995).

⁵ Escobar (1995) identifies this will to spatial power as an essential feature of development, implicit in expressions such as First and Third World, North and South, centre and periphery. In his view, the social production of space implied by these terms is bound with the production of differences, subjectivities and social orders. For him, despite the correctives introduced to this geopolitics – the decentering of the world, the demise of the Second World, the emergence of a network of world cities, the globalisation of cultural production, and so on – they continue to function imaginatively in powerful ways.

Africa has long aspired to the modernity of the developed world – albeit on the basis of a politically distinct and culturally specific vision⁷. This vision can be seen in Pan-Africanism⁸, which originated in the Caribbean and North America in the nineteenth century as a reaction to slavery and the oppression of black people and later evolved to contest colonialism and inspire the fight for Africa's independence. Indeed, the notion of 'African renaissance' has existed in African political discourse since the colonial period, with Senegalese historian Cheik anta Diop first using the term in the context of the struggle against colonial rule to capture the dreams and aspirations of Africa's peoples as they fought for self-determination (Cheru 2002). 'African renaissance' is a powerful imaginary symbolising the shared aspiration for a peculiarly African identity. It constitutes an appeal, strongly articulated by intellectuals, for a new future for Africa (Vale and Maseko 1998).

After independence, African political leaders and intellectuals promoted a distinct view of economic development: oriented less towards a generic 'developed economy' and more towards the communitarian roots of African economies (Cooper and Packard 1997, p.12). As I discuss in Chapter 2, newly independent nations prioritised the training of a generation of African development experts, many of whom were sent to Western universities. At the continental level, Ghana's first postcolonial leader, Kwame Nkrumah advocated for a 'United States of Africa', a master plan to consolidate Africa's independence and achieve sustainable economic development, predicated on a recognition of 'Africa' as a geopolitical bloc. The imperative of achieving development thus constituted an overarching preoccupation of early African self-rule.

⁶ As Bayart (1993, p.195) explains, "...we do not wish to suggest that, country by country, Africa represents a collection of historic blocs, each one articulated with the west, and each one having a different degree of actualisation. On the contrary, we argue that Africa should be seen as being engaged in the edification of *one* postcolonial historic bloc whose degree of actualisation varies from country to country and region to region, and which integrates sub-Saharan states in diverse ways" (original emphasis).

⁷ The Pan-African 'idea' of Africa resonates with Shore's (2000) notion of 'imagined communities', developed to look more closely how Europe is being constructed as a symbolic and political entity – and therefore as a more knowable and governable space.

⁸ E. Wilmot Blyden in the 1850s and Marcus Garvey in the 1920s both advocated the geopolitics of a united Africa bloc as the ultimate freedom from oppression for all Africans, whether in the Diaspora or on the continent (Griggs 2003).

Two important points emerge from the above discussion. First, Africa as a continent has in past centuries suffered the most extreme forms of objectification, with its discourses sidelined (Cox 1994, p.xxiii). Second, in reaction to this objectification, Africa's intellectuals and leaders have deployed emancipatory discourses ('Pan-Africanism', 'United States of Africa', 'African renaissance') to project spatial power. As the excerpts from Mandela's and Mbeki's speeches show, and as will be further seen, the ability to create a discursive domain of representation that then provides the rationale for intervention holds the key to development's power. This demonstrates the significance of language, narratives and representations in the production of new politico-territorial arrangements – in this case, an alternative African geography of power (Griggs 2003).

As much as 'Africa' may be 'invention', a discursively imagined object of developers, I contend that it is simultaneously a 'lived reality', a dynamic and complex terrain of politics involving multiple social actors who deploy strategies to reach their various goals. In this 'geopolitical space', development operates as a regime, or institutionalised configuration of power (Ludden 1992). Development's hegemonic intent marks it as a key site of struggle over how to progress, and according to whose agenda.

My reference to 'Africa', rather than 'Sub-Saharan Africa'⁹, relates to the discursive construction of 'Africa' highlighted above. Whether as external objectification or postcolonial 'geopolitical bloc', the discursive 'Africa' has power, and this power has effects. This dissertation is devoted to the task of unearthing how this power is deployed, and to what effect. I am not by any means suggesting that African identity – what it means to be 'African' – is a purely geographical or even racial representation. As I intend to show through my study of African development experts, African expert identity is not offered in opposition to, or as a corrective to, a European worldview on development. It is a socially constructed identity that is

⁹ Although many development agencies (including UNDP, World Bank and IMF) distinguish between 'Sub-Saharan Africa' and 'North Africa and the Middle East', references to 'Africa' in this paper reflect the African Union's membership of 53 countries, including North African member states.

continuously being negotiated in ways that are fluid, complex and co-contingent. This is elaborated in Chapter 1.

Teleological Globalism, Dubious Culturology

Too often, the academic literature has failed to capture the complexity of struggles over Africa's development. In identifying neo-liberal globalisation¹⁰ as the dominant development ideology of the day, analysts have cast Third World development-policy agents as powerless small-time players in a game whose outcome is pre-determined in Washington (cf. Soederberg 2004, Petras 2005). Such accounts tend to reify neo-liberal globalisation as omnipotent, irresistible and therefore inevitable. Conceptions of this nature have represented countries, regions and people as 'objects' of developers. While it can be argued that capital is seeking to achieve global hegemony, there is ample evidence of resistance worldwide to the neo-liberal 'Project', leading it to modify and moderate its prescriptions.

Political science tends to cast African leaders as kleptocratic elites in a neo-patrimonial game of hide and deceit (cf. Chabal 2009, Chabal 2002, Chabal and Daloz 1999, Bayart, Hibou and Ellis 2000). For example, "... it is in the interplay between the formal and informal that the kernel of politics is to be found on the continent", with this neo-patrimonial form of government resting on "... well-understood, if unequal, forms of political reciprocity which link patrons with their clients along vertical social lines" (Chabal, 2000, pp.450-51). Chabal (2009) attempts to state the case more elegantly, arguing that "... indigenous socio-economic and cultural features have determining influence over the exercise of power in Africa" (ibid, p.6). Yet the bottom line for this school is that Africa's 'traditions' and 'culture' are the sole determinants of how politics, and indeed public action, is pursued. Small wonder that neo-patrimonialism has been dismissed as "dubious culturology" (Ferguson 2006, p.5).

¹⁰ Neo-liberal globalisation has two dimensions: worldwide market liberalisation and the construction of a new legal and regulatory superstructure for the global economy; and the internal restructuring and global integration of each national economy. Sklair (1995) writes of the "globalisation of capitalism in the economic, political and culture-ideology spheres", manifested by three institutions – transnational corporations, transnationalist capitalist classes and the culture-ideology of consumerism (ibid, p.340).

Underlying such theories is the view that the African state is institutionally dysfunctional. This resonates with the 'state failure' analysis in the so-called 'Berg Report' (World Bank 1981) that directly led to the market fundamentalism that underpinned SAPs (as discussed in Chapter 2). From a political economy perspective, van de Walle (2001) argues that, in the aftermath of independence, African political systems became neo-patrimonial, combining an external façade of modern rational-legal administration with an internal patrimonial logic of dyadic exchange, prebendalism, and the private appropriation of public resources by state elites. These dynamics, he asserts, conditioned the African state's response to crisis in the 1970s. Initially, Africa's political leadership sought to evade SAP reforms, as they feared these would dilute their command of state resources. As the crisis progressed, it is argued, leaders have implemented only enough reform to unlock new flows of donor resources. This is dubbed 'partial reform syndrome' (ibid).

Jean-Francois Bayart (1993) has attempted to paint a more historically and socially grounded picture of an informal and informalised Africa. His assertion that "... in Africa, as elsewhere, politics is produced 'from the bottom up'" (Bayart 1993, p.209) at least reflects an attempt to ascribe agency to subjects the neo-patrimonialists have characterised as devoid of agency and dependent on patrons. However, casting Africa as a study in 'extroversion' serves only to reinforce the notion that Africans consider the outside world as their primary agent of progress. In a very real sense, therefore, neo-patrimonialism reifies the age-old 'idea' of Africa as devoid of agency. My thesis is at odds with such essentialist views.

Rationale for this Study

Africa remains the world's most intractable development challenge, with more than 34 of its 53 countries classified as least-developed countries (UNCTAD 2005). Development agencies have labelled African countries as 'failed states', 'crisis states', and 'low-income countries under stress', among other categories¹¹ – with this deployment of the language of crisis preparing the ground for corrective expert intervention. Historically, expertise has played a pivotal role in

¹¹ In Chapter 3, I explain how African experts have come up with a new categorisation, distinguishing between 'enhanced partnership', 'limited partnership' and 'post-conflict' countries (ECA 2001).

sustaining the ideology of science that underpins and legitimises technocratic development (cf. Ludden 2005, Mitchell 2002, Cooper and Packard 1997). Yet, little has been written about the role of African development experts in this process of legitimisation. Indeed, the assumption that Africa has lacked sufficient expertise in development fields has fuelled the perception that external technical assistance is critical to ‘helping Africa develop’.

This explains the presence of large numbers of expatriate advisers in African countries over the years¹². Of all the developing regions of the world, Africa has had the highest density of technical assistance (Mkandawire and Soludo 1999)¹³. In some countries, the presence of such a high number of foreign experts has not only imposed a high transaction cost on nascent African bureaucracies, but also made the learning curve extremely costly. In many ways, SAPs compounded the problem as they created the justification for the introduction of even more external expertise. In the 1980s and 1990s, and on the basis of their superior power, the Bretton Woods institutions were able to foreclose the debate – forcing African intellectuals to assume reactive positions on the basis of Washington’s superior power (ibid).

More than two decades after SAPs were introduced, African scholars are increasingly of the view that Africa should re-enter the debate and assume the leading role in defining the continent’s development agenda (Mkandawire and Soludo 1999). This growing assertion of African expert agency finds resonance in NEPAD which asserts the primacy of African ownership and leadership of its own development agenda. The notion that Africa should assume a lead role in charting its future has been consistent in African development plans from the 1970s onwards. Yet the significance of NEPAD is that it coincided with an emerging paradigm shift in the aid relationship between Africa and its development partners. This shift is reflected in the *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* (2005) and the *Accra Agenda for Action* (2008), which

¹² Gutto (2006) argues that in the 1980s, through its advocacy of structural adjustment programmes, the World Bank played a key role in “[creating] space for the deployment in Africa of so-called experts, consultants and advisors from the North, at considerable cost to the continent” (ibid, p.310).

¹³ According to former World Bank Africa Vice-President, Kim Jaycox: “The extraordinary fact is that there are more expatriate advisers in Africa today than there were at the end of the colonial period” (Jaycox 1993, p.9, cited in Mkandawire and Soludo 1999).

confirm both the centrality of African ownership and leadership, and the imperative of mutual accountability¹⁴.

For the first time, donor countries have agreed that they should follow Africa's lead rather than dictating the terms of its development. Yet beyond rhetorical declarations, what has actually changed in the relationship between Africa and the developed world? Does the advent of the 'ownership' discourse signal a decisive shift in power relations, in the direction of greater African agency? Or is Africa's emerging development regime merely helping to reinforce the modified project of neo-liberal globalisation? My hypothesis is that the discursive consensus around 'ownership' could provide increasing room for manoeuvre for Africa's policy community in charting what may be a more authentically 'African' development agenda. As will be shown, African development experts are important actors vying for this expanded policy space.

The demise of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and birth of the African Union (AU) in 2001 sparked a resurgence of Pan-Africanist aspirations to continental government. This has led to a revival of interest in continentally directed development. A growing body of work is now focusing on the AU and continental government, with particular emphasis on political issues including democracy, elections, peace and security and the role of civil society (cf. AfriMAP, AFRODAD and Oxfam 2007). The birth of NEPAD in 2001 generated considerable response, often critical (see Chapters 3 and 5). A few scholars (cf. Arrighi 2001, Owusu 2003, Nabudere 2002) have attempted to situate the new aspiration to trans-national, continental development in historical perspective – even if the Bretton Woods institutions tend to draw attention at the expense of analysis of African internal dynamics.

African economists (cf. Ndulu *et al* 2008, Mkandawire and Soludo 1999) have sought to move Africa beyond the 'crisis' by providing critical context on why it happened, and suggesting ways forward. These writings have been useful in informing the extent and limits of expert agency. In

¹⁴ Further evidence of this paradigm shift can be seen in the Millennium Summit and Declaration (2000), Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development (2002), and the G8 Gleneagles Summit (2005).

the process, they have highlighted the growing clamour for African solutions to African problems, indicating a strong desire among African experts to take the lead in engineering Africa's exit from poverty and underdevelopment. And yet, despite the growing currency of regional or continental approaches, there remains a dearth of scholarship interrogating the workings of development's power in Africa.

Research Topic

The growing demand for indigenous expertise signifies a shift from the colonial and early postcolonial period when Western experts were dominant in driving national planning, and the capacity of indigenous national and trans-national 'think tanks' was relatively weak. However, the dynamics of African expertise have rarely received adequate academic study. Therefore, to contribute to addressing this gap, I set out to explore expert agency and agendas in Africa's development regime.

Drawing on insights gathered during fieldwork, I interrogate the role of African economists and other social scientists working trans-nationally – in the African continental space – in generating and giving authority to development ideas. My aim is to explain how experts, their institutions and interactions shape policy discourses, and how they both reaffirm and contest dominant development thinking.

While the idea of indigenous African expertise is considered an important prerequisite to advancing 'African ownership' – an increasingly insistent discourse in the aftermath of several decades of development failure – disaggregating 'African' expertise from the wider global pool of experts that has 'professionalised' development (cf. Cooper and Packard 1997, Chabbott 1999) may be considered futile. This is because so many experts working on development in Africa, whether African or not, trained in many of the same universities and share a common epistemology.

On the face of it, African experts harness the techniques learned in universities in the metropole to adapt dominant global development ideas and approaches to local African realities. In translating the global into forms that can readily be applied and accepted in local contexts, African experts are therefore ‘sub-hegemonic’ – meaning they support the hegemony of external development ideas. According to this reading of ‘ownership’, the role of African expertise in the global division of labour is to adapt and retail policies crafted externally, in the process making these policies more acceptable to African governments.

The Politics of Identity

While I agree that the menu of policies implemented in Africa from independence to the present day has largely originated outside the continent, and share the view that ‘ownership’ may under certain circumstances signify consent, my hypothesis is significantly more nuanced. I read ‘African ownership’ as a discourse with the potential to create space for expanded agency by experts in Africa’s development regime.

At the heart of my inquiry is the notion of ‘African-ness’ as a socially constructed identity among experts. My focus on Africa’s trans-national development regime is aimed at elucidating the ongoing process of identity construction, evident in the deployment of Pan-Africanist discourses as well as in the emergence of expert-led continental initiatives and arrangements. My claim is not that African experts working trans-nationally are asserting their African identity as a contrast to Western or global models of development. Rather, a key plank of my argument is that, in as much as experts may deploy their African origin as a device to assert their legitimacy in leading the quest for technocratic solutions to African development challenges, the education of these experts in Western academies plays no small role in conferring legitimacy on these African experts. As such, ‘African-ness’ is deployed in tandem with the assertion of another identity, that of membership of a global community of accredited development experts.

Theoretical Propositions

To signpost the empirical inquiry described above, I develop a working conceptual framework that makes explicit key characteristics of Africa's development regime. In addition to the ideas above, which draw on postcolonial studies, I incorporate Foucauldian governmentality, related understandings of hegemony, and Ludden's (1992) theorisation of development regimes as key building blocks of this framework¹⁵. This is underpinned by the following theoretical propositions:

1. Views that see development's power as monolithic and deny the objects/ subjects of development any room to resist or articulate alternatives do not paint an accurate picture of reality. As much as development is an ideology that possesses power, the development regime is a 'field of power' (Sinha 2002, Bourdieu 1993), a terrain of live politics. In such a field, multiple agents challenge domination and disrupt hegemonic claims to power.
2. In reaction to these challenges, the hegemonic 'Project' deploys a survival strategy of incorporating dissenting views. Yet, far from easing the advance of hegemony, this device of accommodating dissent triggers further contestation. At each turn, the power of the hegemonic apparatus is weakened and the force of its ideas diluted. As a result, no hegemonic project ever fully succeeds.
3. The contestation and disruption of hegemony and the multidimensional nature of struggle ensure that the outcomes of the hegemonic process are usually not those intended.
4. Domination and resistance are therefore mutually constitutive. As such, resisting the hegemonic development 'Project' implies an engagement with the very political

¹⁵ In previous work (da Costa 2004) I have argued that conceptualising development in Africa as a regime makes possible a detailed and nuanced account of the myriad struggles by multiple agents over development underway in the geopolitical space of postcolonial Africa.

rationalities (ideas) and political technologies (mechanisms or tools) harnessed by the apparatus to advance its hegemonic intent. As such, it is hard for resisters to position themselves 'outside' the field of power. They are actors in it and resist from within.

5. The key to resistance lies in the sub-hegemonic process, during which development experts 'translate' or 'hybridise' the hegemonic development discourse to facilitate its reception in different localities. It is in this process of sub-hegemony that possibilities may open up for a recalibration of asymmetries of power.

Research Questions

Informed by the above, the following research questions guided my fieldwork:

- Historically, how have African institutional complexes of expertise (ICEs) informed and engaged with the development discourse, and how has that discourse changed over time?
- How do ICEs in Africa's contemporary development regime conduct the business of sub-hegemony? What strategies and tactics are deployed?
- In what ways does sub-hegemony open up the possibility for increased African policy space?
- How do the influences, belief systems and motivations of African experts working in ICEs interact in informing expert-identity politics and how does this politics enable the possibilities for expanded agency?
- What are some of the forms of knowledge and power exercised in Africa's development regime?

Object of Study

Cooper and Packard (1997) argue that, while deconstructing the modes of discursive power is relatively unproblematic, it is much harder to discover how discourse operates within institutions. In their view, little is known about how institutions operate – from small NGOs to the World Bank.

To elicit responses to the above questions as a means of addressing the dearth of knowledge about agency and agendas in Africa's development regime, I have selected the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) as my case study. The ECA functions as the continent's premier expert community on economic development issues, including economic and corporate governance (de Waal 2002). It was established in 1958 with the mandate of providing technical advice and options to fledgling African nations planning their development strategy. The Commission came into being despite sustained resistance from a number of colonial powers, who did not deem it necessary for Africa to have a dedicated regional economic commission since several African countries were still under colonial rule (Berthelot 2004, D'Sa 1983). Since then, and over several decades, it has played a pivotal role in developing the technocratic discourse on the basis of which Africa's leaders – through the OAU and latterly the AU – have issued collective pronouncements spelling out continental development strategy.

The Commission works on diverse issues such as economic and social policy, gender, trade and regional integration, governance, civil society and development management. The ECA's development experts are Western-trained economists, some with general expertise and others specialising in specific sub-disciplines. As a UN agency, and in the early years, the ECA staff consisted of equal numbers of Africans and non-Africans. As a result of an explicit policy to recruit more Africans, a majority of the ECA's experts today are either African nationals or of African origin. These experts, their interactions, and their institution, have been the focus of study.

My decision to study the ECA in no way implies that it is the sole institutional complex of expertise operating in Africa's development regime. Expertise coalesces around a number of key institutional or organisational hubs, among them the African Union Commission (AUC), African Development Bank (AfDB) and regional economic communities (RECs) – which aggregate and pursue the collective interests of the continent's various sub-regional groupings. Furthermore, vibrant expert complexes operate within and around the state, as government bureaucracies, civil society organisations and policy research institutes, and in the private

sector. My intention has been to shed critical light on discursive strategies of rule and resistance deployed by experts in the continental policy space that forms a key dimension of Africa's trans-national development regime. While I do address relationships between the ECA and AU in particular, and while intersections between national and continental expert agendas reverberate throughout the thesis, it was never my intention to conduct a detailed inquiry into national expert agency and agendas.

Unit of Analysis

Discourse serves as my main unit of analysis. Discourse as a concept applies to both oral and written material, and embraces all aspects of linguistic organisation at, or above, the phrase level (Shore and Wright 1997). Discourses are ways of thinking that may overlap and reinforce each other and close off other possible ways of thinking. In defining discourses as "configurations of ideas which provide the threads from which ideologies are woven", Shore and Wright (1997) stress that language is socially constituted and not an autonomous domain, and that anthropological interest in discourse concerns the 'politics of discursive practice'.

Following from this, "... a key concern is who has the 'power to define': dominant discourses work by setting up the terms of reference and by disallowing or marginalising alternatives. Policies enable this to happen by setting up a political agenda and giving institutional authority to one or a number of overlapping discourses" (ibid, p.18). Indeed, and as Seidel and Vidal (1997) point out in the same volume, discourses are not purely symbolic resources and arguments, but resources that may be politically invested by social actors to particular ends. In their view, "[c]ertain discourses, when translated and mobilised through forms of action, including through policy, lead to political and ideological battles, fought through discourse as well as in extra-discursive activity" (ibid, p.59).

Over time, a series of powerful discourses have structured and provided stability to the various iterations of Africa's development regime. As will be seen, these have included '*self-reliance and self-sustainment*', '*shared responsibility*', '*African ownership*', '*mutual accountability*', and

'enhanced partnership'. In particular, the idea that Africans should own and lead their quest for development has reverberated in successive decades. *'African ownership'* constitutes the mantra of the contemporary development regime. Along with ownership, Africans are insisting on *'mutual accountability'*, a symmetrical form of accountability that would require the conditions applying to the donors to be spelt out in more detail, with enforcement mechanisms and penalties applying equally to donors and recipients (Maxwell and Christiansen 2002)¹⁶.

The dissertation assumes a critical nexus between discourses, policy as a form of action, and material effects of policy (Shore and Wright 1997, p.60). In contrast to studies on 'policy-as-political technology' that focus on the impact of policy in specific development locations (cf. Ferguson 1990, Brigg 2001, Mosse 2005), my research has isolated for detailed study the 'upstream' stage in the nexus: the process of discourse generation, translation and adaptation. I explore how discourses are imagined and harnessed to assert stronger African agency. As will be seen, in development regimes, discourses as political rationalities of power work in concert with political technologies (tools, mechanisms or policies) to advance the process of hegemonic construction.

Methodology

Exploring agency and agendas, as opposed to attributing social change to structure, has thus been central to my approach. To this end, my research strategy was qualitative – although selective use has been made of quantitative data from primary as well as secondary sources. Qualitative research strategy embodies a view of social reality as a constantly shifting emergent property of individuals' creation, and is predicated on "... an inductive approach to the relationship between theory and research, in which the emphasis is placed on the generation of theories" (Bryman 2004, p.7)¹⁷. Such a strategy is sceptical of the natural-scientific method and

¹⁶ This concept is central to NEPAD, which proposes a multi-layered institutional arrangement to ensure that both sides are equally accountable for their actions (NEPAD, 2001). 'Partnership' has gradually become the order of the day, at least discursively, between Africa and the international community. However, traditional partnerships tend to be asymmetrical – applying more to recipient than donor (Maxwell and Christiansen 2002).

¹⁷ Bryman (2004) defines qualitative research strategy as one that "... usually emphasises words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data" (ibid, pp.19-20).

of positivism in particular, and emphasise the ways in which individuals interpret their social world. My approach has been social constructionist¹⁸, beginning from the ontological premise that “...social phenomena and categories are not only produced through social interaction, but ... are in a constant state of revision” (ibid).

In terms of research design, social constructionist approaches imply, to a greater or lesser extent, that “... the observer is part of what is being observed” (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe 2002, p.30). In Mosse (2005), the author is a project actor like others, with policies and points of views and analyses that stand with those of other project staff. At the same time, he is a researcher studying a particular set of institutional relations and practices, and so is “part-insider/part-outsider” (p.13). Having worked as a senior adviser to the ECA Executive Secretary from 1997 to 2003, my proposed research is grounded on intimate knowledge of the terrain, as well as its actors. As such, while I cannot be seen as an ‘insider’, I have nonetheless had access to privileged knowledge. I am therefore part-participant as well as observer. This ‘dual positionality’ has provided a degree of insider-level access to my objects of study, while guaranteeing me the space to conduct my research with the required detachment.

Post-structuralist critiques of anthropology developed in the mid-1980s have revolutionised how anthropologists conduct fieldwork. The recognition of power asymmetry in development discourses has: generated new fieldwork ethics, methods and stances; challenged operative distinctions between ‘local’ and ‘global’ as spatial and theoretical frames; and blurred commonsense conceptions of activism and academic analysis as epistemologically distinct. Researchers have had to expand their objects of study to recognise trans-national actors and global networks and institutions as critical sites of cultural production and debate (Leve and Karim 2001).

¹⁸ In interrogating an institutional complex of experts working continentally and generating trans-national discourses, I have been mindful of the need to transcend the state-centricity of ‘constructivist’ approaches in the analysis of ‘epistemic communities’ (Boli and Thomas 1999).

Informed by this methodological shift, and in light of my interest in a development regime that works below, through and above states and is geographically as well as politically bounded, I sought to harness fieldwork methods that could help me pursue the slippery fluidity and co-complicity of domination and resistance in a discursive regime of power. Anthropology of policy¹⁹, discourse analysis, and ethnography are the three methodological disciplines that most influenced my approach – although I have also made selective use of international political economy.

Ethnography²⁰ implies both a particular set of methods used to produce a range of qualitative data, and the end product or ethnographic text constructed from such interactions (Smith 2002). To research a continental development regime, traditional anthropological means of inquiry must give way to methods that capture social relations in a multiplicity of sites of observation. Mosse (2005) refers to “the new ethnography of development” (p.11) as a multi-positioned as well as multi-sited phenomenon. Multi-sited research involves a number of techniques, among them tracking movements of people, following a specific material object of study such as a commodity, following stories or narratives, conducting life histories or biographies, following conflicts, or conducting strategically situated single-site ethnography (Marcus 1995, pp.106-113).

I employed three main methods to gather and review data – discourse analysis, participant observation and life histories²¹. Drawing on these techniques, I have traced the progression of a

¹⁹ As Shore and Wright (1997) have pointed out, policy, or more precisely the policy process, constitutes an important object of study, because it has become an increasingly central concept and instrument in the organisation of contemporary societies.

²⁰ The key ethnographic methods are participant observation and oral testimony: the first emphasising the legitimacy of a researcher’s interpretation of observed cultural phenomena from their participation and immersion in these phenomena, and the second emphasising a researcher’s ability to allow people to ‘speak for themselves’. Overall, ethnographic approaches aim to be ‘actor-oriented’ in their attempts to convey reality from a subject’s ‘point of view’, increasingly including those of the researcher as final author and editor of the ethnographic text (Scheyvens and Storey 2003).

²¹ Life-history methodology relates to the collection and interpretation of personal histories or testimonies. For some, life-history research reflects a turn away from objectivity and a privileging of subjectivity and positionality. For others, life histories provide a rich source of data enabling researchers to examine relationships between cause and effect, agency and structure (Ojermark 2007).

number of critical discourses in Africa's development regime. Discourse analysis was conducted on key African development plans, institutional documents, interview transcripts and a large number of other primary and secondary documentary sources. Textual analysis is also deployed throughout the dissertation. As a participant for nearly seven years in some of this story, I have been able to glean a number of insights that have informed and shaped this dissertation. This has been possible through my involvement and attendance in key gatherings, including conferences of African Ministers of Finance, OAU and AU summits, and other major meetings.

Interviews

To explore my hypotheses, I conducted over 60 hours of interviews with more than 40 experts (see Annex I). Key respondents were economists, demographers or experts in other social-science disciplines relevant to the ECA programme of work, and were either serving or former members of staff. The purpose of the interviews was three-fold: to elicit life histories including first-hand perspectives on key moments in the evolution of the continental development regime; to gather evidence related to my hypothesis on the policy space opening as the engagement around a new development partnership unfolds, as seen in the discursive consensus around 'African ownership'; and to understand the dynamics, markers and limits of African expert agency.

To this end, I targeted two generations of ECA experts of African origin: those who had joined the Commission in its early years (1960s and 1970s); and a younger generation recruited around 2000, mainly from the Diaspora. These two groups were selected to identify generational differences in epistemology, strategies and tactics, as well as to identify evolving markers of 'African-ness' over time.

Sikkink (1997) identifies generational shifts within institutions as a key factor in the evolution of ideas. In her study of the transformation of ECLA (now ECLAC, the Latin American counterpart of the ECA), from structuralism to neo-liberalism, she notes that the ECLA shift happened partly

because of the retirement of the 'old guard' and its replacement by a new group of staff less personally interested in maintaining classic ECLA positions, and more likely to have trained in U.S. universities and to have more mathematical and technical training. Given the tendency of many staff in the regional commissions to remain in the same institution for their entire careers, ECLA staff recruited in the 1950s would have spent up to 20 years, and in some cases longer, in the Commission, retiring two or three decades later, in the 1980s. At the ECA, the longest-serving staff members typically joined the Commission in the 1970s and retired in the 1990s or after 2000.

Interviews with ECA respondents were mostly conducted during three field visits to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in March, May and October 2006. Interview respondents were chosen randomly. Each interview lasted for an average of one hour. A questionnaire (see Annex II for a sample) was developed and administered in each of the interviews, which were open-ended. On the basis of a thorough examination of the interview transcripts, follow-up interviews were conducted in 2008 and 2009 by electronic means (e-mail or VOIP phone). A number of non-ECA experts actively engaging with the ECA ICE were also interviewed on questions relevant to the dissertation. Access to field sites was made possible by a series of consulting assignments for a variety of development agencies, involving travel to Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, the Gambia and other countries. This allowed me to gain insights from a range of experts who were not available in my primary field site.

Road Map

Following this introduction, the rest of the dissertation consists of five substantive chapters and a conclusion. Each chapter performs a specific set of tasks in relation to the overall objective. Data gathered from interviews are featured throughout the thesis, and in particular in Chapters 2 to 5. Much of the data appear in the form of discursive content, and I reproduce excerpts of direct quotations as much as possible. Data gathered from interviews are also consistently paraphrased, cited as evidence and appropriately attributed.

The purpose of Chapter 1, *Conceptualising Africa's Development Regime*, is to introduce the theories informing my exploration of expert agency and agendas. It includes an extensive, critical review of inter-connected bodies of literature relating to development's power. The chapter details a conceptual framework for Africa's development regime.

Chapter 2, *From 'Self-Reliance' to 'Adjustment with Transformation': Africa's Development Regime in Historical Perspective*, traces the evolution of ideas that influenced trans-national development policy from the late 1950s to 1995. The chapter identifies and discusses key discursive structural shifts in Africa's development regime, presenting compelling evidence in support of my hypothesis. The crucial role of the ECA in the generation of key ideas emerges clearly in this chapter, which cross-references and triangulates evidence from secondary material with discursive content gained from interviews with key African thinkers and experts, past and present.

In Chapter 3, *His Master's Voice or 'Manufacturer of Minimal Hegemony'? The ECA's Tactical Shift (1995-2005)*, I provide evidence supporting my main theoretical argument about the articulation between sub-hegemony and expanded African expert agency. I explore the sub-hegemonic role of the ECA of the new millennium in 'translating' the globally dominant development discourse into palatable African variants and show how the ICE simultaneously pushed to expand African policy space. This chapter locates the ECA's pivotal role in the emergence of NEPAD and the APRM.

Chapter 4, *'African-ness' and 'the West': Identity as Techno-Politics in the Quest for Expanded Expert Agency*, unpacks key explanatory variables underlying claims by African experts to expanded agency. The chapter features extensive discursive content gathered from interviews to illustrate how experts invoke their 'African-ness' alongside their technocratic credentials, gained in the West, to assert their claims.

In Chapter 5, *The APRM: A Political Technology of African Power*, I examine a key expert-led tool and process in Africa's development regime whose origins can be traced back to the ECA of 1995 to 2005. I show how the APRM, ostensibly a sub-hegemonic political technology conceived to advance the globally hegemonic development discourse of 'good governance', holds significant potential to expand African ownership and leadership of its own development agenda. I show how, by opening space within and above the African state, the APRM is enabling a plurality of voices to influence the outcome of peer review as well as the policies of governments.

This dissertation is structured to tell a coherent story. Chapters 2 to 5 provide an account of Africa's evolving development regime from 1960 to the present day, charting the historical evolution of ideas. In the process, the remarkable stability of the African development discourse over these years, amidst profound change, is evident. Underpinning this evolution, and the continuity as well as shifts, has been the ECA, the continent's premier institutional complex of expertise. As such, the ECA is more than an object of study: it is at the heart of Africa's development regime.

Conclusion

The research outlined in the preceding pages aims to make an original contribution on theoretical as well as empirical counts. Part of the task at hand has been to unpack the theoretical attributes of a new concept, that of an African development regime. Guided by the conceptual framework and working hypothesis developed in Chapter 1, I set about unearthing a rich body of evidence on how development ideas have been shaped, and continue to be shaped, by the lived reality that is Africa. As will be seen when the conceptual framework is revisited in the Conclusion to this dissertation, the process has been constructionist and inductive, in the sense that my research findings have led me to revisit and revise my initial theoretical thinking.

In undertaking this study, my intention has not been to claim that my account of Africa's development regime is definitive. My goal is explanatory. I seek to illuminate aspects that have hitherto failed to attract the attention of Africanists. Furthermore, I am neither arguing in favour of the universal applicability of my theoretical framework, nor claiming to provide a comprehensive account of institutional complexes of expertise operating in different spaces in Africa's development regime. If I have achieved anything, it will have been simply to table a potentially interesting way of looking at the workings of development's power in Africa.

Chapter 1

Conceptualising Africa's Development Regime

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to develop theoretical tools for my inquiry into expert agency and agendas in Africa's development regime. I set out to accomplish two preliminary tasks. First, through a review of relevant literature, I will detail how development regimes seek to dominate, how development as hegemony is contested, and how new forms of knowledge and power potentially emerge. Second, I will isolate some key arguments related to development's power, and elaborate a working conceptual framework of an African development regime.

Three distinct but inter-connected bodies of literature are reviewed in this chapter:

1. relating to development regimes, governmentality, the hegemonic process, and trans-nationality;
2. addressing the role of institutional complexes of expertise in generating the discourse, developing the policy and mediating the practice of development;
3. focusing on a body of theory seeking to explain agency as a complex of human and nonhuman elements.

Additionally, and to establish further the theoretical basis for my inquiry, I review literature from postcolonial studies relating to African identity.

At the outset, I should clarify my understanding and use of 'hegemony', which owes its origins to Antonio Gramsci's theory of cultural hegemony. This is the subject of much critical appraisal by scholars (cf. Cox 1981, 1983, 1987 and 1989; Bieler and Morton 2003; Morton 2008) who have grappled with the applicability of Gramsci's body of theory to international political economy, international relations, postcolonial theory and other disciplines. I do not presume to follow in the footsteps of these and other distinguished neo-Gramscians, nor do I apply cultural hegemony rigidly in my work. I am influenced by the Gramscian view that power, far from being

achieved through coercion, is advanced through consent. However, my understanding is closer to Roseberry's (1994) interpretation that hegemony should be seen "not as a finished and monolithic ideological formation but as a problematic, contested political process of domination and struggle" (ibid, p.358)²². For me, hegemony is neither stable nor solid, but always a process that involves continuous renegotiation, including incorporation of subordinate perspectives (Salskov-Iversen *et al* 2000).

I have deployed hegemony alongside Michel Foucault's 'governmentality', which theorises a complex form of power that acts on the 'self', from within – as opposed to being externally imposed. Together, hegemony and governmentality are central to my theoretical account of the process through which development regimes seek to dominate, and how this domination is advanced as well as disrupted. Ultimately, I present a theoretical account that is considerably more open-ended than other formulations or interpretations of governmentality and hegemony would accommodate.

Deriving from my particular understanding and use of 'hegemony', here are some key concepts used in this thesis and an explanation of what I mean when I use them:

'Sub-hegemony': This is a central concept in my work, describing the process of hybridisation or translation of globally hegemonic political rationality of power (idea or ideology) into forms consonant with the reality in different localities, so as to ease the universal acceptance or adherence (and thus hegemony) of the rationality. Peet (2002, 2007) theorises three distinct stages of the process of hegemonic construction: hegemony, sub-hegemony and counter-hegemony. While I agree broadly with his categorisation, I argue that theorising the hegemonic process as one in which there is considerable fluidity and interplay between the three stages provides a more accurate account than one in which each stage is treated as distinct. Further, and according to my theorisation, it is possible to conceive of the sub-hegemonic process

²² Furthermore, hegemony understood as domination (or intention to dominate) results not from an all-controlling centre, but from processes of contestation and change in multiple arenas, including locations outside or at the margins of national centres and formal politics (Salskov-Iversen *et al* 2000).

(which I often refer to as '**classic sub-hegemony**') as accommodating not only creative adaptation to ease hegemony, but also as a process in which the very act of hybridisation has the potential to restrict, blunt and potentially roll back hegemony.

'Minimal hegemony': Moore and Schmitz (1995) use this term to describe the outcome of struggles by sub-hegemonic agents, or 'translational agents' (Sinha 2011) to limit the regulatory depth and extent of hegemony. My theorisation accommodates the possibility that there is clear intentionality on the part of the sub-hegemonic agents to pursue alternative projects within the Project. They recognise the weakness of their position in relation to the dominant rationality. Yet, at the same time, they are able to act to minimise its hegemonic intent. Thus, when I suggest that the ECA of 1995-2005 (Chapter 3) may have been a 'manufacturer of minimal hegemony', the evidence I provide in that chapter points to the development of a strategic set of political technologies aimed at minimising the hegemony of the international development discourse and creating increased policy space for greater African ownership.

The effects of re-ordering power emanating from sub-hegemony are by no means exclusively the outcome of intentional struggles; the indeterminacy of the hegemonic process opens up the possibility of a myriad of unintended outcomes. Given the 'radical indeterminacy' of actor networks (discussed later in this chapter), reality is a messy mixture and nothing is ever sewn up. In line with Mitchell (2002), 'minimal hegemony' can therefore result from intentional 'techno-politics' (the deployment by expertise of political technologies), or manifest itself as unintended outcome of such techno-politics. In describing sub-hegemony as a messy process involving a host of actors with different valences of power, acting simultaneously in support of the globally dominant rationality while at the same time changing it in ways that may ultimately have repercussions on its hegemonic intent, I occasionally use the term '**modified sub-hegemony**'.

My focus is on sub-hegemony and how it simultaneously embodies both faithful hybridisation and the incorporation of elements of oppositional agendas that may ultimately ensure that

hegemony never fully succeeds. My approach is guided by Foucault's assertion that future power struggles over development will be waged with political technologies rather than political rationalities (Foucault 1980). Therefore, my focus is squarely on the discursive techniques and technologies deployed by continental experts in Africa's development regime. To this end, I concentrate on the possibilities opened up by 'modified' or 'minimal' sub-hegemony for subaltern actors to increase their room for manoeuvre or policy space.

I do not presume in this thesis to address the thorny question of whether sub-hegemonic struggles lead to paradigm shift – in the sense that the content of the dominant political rationality, whether opposed directly or adapted beyond recognition, is liable to give way to alternative ideologies and policy constructs. To do so would be to suggest that Africa's development regime is at a moment of Gramscian 'interregnum' – one in which the old development paradigm is dying and the new is yet to be born (Gibson 2001). My limited ambition precludes an exploration of alternative political rationalities, whether actually existing or nascent. Doing so would necessitate a formal engagement with Gramscian 'counter-hegemony', something that is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Foucault's Governmentality

Inspired by Michel Foucault, a now significant body of literature has sought to demonstrate the nature of development's power, and the hegemonic way in which it seeks to universalise a particular version of truth. Foucauldian governmentality is the art or conduct of government. It is a "complex form of power", with: population, territory and economy as objects of its control; the monopoly of government (the bureaucracy as well as governmental forms of knowledge) over sovereignty and discipline; and the historical process through which the state becomes 'governmentalised' (Foucault 1991, pp.102-103).

Modern government's new preoccupation with 'society' marks a fundamental shift in the sense that the governmental state is no longer defined purely in relation to its physical surface area, but in relation to its social geography, its population and economy (Barry *et al* 1996). Foucault's

'society of government' is therefore based on a sovereignty–discipline–government triangle that involves the use of security apparatuses to maintain the order needed to ensure progress. Yet despite the threat of violence, this modern regime of power works mainly through apparently neutral, scientific forms of knowledge applied in the public interest. Modern government thus considers the delivery of public action as a key function of its legitimacy. It involves a symbiotic relationship between ruler and the ruled, who are simultaneously subjects and objects of state power – subjects because improving their welfare confers legitimacy on the government, and objects because they passively accept state power as being in their interest.

Governmentality harnesses three key elements. First is a set of political rationalities – the thoughts and discursive representations (or meanings) involved when authorities define their planned field of intervention. Second is a set of technologies to deal with problems defined by political rationality. Rationalities are embedded in governmental discourse, while technologies involve various tools and forms of knowledge, promulgated and managed by experts and institutions (Salskov-Iversen *et al* 2000). These tools include disciplines and sub-disciplines within science. For Foucault, political rationalities are not simply ideologies, but “... constitute a part of the fabric of our ways of thinking about and acting upon one another and ourselves” (Barry *et al* 1996, p.7). Deployed in concert, political rationalities and technologies are harnessed to create the third element, a new type of subjectivity, whereby externally imposed discipline is superseded by discipline of the self.

Escobar (1995), characterising development as “... a historically singular experience, the creation of a domain of thought and action”, usefully describes governmentality's three elements, or axes:

“...the **forms of knowledge** that refer to it and through which it comes into being and is elaborated into objects, concepts, theories, and the like; the **system of power** that regulates its practice; and the **forms of subjectivity** fostered by this discourse, those through which people come to recognise themselves as developed or underdeveloped” (ibid, p.10, emphasis added).

It is the ensemble of forms found along these three axes that constitutes the development discourse and gives rise to development as a knowledge-power apparatus (ibid).

As Lemke (2001), interpreting Foucault, points out, the neo-liberal agenda for state withdrawal can be read as a technique of government, to diminish the function of the state and shift its regulatory responsibility to individuals operating on the basis of rational choice. When read through the lens of governmentality, neo-liberalism is more than simply ideological rhetoric or political-economic reality. It is a political project aimed at creating a social reality it suggests already exists, a political rationality that seeks to render the social domain economic.

Mitchell (1988) unpacks the notion of subjectivity as an effect of modern power, noting that, far from constituting an external restriction on social action, this power “... works not from the outside but from within, not at the level of an entire society but at the level of detail, and not by restricting individuals and their actions, but by **producing them**” (ibid, p.xi, emphasis added). At the same time as power relations become internal to the self, a second effect of modern power is that it appears to take the form of external structures – producing a two-dimensional effect that reduces the reality of the world, a complex set of social practices, into a chimerical binary order²³. In this way, the street-pattern of nineteenth-century Cairo is designed by experts to convey a sense of order and discipline then internalised by citizens (ibid). As another example of this two-dimensionality, Mitchell (1988) also argues that representing the Orient as ‘uncivilised’ (compared to ‘civilised’ Europe) renders it a knowable object, thereby providing the rationale for its colonisation.

Foucault’s governmentality thus constitutes “... a way of thinking about how ... societies ... can be regulated, and it becomes the basis of modern forms of political thought and intervention” (Salskov-Iversen *et al* 2000). In the process, it emerges as a useful analytical tool for understanding the rationale of ruling and its techniques, one that has been used to explain how

²³ According to Mitchell (1988, p.xii), the appearance of power as an external apparatus is an aspect of his theory Foucault did not fully develop before his death.

development has endured in different contexts, including colonialism, postcolonial self-rule, and more recently globalisation.

Subjectivity (Mis)understood?

Ferguson's (1990) application of Foucault's theory of power sets out to show how development as a discursive regime ordered the conceptual apparatus of official thinking and planning about development in Lesotho. He finds that "... planned interventions may produce unintended outcomes that end up, all the same, incorporated into anonymous constellations of control – authorless 'strategies'... that turn out in the end to have a kind of political intelligibility" (ibid, p.20). Thus, while outcomes may appear as mere 'side effects' of a failed development plan, they "become legible in another perspective as unintended yet instrumental elements in a resultant constellation that has the effect of expanding the exercise of a particular sort of state power while simultaneously exerting a powerful depoliticising effect" (ibid, p.21). He calls this constellation 'the anti-politics machine'²⁴.

The indeterminate nature of development calls into question the explanatory power of Foucauldian governmentality, which has left itself open to charges of rendering a "totalising view of history" (Rossi 2004, p.22) leaving little, if any, room for subject agency. It has tended to assume a coherent governmental programme that reduces "... the real subjects of self-regulating governmental practice to mere pawns in an overarching and determining governmental project" (Rankin 2001, p.30). This flaw stems from interpretations of Foucault's theory of power that fail to explain two orders of questions central to development: first, the relationship between different categories of actors and a particular kind of discourse; and second, the strategies and negotiations for control of discourses conducted by differently positioned groups (Rossi 2004).

²⁴ Ferguson's study interrogates the assumed symmetry between development blueprints and project outcomes, suggesting that the process set in train by the conceptual apparatus ultimately fails to achieve the desired hegemony. Mosse (2005) makes this gap between policy intentionality and project outcome the subject of a study of a development project in India, and concludes that policy ideas do not shape project outcomes.

Ferguson (1990) is correct in: (a) identifying a discursive development regime in Lesotho; and (b) pointing out that the transformations brought about by the project were “... in no way congruent with the transformations that the conceptual apparatus planned (ibid, pp.275-276). However, his assertion that the unintended outcomes are incorporated into anonymous ‘strategies’ with political intelligibility undermines the credibility of his account. His pre-eminent focus on the external apparatuses of development-as-power gives the overwhelming impression that the beneficiaries of the Thaba-Tseka project passively accept its imposition on their way of life. His implication is that power rests more or less solely with the state, experts and the development ‘apparatus’. His application of Foucault’s governmentality is almost too literal, with the result that structure is monolithic, and agency is thin or absent.

While the failure of the Thaba-Tseka project may indeed have provided the state with the rationale to deploy expertise to try and iron out the problems in future interventions, and while ‘development’ may certainly have entrenched and reproduced itself, to imply – as Ferguson does – that the apparatus is so powerful and coherent that project failure is part of its master-plan of control is to reify the totalising power of development. In the same volume, Ferguson demonstrates how the ‘beneficiaries’ of the Thaba-Tseka project succeed in subverting its means to their own ends in a number of ways: far from being irresistible, development is resisted.

This interplay between domination and resistance is what makes the outcomes of development interventions so indeterminate. Anthropological studies of development have consistently shown that subaltern groups, including so-called ‘project beneficiaries’, harness myriad strategies and forms of negotiation or resistance to advance their own ‘projects in the Project’ (Rossi 2004, pp.3-4). There is also evidence of how elites have been able to make a difference to policy, as well as actor-oriented approaches that see agency as dependent on the capability of the individual to ‘make a difference’ to pre-existing circumstances (ibid., p.4)²⁵.

²⁵ Worby (2000) and Munro (1998) clearly show how development’s power play is fractured. In the former case, resettlement in Sanyati is fiercely contested and has to be imposed by force. In the latter, at the level of central state policy formation, entrenched economic structures, class interests and political fears of party leadership and

Like Rossi (2004), Escobar (1995) is also concerned that viewing power as monolithic does not do justice to the struggles of those cast as powerless subjects. He suggests that Third World correctives to Eurocentric anthropological methods make possible a “discursive insurrection” by Third World people to free themselves from the rationality-based system of thought of European science (ibid, p.17). I agree with the possibility of a ‘discursive insurrection’ in the Third World. However, I beg to differ with Escobar’s view that the aim of this would be to escape rationality-based Western science. As this dissertation intends to show, the application by experts of scientific techniques underpinned by rationality is as pivotal to the pursuit of development in Africa as elsewhere. Furthermore, I contend that the nature of this ‘discursive insurrection’ does not position the relevant actors ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ development. On the contrary, such actors are firmly situated within the regime and challenge it from within. This provides the context for my focus on African inter-governmental expertise as the main object of study in this dissertation.

Interrogating Resistance

In conceptualising resistance from ‘below’, Ferguson and Gupta (2002) manage to escape the view of development’s power as teleological and incontestable, but in doing so posit another binary, common to post-modernist views: that resistance can happen only outside development. As I intend to show, a key locus of resistance to the dominant development discourse is within the apparatus itself. More often than not, challenges emerge from within the dominant school of scientific thought, in some cases leading to the emergence of new paradigms (Kuhn 1962). A critical challenge is therefore to move beyond binaries and develop a more realistic theory of resistance in governmental regimes of power.

Rossi (2004) elucidates the relationship between agency and hierarchy by asserting that acceptance of more powerful discourses may be a pragmatic strategy by weaker discourses to ‘resist from within’. While some discourses are more dominant than others, she argues, the

divergent institutional interests of development ministries hampered state–peasant negotiations on agrarian development.

weaker ones are not necessarily powerless. Recognising that the more powerful discourses have greater influence, actors in weaker bargaining positions make a strategic decision to 'buy into' these dominant discourses, in so doing leaving room to influence outcomes. In a world of discursive plurality, some discourses take on the appearance of a configuration while others remain marginal (ibid, also see Moore and Schmitz 1995). Nevertheless, it is conceivable that dominant discourses may be strategically manipulated by different actors driven by different agendas. As such, "... discursive conformity ('wearing the same uniform') should not be automatically taken as evidence of [...] convergence" (Rossi 2004, p.23).

Can governmental regimes therefore be subverted by these weaker actors, or does 'wearing the same uniform' merely serve to reaffirm the regime's power? While some may argue that a hierarchy of discourses with different valences of power reifies the Foucauldian dichotomy (powerful versus powerless), Rossi (2004) concedes that Foucault's notion of 'strategic reversibility' – 'counter-conducts' or 'dissenting conducts' interwoven throughout the 'conduct of conduct' (or 'history of government') – shows that he accounted for resistance to governmental regimes of power. However, in her view, because Foucault equates power and knowledge, it is difficult to read the extent to which knowledge can be manipulated in a situation where different discourses have different valences of power. Therefore, Rossi prefers Bourdieu's notion of a 'field' opened by a development intervention (ibid, p.7).

As Sinha (2002) has also elaborated, viewing development as arriving in a pre-existing 'field of power' allows for more meaningful and insightful interrogation of the discourse and practice of development. In my view, this is best achieved by juxtaposing a nuanced reading of Foucault's governmentality with neo-Gramscian theorisations of the hegemonic process. Bourdieu's argument that the 'field of power' is the exercise of politics adds value to the analysis of development's power – since struggles over development are clearly political struggles. However, his characterisation of this 'field of power' as the dominant or pre-eminent field in any society, and the source of hierarchical power relations which structures all other fields (Jenkins 2002), risks bringing us back to square one. While I agree that discursive hierarchy is

given, and that different valences of power exist and interact, I reject the lack of a theory of resistance implied by Bourdieu's account. It is this flaw that provides the basis for the criticism that Bourdieu "... is revealed as working with an impoverished, two-dimensional model of individuals and agency" (Jenkins 2002, p.93).

A related question then arises. From which position are dominant discourses resisted –outside or inside the apparatus? Whether or not Foucault's concept of 'strategic reversibility' appears to leave open the possibility of resistance, or 'dissenting conducts', it is clear that interpretations of governmentality as the top-down exercise of power fall short, and that much greater interpretative flexibility is needed. Also, does dissidence happen from outside or inside? Indeed, is it possible to be on the 'outside'? Foucault's focus on bio-power as a modern form of power than acts on the self can be read as implying that there can be no 'outside'. Individuals are reconstituted as subjects, accepting the rule of modern government as being in their interest. By embodying self-discipline they internalise self-government. Since bio-power acts on the self, it follows logically that even 'dissenting conduct' emanates from and operates within the same regime of government, not outside it. As such, subjects of modern government cannot situate themselves outside the 'apparatus', meaning that any 'counter-conduct' or counter-governmental struggle necessarily takes place within the apparatus.

I assert the 'inside versus outside' dichotomy to be false in that it constitutes too simplistic a theorisation of the positionality of resistance. Challenging the dominant discourse from within the apparatus does not preclude room for struggle in what is a dynamic engagement between development's claim to dominate and the myriad actors in the pre-existing 'field of power' in which it seeks to advance its intent. However, the crux of my argument is not that resistance to development's power can only happen from within. Indeed, the plurality of discourses, and the proliferation of weaker actors seeking change create many 'withins' to be unpacked. This is further complicated by the overlapping nature of multiple regimes, (to which I will return), and the fluidity of strategies of resistance adopted by a multitude of diverse actors with different agendas.

I take the argument further, asserting that engagement with the 'apparatus', in a field of power, simultaneously involves reaffirmation and resistance, and often implies the use of the same techniques and tools. For example, Indian nationalists harnessed many of the rationalities and technologies of colonial power in their resistance to the continuation of centuries of domination (cf. Ludden 1992). Reaffirmation and resistance are mutually conditioning and mutually constitutive. I therefore beg to differ from globalisation theorists and post-development advocates who argue that there is life *beyond* development or *alternatives* to it. Both resisting development and proposing alternatives imply being somehow ideologically wedded to development-as-progress, albeit interpreted in different ways.

At the same time, I do not necessarily agree that "[r]elative 'distance' from the sources of development rationality increases the room for manoeuvre available to the actors involved" (Rossi 2004, p.26). This argument may work well when neo-Foucauldian approaches are applied to development projects with community-level beneficiaries, such as the Thaba-Tseka project or Rossi's own IRDP. It may also be the case that social movements, such as the Anti-Privatisation Forum²⁶ in Johannesburg, South Africa, are able to resist moves to neo-liberalise power supply to communities precisely because they are local and far from the centre of power. However, it is hard to establish causality between relative distance from development planners and room for manoeuvre to resist. Rather, the strength of each resister's power should be considered on the basis of the extent to which its modes and strategies are able to affect the dominant discourse.

Furthermore, if forms of knowledge promulgated and managed by experts are deployed as key technologies of power, as Foucault has argued, then it becomes necessary to move beyond simplistic 'inside–outside' binaries and interrogate the role in fracturing power of actors instrumental in the reproduction of the development regime itself. In Africa's development

²⁶ See <http://apf.org.za/>

regime, this is evident in how civil society ‘counter-experts’²⁷ – educated in the same universities as experts developing and promoting hegemonic development ideas – are contesting dominant ideas and proposing policy alternatives. While Peet (2007) characterises this ‘counter-expertise’ as ‘counter-hegemony’, that is diametrically opposed to neo-liberal globalisation, my view is that many experts operate much more pragmatically and may not necessarily be in total opposition to globalisation, only to aspects of it.

Following from this, a key argument in this dissertation is that the experts who generate, articulate, ‘translate’ and disseminate modified versions of the dominant development mainstream in Africa’s development regime can also often be key agents in contesting asymmetries of power. Whether in reaffirming or resisting, these experts invoke their ‘African-ness’ towards legitimising their claim to expanded agency. As discussed in the Introduction to this dissertation, and further explored in Chapter 4, African expert identity is anything but static. Rather, it reflects of the ongoing evolution within Africa’s development regime, manifested by discursive power struggles over the meaning of ‘ownership’ as well as by concrete actions to expand African policy space.

Having addressed the two orders of questions above (whether development can be resisted by ‘wearing the same uniform’ and whether this resistance happens from outside or inside), a third set of questions arises on the nature of the struggles taking place in the ‘field of power’. Are resisters condemned to marginality? To what extent can weaker actors change the content and trajectory of the dominant discourse? What happens when some actors comply and others resist? How can the complexity of power struggles be accurately accounted for? Answers to these essentially theoretical questions can found only by sifting through the evidence of real-life power struggles, as attempted in subsequent chapters. Here, it is sufficient to note that these questions signal the complexity involved in unpacking the notion of resistance as ‘projects within the Project’.

²⁷ I discuss the role of civil society expertise in the APRM in Chapter 5 and the Conclusion.

Much of the literature on power has failed to reflect adequately the complexity and co-complicity of domination and resistance discussed above. Brigg (2001), for example, in deconstructing microcredit as a means through which non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as 'political technology' create new neo-liberal subjects, also falls prey to the tendency to view neo-liberalism as a hegemonic imposition that cannot be contested. As Guha (1997) has correctly argued, it is not possible to think of dominance and subordination without each other, as they are mutually co-implicated.

Development Regimes

In mainstream international relations theory, regimes are defined as "... sets of 'principles', norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area of international relations" or "... rules of the game agreed upon by actors in the international arena (usually nation states) and delimiting, for these actors, the range of legitimate or admissible behaviour in a specified context of activity" (Rittberger, 1993, p.xii). There are two distinct lines of argument on international regimes. The first, deriving from rational choice theory, new institutionalism and liberal co-operation theory, addresses the challenge for states of overcoming market failure. The second, characterised as 'realism', focuses on power and distribution rather than information and joint gains, whereby regime creation and maintenance are a function of the distribution of power and interests among states (Krasner 1993, pp.139-40). Both explanations are state-centric, rendering them less than useful when exploring development regimes that transcend borders. In addition, realist conceptions of power, even when they transcend inter-state relations, tend to point to a zero-sum game, with some actors vested with absolute power and others completely powerless.

From a new institutionalist perspective, Hyden (cited in Moore and Schmitz 1995) describes a regime as determining "who has access to political power, and how those who are in power deal with those who are not" (ibid). However, it "is not a set of political actors... but rather a set of fundamental rules about the organisation of the public realm [which] provides the structural framework within which resources are authoritatively allocated..." (ibid). The emphasis here on

'rules of the game' again implies a certain functionalism that is not entirely helpful to the quest to understand the complex workings of development's power.

More interpretative flexibility is implied by Samhat's (1997) view, still from an international relations perspective, that certain types of regimes – such as environmental, human rights and arms control regimes – are forms of international political community that can be fostered through rules, norms and principles agreed by both state and non-state actors. In this theorisation, there is more room for engagement by different agents across spaces and scales. However, the assertion that regimes as political community are universal in their application and "... seek to promote emancipatory ends" (ibid, pp.369-70) paints too utopian a picture of a global community devoid of conflict when, in reality, such regimes are subject to ongoing contestation.

The sense in which I apply the 'regime' concept is quite different. After Ludden (1992), development is clearly manifesting itself as "an institutionalised configuration of power within a [...] system ideologically committed to progress that draws its material sustenance from the conduct of development" (ibid, pp.251-52). More recently, Ludden (2005) described a development regime as "...an institutional configuration of **effective power over human behaviour**, and that also has **legitimate authority to make decisions that affect the wealth and well-being of whole populations**" (ibid, p.2, emphasis added). In addition to an official state apparatus, the development regime includes institutions of education, research, media, technology, science and intellectual influence that constitute a development policy mainstream (ibid).

For Ludden, as for Foucault, the regime's power and authority reside not only in government but also in "... physical instruments of power over nature and in cultural instruments of authority over people's minds and morality" (ibid.) In other words, the rule of modern government combines the monopoly of violence with the arguably more powerful ability to produce subjectivity. Within the regime, the development process is directed by experts, who

ensure that the regime constitutes a documented historic formation, generating ideas and empirical knowledge compelling to leading development actors in specific places and times of history (ibid). This theoretical understanding of the role of expertise further validates my choice of the ECA, which I consider a key ICE in Africa's development regime.

Trans-national Development Regimes

I rely heavily on Ludden's conception in identifying the key underpinnings of Africa's development regime, detailed at the end of this chapter. However, while Ludden's more recent conception theorises a global development regime that operates in concert with state regimes, his original characterisation is state-centric. My assertion, to which I now turn, is that development has long operated trans-nationally.

Gupta (1998) questions the view of a sub-set of Foucauldians that development acts monolithically on its objects as subjects, and enters the debate from a subaltern perspective – focusing on the objects of development, those the development discourse seeks to reconstitute as global subjects. In rural Northern India, for example, underdevelopment serves as a form of identity, with "... a pervasive feeling of being underdeveloped, of being behind the West, articulated with other identities of caste, class, region, gender, and sexuality", producing "people's sense of their selves" (ibid, p.x). This complex articulation of 'backwardness' constitutes "the postcolonial condition", a condition Gupta argues gives the lie to development as a "singular or monolithic 'apparatus' that imposes itself on the rural poor" (ibid).

According to Gupta (1998), the advent of neo-liberal globalisation as a new, trans-national mode of government means the nation-state is no longer the sole mediator between its citizens and the world economy. For him, trans-national forms of knowledge, embedded in global treaties such as Agenda 21, the outcome of the Earth Summit, represent new forms of governmentality that mark a significant departure from the projects of colonialism and nationalism, which both shared the nation-state as their basis. The dichotomy between impositional 'global' discourses of development and receptive or resisting 'local' cultures

therefore no longer applies, and Indian farmers should be viewed as “... part of intermestic (international/domestic) coalitions that are attempting to resist forces of governmentality which are operating across and through the spaces of nation-states” (ibid, p.337).

Two areas of difference are worth noting here. First, Gupta (1998) does not entirely succeed in debunking the idea of development as monolithic: the same global development discourses that identify poor Indian farmers as ‘underdeveloped’ work to constitute a subaltern identity that could be viewed as subjectivity in the face of power. Second, Indian farmers do not simply reject the development discourse – they use its logic productively to pursue their own projects. While they complain about fertiliser negatively affecting the taste of their crop, and over-working the soil, they also welcome biotechnology and scientific methods that increase yield. Such “impure, hybrid, incommensurable modes of thinking and being” (ibid, p.6) call for close attention to the interconnections between divergent discourses and structural forces²⁸.

Trans-nationality poses problems for theories predicated on the state as a unit of analysis. As Ludden (2005) correctly argues, South Asian countries inhabit at least two development regimes – state and international. Further, “... national development regimes can also be understood realistically as officially but not operationally independent territories in a global development regime” (ibid, p.13). According to this view, this global development regime, while underpinned by imperial histories, has become significantly more coherent and integrated over the past two decades, manifested by the increasing impact of globalisation and growing World Bank and IMF disciplinary power. This global regime gains coherence through the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which ascribe unprecedented powers of surveillance to international agencies and target the ‘poor’ as global objects of development. As a result, national regimes still operate, but each has various local and regional sub-units with distinctive rules of operation, and each must also abide by international rules (ibid). NGOs and

²⁸ For instance, Gupta (1998) argues that ‘local’ understandings of agriculture in Alipur were profoundly shaped by global and national discourses of development: “... farmers were as likely to draw on – and contest – hegemonic meanings of development as they were to employ – or resist – dominant (that is, indigenous) understandings of agriculture” (ibid, p.6).

government agencies, such as DFID, serve as “...articulating institutions that knit together local, national and global regimes with cross-border activities to connect rich and poor capital cities with ‘target’ sites and populations throughout Bangladesh” (ibid). Thus, it becomes increasingly difficult to delimit populations served by development regimes in purely geographic terms.

This holds true for Africa, where state regimes interact and overlap with the continental ‘African’ development regime and ‘international’ or ‘global’ development regimes²⁹, resulting in a multiplicity of regimes operating across some of the same spaces and scales. The articulation of these regimes is simultaneously trans-national, geo-spatial, and socially and politically geographic³⁰. In referring to an African development regime, I am theorising a regime that manifests itself and has effects in different spaces and at different scales, whether sub-national, national, sub-regional, continental or global³¹.

In line with my assertion, Ferguson (1995) argues that, since many important political processes on the continent are taking place at sub-national and trans-national levels, assessing Africa’s political situation must transcend the ‘Eurocentric’ state-centred framework. In earlier writing (1990) he points to the uniformity and standardisation of many aspects of ‘development’ interventions, implying the existence of discursive, planning and programmatic commonalities across countries. Emblematic of this one-size-fits-all commonality is structural adjustment, with some 241 SAPs initiated by 36 Sub-Saharan African countries between 1980 and 1989 (Owusu 2003). While the details of the programmes were tailored according to the specificities of each country, the template consisted of the same menu of prescriptions – a combination of short-term stabilisation measures and longer-term adjustment policies. Today’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, developed by the World Bank and IMF, has been identified as fulfilling a similar function as SAPs.

²⁹ There are also sub-national development regimes (cf. Sinha 2005 on India’s community-development regime), and regimes of power that are not developmental.

³⁰ One example of this is the co-contingency (discussed in Chapter 2), between Africa’s development regime and the international development regime.

³¹ In that its power can be felt across and through spaces and scales, it is a ‘trans-national’ regime – as opposed to simply ‘African multilateralism’ (Bischoff 2008) or ‘neo-patrimonial trans-state regionalism’ (Bøås 2002).

The trans-nationality argument is further developed by Ferguson and Gupta (2002), who argue that modes of government operate on a global scale – including new neo-liberal strategies of discipline and regulation as well as “... trans-national alliances forged by activists and grassroots organisations supported by complex networks of international and trans-national funding and personnel” (p.990). The authors are correct in theorising a trans-national mode of government, although (*pace* Sinha 2005) I assert that development has *always* been trans-national, and question the idea of trans-nationality as an emerging system. While new dimensions of trans-nationality may be emerging in the context of globalisation, the phenomenon dates back to the dawn of development as public action. Emerging in the nineteenth century in response to disorder brought about by the industrial revolution, development took on a distinctly intentional and ideological aspect after World War II.

Crisis, Claims and Unintended Outcomes

Development regimes inevitably arise out of, and are ‘imagined’ by, discourses of crisis or conflict. Perceptions of an African ‘crisis’ around 1980 – fuelled by a contraction in global money supply as a result of oil shocks, and exacerbated by widespread drought and famine (Chapter 2) – triggered separate proposals for public action by Africa’s leaders and by the Bretton Woods institutions. Successive African development plans have internalised the perception of crisis to mobilise a continent-wide response or seek external assistance.

Development regimes also derive their legitimacy from their ability to meet claims. As Worby (2000) shows, the development regime in post-war Rhodesia emerged in response to two conflicting sets of demands: those of white settlers for market protection and a reliable depoliticised labour supply, and those of black nationalists for a meaningful share of political power and economic equity (*ibid*, p.102). ‘Development’ (as a response to the conflict) was conceived as a fairly coherent and consistent set of narratives, policies and strategies “carefully intertwined in order to address the complex contradictions of racially-distributed relations of property and rule” (*ibid*). In another study of the same country, now postcolonial Zimbabwe,

and in similar vein, Munro (1998) argues that “... state formation occurs not only in arenas of ‘political struggles and discourses’ but in the construction, legitimation, and implementation of policies through which states try to shape the social order”.

Both studies are consistent with Mitchell’s (1988) view that “disciplines can break down, counteract one another, or overarch... offer spaces for manoeuvre and resistance, and can be turned to counter-hegemonic purposes” (ibid, p.xii). Negotiations over development are therefore struggles over power or, to borrow Munro’s (1998) characterisation, “... capillary negotiations over domination, identity, and culture” (ibid, p.xxiii). These power struggles condition another important characteristic of development regimes: they rarely, if ever, achieve their intended purpose.

In other words, the outcomes of development interventions are more often than not largely unintended. As Worby (2000) finds, despite attaining a degree of coherence in its moral objectives and policy discourse, the Rhodesian development regime fragmented into a variety of more idiosyncratic practices as its policies were implemented across the colony. Similarly, Munro (1998) concludes that the hegemonic agenda of the Zimbabwean state in formation, manifested in agrarian development strategies that tried to establish a stable, productive middle peasantry, failed to achieve its objective because different interests, and at times authoritative ideas, subverted the emergence of a common understanding of the meaning of community membership or citizenship³².

Material Heterogeneity, Radical Indeterminacy

Actor-Network Theory (ANT), emanating from technology studies, validates the above theorisation on the workings of power and sheds light on the idea of unintended outcomes. Latour (1984) argues that power, far from operating through individual agency, works through the actions of actor-networks made up of human and nonhuman agents. Society, or the social,

³² The failure of latter-day efforts by French and British colonial experts to stifle dissent in West Africa, leading to renewed claims ultimately leading to the end of colonial rule, is another example of the tendency of hegemonic regimes to fail.

“is nothing other than patterned networks of heterogeneous materials... composed not only of people, but also of machines, animals, texts, money, architectures” (Law 1992, p.2). Agency is therefore not a function of individuals. Rather, an actor is a patterned network of heterogeneous relations, or an effect produced by such a network (ibid, p.4).

This is consistent with Foucault’s heterogeneous apparatus of power, the *dispositif*. For some ANT theorists, human and nonhuman agents in actor-networks are equivalent and there is no hierarchy. What is important is that:

“...they are all renegotiating what the world is made up of, who is acting in it, who matters, and who wants what. *They are all creating ...new sources of power and new sources of legitimacy, which are irreducible to those that hitherto coded the so-called political space...*” (Latour 1984, p.40, emphasis added).

Just as machines and texts are heterogeneous networks, so too are institutions and organisations. Such networks sometimes take on the appearance of single, coherent objects because they constitute a ‘punctualisation’ or simplification of routine (Law 1992, p.4). Punctualised resources, managed by experts, offer a way of aggregating interests without having to deal with endless complexity. Yet punctualisation is always precarious. Punctualisation faces resistance and may degenerate into a failing network (Law 1992, p.4). Resistance is defined as not wanting to be incorporated, ‘enrolled’ or ‘ordered’, in a network.

Law’s recognition of hierarchy in a network is consonant with my earlier discussion on the different valences of power, and constitutes a challenge to Latour’s (1984) view that all sub-components are equal in an actor-network. Actor-networks are precarious precisely because networks are not equal, because some discourses have more power than others. ‘Enrolment’, a key concept in ANT, implies hierarchy, as originators of an idea try to ‘overcome resistance’ by convincing others to follow their lead. This supports my view that different network members have differential power, and the need to ‘enrol’ supporters clearly implies that not all power resides with the apparatus. Where resistance to enrolment prevails, the actor-network is weakened and may fail. On the other hand, a successful network is one that is able to overcome

resistance. The movement of the 1990s to ban landmines, for example, achieved its objective by successfully enrolling supporters to the point at which it achieved critical mass.

However, ‘social ordering’ – the process of overcoming resistance and creating the effect of ‘punctualisation’ and its effects, including power – is contestable and contested. Therefore, “science, far from being founded on rational methods, reveals a disorderly, indeterminate mixture” (Latour 1987, p.15). Specific actions cannot in advance guarantee certain results. The effects and outcomes generated by actor-networks may be random, and are radically indeterminate. Thus, hegemonic projects can be disrupted without necessarily being overthrown or replaced by alternative paradigms or ideological constructs. Often, the outcome of resistance to ordering is a reconfiguration of the balance of power, and yet more radical indeterminacy.

Discourse and its Material Effects

This dissertation assumes a critical nexus between discourses, policy as a form of action, and material effects of policy (Shore and Wright 1997). While my focus is largely on discourse generation, translation and adaptation, I devote significant space to exploring the material effects of discursive power – as for example in Chapter 5, in a detailed assessment of the African Peer Review Mechanism, a key form of knowledge and political technology of power in Africa’s development regime. Therefore, it is worth briefly reflecting on the distinction between discourse and its material effects, and the relationship between the two concepts.

Largely following Foucault, an extensive body of literature has identified discourse, its production and circulation as an integral component of power³³. A sub-set of this literature has sought to explain how development discourses in particular seek to ‘colonise’ localities (cf. Mitchell 1988), and how these discourses become hegemonic and are reaffirmed or resisted³⁴. Escobar (1995) has argued that “... the development discourse ... has created an extremely

³³ cf. Shore and Wright (1997), Escobar (1988, 1995), Mitchell (1988, 1995, 2002), and Said (1995), among others.

³⁴ See also Moore (in Moore and Schmitz 1995) on the similarities and differences between academic-development discourse and development-agency discourse.

efficient apparatus for producing knowledge about, and the exercise of power over, the Third World” (ibid, p.9). The authoritarian character of development-as-apparatus is reproduced by metaphors of practice (Porter 1995). This explains why, across the different development approaches since the end of World War II, the overt markers of political power have consistently been replaced by “... more covert and subtle ways in which established international interests have been maintained” (ibid, p.84). By operating through discourse, power works to incorporate its subjects, as objects, by appearing as ‘authorless’, by hiding its intent. Understanding development’s discourse is therefore a key to understanding its power.

Foucault defines discourses in functional terms, as combinations of speech acts, or statements. To him, a discourse is a specific instance of language use: a letter, a speech, a book, an argument, a conversation (Sawyer 2002). A central Foucauldian concept is the ‘discursive formation’³⁵, a grouping of statements that can be delimited and individualised, and that must satisfy four criteria: they must refer to the same object, be enunciated in the same way, share a system of conceptual organisation, and share similar themes and theories, or strategies (ibid).

While he focused almost exclusively on discursive practices in his earlier work, Foucault later came to emphasise “an institutional field, a set of events, practices and political decisions, a sequence of economic processes” (Foucault 1969/72, p.157, cited in Sawyer 2002, p.441). For Foucault, discourse was only one of many elements of his ‘*dispositif*’, which he defined as “...a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements” (Foucault 1980, p.194). As much as his earlier concepts of ‘discursive formation’, ‘episteme’ or ‘archive’, it is Foucault’s extra-discursive concepts such as power–knowledge relations, technologies of power, apparatuses and the ‘politics of the body’ (Sawyer 2002, p.441) that make his theory of power all the more relevant to my inquiry.

³⁵ ‘Discursive formations’ include internal systems of rules determining what statements are taken seriously, and what objects are included in discussions deemed important or responsible. Foucault thought these regularities of presence and absence could be analysed archaeologically (identifying the relations that bind statements into whole arguments) and genealogically (how discourses were formed within institutions claiming power) (Peet 2007, p.15).

As Peet (2007) points out, discourses can assume the shape of policies designed by experts for governing bodies, who use them as instruments, or political technologies, of power. These technologies rephrase essentially social, cultural or political problems in the apparently neutral language of science to gain the adherence of people convinced that science benefits humanity. The effectiveness of this manoeuvre depends on a combination of external objectification, typical of science, and internal subjectification (ibid, p.16). A given discourse has behind it a set of labelled concepts or theories with a set of analytical terms that the discourse employs as a 'social imaginary'. This is promulgated by experts who originate a system of discursive and imaginary power. This translates into hegemony, produced as "...dominant theoretical imaginaries in disciplines claiming power by presuming to the status of science" (ibid).

The Process of Hegemonic Construction

Salskov-Iversen *et al* (2000) examine how hegemonic discourses are mediated locally, produce hybridity and thus become embedded in local practice. They dispute the conventional wisdom that the global New Public Management (NPM) discourse constructs a unity of identities, arguing that, on the contrary, local actors 'translate' the discourse, making its reproduction contingent on local context and reality. In their examination of two municipalities – Tijuana, Mexico and Newham, UK – they find local authorities to be active agents in a field of power that pre-dates the arrival of the NPM discourse. The local is therefore not simply accepting of globally hegemonic discourses, but is generative of new political rationalities and technologies of government (ibid).

Informed by Foucauldian understandings of discourse, Peet (2002, 2007) develops a 'geography of power' to account for his assertion that global institutions of governance deploy strategies and mechanisms of ideological power somewhat different from the governments of nation-states that Marx had in mind. Globally hegemonic discourses have two attributes: 'hegemonic depth', or intensive regulatory power, which emanates from the discourse's ability to specify the parameters of the practical, realistic, and sensible debate among linked groups of

theoreticians, policy-makers, and practitioners; and 'hegemonic extent' or regulatory space, which comes from its ability to impose uniformity over diversity in wide spaces of territory. Discourses with hegemonic depth originate in so-called "political and economic command centres" and achieve hegemonic extent by extending persuasion, coercion, and power over spatial fields of influence (Peet 2002, pp.60-61). Mutually reinforcing combinations of depth with extent create 'geographic blocs' of states and institutions exercising power through globally hegemonic discourses. These geographic blocs arise out of an interdependent process of articulation between global hegemonic discourses, regional sub-hegemonic discourses, and alternative discourses.

To fit local contexts, hegemony conceived in global centres of persuasion must be creatively 'translated' or hybridised. This process of hegemonic construction involves sub-hegemony, defined as the semi-autonomous strata and locations that translate broad hegemonic ideals into particular ideologies suited to more discrete audiences (Peet 2007), a process involving "...rewriting and modification, but also independent discovery and creative adaptation" (ibid, p.22). Making a hegemonic discourse context-specific can be thought of in terms of class, as with priests translating the Pope's Latin encyclicals for the Catholic faithful, or in terms of space and ethnicity – local intellectuals translating Northern ideas into languages and terms that can be understood locally (ibid). However, the process of hegemonic construction and translation is anything but smooth and predictable. Hegemony becomes a site of conflict; as ANT would have it, structure becomes a site of struggle. In Peet's theorisation, just as intellectuals play leading roles in hegemony, they emerge at the forefront of counter-hegemony, or the creation of alternatives. According to this view, both global and regional discourses are confronted by alternatives deriving more directly from different interpretations of the varying experiences of oppressed peoples (Peet 2002).

Peet's 'geography of power' provides useful insights into how global and regional discourses continually interact and shape each other, and is consistent with my argument, as well as with Salskov-Iversen *et al's* (2000) assertion, that hegemonic global discourses are continuously

subject to local interpretation, leading to unintended outcomes. These outcomes arise from the complex working of the sub-hegemonic process. A difference in nuance between my theorisation and Peet's is that whereas he gives prominence to 'counter-hegemonies' as the creation of alternative ideologies, my emphasis is on the possibilities the sub-hegemonic process opens up for expanded African expert agency. I do not presume in this study to provide evidence of actually existing 'counter-hegemonies'. Rather, I demonstrate how African experts working within the parameters of the apparatus exercise technocratic pragmatism as a tactic to carve out increased African policy space. Hegemonic development regimes cede power in order for the dominant ideology to survive. This results in less powerful actors gaining increased room to manoeuvre.

This discussion raises important conceptual issues that help advance my arguments about the role of expertise in Africa's development regime. One is the notion of 'translation', which serves as a key element of 'sub-hegemony' – for me the most critical stage in the hegemonic process that involves adapting a global discourse to ease its acceptance in different localities. As will be unpacked further in the discussion on expertise below, this 'translation' function is undertaken by local actors (in this case African experts schooled in the epistemology of Western science and ideologically committed to development). In the process of 'translation', the global discourse is transformed and appropriated by these very same sub-hegemonic local agents, and becomes hybridised³⁶.

A hybrid discourse is one that has been 'translated'. Depending on the extent to which it has been transformed, such a discourse may be harnessed towards the original goal of achieving hegemony, towards influencing the trajectory of the globally hegemonic discourse, or as an agent of 'counter-hegemony'. In the first and second scenarios, hegemony will have been advanced – albeit with the discourse having had to take on local perspectives that it had not originally embodied. In the third scenario, and according to Peet's (2002, 2007) theorisation,

³⁶ I use 'hybridisation' as shorthand for 'translation'. I am not referring to the various meanings of 'hybridisation' as explored by different authors in relation to globalisation – cf. Appadurai (1996) on cultural hybridity, Slater (2003) on hybrid democracy, and de Sousa Santos (2006) on hybrid legal systems.

the act of 'translation' may have counter-hegemonic potential, opening space for new types of social and spatial differentiation, struggles that lead to a reconfiguration of power relations. While I engage fully with the idea that sub-hegemony opens up the possibility of power relations being recalibrated, I do not engage with 'counter-hegemony' read as paradigm shift.

A second important conceptual issue is the definition of hegemony as "...merely indicating some form of dominance and ubiquitousness: the simple transmission of a pattern of dominance" (Salskov-Iversen *et al* 2000, p.20). Hegemony, it is never stable or solid, but always a process that involves a constant renegotiation of interpretations and incorporates subordinate perspectives (*ibid*). This is consistent with Sinha's (2001) argument that domination as hegemony and governmentality is fragile and fluid, both contingent and indeterminate, and therefore constantly restated in new idioms. It is this slipperiness of domination that makes it possible for elements of it to be used in the constitution of oppositional agendas and identities (*ibid*). As such, domination as hegemony remains a claim, not so much an ideological consensus as an intention to create it (Roseberry 1994).

With reference to global capitalism, Moore and Schmitz (1995) demonstrate how this 'slipperiness' of domination, a key dimension of the hegemonic process, involves lifting the language of development's opponents into the dominant discourse while maintaining the same ideology and basic practices. This process of constructing and maintaining hegemony "...takes on as many guises as the multitudinous manifestations of capitalism can support; as many strands of oppositional discourse as it can co-opt" (*ibid*, p.1). The discourses are sufficiently ambiguous and loose that they can simultaneously embody varying, even opposing, interpretations. Attempting to unravel these discourses, as will be done in subsequent chapters, thus necessitates "... paying special attention to the struggles for and against 'reform' within the dominant discourses of development, because both reform and reaction are born of clear challenges to orthodoxy and thus imply, in their own ways, revolution" (*ibid*, p.7).

With the above in mind, I contend that Africa's development regime is sub-hegemonic. It is a heterogeneous apparatus that includes institutions, experts and networks whose assigned role in the international division of labour is to advance the hegemony of certain ideas and ideologies by 'translating' the globally hegemonic development discourse into 'regional' discourses. These are context-specific and tailored to different localities, while retaining the key epistemological tenets of the parent discourse. Yet, because these ideas and ideologies are appropriated, adapted and ultimately transformed, the hegemonic process is disrupted. In making this point about the fluidity of the sub-hegemonic process, I differ slightly from Peet (2007), who views sub-hegemony as somewhat separate from counter-hegemony – which he describes as "offering alternative ideas" (ibid). For Peet, 'translation' of the dominant ideology into acceptable local forms can only aid and abet hegemony. For me, the hegemonic process is dynamic, highly complex and its outcome radically indeterminate. Ostensibly sub-hegemonic 'centres of translation' (such as the Economic Commission for Africa, my case study) may develop new discursive styles and ideas of their own. Paradoxically, therefore, the very act of 'translation' can thus create the conditions for sub-hegemonic agents of a hegemonic development regime to assume greater agency.

Institutionalised Development

Along with discourses as ways of thinking that shape action, forms of knowledge have historically been critical to the exercise of power in development regimes. The colonial period was significant in the formation and practice of social theory, and instrumental in the emergence of new forms of knowledge, not least the modern social sciences (Mitchell 2002, pp.6-7). In particular, the discipline of economics³⁷ formalised a series of domestic arrangements³⁸ as 'market practice', abstracting these arrangements and categories and presenting them as a general standard for both scientific knowledge and social practice. This standard could then be exported overseas and applied everywhere, regardless of cultural

³⁷ Other disciplines created and harnessed by development include health, demography, urban planning, education, and nutritional anthropology (Escobar 1988).

³⁸ These included certain forms of social exchange, contract law, disposition of property, corporate powers, methods of calculation, dispossession of labour, relationship between public and private, organisation of information, and government regulation (Mitchell 2002, p.7).

context (ibid.). In this way, and as a worldwide project involving colonial government, the colleges of the East India Company, American academic visitors' programmes, metropolitan universities, intergovernmental organisations, the Ford Foundation and other agencies, economics was transformed into a global form of knowledge (ibid.).

Along with these new universal standards came new forms of (Western) technical expertise that made development an institutional field "... in which, and from which, discourses and techniques are produced, recorded, stabilised, modified, and put into operation" (Escobar 1988, p.430) by a large network of trans-national, national, regional and local development institutions. By using certain forms of knowledge and producing specific forms of intervention, these institutions organise visibilities and enable the exercise of power.

This institutionalisation of development helped operationalise a rationalised discourse and international activity around development that originally emerged in the twentieth century and became a fully fledged project after World War II (Chabbott 1999, pp.222-23). International development professionals used their concerns – often distinct from those of their funders – to entrench a larger role for international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) over time. While experts recruited by inter-governmental organisations after the war tended to include former colonial officers, military personnel, and veterans of INGOs, in the 1960s and 1970s they either emerged from development studies programmes in major Western universities funded by liberal, private philanthropies, or from voluntary work in humanitarian and emergency operations.

The outcome of this professionalisation is today's specialised cadre of development professionals, somewhat detached from their countries of origin, with sufficient autonomy from funders of their organisations to make independent decisions. It is these professionals, rather than national politicians or diplomats, who have generated the international development discourse, and carved out technical domains of specialisation. They share a common culture and belief system that "...includes a belief in the centrality of development to

human progress, in the responsibility of governments to promote it, in the imperative for international-development assistance to support it, in the definition of development in 'human' rather than strictly economic terms, and so on" (Chabbott 1999, p.245). Because they are schooled in the *episteme* of the international development regime, Third World experts act as pivotal agents in the exercise of sub-hegemony, by translating the globally hegemonic development discourse into forms that facilitate its domination across spaces and scales.

Cooper and Packard (1997) identify two types of expertise in the development industry – an industry in the academic social sciences, and a cadre of Third World experts who have studied economics or public health in European or American universities, worked in international organisations, attended international conferences and managed NGOs or government departments back home. These combine to form overlapping networks of communication within which ideas and theories of development have emerged, circulated, and been appropriated within a wide variety of institutional settings (ibid, p.2). Cemented by a development language that is "simultaneously universalistic and pliable", these networks facilitate a conversation about development that gives rise to epistemic linkages across developed and developing countries (ibid, p.6).

As will be seen, economists and other social scientists working at the ECA clearly fall into the second category. In today's African development regime and in the wake of the growing assertion of African 'ownership', there is an increasing premium on indigenous expertise. After independence, many Africans benefited from scholarships administered by Western governments and U.S. foundations to study abroad. Many of these African students pursued degrees in economics, demographics or other 'hard' social sciences. With the advent of structural adjustment in the 1980s, the resulting 'brain drain' robbed Africa of some of its brightest minds – with a large number of highly skilled Africans now living and working outside the continent³⁹. The ECA consciously targeted African experts in the Diaspora and successfully

³⁹ According to the ECA (2000a), the brain drain began well before the 1980s. It estimates that 27,000 high-level Africans left the continent for the West between 1960 and 1975, with the number increasing to an estimated

recruited from them. This appeal to experts of African origin speaks to the recognition and strategic deployment of identity politics as a tactic for creating increased policy space.

Expertise and Techno-Politics

In light of the pivotal role of experts in the reproduction of development regimes, I now briefly explore the dynamics of what Mitchell (2002) calls ‘techno-politics’. Consistent with ANT, Mitchell (2002) argues that certain outcomes associated with the building of the Aswan Dam at the turn of the twentieth century – such as political tensions surfacing in the wake of the technical, environmental and social problems associated with the dam – exceed human intention. Nonhuman elements, such as mosquitoes, the Nile, the Second World War, and so on, were also key actors in specific outcomes. He further asserts that demand for more scientific expertise to solve problems associated with the dam, along with the accompanying national politics, far from being causal, were *produced* as outcomes, whether intended or otherwise. New ideas and political technologies such as cost-benefit analysis did not precede nature, or social arrangements such as the Nile. They were manufactured from and emerged out of the real world, and as such cannot claim to stand apart from nature (ibid).

Precisely by trying to simplify complexity and counterpose expertise against nature, argues Mitchell (2002), ‘techno-politics’ produces and re-produces itself, in this way representing the exercise of modern power as a neutral, objective technical field that sits apart from reality. Two outcomes are produced from this tension between expertise and nature: politics and more scientific expertise. For instance, the rationale provided for creating a Ministry of Public Health in Egypt in 1936 was that the increasing numbers of poor people – a direct result of capitalism and industrialisation, fuelled by science – needed to be ‘helped’. Policy-makers, fearful of social unrest, accordingly developed welfare policies to legitimise their continued tenure in office⁴⁰.

40,000 between 1975 and 1984 and then almost doubling by 1987 – representing 30 per cent of the highly skilled workforce.

⁴⁰ Another example invoked in support of this assertion is a U.S.-funded demonstration project to build ‘improved’ brick houses, even though Egyptians had been doing this for millennia. As with the dam, there were three significant features: a concentration and reorganisation of existing (indigenous) knowledge, rather than an

Social science mimics this form of power, by relating particular events to a universal reason and by treating human agency as a given. It “helps to format a world resolved in this binary order, and thus to constitute and solidify the experience of agency and expertise” (ibid, p.52).

In this way, expertise is harnessed in a self-perpetuating cycle of legitimation, with failed policies ‘producing’ the rationale for more expertise, more calculation and more argument. Thus, expertise creates the conditions for its own survival, accommodates dissent, ‘learns’ from policy and project failures, and comes back with new fields or disciplines, forms of knowledge that turn out to be forms of power. In the next chapter, and with reference to the so-called African ‘crisis’, I will discuss how nonhuman factors, such as the famine of 1980, combined with human-initiated phenomena such as the oil and debt crises to provide the justification for the World Bank’s ‘Berg Report’, the OAU’s Lagos Plan of Action, and subsequent ideas and policies designed by African as well as international experts.

Thus, expertise ensures the reproduction of development regimes. As argued above, development regimes emerge from discourses of crisis generated by experts to provide the basis for reasoned intervention. Expertise then re-produces itself by evolving new forms of knowledge as lessons are ‘learned’ from each development ‘failure’. Experts seek to represent science as being apart from reality, when in fact the technical and the political cannot be separated (Mitchell 2002). Indeed, ‘technical’ terms such as ‘apparatus’, ‘machine’ or ‘network’ convey a sense of the complex relays and linkages between the techniques or technologies of ruling and the objects of power (Barry *et al* 1996). Projecting the world in terms of binaries (‘good’ versus ‘bad’, ‘uncivilised’ versus ‘civilised’, etc) serves only to create further space in which this expertise can operate and flourish.

Institutional Complexes of Expertise

A key element of my conceptual framework is that, within development regimes, expertise operates as part of a heterogeneous ‘ensemble’. Conceptually, and drawing on Peet’s (2002,

introduction of expertise where there had been none before; continuous practical difficulties, leading to the failure of each pilot; and the systematic overlooking or covering up of the problems and failures (Mitchell 2002, pp.36-37).

2007) concept of ‘complexes of institutions’ or ‘institutional complexes’, I identify this ensemble as an *institutional complex of expertise (ICE)* – a composite of experts, institutions and networks of relations among and between them. Peet (2002) highlights institutional-media (AIM) complexes, which produce “...policy prescriptions, position papers, press releases, popular columns, commentaries and programmes, news bites, expert interviews, and a vast panoply of well written, illustrated books, reports, and articles” (ibid, p.59). These ‘institutional complexes’ concentrate resources (capital, ideas, expertise) from a broader ‘field of power’ – which may be physically contiguous in the sense of a hinterland, may consist of networks among widely separated centres, or may be ‘virtual’ in the sense of position in a worldwide web (Peet 2007, p.22)⁴¹.

Peet’s notion of ‘institutional complexes’ is consonant with my concept of ICEs, which in turn form part of the broader, heterogeneous development ‘*dispositif*’ or ‘apparatus’. Sub-hegemonic regional ICEs are instrumental in advancing the process of discursive ‘translation’, by projecting modified hegemonic discourses into practice via regional consciousnesses (Peet 2002, p.61). The ICE construct I apply in this dissertation describes institutional complexes of development expertise that operate trans-nationally in the African geo-political space, networking with various complexes of expertise in different spaces and scales, including globally. Understanding the role of these ICEs in sub-hegemony constitutes a key goal of this dissertation.

Minimal Hegemony, Passive Revolution

Earlier in this chapter, I discussed the variable geometry of different discourses in a given field of power. Cooper and Packard (1997) agree that different ideas have held different valences or power, pointing to broad convergence of thinking about development, at certain moments and

⁴¹ Such institutional complexes may be: hegemonic, meaning that “they produce ideas and policies with sufficient theoretical depth and financial backing that they dominate thought over wide fields of power” (ibid); sub-hegemonic, in that from the periphery of the ‘field of power’ they translate received discourses, modify and add to ideas, and provide evidence of their validity through regional practice (ibid); or counter-hegemonic, meaning “centres, institutions and movements founded on opposing political beliefs that contend against the conventional, and advocate policy alternatives” (ibid).

in specific places, around certain models or theories. While some of these convergences have had long lives, others “...have been more fleeting, emerging at one moment as orthodoxy and then losing support to a new paradigm” (ibid, p.19). Finnemore (1997) validates this view in her analysis of the World Bank’s role in hegemonising discourses of ‘poverty reduction’ and ‘sustainable development’.

Similarly, Sikkink (1997) attributes an ideational shift at the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA, now ECLAC) from dependency-influenced approaches to neo-liberal economic policy prescriptions between 1980 and 1990 to have been a function of power, learning and institutional change. She finds that “[b]y 1990, ECLA was trying to correct both what it saw as the main errors of the [import substitution industrialisation] approach *and* of neo-liberalism” (ibid, p.233). ECLA’s latter-day emphasis on ‘an integrated approach’ which emphasises the compatibility of growth, social equity, and democracy, she argues, transcends and defies any analysis that it has become neo-liberal. This evolution of ideas is attributed to factors including: (i) the onset of crisis, with policy failures or crises leading to a search for new ideas; (ii) the power of development institutions, in which “a team of like-minded people transforms their individual ideas into institutional purpose” (ibid, p.236); and (iii) generational shifts within institutions – such as replacement of the ‘old guard’⁴² with a new group more likely to have trained in U.S. universities, and to have more mathematical and technical training.

This account of the shift in ECLA coheres with my interpretation of sub-hegemony discussed earlier. ECLA, a sub-hegemonic ‘centre of translation’ established as part of an array of worldwide UN regional think-tanks, is staffed by a new generation of economists trained in the use of highly complex technologies who conduct a debate within the institution that is also influenced by external ideas. This debate created “an intellectual energy and dynamism that contributed to the later paradigm shift” (Sikkink 1997, p.248). While Sikkink goes as far as classifying the new ‘integrated approach’ as a new paradigm, my view is that it may not necessarily constitute a new rationality of power as distinct from the old. However, I agree that

⁴² Mostly hired at the inception of ECLA in the 1950s, and reaching retirement age in the 1980s.

the 'integrated approach' developed by ECLAC sets the Latin American development regime of the 1990s apart from both the dependency-led regime of previous decades. As such, and applying my theoretical arguments on sub-hegemony to this case, what emerges is the way in which the ECLAC experts embodied pragmatism and freed themselves from the constraints of ideological labels ('neo-liberal or not') in order to develop an 'integrated approach' that resulted in stronger agency for these experts in charting the future development path of Latin American countries.

Moore (1995) identifies ECLAC and its African counterpart, the ECA, as key agencies in the study of the proximity of development agencies to imperial power, arguing that the two agencies

"...are bound by their political-geographical situation to be in a relationship of at least some antagonism to institutions emanating from the metropole. To deny this would be to make the baseless assertion that all intellectuals on the periphery are compradors. To assert it is only to suggest that a very large part of the project of western development discourse is to bring third world intellectuals on side" (ibid, p.10).

The ECLAC case is therefore highly relevant to my examination of the ECA, which was established in 1958 with terms of reference similar to those of ECLAC. The two ICEs play a similarly pivotal role in advancing as well as metamorphosing sub-hegemonic processes in their respective regions.

Sub-Hegemony and Identity Politics

In my theorisation of the sub-hegemonic process I have highlighted the pivotal role that Third World experts play in translating or hybridising the globally dominant development discourse into forms that ease the rationality's reception in different localities. I have asserted that the process of hybridisation may lead to changes in the rationality and ultimately to shifts in the asymmetry of power between hegemonic agents and sub-hegemonic agents. Here, I take the theorisation further, arguing that sub-hegemonic experts in Africa's development regime appeal to two constructed identities to legitimise their quest for expanded policy space: one is their 'African-ness' and another is their membership of the global community of Western-

trained development experts. In my view, this constitutes a critical dynamic of the complex process of hegemonic construction deserving of further study.

My discussion in the Introduction to this thesis on Africa as ‘invention’ and ‘lived reality’, the deployment of emancipatory Pan-Africanist discourses and the emergence of expert-led continental initiatives and arrangements in Africa’s trans-national development regime, all point to the pivotal nature of the question of African identity. The discourse on ‘African Renaissance’ associated with the emergence of NEPAD has further animated the debate. Gutto (2006), for example, has argued that, since the concept of ‘Renaissance’ is historically associated with the European Renaissance, “it is important to take account of the motivating forces that propelled the European Renaissance and its manifestations, products and consequences, and then to appreciate what makes the quest for African Renaissance different” (ibid, p.313). At the heart of the debates has been the question of African identity, which has been constructed and reconstructed over time, and which in reality does not exist as a fixed category (Ikpe 2009).

My assertion is that experts in Africa’s trans-national development regime strategically deploy their ‘African-ness’, along with other perceived attributes, as a tactic towards carving out increased policy space. The genealogy of expert ‘African-ness’ clearly owes its origins to the discourses of ‘*Pan-Africanism*’, ‘*African nationalism*’ and ‘*African renaissance*’. And yet, in contrast to those that theorise African identity as a fixed category limited to racially indigenous Africans (cf. Hountondji 1983), I contend that it is a socially constructed identity firmly situated in Africa’s postcolonial historical and social context. It is an identity that is fluid and continually under construction. Given the growing appeal to Africa’s Diasporas, ‘African-ness’ is also an identity that is by no means exclusively a function of race or geography. With specific reference to my case, for example, many of the experts interviewed returned from the Diaspora⁴³ to work at the ECA. Furthermore, and as Gutto (2006) suggests, Africanists from other parts of the

⁴³ Indeed, Africa’s Diaspora has contributed arguably more to forging intellectual, cultural and political links between the continent and the 200 million or so world citizens of African descent. In addition the AU reserves special status for the African Diaspora (Gutto 2006).

world are also actors in Africa's development regime, and they should not be discounted simply on the basis that they are not racially 'African'.

Shore (2000) has harnessed Anderson's (1983) notion of the 'imagined community' to look more closely at how Europe is being constructed as a symbolic and political entity – and therefore as a more knowable and governable space. His intent is to show how 'culture' has been appropriated as a political instrument for the construction of Europe. As part of this process, he highlights the way in which bureaucrats working for the European Community are coalescing around a nascent expert identity. In Shore's theorisation 'European experts' see themselves as no longer nationals of individual countries, but as a new community of supra-national experts who occupy pride of place in building Project Europe. In the same way, 'African-ness' as an 'imagined' identity is key to the pursuit of sub-hegemonic expert politics.

As will be seen in Chapter 4, 'African-ness' emerges as a legitimising identity, harnessed by African experts to pursue their claim as the technocrats most credibly positioned to craft workable solutions to Africa's development problems. It is an identity replete with consistencies as well as contradictions. It is a construct that renders problematic the idea of African nationalism and European imperialism as totalising narratives counter-posed to each other. 'African-ness' is an identity born of pragmatism and grounded in the idea of 'Africa' not as 'Other', but as an important and inalienable category through which the world should be viewed. In the process, my understanding of African expert identity also gives the lie to essentialist views that characterise 'Africa', in all its complexity, as either being captured by or rejecting in their entirety, externally conceived and imposed models of development.

A second dimension of my hypothesis on expert identity politics is the invocation by African experts of credentials afforded by the West as a key legitimising attribute in asserting agency. Indeed, my claim is not that African experts working trans-nationally are asserting their African identity in contrast to Western or global models of development. On the contrary, a key plank of my argument is that – inasmuch as experts may deploy their 'African-ness' as a device to

assert their legitimacy in leading the quest for technocratic solutions to African development challenges – the education of these experts in Western academies plays no small role in conferring legitimacy on the quest of African experts for greater agency in helping overcome Africa's development challenges.

Like their Western counterparts, African experts are ideologically committed to 'developmentalism' and dedicate their lives to pursuing it. However, one constructed identity ('African-ness') is not counter-posed to the other ('global development expert'); both are deployed simultaneously and in concert, and are mutually reinforcing. They stand out as key tactics harnessed in the pursuit of 'techno-politics', identified by Mitchell (2002) as holding the key to the reproduction of development regimes. Thus, sub-hegemony is about not only 'hybridisation' or 'translation' but also the 'techno-politics' of identity.

Important lessons emerge from this discussion. One is that the power of Western science can be felt even if the institution doing the work is located in a Third World region. Another is that the act of collecting indigenous knowledge to contextualise global ideas is by its nature transformative, leading to hybrid forms of knowledge (Moore and Schmitz 1995). Following from this, and as argued above, the process of 'hybridisation' or 'translation' may result in the transformation of the dominant discourse and the recalibration of power asymmetries. Third World experts, working in ICEs, hold the key to these power shifts.

In many cases, development-agency experts "must maintain their masters' legitimacy" (Moore and Schmitz 1995, p.11.) and cannot openly dissent from the dominant discourse, meaning that the extent and nature of their agency remains hidden. Nevertheless, they are "...the purveyors of passive revolution, the manufacturers of minimal hegemony" (ibid). Revealing how this 'minimal hegemony' is manufactured, how the process of passive revolution takes place in Africa's development regime, is a key goal of the research reported in this dissertation.

If it is agreed that trans-national institutions such as ECLA, ECA and the World Bank have played important roles in the transmission of ideas (Sikkink 1997), this gives rise to a number of questions that call for equally serious consideration of the institutions as well as discursive mechanisms that make the trans-national conversation possible:

“Who is excluded from a [development] conversation, and on what grounds? How are rhetorics defined historically, and what processes within communities of experts determine which rhetorics are deemed convincing and which are not? [...] Is there a clearly definable ‘mainstream’ of meanings and representations and an established repertoire of actions... that developers consistently draw upon? How does the professionalisation of a discipline and the creation of institutions engaged with development distinguish the persons and ideas included within acceptable practice from those labelled as marginal, as pedants or as quacks?” (Cooper and Packard 1997, p.6).

Subsequent chapters will seek to shed critical light on these important questions.

Towards a Conceptual Framework

Drawing on the arguments discussed in the literature review above, this final section articulates elements of a conceptual framework intended to signpost my inquiry into expert agency and agendas in Africa’s development regime.

So far, I have argued that:

1. A development regime is an ‘apparatus’ that constitutes a shifting coagulation of heterogeneous elements (both human and nonhuman), as well as systems of relations established between these elements.
2. Development regimes emerge from perceived crises, which create the constituency for external corrective intervention.
3. Development operates as a trans-national regime or institutionalised configuration of hegemonic power.
4. Development regimes project their power discursively on the basis of a chimerical sleight of hand that projects neutral, technical, rational science as standing above and apart from the world whose problems it claims the ability to solve.

5. Although discourse is a key weapon in advancing hegemony, development regimes are not discursive alone: they deploy extra-discursive elements – including political technologies such as policies and mechanisms – to advance their hegemonic agenda.
6. Hegemonic processes do not happen in a vacuum, but in a pre-existing ‘field of power’ in which dominant ideas and ideologies are translated, reaffirmed, contested and countered in multiple sites of struggle.
7. Historically, the professionalisation and institutionalisation of development has been critical in the exportation to the Third World of a hegemonic scientific discourse originating in the West.
8. Many Third World ICEs are officially cast in a sub-hegemonic role: their primary function is to facilitate the universal acceptance of dominant global development ideas and policies by ‘translating’ them into locally digestible variants.
9. Yet sub-hegemony can simultaneously serve to compromise the claim to absolute power of hegemonic development regimes, as sub-hegemonic agents become more authoritative and powerful within and beyond their localities.
10. Because the outcomes and effects of the sub-hegemonic process are ‘radically indeterminate’ (i.e. contingent on the exercise of politics and therefore not predictable in advance), development regimes can only claim hegemony – they can never fully achieve it.

These arguments are the basis of my conceptual framework of an African development regime. Next, I state this framework, in five points, relying on important characteristics of a development regime as identified by Ludden (1992, 2005).

First, the African development regime is a ‘techno-regime with a discursive regimen’, directed by institutional complexes of expertise that generate new forms of knowledge which constitute forms of power. Since independence, Africa has sought to establish modern institutions, and to promote scientific and technologically driven development. As in India beforehand, planning has been at the centre of development efforts launched by newly

independent African states – not only at state level but trans-nationally, as evidenced by the large number of sub-regional and continental organisations and initiatives. These centres generate ideas with a view to influencing or informing national as well as supra-national policy. The existence at the secretariat of the African Union (the continent's highest political body) of directorates for economic affairs, infrastructure, trade and industry, social affairs, peace and security, and the historic issuance of continental plans, treaties, standards and norms, reflects the centrality of 'techno-development' to Africa and Africans. African experts invoke their 'African-ness', along with their Western educational and professional credentials, to assert their claim to primacy in directing the African development regime.

Second, Africa's development regime involves ruling powers that claim progress as a goal, and self-declared 'enlightened' leaders who compete for power with claims of their ability to effect development. Africa's leaders routinely invoke the challenge of developing Africa and liberating its people from the shackles of poverty as a justification for their continued rule. This happens in multi-party democracies as well as in autocracies. Inspired by the vision of Kwame Nkrumah, the postcolonial history of Africa is littered with exhortations to regional integration and political union. Trans-national projects (dams, trans-continental highways, and so on) provide ripe opportunities for national leaders to invoke visions of the development of the continent as evidence of their efforts to develop their respective countries. This is evident in the multiple commitments by African countries to membership of sub-regional economic communities (ECOWAS, SADC, etc), as well as the AU.

Third, the objects of Africa's development regime are Africa's geographic territory, the African economy, and the African population – a 'people' whose condition must be improved. Elsewhere (da Costa 2007), I have documented the demise of the OAU, a state-led continental project, and the birth of the AU in 2001. The OAU's founding fathers left no room for subject agency in the construction of the continental development project, assuming their citizens' full support in the aftermath of colonialism. The effective absence of an African 'civil society' during this early period served to reinforce the state's hegemony over the national development

project. African intellectuals largely acquiesced and failed to contest the national project, even as it began to unravel (Mkandawire 2005). It was only with the adoption of the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation in February 1990 that ‘people’s participation’ officially entered the lexicon of the continental project (see Chapter 2). This culminated in the 2001 Constitutive Act establishing the AU, which promised to build “...an integrated Africa, a prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena” (AU 2004, p.6). Despite this commitment to a people-led Union, and despite the steady growth of civil society organisations and coalitions from the early 1990s onwards, continental development remains largely a leadership-driven aspiration.

Fourth, Africa’s development regime embodies an ideology of science that controls principles and techniques to effect and measure progress. From infrastructure-driven approaches via dependency theory and basic needs, to structural adjustment, structural adjustment with a human face, and poverty reduction strategies, African countries have continuously adopted and adapted scientific approaches to development – as evidenced by the large number of technical organisations established by the ECA and OAU over time (see Chapters 3 and 4). Technical co-operation, largely paid for with aid money, has helped African countries internalise and implement policies underpinned by these ideas and ideologies. Today’s primary means of advancing and measuring global development are the MDGs, which spell out targets the world’s countries must meet by 2015 in order to reduce poverty. African countries, particularly the 30 or so classified as ‘Least Developed Countries’, now measure their progress in key areas against the MDGs. A key ‘political technology’ (discussed in Chapter 5) is the APRM, designed by African leaders to measure their countries’ progress against key development indicators.

Fifth, the rule of Africa’s development regime is enforced by physical and cultural apparatuses of security and control. In the early years of the OAU, Africa’s leadership was divided over whether to fast-track a continental union or to pursue a more incremental

approach from the bottom up. Nkrumah, who led the fast-track group, proposed the establishment of an African High Command or continental army. Today, the African Union has revived this idea. As part of the Constitutive Act, a Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established in 2002 to enable African troops to intervene to restore peace and security in specific circumstances – genocide, gross violations of human rights, national instability with cross-border ramifications, and unconstitutional changes of government. The advent of the PSC marked an end to the principle of non-interference and non-aggression that defined the OAU. AU forces have already intervened in a number of countries – notably Burundi, Sudan, the Comoros and most recently Somalia. The AU is now actively collaborating with the European Union and UN to establish an Africa Standby Force, effectively a standing African army ready to mobilise at any time in situations of conflict.

These five characteristics, drawing on the ten arguments summarised above, constitute key elements of a conceptual framework for Africa's development regime – a 'geopolitical space' (Escobar 1995) that is discursively 'imagined' or constructed by African leaders and Africa's people. This 'geopolitical bloc' (Peet 2002) or 'single historical postcolonial bloc' (Bayart 1993)⁴⁴, while varying between countries or regions, integrates Africa in diverse ways (ibid). Mamdani (1997) asserts the specificity of the African experience and the historical legitimacy of Africa as a unit of analysis. The conceptual framework outlined above is intended to contribute to wider understanding of this 'geopolitical bloc'.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to contribute to a nuanced theoretical understanding of the workings of development's power. Beyond this, the theoretical ideas discussed have served to signpost the inquiry into expert strategies for carving out policy space that is presented in subsequent chapters. It is not my intention to follow every single one of the conceptual twists and turns laid

⁴⁴ As Bayart (1993, p.195) explains: "...we do not wish to suggest that, country by country, Africa represents a collection of historic blocs, each one articulated with the west, and each one having a different degree of actualisation. On the contrary, we argue that Africa should be seen as being engaged in the edification of *one* postcolonial historic bloc whose degree of actualisation varies from country to country and region to region, and which integrates Sub-Saharan states in diverse ways" (original emphasis).

out here, since matching every aspect of the theory with substantial evidence is well beyond the scope of this dissertation.

The theoretical issues of interest in the rest of this dissertation relate to sub-hegemony in Africa's development regime. I will focus on explaining how sub-hegemony works in practice and will unearth the sub-hegemonic strategies and tactics deployed by a key ICE in this regime. I will show how, over time, the ECA has resisted as well as reaffirmed the globally hegemonic development discourse. I will reveal the ways in which the ECA of 1995 to 2005 was on the face of it classically sub-hegemonic whilst exploiting the growing clamour for 'African ownership' to pursue a strategy aimed at minimising hegemony and in the process opening up space for expanded African agency in developing technocratic solutions to Africa's development problems. In doing so, I will illustrate the ongoing constitution of African expert identity as a manifestation as well as an outcome of the sub-hegemonic process.

Chapter 2

From 'Self-Reliance' to 'Adjustment with Transformation': Africa's Development Regime in Historical Perspective

Introduction

In a discussion of the 'developmental state', Mkandawire (2001a) lists a number of reasons why many suggest that Africa cannot replicate the Asian development experience. One is the inaccuracy of economic histories. Much of the 'impossibility' literature, he argues, is based on a misreading of the economic history of Africa. What makes these 'impossibility arguments' all the more significant, he adds, is that "...the discursive framework they have engendered has produced a knowledge that has been acted upon by key policy-makers in a self-fulfilling manner" (ibid p.306). Adesina (2005) argues that the construction of a hegemonic project is not always only about affirming the validity of its stated objectives and the pattern of relationships embedded in it, but is also a selective reading of history (ibid p.1).

In broad agreement with the above, I contend that much of the literature codifying the history of Africa's postcolonial quest for economic development falls short – on grounds of misrepresentation, amnesia or lack of analytical depth. Further, I concur that how history is recounted, and the extent to which a particular version of the truth is given the stamp of credibility and universalised, can have power effects. To explore the nature of these effects, this chapter will interrogate key discursive moments in the evolution of Africa's development regime. My intention is not simply to revisit and re-present the debates of the past. Rather, it is to undertake a critical analysis of Africa's development strategies and plans in order to locate the key discursive underpinnings and shifts and to identify some of the key agents and relationships influencing these.

As I argued in the previous chapter, after Ludden (2005), experts are key agents in development processes. By generating ideas and empirical knowledge compelling to leading development

actors in specific places and times, they ensure the regime constitutes a documented historical formation. Consistent with this argument, all key African plans and policy documents analysed in this chapter emanated from expert-led initiatives – attesting to the power inherent in ‘techno-politics’. As such, much of the evidence referred to in the pages that follow relates to historical texts. Added context is provided by insights gleaned from fieldwork interviews and interactions with key experts involved in the processes in question.

The rest of this chapter focuses on nearly four decades that marked a critical period in the evolution of Africa’s postcolonial development regime. I begin by locating the origin of ideas of continental development, and then chart the continuity between colonial and postcolonial approaches to development in the first 10 to 15 years after many African states achieved self-rule. I then highlight the influence of external ideas on African development strategy in these early years, and highlight the impact of the Cold War on development thinking. Next, I explore the disillusionment among African technocrats with so-called ‘inherited theories of development’ around 1970, and the process to develop alternatives.

I then chart the deterioration of Africa’s economic performance in the late 1970s, discuss the so-called ‘African crisis’, and highlight African strategies of reaffirmation and resistance of the 1980s. Through a detailed deconstruction of ECA and World Bank documents, and drawing on my conceptualisation of the process of hegemonic construction presented in Chapter 1, I unearth African expert strategies of resistance as well as the tactics of legitimation employed by the international development regime to extend its rule over Africa’s economies from 1980 to 1990. I then show how Africa’s development regime, while retaining its core structural underpinnings of ‘*collective self-reliance*’ and ‘*self-sustainment*’, evolved over time to take on ‘*human-centred development*’, ‘*structural transformation*’ and ‘*social justice*’. I argue that these new concepts embodied as well as influenced the latter-day international development consensus on ‘*good governance*’.

Pan-Africanist Development Visions

Before a detailed reflection on this period, I briefly locate the origins of the notion of continental African '*economic development*'. The first Pan-African Conference, held in London, England in July 1900, marked the institutionalisation of a movement with Africa as its object, yet imagined and nurtured outside Africa in opposition to slavery. At the 1945 Pan-African Congress in Manchester, African countries articulated their twin desire to be independent from colonial rule and to achieve continental unity. The rationale was to enable Africa to achieve faster economic growth and development and ultimately catch up with the industrialised countries, and to create an Africa that was strong within the international system (Bujra 2002).

Key in all this was the re-imagining of Africa as a geopolitical entity that could transcend and indeed reverse the fragmentation created by the formalisation of European colonisation in the late nineteenth century. Along with this edifying idea of Africa came the conviction that economic development was likely to be achieved only if steps were taken to aggregate the multiplicity of national markets, many of them unviable, into an expanded economic space. The power of this idea of Africa as a politically independent, democratic, economically self-reliant space for all its peoples provided ideological sustenance to nationalist movements across the continent as they mobilised for the struggle against colonial rule.

In 1959, two years after Ghana became the first black African country to gain its independence, an All-Africa Conference was convened in the capital Accra. The first time that nationalists from all over the continent were brought together on African soil, the Accra meeting cemented the importance of states working in concert to fight colonialism. Four years later, by which time a number of other African countries had become independent, this awareness led to the founding of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. At that point, the move to liberate Africa's remaining colonies and forge a multi-state political union evolved from Pan-Africanism as a mass movement into an ideology driving a state-based continental organisation (Bujra 2002).

In *Africa Must Unite*, published on the eve of the summit that created the OAU, Ghana's leader Kwame Nkrumah highlighted the interdependence of politics and economics:

"Just as I was convinced that political freedom was the essential forerunner of our economic growth and that it must come, so I am equally convinced that African union will come and provide that united, integrated base upon which our fullest development can be secured" (Nkrumah 1963, p.170).

Nkrumah's speech in Addis Ababa on 24 May 1963 included a number of proposals to advance Africa's economic development – among them a commission to work on a continent-wide plan for a unified or common economic and industrial programme for Africa that should include proposals for setting up a common market for Africa, an African currency, an African monetary zone, an African Central Bank, and a continental communications system (Nkrumah 1963).

Two opposing blocs of African states emerged in the period before the founding of the OAU. One was the Casablanca Group of seven countries⁴⁵, which was radical in its orientation and adopted Nkrumah's vision of the future that emphasised rapid continental political unity, self-reliance and equity, with socialism being the main path to development (Bujra 2005). The second bloc, known as the Monrovia Group⁴⁶ (including 12 states that had founded the francophone African and Malagasy Union in 1960 in Brazzaville⁴⁷), de-emphasised issues of equity and self-reliance, instead advocating "nation-building and a development path through *laissez faire* and the open market" (ibid p.2). Some have described it as following a neo-colonial line (cf. Amin 1998).

Nkrumah's proposals influenced several African development plans – from the Lagos Plan of Action to the Constitutive Act establishing the African Union (2001). This speaks to a remarkable continuity between Pan-Africanist ideas of development and subsequent declarations, strategies and programmes developed at continental level. Nonetheless, it was

⁴⁵ Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mali, and Morocco.

⁴⁶ In addition to the 12 Brazzaville Group countries, the Monrovia Group included Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Tunisia and Congo (Kinshasa).

⁴⁷ These were Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Cote d'Ivoire, Dahomey (later Benin), Gabon, Upper Volta (later Burkina Faso), Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, the Central African Republic, Senegal and Chad.

the Monrovia Group's gradualist approach to building African unity that won the day, as evidenced by the passing of a resolution at the 1964 OAU summit in Cairo, influenced by Nyerere's lobbying, to accept the colonial borders as permanent, recognised frontiers of the OAU member states (Chachage 2009). As Mazrui (2005) notes, the OAU's gradualist mandate indicated the diminishing idealism and growing pragmatism of Africans as cautious post-coloniality replaced the vigour of anti-colonialism (ibid p.58). This pragmatism has steadily manifested itself not only in the political domain, but increasingly in engagement around African development strategy.

Postcolonial Optimism (1960-1970)

In the run-up to independence, black nationalists had criticised the extractive nature of colonialism, which robbed the African peoples of the fruits their labour. At independence, 'development' constituted a central preoccupation for most of the first generation of African leaders, most of whom by political commitment and social origins were deeply committed to "...the eradication of poverty, ignorance and disease, [...]an 'unholy trinity' against which nationalist swords were drawn in the post-colonial era" (Mkandawire 2001a, pp.295-296). 'Developmentalism' became part of a nationalist postcolonial ideology which saw nation-building and the provision of welfare as two sides of the same coin (ibid)⁴⁸.

Hutchful (1995) highlights three themes common to the political discourses of independent African states: nationalism (national ownership of the means of production and direction of development); statism (the state as playing a major role in development); and welfare (ibid p.58). To a greater or lesser degree, these themes are common to all the African development plans. Overall, they have provided an inhospitable ideological environment for market-oriented reforms, and have furnished the basis of a 'discourse of resistance' to structural adjustment reforms (ibid). However, the first 10 to 15 years of independence showed considerable continuity with colonial approaches to development. Bujra (2002) attributes this to a wave of

⁴⁸ Mkandawire's view, with which I concur, contrasts with the conviction held by a number of African academics (cf. Ake 1996) that African leaders did not have development on their agenda because they were generally consumed by survival and accumulation and maintenance of power.

optimism brought about by healthy foreign currency reserves, economies performing reasonably well, and the emergence of an indigenous capitalist class benefiting from state-led development efforts and therefore happy with the pre-independence structure of their economies as well as policies recommended by colonial advisers.

Another important factor in this continuity was the dearth of trained African technocrats. In the colonies, there had been scant exposure to alternative approaches to development, with many of the so-called radical leaders with alternative visions eliminated in the course of the anti-colonial struggle (Senghor 2009). In the immediate aftermath of World War II, and as part of a prolonged gradualist strategy of decolonisation, the British, French and to a lesser extent Belgians, had sought to train a cadre of collaborative elites drawn from educated business as well as traditionally prominent families (Allen 1995)⁴⁹. After independence, former colonial powers actively sought to maintain an influential presence in African countries, through experts sent to provide technical assistance, grants in aid and strong political links with African political leadership (Bujra 2005). Indeed, the enduring role of foreign expertise during the 1960s and 1970s in developing and implementing policy was an important feature of the postcolonial African state (Mkandawire 2001a).

This was largely because fledgling African states found they had a shortfall of development planning capacity. In the run-up to independence and thereafter, a critical mass of promising Africans were sent abroad to study, many benefitting from Western government or philanthropic foundation funding. In 1959, 81 Kenyan students were flown to the U.S. to attend universities, funded by the African American Students Association, Joseph P. Kennedy Foundation and others. The following year chartered planes flew a further 288 Kenyan students to the U.S. in what was the first large-scale American scholarship programme related to Africa (Chideya 1981).

⁴⁹ Faced with pressure from radical nationalists in West Africa in the late 1940s and later in East and Central Africa, the colonial powers resorted to a policy of repressing the radicals and offering rapid decolonisation to conservative elements (Allen 1995).

In Nigeria, which invested heavily in tertiary education in the first two decades after independence (Sibisi 1993) the best students were funded by their originating university or U.S. foundations to pursue Masters and PhD degrees in the U.K. or U.S. (Teriba 2006). One such programme began in 1959 at the request of the then Nigerian Federal Minister of Education who raised the question of the scarcity of highly skilled personnel in Sub-Saharan Africa with the Director of Admissions at Harvard College. This marked the start of a pilot Nigerian–American Scholarship Programme. Twenty-four students were sent to participating U.S. universities which provided tuition scholarships whilst the Nigerian Government covered travel costs. The programme’s success led to the establishment of scholarship programmes funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and administered by the African-American Institute (Chideya 1981)⁵⁰.

Ideology was a key driver for U.S. funding of African scholarship. By the late 1950s the U.S. and Russia, neither of which had been colonisers, had already begun to vie for influence on the African continent. The U.S. intention was to expose African students to American values so that on their return home to positions of influence they would help counteract Communist influences there (Chideya 1981). Soviet Union scholarships offered to African students beginning in the late 1950s were aimed at cultivating relations with newly independent African nations and scoring a Cold War propaganda coup (Matusevich 2008)⁵¹.

The provision of funding for Africans to study in Western academies formed part of a wider strategy of support, from the late 1950s to the late 1960s, by a range of bilateral donors and philanthropist agencies. Much of this support was aimed at developing high-level capacity

⁵⁰ These included the African Scholarship Programme of American Universities (1960), the African Graduate Fellowship Programme (1963), and the Inter-African Universities Programme (1967) (Chideya 1981).

⁵¹ In 1959, an African Institute was set up, followed in 1960 by the founding of the Friendship University (also known as the Lumumba University) as a flagship institution of higher learning devoted to the education of Third World cadres. Between 1959 and 1961 the number of African students in the Soviet Union increased from 75 to 500, and to 5,000 by the end of the decade. By 1990, on the eve of Soviet collapse, African student numbers in the USSR had risen to 30,000, or 24% of the total student body (Matusevich 2008).

through university expansion, with crucial roles played by three American foundations – Rockefeller, Ford and Carnegie (King 1991)⁵².

Outside the realm of government, African intellectuals debated the shape and direction of the postcolonial project. Centres of learning such as the University of East Africa (bringing together the campuses of Makerere, Uganda, Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania) were at the vanguard of African intellectualism (Mazrui 2005)⁵³. This intersected with an active engagement with African socialism by several African leaders developing an intellectual foundation to their national projects⁵⁴. In many cases, external ideology (mainly socialism) was adapted to suit continental and national contexts, and served to advance leadership agendas. While Pan-Africanism did not aspire to be as ‘scientific’ as Marxism, it extended beyond political economy to encompass African culture, aesthetics, poetry and philosophy (Mazrui 2005).

This intellectual engagement by Africa’s fledgling leadership served to usher in one-party states, with rising political authoritarianism leading to declining academic freedom, as in the case of Uganda where academics were abducted and killed by the incoming military regime of Idi Amin

⁵² The Ford Foundation helped establish a series of education research centres in the developing world. The Rockefeller Foundation supported agriculture, health and social sciences in selected African universities, and sought to transfer and nurture to maturity new traditions of scholarship, such as social science research in East Africa (King 1991). Part of the agenda was indigenisation, which happened more quickly in arts and social sciences than in science, medicine and agriculture. As a result these ‘hard’ fields of study remained much longer as fields requiring external support (ibid)

⁵³ Ironically, and by the early 1970s, donors (notably Sweden, Britain and Rockefeller) had begun to criticise African universities for being too preoccupied with urban development in the modern sectors of the economy. In sectors such as health, transport, housing and education it was felt that “the high-cost western ideal was distorting the more ordinary requirements of the majority of the population” (ibid p.242). One study, funded by Rockefeller, suggested that African universities had become the preserve of privileged elites, who were soon blamed for the failure of African countries to achieve economic take-off. World Bank President Robert McNamara was quoted in a 1974 Education Sector working paper as writing: “The education policies themselves are not always at fault; they have tended to serve only too well the basically irrelevant development strategies they were intended to uphold and sustain” (McNamara 1974, cited in King 1991, p.243).

⁵⁴ Among them was Ghana’s Nkrumah, who wrote extensively on ‘Consciencism’, ‘Scientific Socialism’ and the ‘African Personality’; Kenya’s Jomo Kenyatta, his country’s first black social anthropologist, who developed *Harambee*, a nationalist political manifesto founded on self-help; and philosopher-president Nyerere, who developed *Ujamaa*, a Tanzanian variant of African socialism. For a detailed comparison of Nkrumah’s and Nyerere’s versions of ‘African socialism’ see Metz (1982).

Dada (Mazrui 2005)⁵⁵. Another important factor in the decline of African intellectualism was the Cold War. Because African nationalists chose 'positive neutralism', no full-blooded liberal or communist regimes emerged – with vanguard Marxist-Leninist parties in only Egypt, Sudan and South Africa (Mkandawire 2003). However, African intellectuals paid the price for being associated with one or other tendency. As Mazrui (2005) notes with reference to Kenya, the result of the government being co-opted into the Western camp was all too often that intellectuals associated with socialist or left-wing literature were regarded by the state as subversives and detained. In Uganda, *Transition*⁵⁶ magazine, launched by liberal elements at Makerere University in 1961, had links with the CIA through its front organisation, the Congress of Cultural Freedom – this eroded the magazine's credibility (Mkandawire 2003) and helped bring about its demise in 1976.

Ideological Continuity⁵⁷

Active state intervention in agrarian reform was emphasised at independence for helping African countries to overcome some of the continent's structural economic weaknesses and became a pivotal aspect of postcolonial development strategy. Several countries moved from an externally directed neo-colonialist pattern towards radical nationalist populism with a socialist rhetoric and in some cases social transformations (Amin 1998). Some variants of the 'developmental' state, influenced by various brands of socialism, sought to press this interventionist model even further (Saul and Leys 1999).

⁵⁵ Despite this repression, the 1970s saw a vigorous blossoming of the spread of Marxist perspectives, of left intellectual debate and radical perspectives in Africa (Cliffe *et al* 1995).

⁵⁶ According to <http://www.transitionmagazine.com/history.htm>, "The original *Transition* got its start in Kampala, Uganda in 1961. The brainchild of a twenty-one-year-old writer of Indian descent named Rajat Neogy, it quickly became Africa's leading intellectual magazine, publishing such diverse figures as Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere, Nigerian novelist Chinua Achebe, and Americans such as James Baldwin, Paul Theroux, Langston Hughes, and a then-unknown graduate student who signed himself "Skip Gates." Edited in the early 1970s by the Nigerian playwright Wole Soyinka (who would later win the Nobel Prize for Literature), *Transition* continued to make a name – and enemies – for itself until its demise in 1976".

⁵⁷ In the 1950s and 1960s, a number of other theories held sway in and on Africa. These included the Target income/Backward-Bending Labour Supply hypothesis, which held that colonial (and later independent African) labourers would stop working once they had earned their target income, creating vacancies that could not be filled (Sibisi 1993); and the Cultural Barrier hypothesis which argued that social and cultural factors in Africa were insurmountable barriers to the adoption of innovations needed to achieve African social change and development (ibid).

Development policies in fledgling postcolonial states were largely influenced by ideas of development prevalent during the colonial period⁵⁸. One important influence was Rostow's *Stages of Economic Growth* (1960), a manifesto for capitalist development that justified colonialism as a necessary precursor to a process of postcolonial modernisation of 'stages' on the road to a fully fledged capitalist system. This process of moving a given country from traditional society to 'developmental state' was to be led by modernising indigenous elites, bolstered by foreign aid and training (Mkandawire 2001a). 'Stagism', as Rostow's theory was known, was so widespread in the 1950s and 1960s that many of the first generation of postcolonial 'development plans' reflected the desire to move economies from the 'pre-take-off stage' towards the 'take-off stage' (ibid p.296)⁵⁹.

Most early national development plans borrowed from one or the other of the existing external perspectives, with the result that they implicitly assumed an increased degree of external dependence. Consequently, African national development strategies and policies, like those in other developing regions of the world, tended to concentrate on economic questions such as increases in GDP, capital formation through increases in investments, savings, foreign aid, and incentives for attracting foreign direct investment, with external trade as the engine of growth (Adedeji and Shaw 1985).

Cold War, Dependency Theory and NIEO

The 1970s saw the Cold War at its ideological height, with African countries deeply divided between Socialist, Marxist and Capitalist blocs. As these ideas competed for hegemony in Africa, the prevailing orthodoxy of modernisation – which equated development with economic growth and took trends in per capita income as the primary indicator of the rate of progress – began to be questioned on logical, moral, political and historical grounds (Asante 1991).

⁵⁸ While space does not allow for a detailed discussion of the postcolonial state literature in this chapter, it has been alluded to in Chapter 1.

⁵⁹ Hollis Chenery, World Bank vice president for development policy from 1972 to 1982, and a leading figure in crafting the Bank's Africa strategy, reflected this linear view of development in much of his and his associates' work (ibid).

Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja (1987), a leading Congolese scholar, for example, wrote that “modernisation theory is ahistorical, astructural and ethnocentric” (ibid p.15). The critique was largely inspired by the Dependency School, emanating from Latin America and led by André Gunder Frank. An African school of *dependistas* soon emerged, rejecting capitalism’s claim to be able to bring development to the periphery.

Amin (1974) attacked the colonial regime as being anything but developmental, arguing that the role of colonies in this division of labour was as permanent producers of raw materials intended to fuel metropolitan growth. Colonial economies, dominated by the production of one primary product, were structurally linked to the economy of the metropole – which determined both the availability of a market for the raw materials, and their price (ibid). This left the colonies mired in a ‘development of underdevelopment’⁶⁰. Thus, the international division of labour bequeathed a legacy of raw material production and export to the colonies without any infrastructural base for processing them, with the result that “...the colonies produced what they did not consume and consumed what they did not produce” (Danso 1990, p.1).

Samir Amin stood out as the leading African *dependista*⁶¹. His contribution to the debate included his theorisation of the differing modes of capital accumulation in the centre and periphery, his conclusion that this leads to marginalisation, and his advocacy of ‘self-reliance’ (Amin 1974), ‘autocentred development’ or ‘delinking’, a notion considered by some as autarkic (cf. Cooper 1981)⁶². A self-described “independent Marxist” (Amin 2005), he advocated a transition to socialism at the world system level as the only way forward, influencing the work of other Dependency theorists (cf. Wallerstein 1974, 1980). During his time as Director of the

⁶⁰ It is worth noting here that experiences in Latin America, Asia and Africa in the 1970s and 1980s with ‘associated dependent development’ showed that some form of capitalist development in the periphery was actually possible – something that André Gunder Frank had considered impossible in his original theorisation (Mkandawire 2001).

⁶¹ Claude Ake, a Nigerian political scientist who died in a plane crash on 7 November 1996, is often cited as another dependency-influenced scholar. Another is Issa Shivji, a Tanzanian legal scholar who has written expansively on his country.

⁶² Amin (1985) saw his ‘delinking’ thesis as embracing four propositions: the necessity of delinking as a logical political outcome of the unequal character of the development of capitalism; delinking as a necessary condition for any socialist advance; the need to recognise delinking as a means to the end of socialism, and not as an end in itself; and the need to discuss the options for delinking in political terms (ibid p.xiv).

UN Institute for Economic Planning and Development (IDEP) in Dakar, Senegal (1970-1980), Amin nurtured a group of African scholars⁶³ with whom he co-published several volumes. Amin was also keen to stimulate a dialogue across the Third World as a means of breaking Africa's isolation. In 1972 he organised an encounter between intellectuals from Africa and Latin America in Dakar, the first time that many of the Latin American *dependistas*⁶⁴ had travelled to Africa. Two years later, a second meeting took place in Madagascar between African and Southeast Asian scholars⁶⁵.

The analysis underpinning the ECA's efforts to design an African development strategy was strongly influenced by Dependency approaches, as were African development ideas more broadly – spelling a loss of dominance for 'stagism'. Socialist governments in several countries, including Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mozambique, Kenya and Tanzania, adopted statist development strategies that were to some extent informed by Dependency Theory. Of these countries, however, only Tanzania adopted Dependency as an explicit basis for policy as part of a broader socialist agenda (Leys 1996). For the most part, these strategies were equally informed by neo-Stalinist ideas about development, contributed by East European aid personnel (*ibid*)⁶⁶. Nonetheless, Dependency Theory played a significant role in the 1970s because it provided a powerful political-economic as well as moral critique of existing development policy in and on Africa⁶⁷.

⁶³ These scholars included Cadman Atta-Mills, a Ghanaian economist who published extensively on dependency approaches and industrialisation, and later joined the World Bank; Anthony Obeng (Ghana); Fawzy Mansour (Egypt); and Jagdish Saigal (India). For a full list, see Amin 2005, pp.202-203.

⁶⁴ Latin American participants included Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Ruy Mario Marini, Theotonio Dos Santos, Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, Andre Gunder Frank, Anibal Quijano and Gerard Pierre-Charles (Amin 2005).

⁶⁵ While at IDEP, Amin also exploited his connections with Latin America to establish two organisations – the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA, 1973), which was modelled on the Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLACSO); and the Third World Forum (1975), an organising platform for African, Asian and Latin American intellectuals seeking development alternatives.

⁶⁶ This demonstrates how development was instrumentalised to advance Cold War agendas. As Singh (1995) has highlighted, the contention between the U.S. and Soviet Union worked in favour of developing countries, just as it had done in the early post-war period for West European countries and Japan. His argument is that during this period of contention between the U.S. and Soviet systems, many developing countries benefited from technical and economic aid from both sides.

⁶⁷ Ngugi wa Thiong'o's books – notably *Petals of Blood* (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1971) and *Devil on the Cross* (London: Heinemann, 1982) – are held up by Leys (1996) as representing perhaps the deepest popular impact of Dependency Theory as a populist moral discourse.

The Dependency critique of mainstream development also helped fuel the rise of new external ideas. One of these was the 'basic needs' approach, first unveiled in 1969 by the International Labour Organisation (ILO). A reflection of the concern among development experts that the fruits of rapid economic growth were not being equitably redistributed, 'basic needs' sought to ensure a baseline for the fight against poverty⁶⁸. In the same vein, the World Bank published its *'Redistribution with Growth'* report in 1974. Authored by a team led by Hollis Chenery, Vice President for Development Policy, the report sought to bolster the shift in development thinking called for by ILO⁶⁹.

Meanwhile, proposals for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) – tabled at a meeting of the Nonaligned Movement in Algiers (September 1973) and adopted by the UN General Assembly the following year – signalled the escalation of an ideological stand-off between South and North, influenced by structuralist ideas over divergent paths to development. The *'Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order'* and associated documents included a series of proposals aimed at restructuring the global economic system to ensure increased participation by, and benefits for, developing countries.

Mixed Performance Raises Concerns

As Mkandawire (2001a) has argued, many African nations qualified as successful 'developmental states' throughout the 1970s: ten African countries experienced a growth rate of 6% between 1967 and 1980. These included not only mineral-rich countries such as Gabon, Botswana, Congo and Nigeria, but also such countries as Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire, who did marginally better than both Indonesia and Malaysia during that period (ibid p.303). By the early 1970s, however, African policymakers and development experts alike had begun to express

⁶⁸ The approach hinged on two key elements. The first was the provision of minimum requirements for a family's private consumption: adequate food, shelter and clothing, as well as some household equipment and furniture. The second was the provision of essential services for and by the community, such as safe drinking water, sanitation, public transport and health, education and cultural facilities (*Meeting Basic Needs: Strategies for Eradicating Mass Poverty and Unemployment*, ILO 1977).

⁶⁹ According to Leys (1996), neither the ILO nor World Bank acknowledged the influence of Dependency Theory on their thinking.

concern that the performance was not consistently good enough to bring about accelerated development. In their view, the theories and concepts underpinning the first 25 years of African independence were failing to set Africa on a sustainable development path.

On the tenth anniversary of the OAU, in May 1973, African heads of state passed their first resolution on economic development. The '*African Declaration on Cooperation, Development and Economic Independence*' expressed concern at the "...ever-deteriorating economic and social position of the developing countries in relation to the developed countries", and lambasted the:

"...ineffectiveness of measures adopted during the past decade to combat under development [as well as] the inability of the international community to create conditions favourable for the development of Africa" (OAU 1973, pp.1-2).

As a political statement, the Declaration did not include an empirical analysis of the deteriorating situation. However, it proposed a series of actions for all OAU member countries, to arrest the downward slide⁷⁰. The 1973 Declaration signalled the OAU's growing preoccupation with the state of the continent's economies. It also marked the start of a tradition of leadership pronouncements that constituted collective positions of African countries on how the continent should pursue its own development⁷¹.

In 1975, the UN reviewed and assessed development progress since 1960 in its five world regions. Overall, developing countries fared poorly – both against the UN growth rate target of 6%, and against associated targets of average annual expansion of 4% in agricultural output and 8% in manufacturing output. An ECA study of Africa's macro-economic performance from 1960 to 1975 found that Africa had failed to meet most of the targets laid down by the UN Second Development Decade. Africa's GDP annual growth rate was 4.5%, compared to the target of

⁷⁰ The manifesto covered mobilisation of Africa's human and material resources, agriculture, transport and infrastructure, telecommunications and communications, industrialisation, the environment, tourism, monetary and fiscal policy, intra-African trade, international trade, development financing and international co-operation (OAU 1973).

⁷¹ By 1997, the OAU had issued 12 Resolutions on economic development, roughly one every two years (Bujra 2004a).

6%; exports were at 2.8%, against a target of 7%; at 1.6% the continent's aggregate agricultural growth rate was way below the targeted 4%; and manufacturing grew at 6% instead of the targeted 8%. Only in one area did performance exceed target: aggregate macroeconomic performance, which recorded an actual growth rate per annum of 10% as compared to the target of 7%. Of all five UN regions, Africa's performance was the worst (ECA 1977). Ironically, and in retrospect, the period turned out to be Africa's 'golden era'; from 1975 to 2000, the continent's performance deteriorated (Adedeji 2002).

The Search for Alternatives

As African policy-makers digested the sobering news of Africa's deteriorating economic performance and prospects, interest grew in finding an indigenous African development strategy. According to one policy-maker attending the ECA's 10th Session in 1968:

“What I think is necessary for the future is for the Economic Commission for Africa to give us an African Plan for Development... The focus... should be on the development objectives appropriate in the African context and the necessity for mutual cooperation among member States. The Commission would thus be helping the world to have a better appreciation of the development process in Africa. We need a better articulation of the real obstacles to economic and social development in our continent. Through such a master plan, we can evolve the much-needed African philosophy of economic growth and social change” (cited in Asante 1991, p.37).

In response to demands such as these, African intellectual and political resources were mobilised to work towards an indigenous strategy for African development (Asante 1991). The ECA set out to “...[lead] the attack on inherited colonial and neo-colonial economic policies and [assume] a vanguard role in the search of an alternative strategy to such policies being perpetuated by independent African countries” (Adedeji and Shaw 1985, p.12).

The ECA's Preliminary Assessment, annual economic surveys, biennial reviews and appraisals showed clearly that Africa's economic performance had been on the downward slide since 1971. The ECA also insisted that prospects for the future would be:

“... dim if the mix of public policies were to persist and if the existing international economic order, in which Africa was at the periphery of the international community, to continue” (ibid p.13).

The ECA sought to challenge the conventional wisdom of the inherited theories of development and economic growth, to persuade African governments to accept the need for a fundamental change in approach and strategy (ibid pp.13-14). It argued that while Africa welcomed the NIEO proposals, its current state meant it was the least-prepared for such an order and would not benefit unless its national, sub-regional and continental economies were in order⁷². Instead, it argued for an internally focused African economic strategy.

The ECA's *'Revised Framework of Principles for the Implementation of the New International Economic Order in Africa, 1976-1981'* was discussed and endorsed at the ECA Conference of Ministers in Kinshasa, Zaire in February 1977 and approved by the OAU later that year. It is considered to have provided the “...main intellectual and theoretical foundation for the preparation of a new development strategy for Africa” (Asante 1991, p.44). The *Revised Framework* argued that a credible and appropriate development strategy for Africa must satisfy four fundamental principles – self-reliance, self-sustainment, the democratisation of the development process. and a fair and just distribution of the fruit of development through the progressive eradication of unemployment and mass poverty (ECA 1976).

Beyond the corridors of inter-governmental conferencing, these four principles appeared to resonate in the wider African political and development discourse of the time. On the notion of 'self-reliance', there appears to have been a keen debate⁷³.

⁷² That most of the NIEO proposals would not benefit Africa in the short-to-medium term seems to have been the consensus, with some suggesting that a 'basic needs' approach would be much more appropriate as a development strategy for Africa (cf. Arnold 1980).

⁷³ See Ake's (1996) definition of 'self-reliance' as the responsibility for producing a development project as well as for financing it (ibid p.40).

Which Way Africa? The Monrovia Strategy

In July 1979, building on the *'Revised Framework'*, African leaders meeting in Monrovia signalled their intent to push for the increased self-reliance that Nkrumah has advocated two decades earlier. The summit was preceded by a symposium convened by then OAU Secretary-General, Edem Kodjo in February 1979, *'The Monrovia Symposium on the Future Development Prospects of Africa Towards the Year 2000'*, which brought together leading African policy-makers and intellectuals⁷⁴. The Symposium concluded that Africa was mired in underdevelopment and must break with the past to create "a material and cultural environment that is conducive to self-fulfilment and creative participation" (OAU 1979, p.15). Participants proposed a new programme of action based on four main elements: African unity – manifested by an African common market, free movement of persons and goods, and a public sensitisation campaign on the need for African unity; an education manifesto underpinned by African values and culture; a series of technical instruments including planning; and enhanced co-operation between Third World countries (ibid).

The Monrovia Declaration, which derived from the Symposium, committed signatories to promoting social and economic development and integration:

"...with a view to achieving **an increasing measure of self-reliance and self-sustainment**, and encourage an **endogenous and self-sustaining development** to facilitate and strengthen our social and economic relations, to erect on the national, sub-regional and regional level **a dynamic and inter-dependent African economy**, and to establish each year specific programmes to materialise this **sub-regional, regional and continental economic cooperation**" (OAU 1977, emphasis added).

The Monrovia Declaration and Strategy, aimed at achieving modern economies by the year 2000, were underpinned by two subsequently pivotal concepts to Africa's evolving development regime. The first was **'national and collective self-reliance'**. This referred to: (i) the internalisation of the forces of demand which determine the direction of development and

⁷⁴ Aside from leading figures from international agencies (such as the ECA's Adedeji and UNCTAD Secretary-General Kenneth Dadzie), participants at the Monrovia Symposium included radical African academics such as Joseph Ki-Zerbo and Ali Mazrui.

economic growth processes and patterns of output; (ii) increasing substitution of factor inputs derived from within the system as opposed to those from the outside; and (iii) increasing participation of the mass of the people in the production and consumption of the social product (Asante 1999, p.9).

The second concept was '**self-sustainment**', related to:

“the deliberate installation of patterns and processes of development and economic growth in which different components support and reinforce each other so that, when related to the internalisation of the forces determining demand and supply, the whole system develops its own internal dynamics” (Asante 1991, p.9).

The key message emanating from the Monrovia Strategy was that Africa would look to build from within, in the process reducing its outward orientation and reliance on external sources of finance to fuel its development. The OAU Secretary-General and ECA Executive Secretary were asked to develop a plan realise these objectives. The idea that Africa could adopt an inward-looking development strategy sparked major controversy, with opponents later dubbing such ideas 'autarkic'.

Onset of the African 'Crisis'

1980 has been identified as the start of what became known as the 'African crisis', marked by a dramatic downturn in Africa's economic prospects and its standing in the world at large (Arrighi 2002). In Chapter 1, I identified an important characteristic of development regimes as being the way they arise out of perceptions of crisis. It was the 'crisis' of latter-day colonialism that led African leaders to espouse an ideology of 'developmentalism', in the process legitimising their stewardship of the newly independent former colonies. Two decades later, Africa's growing economic difficulties were deemed by experts to have become a 'crisis', again paving the way for intervention.

While Africa's leaders largely attributed the 'crisis' to a hostile external environment, the World Bank blamed internal African shortfalls. In reality, the reasons for the economic downturn are

complex, interlinked and difficult to attribute to any one set of factors or policies. However, it is worth briefly reviewing the main factors commonly cited as having precipitated or contributed to the African 'crisis'. First, despite periods of strong growth, the postcolonial African economy remained more or less as dependent, vulnerable and mono-cultural in 1980 as it had been in 1960 (Jespersen, p.10 in Cornia et al, 1991). Second, the Sudano-Sahelian drought of the 1970s led to food stocks being at their lowest levels for 20 years.

A third factor was the oil-price rises of 1973/73 and 1978/79. What began as a political stand-off between the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the U.S., in October 1973, led to a 400% rise in the price of oil. This had devastating impacts on oil-importing countries, including many African nations that had not planned for such an eventuality. Worse was to come with the second oil shock in 1978/79. Although the resulting 200% price increase was smaller than in the first shock, the dollar effects were much greater, primarily because the increase started at a much more elevated level, at roughly \$13 per barrel in 1978, as opposed to \$3 per barrel in 1973 (Danso 1990).

Linked to this, the global management of the economy suddenly shifted when on 15 August 1971 the U.S. withdrew from the Bretton Woods Accord, and left the Gold Standard, allowing the dollar to float. OPEC countries were now getting fewer dollars for their oil and reacted by pricing oil against gold, precipitating the 1973/74 oil shock. This led to the emergence of the Eurodollar market, which enabled international banks to hold dollar deposits and issue dollar loans while remaining outside the jurisdiction of U.S. financial regulations (Danso 1990).

The growing debt owed by African countries⁷⁵, mostly to the multilateral development banks but also to unregulated private banks, was an important fourth factor. The post-independence

⁷⁵ Africa was to become the most indebted region in the world – as a percentage of GNP, total external debt rose from 39.6% in 1980 to 78.7% in 1994; and as a percentage of the value of exports it went up from 97% in 1980 to 324% in 1990 (Saul and Leys 1999, p.4).

investments by African governments in public infrastructure projects⁷⁶, and growth of 1974 to 1980, had been enabled largely by borrowing, including from Eurodollar-rich banks in OPEC countries. At that time, the debt being accumulated was considered to be sustainable, as long as commodity prices maintained an upward trajectory and the impressive economic growth registered in the 1960s and early 1970s continued. However, the oil shocks largely put paid to this optimism. Between 1975 and 1979, Africa's debt grew by 25% annually, as set against a 22% annual rise in exports (Danso 1990).

Deteriorating terms of trade for Africa's commodities are commonly cited as a fifth reason for the 'crisis'. Prices of commodities (which had initially rallied alongside the increase in oil prices in 1973/74) subsequently crashed, forcing many African countries to borrow Eurodollars to cover the increased cost of oil imports and finance public projects (Danso 1990). By the late 1970s, the terms of trade had turned significantly against African agricultural products, reflecting a deepening recession in Europe and North America.

The combination of these five related factors had significant effects in many African countries throughout the second half of the 1970s. Among these, and directly linked to the economic difficulties, was social unrest, manifested by food riots and the outbreak of military coups d'état⁷⁷. Outside Africa the 'crisis' registered worldwide impact, leading to attacks on the reformist and globalist inclinations of the international system – from both mercantilist nationalists in the North and *dependistas* in the South (Adedeji and Shaw 1985, p.271).

So far, I have argued that Africa's development strategy in the first two decades of independence was largely influenced by dominant international theories, and later by ideological strands emanating from the Cold War. These external ideas were seized upon by African leaders and technocrats, many trained in the West, seeking a coherent theoretical basis

⁷⁶ Among these projects was the construction in Nigeria of a new federal capital, Abuja, which is estimated to have cost more than the country's sovereign debt at the time; and the expansion of Dodoma to become Tanzania's national capital (Danso 1990).

⁷⁷ McGowan (2003) chronicles 22 successful African coups d'état in the 1970s alone.

for nationalist 'developmentalism' amidst a profound lack of capacity⁷⁸. Confronted by poor economic performance policymakers commissioned continental experts to develop alternatives to 'inherited' development theories. As I have argued in Chapter 1, criticising external ideas considered to have failed does not necessarily lead to paradigm shift. My reading of the search for 'alternatives' is that it reflected African ambitions to engage in power struggles over policy space.

Strategies of Reaffirmation and Resistance (1980-1990)

The effects of the downturn of the 1970s were so profound that many subsequently characterised the 1980s as 'the lost decade'. This spoke to a growing Afro-pessimism, implicit in which "...was the core idea that the African people – their societies, cultures, mindset and structures – are incapable of running their states and their economies and therefore they will remain in a permanent state of crisis – stagnation and negative growth" (Bujra 2005, p.6). Thus, Africa was again objectified as a hopeless continent.

On the basis of the ideas contained in the '*Revised Framework*', at the request of African leaders at their Monrovia meeting, the ECA began a four-year process of research, seminars, workshops and ministerial meetings to plan for a development effort based on African thinking. To secure political buy-in at the highest level, the initial idea had been to convene a meeting of like-minded Heads of State, in effect a sub-set of the OAU membership. However, the ECA argued that unless every African country signed up to the proposed plan, it would be easy for external interests to divide and rule Africa. The idea of a summit of all African countries finally won the day, with the caveat that what was agreed would be a compromise plan based on consensus (Adedeji 2006).

⁷⁸ Nyerere's *Ujamaa* in Tanzania and Zambian Humanism are examples of how socialism was adapted to national African realities – although both Nyerere and Kaunda were at pains to distinguish their brands of African socialism from Marxism-Leninism and orthodox socialism (Grey 1984). In the mid-1980s, some 20 out of 52 independent African states were governed by socialist regimes (Sklar 1988).

A number of tensions were at play. One was a manifestation of the periodic tension between continental and national development exemplified two decades earlier by the Monrovia and Casablanca fault line. This was further complicated by the diverse political belief systems of Africa's leaders, ranging from neo-Marxist to ultra-conservative. As Adedeji (2006) explained:

“In those days you had [Marxist-influenced Ethiopian leader] Mengistu at one extreme, and the King of Morocco at the other, so for them to be able to agree on the proposals in the Lagos Plan of Action was really a mega-breakthrough” (ibid p.9)⁷⁹.

Possibly the most significant tension was between ECA and OAU experts. In parallel to the ECA initiative, the OAU Secretariat, also based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, had drafted a separate document – developed after a consultation in Addis Ababa in December 1979 – which was presented to Planning and Finance Ministers in Lagos⁸⁰. However, the policy-makers rejected the OAU version and asked that the ECA's proposals for a '*Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa 1980-2000*' (LPA) be tabled for discussion. (I revisit the (O)AU-ECA rivalry in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4).

The Lagos Plan of Action

The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and Final Act of Lagos (FAL) were endorsed by the Second OAU Extraordinary Session of Heads of State and Government, held in Lagos, Nigeria in July 1980. The LPA constituted a detailed elaboration of the general principles and objectives arrived at in Monrovia in 1979. It included sector-by-sector proposals for accelerated economic and social development in Africa in the last two decades of the twentieth century. The FAL provided a blueprint for regional integration, committing African governments to establishing an African Economic Community by 2000 and laying out steps towards this goal.

⁷⁹ Shaw (in Adedeji and Shaw 1985) notes that although some leaders and regimes had serious reservations about certain aspects of the LPA their apprehension about the political consequences of further economic stagnation or decline led them to endorse it. He identifies the dissenters as a growing 'radical' coalition within the OAU and an established 'conservative' bloc, citing splits between these groups as leading to disagreements over Chad, the Horn of Africa, the Sahara, and Libya. Elsewhere, Shaw (1982) notes that self-reliance was adopted at national level by a group of "more radical and peripheral states" – including Angola, Benin, Mali, Somalia and Tanzania – and was "... avoided assiduously by those countries and regimes at the semi-periphery which still hope to benefit from continued incorporation into the world system – Algeria, Egypt, Ivory Coast, Kenya and Nigeria"(ibid p.115).

⁸⁰ For a detailed account of this incident, see D'Sa (1983).

Never before had Africa's leadership been so frank and unequivocal about what it deemed to be the causes of Africa's economic problems. In the LPA preamble, leaders lamented the fact that, despite a rich endowment of natural resources, Africa remained the least developed continent, with 21 of the world's 30 least developed countries at that time. They placed the lion's share of the blame on external factors, notably racism, colonialism and neo-colonialism⁸¹. Detailed deconstruction of the 13 substantive chapters of the LPA, spanning 90 pages, is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, it is worth noting here that the Plan included detailed proposals for:

- promoting food self-sufficiency as well as reviving agriculture;
- galvanising internally focused sub-regional and continental industrialisation;
- managing Africa's natural-resource endowment to the benefit of the continent and its peoples;
- establishing sub-regional and regional energy initiatives;
- strengthening Africa's human-resource capacity;
- investing in science and technology;
- building a transport and communications infrastructure across the continent;
- taking measures to protect the environment; and
- improving the status of women (LPA 1980).

Critically, the LPA's credo of 'collective self-reliance' and 'self-sustained development' was advocated not only at the continental level, but also at national, sub-regional, and international levels – particularly in the context of industrialisation, trade and finance. The LPA was underpinned by a collective African nationalism, which combined Dependency Theory,

⁸¹ Although moderate African leaders in the Monrovia Group ensured that the OAU adopted an incrementalist vision of African unity (as opposed to the Casablanca Group's more radical approach), the continental organisation's definition of neo-colonialism was no different from Nkrumah's. For Nkrumah (1965), the neo-colonialism of the immediate post-independence period represented "imperialism in its final and perhaps its most dangerous stage" (ibid p. ix). For him, the essence of neo-colonialism lay in the external domination of the political polity and economic systems of ostensibly sovereign nations. While a degree of military coercion was involved, neo-colonialist control was more often than not exercised through economic or monetary means, including unfair terms of exchange (ibid). The views of radical African scholars were consistent with this reading of neo-colonialism.

environmentalism and basic human needs with indigenous and long-standing African priorities (Adedeji and Shaw 1985). While it marked a definitive departure from orthodox development theories, it could not be categorised as entirely 'radical' as it combined mainstream ideas (on environmentalism, for example) with elements of Dependency Theory and other external ideas – illustrating the hybrid nature of African development thinking.

This resonates with a foundational argument in this thesis: from seeing itself as separate, Africa has always considered itself as an integral part of the wider world. Thus, the pursuit of African development has always involved the fusion of indigenous and external ideas, adapted and tailored to fit the local context. This 'hybridisation' argument is at odds with a major critique of the LPA – that its underlying intention was to separate Africa from the rest of the world. Countering this, Adedeji and Shaw (1985) argue that, far from advocating autarky, the LPA sought to balance Africa's overly outward-looking postcolonial development strategy with relative introversion. This speaks to the strategic 'pragmatism' I argue is central to understanding the workings of power in Africa's development regime. Although there was a clear appeal to 'alternatives', what the ECA set out to deliver was essentially a 'home-grown' set of policies, drawing on external rationalities, informed by local realities. The intention was that pursuing an internally focused and African-led search for a development strategy would ensure outcomes considered legitimate by African states – whether or not the content of the policies was authentically African.

In addition to the charge of 'autarky', critics of the LPA pointed to a number of faults that in their view rendered the Plan suspect. One charge, common to African and external critics, was that the LPA's diagnosis of the African 'crisis' focused overwhelmingly on exogenous factors that created and sustained 'dependent capitalism'. One commentator has highlighted the LPA's lack of focus on the endogenous agency aspects of the crisis of 'dependent capitalism' as an enduring weakness, with the Plan "offering little reflection on the extent to which several of the leaders sitting around the conference hall where it was adopted in Lagos in 1980 were fundamentally liable for adumbrating the crisis of colonial political economy" (Adesina 2005,

p.13)⁸². According to this view, a number of African countries were at least partially responsible for the 'crisis' because they invested in expensive prestige projects, using money borrowed to advance national development.

A second criticism was that the LPA was utopian and failed to specify practical policy measures that might make a realistic contribution towards the attainment of its long-term objectives. Ravenhill (1986) dubs the LPA a "mammoth shopping list" with no ranking or preferences, no price-tag and no assessment of trade-offs (ibid p.88). Third, the LPA was seen as naïve, as its assumption that international donors would foot the bill for implementing the Plan meant it did not address the potential incompatibility between self-reliant development and increased dependence on aid (Ravenhill 1986). Fourth, critics lambasted the proposal for an African Economic Community hinged on preferential trade as 'outmoded' (ibid). A fifth critique was that the LPA's adoption of the African continent as its unit of analysis called into question the applicability of its proposals to any given country (cf. Ravenhill 1986).

This speaks to the tension referred to earlier in this chapter: for political purposes, and to fight the anti-colonial struggle, Pan-Africanism sees the continent as a 'geopolitical bloc'. At the same time there is a strong reaction against the objectification of Africa as an undifferentiated mass. The LPA, like all development-related plans issued by African leaders, harnesses Pan-African unity as an essentially political device, that does not preclude the experts who drafted these plans from later arguing for differentiation and context-specificity while countering the idea of 'one-size-fits-all'. Thus, African policy-makers see no incompatibility between agreeing on continent-wide principles as a basis for negotiation, whilst recognising that the reality in each country may necessitate context-specific strategies.

Ravenhill (1986) is also critical of the lack of discussion in the plan of the need for increased exports. Indeed, the LPA is clear on its intent to move Africa away from the export-orientation

⁸² A number of other African experts, including Asante (1991) and Anyang' Nyong'o (2004) have argued that the LPA failed to get to grips with the poor internal governance of African states as a critical factor that may have affected implementation of development policy in the first two decades of independence.

trap highlighted by the *dependistas*, towards developing an industrial base. Doing so would involve considerable technological inputs in the early stages, as had been the case in Latin America. This would require foreign exchange, which could most readily be acquired through export of raw materials or a combination of aid and technology transfer. However, its supporters argue that the LPA did not go into this detail because African leaders were trying to make a political statement about reliance on external sources as the antithesis of 'self-reliance' (Shaw 1982). Furthermore, the key to the LPA was industrialisation as the *sine qua non* for development, hence its designation of 1980-1990 as the '*United Nations Industrial Development Decade in Africa*' (ibid).

Adedeji and Shaw (1985) hit back at charges that the Monrovia Strategy and LPA were not sufficiently substantive, insisting that the two documents were intended as a political declaration, a development strategy, a set of priorities, sectoral programmes of action, and a blueprint for regional and sub-regional integration. They point to the '*Revised Framework*' and various ECA staff papers as having provided the intellectual and theoretical substance that informed the LPA. They also highlight a number of fundamental assumptions and principles underpinning both the Monrovia Strategy and LPA⁸³.

Adedeji and Elliot Berg

Before discussing the fall-out over '*Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action*' (World Bank 1981) – commonly referred to as the 'Berg Report' – it is pertinent to highlight some little-known but important facts.

The lead author of '*Accelerated Development*', Elliot Berg, at the time Director of the Centre for Research on Economic Development (CRED) at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor in the

⁸³ These are listed as : a) The deliberate promotion of an increasing measure of national self-reliance; b) the acceleration of internally located and relatively autonomous processes of growth and diversification and the achievement of a self-sustained development process; c) the democratisation of the development process; d) the progressive eradication of mass poverty and unemployment and a fair and just distribution of income and the benefits of development among the populace; and e) the acceleration of the process of regional economic integration through co-operation (Adedeji and Shaw 1985, p.15).

U.S., had in 1969 invited Adebayo Adedeji to spend two years as a visiting professor at CRED. Adedeji recalls that, despite knowing and having great respect for Berg, he could not take up the offer because he was appointed a Minister by the Nigerian Government (Adedeji 2006). Owodunmi Teriba, a fellow Nigerian economist who later came to work with Adedeji at the ECA, himself spent a year at the CRED (1972-1973) as an associate professor, at the invitation of Berg. In an interview, he recalls an incident involving Berg, who had wanted to travel to Nigeria to undertake wage review studies with a local researcher:

“Shortly after my return to Ibadan, Berg was going to do a wages review study in Nigeria, I think funded by the World Bank. While in Michigan I remember he came to talk to me, and asked me if I’d like to work with him on this study when I got back to Nigeria. It was Professor H.M.A. Onitiri [then Director of the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research] and Professor Ojetunji Aboyade [then Chairman of the Department of Economics at Ibadan University] who put their foot down, saying: ‘You don’t need to bring an American to come and do wage reviews here’. On the basis of their objection, Berg’s mission to Nigeria was cancelled” (Teriba 2006).

This is significant because it shows that underlying the well-documented fall-out between the ECA and the World Bank over the Berg Report was a history of intellectual engagement between Berg, then at Michigan University, and Nigeria’s top post-independence development experts. According to Teriba (2006), the reluctance of Nigeria’s leading planners to allow a Western academic to conduct a study in their country was emblematic of the fierce contestation between African and international experts over whose ideas should determine the national development policy of independent African nations⁸⁴.

Adedeji, who had honed his combative skills as Minister of Economic Planning and Reconstruction in Nigeria, took this nationalism to a continental stage when he moved to Addis Ababa to head the ECA (ibid). And as will be seen below, Berg’s engagement with Adedeji was to have a direct bearing on the intellectual stewardship and orientation of ECA for more than two decades.

⁸⁴ Nigeria’s post-independence education policy was highly ambitious. By 1967 the state was overinvesting in university education and university-oriented secondary education, compared to other sectors of the economy (Sibisi 1993).

The Berg Report Stand-off

The Berg Report was prepared by the World Bank in response to a formal request of 1979 by African Executive Directors at the Bank to its President Robert McNamara. They called for a review of the causes and potential cures of the dim economic prospects they believed confronted their economies (Green and Allison 1986). Elliot Berg was appointed co-ordinator of a task force named the 'African Strategy Review Group', with the mandate of developing an in-depth study. It was put together from memoranda from a range of invited commentators, a basic consultancy draft by Berg and a series of in-house papers and review committee meetings (ibid). It was released in late 1981.

Among the Berg Report's key findings were the attribution of Africa's economic stagnation primarily to internal factors, notably poor governance and state failure. It rejected the industrial policy that many African countries had sought to pursue, arguing that Africa's problem was one of under-production and proposing a return to export-oriented agriculture as the way forward. Berg advocated a rolling back of the state, arguing that the market should be unfettered to allow it to allocate welfare. Short-term prescriptions included: eliminating state subsidies and controls on imports, wages and prices; floating previously pegged African currencies (effectively devaluing them); and allowing the market to determine the price of commodities for export (World Bank 1981).

In a chapter of a book written five years later, Berg revisited and restated the main arguments in the 1981 Report. The 1986 diagnosis characterises the African economic downturn as four 'crises' rolled into one: a crisis of stagnant or declining production; a crisis in internal and external economic balance; an agricultural crisis; and an institutional crisis. Three sets of factors were said to explain the complex 'crisis': 'structural' factors (historical, geographical, political and climactic); external factors (the oil and food shocks of the early 1970s; and unfavourable terms of trade); and domestic policy deficiencies (manifested by over-valued exchange rates, inappropriate agricultural policies, and an excessive public-sector role in the economy).

In terms of policy prescriptions, Berg (1986) urged African governments to: address the exchange rate problem and the need for economic stabilisation to which it is related; give agricultural development renewed priority; and ensure better economic management in the short-term, at a time when new sources of public revenue will be hard to find. For aid donors, Berg conceded that:

“[since] donor technical assistance drew up plans, designed projects (directly or indirectly) and implemented many of them on the ground, Africa’s economic failures are therefore also donor failures” (ibid p.53).

This recognition of donor culpability represents a difference in emphasis from the 1981 Report, which highlighted state failure as the main reason for the ‘crisis’. Nevertheless, and despite having been a significant player in Africa’s early development efforts, the World Bank escapes direct censure.

The Berg Report was undeniably produced as a response to the LPA, to provide an intellectual basis for the World Bank’s intervention to initiate structural adjustment programmes in African countries. For one commentator, the Report as stood out as “the definitive document on adjustment for 17 years” (Mkandawire 2001, p.292).

Divergences and Critiques

Commentators have highlighted major differences in emphasis between the LPA and Berg Report. A key point of divergence was on the identification of the principal causes of the ‘crisis’. While the Berg Report was deemed to have adopted a revisionist developmentalist perspective within the modernisation genre in emphasising internal factors as the primary cause of Africa’s underdevelopment, the LPA’s emphasis on colonial and neo-colonial exploitation fell squarely within the *dependencia* tradition (Shaw 1982, p.117).

Another notable point of divergence is that while the LPA presented longer-term and radically different two-decade strategic proposals, it was deemed to have failed to address the

immediate 'crisis', to have been unable to put together an articulate set of principles, and to have failed to follow an empirical approach. In contrast, the Berg Report was touted by many as the only major policy-oriented analysis of Africa's economic crisis, including short-term policy prescriptions to address it (Green and Allison 1986).

Patrick Bugembe, a Ugandan econometrist who had joined the ECA in 1978 and served as a member of Adedeji's core team of experts, agreed that the Berg Report addressed issues not dealt with in the LPA – among them questions of poor African governance and issues of macroeconomic policy: "The LPA had not looked at the macro issues. It was a more structural document, based on notions of self-reliance" (Bugembe 2006). However, the Berg Report also advanced a different agenda:

"By inserting the word 'accelerated' in the title of the Berg Report, the Bank was saying to African countries: 'you're OK – you just need to run a bit faster'. The LPA was saying: 'you are not OK – you need to restructure'. 'Acceleration' implies you are already on the road – which was not what the LPA was saying" (ibid).

As Shaw (1982) noted, the two plans were not only antithetical in intellectual association and policy direction; they are also advocated by two mutually exclusive coalitions – the more 'Africanist' coalition of the OAU under the leadership of Adedeji which consisted of indigenous and progressive academics, advisers and leaders; and the more 'internationalist' World-Bank-led grouping which was "...less cohesive, more conservative and less indigenous: bankers, bureaucrats and economists" (ibid pp.117-118).

On publication, the Berg Report was undeniably the most controversial document on Africa's development, drawing fire from a wide range of critics on grounds of both its substance and its style⁸⁵. It was also found to contain sweeping generalisations, inconsistencies and

⁸⁵ A widespread critique was that the Report's basic doctrine was one of economic and political neo-liberalism, advocating as it did an expanded role for the market in allocating welfare and effective state withdrawal from the business of development. One commentator identified strong similarities between the Report's prescriptions and late colonial approaches to development (Green and Allison 1986). Helleiner (1983) dubbed the original thrust of the report as 'productionist' and noted that a constantly stated concern was 'efficiency' in the narrowest sense, stating: "One must strain to discover signs of the World Bank's recent preoccupation with distribution, absolute

contradictions, reflecting the fact that disagreements among the task force led parts of the text to be re-edited prior to its release⁸⁶. There appears to have been an internal battle within the task force over the content and pitch of the Report. K.Y. Amoako, the task force's only African member, recalled in an interview that the original draft of the report was:

“... very free-market-oriented. Elliot Berg was very pro-free-market and very passionate. My contribution was to help moderate its prescriptions” (Amoako 2003).

It also appears the World Bank was never fully in support of the Berg Report and subsequently turned its back on a number of the Report's key positions, according to Green and Allison (1986)⁸⁷. Helleiner (1983) also highlights at least two areas in the report where attempts had been made to soften the message on the need for African governments to change policy direction by inserting qualifiers recognising 'wider political constraints and objectives'. Even commentators in support of the substantive proposals in the Report were forced to concede that attention was diverted away from these by the deficiencies in analysis and tone (cf. Ravenhill 1986). Publication of the Berg Report coincided with a major shift in World Bank policy, with Robert McNamara's retirement as president heralding a new era of supply-side market orthodoxy that abandoned the Bank's focus on meeting basic human needs (Ravenhill 1986).

Enter K.Y. Amoako

Adedeji's cordial relationship with Elliot Berg was severely tested when the World Bank sent Berg to Addis Ababa in 1980 to inform the ECA and OAU leadership that the Bank was preparing a study in response to the LPA. According to his official biographer, Adedeji was flabbergasted to learn of the Bank study, and urged Berg to allow Africa the space to implement the LPA's

poverty or basic needs. Can all these issues have evaporated in Africa during the past few years?” (ibid p.260). The Berg Report was also lambasted for its voluntaristic conception of the African state, and in particular its reluctance to acknowledge the political constraints on government action.

⁸⁶ According to Green and Allison (1986): “Professor Berg's economic worldview is of a more robust and free competitive market-allocated, comparative advantage-led, neo-liberal, political-economic world than portrayed in [the Berg Report]” (ibid p.63).

⁸⁷ Berg (1986) denied that the Report was becoming the 'blueprint' for post-McNamara WB Africa operations (see ibid pp.58-59).

provisions (Sanmi-Ajiki 2000). Accompanying Berg on that mission to Addis Ababa was K.Y. Amoako, a Ghanaian economist who had joined the World Bank as a young professional in July 1974 after completing a PhD in econometrics at Berkeley. In an interview, Amoako recalled the tense nature of the meeting:

“I remember that Adedeji was very upset that the World Bank had been asked by African governments (via their Executive Directors) to produce a report. He thought it was insulting. I was asked to do some consultations in Africa. I came to Addis Ababa with Elliot Berg to meet with the OAU and ECA. I remember coming to meet with Prof. Adedeji in what is now the [ECA] Operations Room. In those days, there was a large roundtable in the room. I remember Elliot and I going into the [...] room and seeing ECA division chiefs sitting around the table, and seeing Prof. Adedeji enter the room. During the whole meeting, he totally ignored me. I got the sense that he was trying to communicate to me that [as an African] I should be ashamed of being a part of this. We then had lunch. After that, we went to the OAU and they refused to see us. We went back to Washington” (Amoako 2003).

Adedeji (2006) remembers being outraged that the World Bank should send an African staff member to help sell its ideas and communicate its intentions to the ECA.

Beyond signifying the intensity of the battle of ideas provoked by the LPA and the Berg Report, and the charged emotions of the time, the meeting between the ECA and the World Bank marked the beginning of an intellectual rivalry between two African thinkers that endures today. Adedeji was an imposing figure whose stewardship of the process leading up to the launch of the LPA put him centre-stage in the battle for Africa to be the prime agent of its own development. Amoako was a rising star at the World Bank who had just had his first taste of the politics of policy-making in Africa’s development regime. Some 15 years later, Amoako would be head-hunted by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali to lead the ECA, and would move to Addis Ababa to occupy the same seat that Adedeji had made his own for close to two decades. Whilst Adedeji and Amoako had much in common – including a passionate belief in the idea of a modern, developed Africa, and a shared conviction on African agency in realising this idea – their styles of intellectual leadership and policy entrepreneurship were radically different.

Once the Berg Report was released, the World Bank made strenuous efforts to minimise the rupture and demonstrate to sceptics how close in thinking the two plans were. Stanley Please, until 1983 senior adviser to the Bank's senior operations vice president, noted in a paper that:

“[o]n issue after issue the ECA and the World Bank are in accord not only about general development objectives but about means to achieve these objectives” (Please 1984, pp.91-92)⁸⁸.

Two years later, Please teamed up with Amoako to co-author a chapter entitled “*OAU, ECA and the World Bank: Do They Really Disagree?*” The two set out to move beyond the polarised debate (which they dubbed the “flow of words”) and focus on what they considered to be the facts⁸⁹. On a number of issues, the authors tried to show consensus between the Berg Report, the World Bank and the LPA⁹⁰; on others, they conceded a variance of views. On a few issues, they admitted that the Bank could have been more explicit or clearer in its arguments. However, nowhere did they admit the Bank was wrong.

The Please–Amoako collaboration should be seen as part of a wider World Bank strategy to advance the policy prescriptions contained in the Berg Report while at the same time minimising the rupture between Africa and the Bank that the Report had provoked⁹¹. Indeed, the World Bank was highly pro-active in seeking to convince African leaders and policy intellectuals that its ideas represented the best way forward for Africa, beyond the ‘crisis’.

⁸⁸ See Please (1984, pp.92-93) for an extensive list of the areas of agreement in question, as well as a list of a few areas of disagreement.

⁸⁹ They focused their discussion on the issues raised by African Governors of the World Bank at their Dakar meeting in March 1982; a report of the 8th meeting of the ECA Conference of African ministers responsible for economic development and planning (Tripoli April 1982); and articles in a special edition of the *Bulletin* of IDS.

⁹⁰ The issues Please and Amoako choose to take on are: food-self sufficiency; export agriculture; industrial policy; pricing policy; roles of the private sector and of government; and regional and sub-regional integration.

⁹¹ The Bank's post-Berg-Report strategy to win acceptance for its ideas was far-reaching. One initiative to this end was the creation in 1983 of the Special Program of Assistance to Africa (SPA) as a World-Bank-chaired donor forum to mobilise quick-disbursing funding to support Sub-Saharan African countries implementing Berg-Report-prescribed reforms. Another was the launch of the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA) in the mid-1980s, intended to provide a space for Africa and its development partners to engage on wider political factors (such as conflict and governance) affecting economic development. The SPA was re-branded the Strategic Partnership with Africa in 2006, and now includes African countries as members. The GCA was deemed to be no longer viable and shut down in 2007.

Official African Reaction to the Berg Report

African policy-makers had been reluctant to criticise the Berg Report openly, as many of their countries received significant Bank funding. A task force made up of the ECA, African Development Bank (ADB), and OAU, was initially set up to review the Report. The task force produced two papers that set the stage for the official response from African leaders (Ake 1996). The first official African reaction came at the Addis Ababa OAU Council of Ministers 38th ordinary session (22 February – 1 March 1982). After debating the Report, African Foreign Affairs Ministers concluded that it was not only unnecessary but also antagonistic to the LPA. A *'Report of the Secretary-General on the World Bank Report'*, issued at the end of the meeting, stated:

“[T]he proposed outward-looking, external-oriented concept of development proposed for our countries in the [Berg Report] is indeed a suggestion that we continue to do what we have been doing all these years. The only difference is that we lose the independence to set our goals, adopt our strategy and determine our policies. Added to this is the glaring arrogant paternalism in the report with no concern shown for the need to increase the capacity of our countries to do in the near future what outsiders are doing for them now” (OAU 1982, Appendix II, p.3)⁹².

Next, at a meeting in Dakar, Senegal in early March 1982, African Governors of the World Bank and IMF – who had requested the study that generated the Berg Report – rejected its focus on domestic factors, opposed its concentration on agriculture rather than industry, and expressed scepticism about whether it would deliver the financing promised. They also lamented its lack of interest in regionalism and its dissatisfaction with the public and parastatal sectors. However, their major complaint was about its focus – the attempt to blame Africa for its own condition – which they asserted placed insufficient importance on external, global conditions beyond Africa's control (Shaw 1985).

⁹² Annexed to that document was a technical response produced by the ECA, the African Development Bank (ADB) and OAU Secretariats, which asserted the viability of the LPA over the Berg Report (Ravenhill 1986).

A third opportunity arose in April 1982 when the ECA convened Africa's Ministers of Planning and Economic Development for their 8th Conference in Tripoli, Libya. According to Adedeji's official biographer, the World Bank sent a large team to Tripoli to prevent any criticisms of the Berg Report. At a closed meeting with African Ministers, Adedeji threatened to resign from the ECA unless African countries came out openly in support of the ideas they had signed up to (Sanmi-Ajiki 2000, Adedeji 2006). The *Declaration of Tripoli on the World Bank Report Entitled 'Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action'*, released at the end of the conference, rejected the Berg Report, stating unequivocally that the goals and objectives defined by African countries for themselves in the Monrovia Strategy, the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos remained the authentic and authoritative goals and objectives for Africa (Ake 1996).

The African Priority Programme

By 1984, natural disasters and harmful weather patterns arising from drought and desertification had spread to 36 of the OAU's then 51 member states. In the same year, devastating global economic recession was manifest in the collapse of commodity prices, unprecedentedly high interest rates, sharp exchange-rate fluctuations, increased protectionism, chronic balance of payments deficits, mounting external debts and steady declines in real terms of aid. This was the worst economic situation in modern times in Africa, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa (Adedeji and Shaw 1985).

Three years earlier, in April 1981, a closed meeting during the ECA Conference of Ministers had been convened to consider a confidential paper submitted by Adedeji entitled *'Africa's Rapidly Escalating Crisis – Proposals for a Short-Term Immediate Programme of Survival'*. This proposed an emergency programme of action in the critical areas of food and drought, energy, and the balance of payments. This emergency plan was not meant to replace the LPA or Third UN

Development Decade, but to lay the necessary foundation for the successful implementation of the LPA⁹³.

This effort to respond to the food crisis marked a period of consultations among African leaders and experts, convened by the ECA, OAU, AfDB as well as by sub-regional economic organisations⁹⁴. During this period, Adedeji and the ECA were the prime movers, devoting significant analytical resources and a series of meetings to addressing different aspects of the economic situation. The ECA set the pace for the OAU and informed the positions taken under its umbrella by Africa's leadership (Asante 1991).

The state of Africa's economies came to the attention of the UN General Assembly, which in Resolution 39/29 (3 December 1984) spoke of Africa's "critical economic situation". In 1985, the UN agreed to convene a special session of the General Assembly to discuss ways of moving Africa beyond the impasse, onto a sustainable development path. In advance of the special session, and with substantial ECA involvement, African countries prepared a document entitled '*Africa's Submission to the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Africa's Economic and Social Crisis*'. This contained analysis and detailed proposals to: accelerate implementation of the LPA and Final Act of Lagos; improve the food situation and rehabilitation of agriculture; alleviate Africa's external debt; establish common platforms for action at sub-regional, regional, continental and international levels; and counter the destabilisation policy of South Africa on the economies of Southern African states (OAU 1985). African leaders adopted these proposals, known as the African Priority Programme for Economic Recovery 1986-1990 (APPER), at an OAU summit in Addis Ababa on 20 July 1985. In 1986, APPER was adopted by ECA Planning Ministers and OAU Foreign Ministers.

⁹³ Adedeji argued that, even if there had been no drought, the African food crisis had been in the making since independence. He saw the food crisis as the result of a conjuncture of three different crises: a *technical crisis*; a *development crisis*; and a political crisis (Adedeji and Shaw 1985).

⁹⁴ It is important to note the high levels of co-ordination between key ICEs in Africa's development regime – whose experts worked closely together in developing the technical basis for leadership positions in response to the various 'crises' Africa's policy and political leadership sought to respond to.

As Asante (1991) notes, the Special Session of the UN General Assembly in May/June 1986 was the first time a session had been convened to discuss the problems of a single continent. It was also the first time an entire continent had pledged itself to a programme of economic reforms with a view to getting support from the international community. Effectively, the Special Session internationalised Africa's economic plight, as it constituted "...recognition by African governments that internal reform was required, and by the international community that the reforms could not be carried out without external help" (ibid p.147). On 1 June 1986, based on APPER, the session adopted the UN Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD).

The APPER was a clear attempt by African countries to renegotiate the terms of their engagement with the international community, amidst tough times and bearing in mind the structural adjustment programmes a number of countries had already signed up to. Although it began with unstinting commitment to the principles of the LPA and Final Act of Lagos, and although it retained the strong language of the LPA when it came to the decolonisation agenda, the overall tone of the document was altogether more conciliatory. Furthermore, both APPER and UN-PAAERD appeared to prioritise a number of areas highlighted by the Berg Report, leading one commentator to declare the emergence of APPER as a defining moment in the "formal surrender" by African countries who largely embraced the critical assumptions and strategies of the Berg Report while discarding those of the LPA⁹⁵ (Ake 1996, p.24).

According to this view, African leaders recognised that their countries were in an invidious position, and realised it was futile to try to pursue the African development agenda without the co-operation of the West. The APPER was therefore tailored to resonate with the World Bank's views to avoid another clash that Africa would surely lose (Ake 1996). Adedeji saw things somewhat differently, and pointed to subsequent World Bank reports as a sign that the World Bank had indeed moved closer to the ECA position on several key issues (Adedeji and Shaw 1985). Does APPER represent a seminal moment in the subordination of Africa's development

⁹⁵ For his supporting arguments, see Ake 1996, p.28.

regime, as Ake (1996) argues? The idea that APPER may have been part of a utilitarian approach to securing sorely needed aid speaks to a recurrent theme in Africa's evolving development regime – whether accepting the dominant development discourse should be seen as an act of complete submission or rather as a pragmatic strategy to gain concessions towards clawing back power. I unpack this question further as this dissertation unfolds.

In any event, if Africa's leadership expected that APPER and UN-PAAERD would result in magnanimous debt relief and increased aid, they were to be sorely disappointed (Adesina 2005, Ake 1996, Kankwenda 2008). The expectation had been that, of the \$128.1 billion estimated to be the cost of implementing UN-PAAERD, \$82.46 billion was to come from domestic African sources, and \$45.6 billion from external sources (Asante 1991). However, although African countries were found by a 1990 ECA study to have made significant headway in implementing the agreed reforms, resource flows to Africa declined in real terms in 1987⁹⁶ (ibid).

At an ECA-organised conference held in Abuja, Nigeria (June 1987), in collaboration with the ADB and OAU, participants highlighted the series of reforms undertaken by African countries in line with APPER and UN-PAAERD. They lamented that the collapse of commodity prices, lack of additional aid and increased debt-servicing burden had exacerbated balance of payments problems, forcing some 28 African countries to embark on structural adjustment reforms designed to correct financial imbalances. They warned that, unless SAPs were more directly related to the wider objectives of APPER and UN-PAAERD, and unless more funding could be mobilised, the programme would have a negative impact on growth, employment, living standards, social development and political stability (ECA 1987). What stood out most clearly however, as the first recommendation, was that, to sustain domestic policy reforms and improve economic management, African countries must continue to pursue structural reform measures (ibid). Although reference was made to the need to minimise the adverse social and

⁹⁶ Although net resource flows to Africa increased from \$17.9 billion in 1985 to \$19.9 billion in 1986 and \$22.9 billion in 1987 in nominal terms, measured in real terms, resource flows were lower in 1986 than in 1985. Export credits to Africa declined in 1986 and 1987, while other private commercial flows remained negligible since 1983. At the same time, there was a net transfer of financial resources from Africa to the IMF – estimated at close to \$1 billion annually in 1986 and 1987 (Asante 1991, pp.153-54).

human impact of adjustment, the *Abuja Statement* provided the clearest indication yet that Africa had largely chosen to follow a path prescribed by Washington.

Concerned by the lack of a favourable response to APPER from the international community, the ECA and OAU fought to keep Africa's economic recovery as a priority on the international agenda. In December 1987, at the end of an Extraordinary Summit, African leaders in Addis Ababa demanded a resolution to Africa's spiralling debt⁹⁷. The '*African Common Position on Africa's External Debt*' called for an international conference to find a solution, and included proposals ranging from debt conversion (into grants), to cancellation (OAU 1987). The '*Common Position*' constituted another key moment in the shifting discourse among African leaders on causes of and responsibility for the economic downturn. While insisting that "...the present economic backwardness of our continent is the direct result of colonialism, the effects of which are still being felt" (OAU 1987, p.2), they also reaffirmed that "....the development of our continent is the primary responsibility of our governments and our peoples" (ibid).

While I agree that by 1987 African leaders had accepted full responsibility for addressing the continent's problems, an inevitability given the weak bargaining position of their countries, I submit that this may have been a discursive device to re-assert their agency, for external as well as internal reasons. The imperative for African countries will have been to re-establish new aid relations with the West to ensure renewed and stable resource flows of capital – an objective Van de Walle (2001) argues several countries achieved while only partially implementing prescribed reforms. At the same time, with the legitimacy of the state in question in many African countries – not least because of the state withdrawal mandated by SAPs but also because the hardships imposed by the World Bank/IMF prescriptions leading to 'bread' riots in the 1980s (cf. Olukoshi 1993) – African leaders were under pressure to legitimise their continued rule.

⁹⁷ Estimated to have reached \$200 billion by the end of 1986, representing 45% of Africa's combined GDP and 293% of export earnings (OAU 1987).

For its part, and in an effort to put the controversy that began with the Berg Report behind it, the World Bank was willing to admit that “the current African crisis, to a considerable degree, has its origins in the international economic environment” (Bujra 2002, p.18). However, the Bank continued to advocate structural adjustment reforms as the way forward for African countries. In 1988, the World Bank published *‘Beyond Adjustment: Towards Sustainable Growth with Equity in Sub-Saharan Africa’* which, despite emphasising previously ignored issues of distribution and other social factors, nevertheless reflected an enduring preoccupation throughout the 1980s with demonstrating the success of SAPs.

This preoccupation crystallised in a subsequent report, *‘Africa’s Adjustment and Growth in the 1980s’*, published jointly by the Bank and UNDP in March 1989. In the Foreword, World Bank Africa Vice-President Edward (‘Kim’) Jaycox and UNDP Administrator Pierre-Claver Damiba stated:

“Although it is too early to draw firm conclusions, the data in this report suggest that a strategy of adjustment with growth is viable in Africa. The evidence points to better overall economic performance in countries that pursue strong reform programmes than in those that do not” (World Bank/UNDP 1989, p.iii).

These findings quickly sparked reaction from Africa. In April 1989, the ECA Conference of Ministers adopted a resolution expressing “deep concern” at the document’s conclusions, which were found to be at variance with the UN Secretary-General’s mid-term review of UN-PAAERD. The Ministers requested the Executive Secretary of ECA to:

“publish a paper highlighting the technical and statistical variances contained [in the World Bank/UNDP report] for an objective evaluation of the economic situation on the continent” (ECA 1989).

The ECA duly published *‘Statistics and Policies: ECA Preliminary Observations on the World Bank Report’*. In this rejoinder, the World Bank was criticised for, among other things: statistical one-dimensionality and selectivity; hazy criteria for classifying countries as strong, weak or non-performers; undue optimism on the impact of the SAP reforms and the road to recovery;

excessive focus on growth; and short-termism. ECA dismissed the World Bank/UNDP analysis and conclusions as “arbitrary and [exhibiting] stark manipulation of data to prove a predetermined position” (ECA 1989, pp.10-11).

Africa’s Alternative Framework

Concerns about SAPs were highlighted in UNICEF’s 1987 publication, *‘Adjustment with a Human Face’*, a seminal report showing the programmes’ negative effects on human development. While Adedeji and the ECA had refrained from taking public positions on SAPs, as so many of its member states had signed up to implement them, a personal appeal by an ECA economist led to a change of tack:

“Eventually I did confront Adedeji and tell him that Africa will not get out of its quagmire if we let these things go on like that – an idea which he bought” (Bugembe 2006).

In 1988, the ECA commissioned a two-year, multi-country study to gather evidence on the impact of SAPs on Africa’s economies, involving 25 national experts covering 24 countries (Sanmi-Ajiki 2000). In addition to the country studies, the researchers produced a series of sector-specific impact studies. The ECA also organised an international conference in Khartoum, Sudan in March 1988, on *‘The Human Dimension of Africa’s Economic Recovery and Development’*. The Khartoum Declaration issued at the end of the conference emphasised the negative impact of SAPs on human development, indicating the growing African preoccupation (first referred to in the Monrovia Strategy) with people-centred development.

In July 1988, Adedeji convened an International Advisory Board of 20 eminent African as well as non-African personalities – including senior officials of the UNDP, World Bank and IMF, to provide input and advice on an African response to SAPs. The World Bank nominated its then Chief Economist for Africa, Steve O’Brien, to serve on the Advisory Board. Professor S.K.B. Asante, a leading expert on regional integration in Africa, and also a member of the Advisory Board, recalls that Adedeji:

“challenged the group to work for ‘novel ways to advance Africa’s long-term development without going back to the unrealistic and unsustainable period before the crisis: **towards a new synthesis of stabilisation and self-reliance**” (Asante 1991, p.176, emphasis added).

This was as clear a statement as any that Africa was willing to accept short-term stabilisation measures advocated by the IMF, whilst pursuing increasing self-reliance in the medium-to-long term.

The ECA convened an international workshop of African economists in early January 1989, which peer-reviewed a zero draft of the research findings. A revised draft went to two inter-governmental meetings of African experts from Ministries of Finance and Central Banks, held in Blantyre, Malawi in February and March 1989 – culminating in the adoption of the ‘*Blantyre Statement*’⁹⁸. The following month, in Addis Ababa, the ECA’s 15th Conference of Ministers of Planning and Economic Development adopted the results of the paper, naming it the ‘*African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation*’ (AAF-SAP). On 10 April 1989, and for the first time, African Ministers of Finance met alongside their Planning and Economic Development counterparts, and endorsed AAF-SAP.

Key Tenets of AAF-SAP

In contrast to the emphasis on short-term stabilisation that had marked nearly a decade of World Bank and IMF-directed SAPs, AAF-SAP set out to address questions of long-term structural transformation. Early in the AAF-SAP document, the structures of Africa’s political economy are identified as “[constituting] the most fundamental causes of its underdevelopment and retrogression” (ECA 1989, p.2). AAF-SAP lists several manifestations of these characteristics: the predominance of subsistence and commercial activities; the narrow, disarticulate production base with ill-adapted technology; the neglected informal sector; the degraded environment; lopsided urban versus rural bias; the fragmentation of the African

⁹⁸ The Blantyre Conference was historic for two reasons: for the first time, Africa at intergovernmental level collectively undertook a critical re-examination of the orthodox structural adjustment programmes prescribed by the World Bank and the IMF. Second, it was the first time that African Ministers, who normally met in Washington, D.C. at the World Bank/ IMF Spring and Annual meetings, convened in an African capital (Sanmi-Ajiki 2000, p.284).

economy; the openness and excessive dependence of Africa's economies including external factor inputs; and weak institutions (ibid).

In charting Africa's journey towards its own development strategy, AAF-SAP reaffirmed the LPA's emphasis on 'self-reliance' and 'self-sustained development'. The Plan had three objectives:

1. **human-centred development**, highlighted in the Monrovia Strategy and LPA but also reflecting growing support by the international community
2. establishing a **self-sustaining process of economic growth and development**, involving maintenance of economic growth, transformation of Africa's economic and social structures, and maintenance of a sustained resource base
3. **achieving national and collective self-reliance**, involving the integration of Africa's physical, institutional and social infrastructure, of the structures of production, and of African markets.

A full chapter of the 59-page AAF-SAP document is devoted to a detailed deconstruction of stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes, which are attacked for their overwhelming focus on "...achieving external and internal balances and getting the prices 'right' through unfettered operation of market forces" (ECA 1989, p.8). An Alternative Framework is then spelled out, underpinned by the credo of adjustment with transformation and focusing on three macro-economic modules: the **operative forces** or initial conditions; **available resources**, including human, natural endowments, domestic savings and aid; and **needs to be catered for**, including social consumption and production. The document then lists a series of more detailed major policy directions responding to the three modules⁹⁹.

Four of AAF-SAP's overarching policy recommendations are acknowledged to address areas that form part of existing SAPs and on which there is broad consensus: improved financial management, efficiency and tighter financial accountability; improved agricultural incentives;

⁹⁹ For a comprehensive list of the major policy directions in AAF-SAP, see ECA 1989, pp.33-36.

export diversification, mainly in processed agricultural products; and improved external debt management (ECA 1989, p.32).

AAF-SAP is considered groundbreaking for several reasons. One is that it introduces new or previously under-emphasised aspects into Africa's development discourse. These include a concern that Africa's social fabric and cultural values are in danger of collapse due to the deteriorating economic situation, and a concern that African citizens lack basic individual rights and freedoms. A third concern is with "overconcentration of power" as well as "poor accountability and policy discontinuity". These concerns were born of the ECA's growing recognition of endogenous factors that contributed, to a greater or lesser extent, to Africa's economic malaise (Adesina 2005). AAF-SAP also bemoaned the narrowing space for independent African policy-making. This is blamed largely on the high transaction cost of protracted negotiations African economic managers were forced to undergo with bilateral and multilateral donors as a precondition for balance of payments support and debt relief¹⁰⁰.

Critically, and on the basis of evidence gathered from the country studies, AAF-SAP was keen to emphasise that, beyond its overall objectives, application of the general framework should be on a case-by-case basis – the antithesis of the early general World Bank/IMF prescriptions criticised for their 'one-size-fits-all' approach to reform¹⁰¹. AAF-SAP recognised the uniqueness of each country, and argued that the mix of policy instruments should vary not only between countries but also at different times in a given country (Asante 1991).

AAF-SAP's renewed focus on Pan-African development – and in particular its advocacy of stronger intra-regional trade as a means of arriving at self-reliance and self-sustainment,

¹⁰⁰ Of significance is AAF-SAP's finding that Africa's public management institutions and culture "...have been increasingly burdened and dominated... by the increasing role of foreign experts and managers in national economic decision-making..." (ECA 1989, p.7).

¹⁰¹ As Adedeji writes in the Foreword, "It should be noted that the Alternative Framework is not a standard programme to be applied indiscriminately in all countries under all circumstances. On the contrary, depending on the peculiar characteristics of each individual country, AAF-SAP will be used for designing specific country programmes, selecting appropriate policy instruments and measures and adopting the relevant implementation strategy" (ECA 1989, p.iii).

including in food production – was generally applauded. AAF-SAP also emphasised regional co-ordination of industrial, monetary and financial policies, including payments and clearing arrangements – reflecting the extent to which Africa was increasingly advocating a self-reliance underpinned by technocratic institutions (Adesina 2005). Regional arrangements of this nature remain a preoccupation today, with African leaders agreeing in 2001 to establish an African Monetary Fund, African Central Bank and African Investment Bank (AU 2001).

While accepting that AAF-SAP retained some key African demands from the LPA and earlier plans, some commentators have asserted that it shared many of the core elements of the World Bank/IMF doctrine. However, the ECA maintained:

“It should have become abundantly clear by now that, both on theoretical and empirical grounds, the **conventional** SAPs are inadequate in addressing the real causes of economic, financial and social problems facing African countries which are of a structural nature. There is therefore an urgent need for **an alternative** to the **current stabilisation and adjustment programmes in Africa**” (ECA 1989, p.25, emphasis added).

Further:

“**...Africa has to adjust.** But in adjusting, it is imperative that it is the transformation of the structures that fundamentally serve to aggravate the African socio-economic situation that constitutes the focus of attention. As such, **adjustment and transformation must be conceived and implemented as inextricably linked and intertwined processes** such that progress will be made simultaneously on the two fronts” (ibid p.32).

What emerges clearly from the above excerpts is that the ECA, while criticising the current round of SAPs as ‘inadequate’, refrained from advocating a paradigm shift, and instead proposed that what was needed was an ‘alternative’ version of SAPs. This reading is consistent with views that while AAF-SAP sought to redress the excessive World Bank/IMF focus on ‘adjustment with growth’ by emphasising the need for ‘adjustment with transformation’, it readily accepted adjustment as necessary (cf. Adesina 2005).

There are many examples in the AAF-SAP document of this technocratic pragmatism, an approach that I argue throughout this thesis can be read as a ‘project within the Project’ – a strategy hinged on accepting key tenets of the dominant political rationality whilst harnessing the same technologies of rule to create increased African policy space. Doctrinaire privatisation as evident in the World Bank model of SAPs is summarily rejected in favour of ‘a pragmatic balance between the public and private sectors’, while privatisation is seen not as replacement for the state, but as strategic bolsterer (Adesina 2005, p.12)

Patrick Bugembe, the ECA econometrist who advocated for the ECA study that led to AAF-SAP, agreed that the Framework was not so much advocating an alternative paradigm as greater ambition:

“What I must emphasise to you is that what got lost in the title was the word ‘**transformation**’. What came out was the word ‘**alternative**’. So it became ‘African alternative to adjustment’, end of story, when the real story was ‘adjustment with transformation’” (Bugembe 2006).

Bugembe notes that the official French title of AAF-SAP – ‘*Cadre africain de référence pour les programmes d'ajustement structurel en vue du redressement et de la transformation socio-économiques*’ – does not include the word ‘alternative’, and in his view constitutes a more accurate representation of what the Framework was about. “What this means is that we did not want adjustment that undermined or was at the cost of transformation – to put it in a nutshell. It has come back to transformation today. We were talking about the same thing” (ibid).

Sub-Hegemonic Power Play?

In reviewing the content of AAF-SAP, the question again arises of whether the ECA’s explicit acceptance of the need for African countries to adjust constitutes some sort of victory for the World Bank and IMF. What seems clear is that the ECA (along with UNICEF and other agencies) was able to draw on evidence from ten years of SAP implementation to demonstrate that they were often not working. During that period, as well as after the publication of AAF-SAP, the

World Bank was forced to amend the content, scope and implementation modalities of its SAPs to reflect the evidence-based criticism from the ECA and others (cf. Mkandawire and Soludo 1999, Tsikata and Kerr 2000).

In my view, what occurred was typical of the process of ‘translation’ (described in Chapter 1 above), whereby globally hegemonic discourses are hybridised to ease their acceptance in different localities. In seeking to become hegemonic, the dominant development discourse (as seen in the ideological prescriptions emerging from the Berg Report) was confronted by criticism emanating from transnational ICEs (including the ECA and its network of institutions and experts). Realising that the dominant discourse could not be dismissed overnight due to its overwhelming power (bolstered among other things by its ability to provide financing to back up its ideas), the ECA harnessed Africa’s expertise to take on SAPs on their own terms, speaking the same language.

However, in the process of ‘translating’ adjustment into something more palatable to African policy-makers (‘adjustment with transformation’), the ECA succeeded in questioning significant elements of the fundamentals of SAPs, forcing the Bretton Woods institutions to revise their discourse substantially in order to keep their hegemony alive. From this perspective, AAF-SAP can be seen as a sub-hegemonic framework, in the sense that it sought to make SAPs more palatable by adding a human dimension and arguing for context-specificity. However, in the process, and as discussed in Chapter 1, sub-hegemonic ‘centres of translation’ (such as the ECA) may develop styles and ideas of their own. ‘Translation’ can thus sow the seeds for active struggles that may lead to re-calibration of power relations – in this case resulting over time in increased African policy space.

A Consensus in the Making?

On 10 May 1989, shortly before AAF-SAP was officially launched, and at the invitation of World Bank President Barber Conable, Adedeji and his team travelled to the World Bank headquarters in Washington, D.C. The ECA team held meetings with Conable, Africa Vice President ‘Kim’

Jaycox, and senior staff from the Bank, IMF and several UN agencies. Asante (1991) regards the meeting as highly significant because it inaugurated an era of consensus on development strategy for Africa. Further, and despite the recognition of the areas of difference and disagreement, the meeting marked the beginning of a decisive shift in World Bank and IMF positions, towards some of the major propositions and premises on which AAF-SAP was based (ibid)¹⁰², as reflected in a joint communiqué issued at the end of the meeting.

A member of Adedeji's inner circle, and part of the ECA team visiting Washington, recalled that in his view the meeting was more form than substance, and insisted that nothing of real significance happened that day. Furthermore, he reveals that ECA economists asked to provide technical support to a team of senior civil servants from Burkina Faso travelling to Washington subsequently to discuss a structural adjustment programme were excluded from a crucial meeting at the Bank (Bugembe 2006). Adedeji's then Chief of Staff recalls that the World Bank routinely discouraged African delegations from including experts who were not government officials. The delegations of African countries using ECA's expertise regularly briefed ECA experts on their return to the hotel and sought guidance from them on the agenda for the next day's session with the World Bank (Senghor 2009). These accounts highlight the continuing tensions in the ECA/World Bank relationship, even as both sides internalised aspects of each other's arguments, indicating that a consensus was indeed on the cards. Despite the appearance of ideological convergence, technocrats and policy-makers continued to engage in power struggles.

In November 1989, the World Bank published *'Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth – a Long-term Perspective Study'*, a 300-page document that clearly demonstrates the extent to which the Bank had gone to reflect consensus. Asante (1991), dubbing the report

¹⁰² Asante 1991 (p.187) highlights the following points of consensus that in his view reflect important components of the ECA's AAF-SAP: i) adjustment must be seen as part of a long-term development approach taking full account of the human dimensions; ii) priority should be given to human resource development and national capacity building; iii) sustainable development and modernisation of agriculture should be central to Africa's future growth; iv) conserving Africa's natural resource base and protecting the environment are to be regarded as urgent priorities; v) the process of regional co-operation and integration in Africa should be accelerated (ibid).

“less polemical, more pragmatic and less theological” (ibid p.187), notes a broad convergence with Africa’s own perception of its development problems as articulated in the LPA, APPER, UN-PAAERD and AAF-SAP, and identifies eight areas in which the Bank has “admitted” that the ECA and Africa were right¹⁰³. Adedeji himself noted that the Bank report “represents a fundamental shift in a position hitherto held as sacrosanct [...and] a major contribution in the process of consensus building on the future of Africa” (Adedeji 1989).

However, while the *‘Long-term Perspective Study’* appeared to reflect African views, the World Bank’s orthodoxy remained firmly glued to the sub-text – privileging the role of pricing policies, the free market, trade liberalisation, competitive exchange rate regimes and the private sector as key prerequisites for Africa’s recovery. As Saul and Leys (1999) point out, World Bank publications since the Berg Report, while advocating pro-poor policies and permitting a more active role for a transformed state, did little to change its overall policy offering. The *‘Long-term Perspective Study’* stands out as the first substantive engagement with politics by the World Bank in a major study – a function of the extent to which its views had converged with those expressed in African development plans since the mid-1970s. Indeed, commentators trace the birth of the ‘good governance’ discourse to the Study, arguing that it gave further credence to the assumption that African countries were in crisis because of the lack of good governance, decentralisation, accountability and reduced government intervention (Ihonvbere 1994, Mkandawire 2004)¹⁰⁴.

Further to the realisation by the Bretton Woods institutions that SAPs were not working, and that the deepening economic crisis was making development well-nigh impossible, the 1980s marked a realisation among African intellectuals that state–society relations (or governance), not ‘market distortions’, were the key constraint on African development (Mkandawire 2003, 2004). This recognition led the World Bank to invite a group of leading African scholars to

¹⁰³ For a list of the eight issues, see Asante 1991, p.188.

¹⁰⁴ In his Foreword to the Study, World Bank President Barber Conable notes: “A root cause of weak economic performance in the past has been the failure of public institutions. Private sector initiative and market mechanisms are important, but they must go hand-in-hand with good governance – a public service that is efficient, a judicial system that is reliable, and an administration that is accountable to its public” (World Bank 1989, p.xii).

author background papers to the Study (ibid). These included Claude Ake, a renowned Nigerian political scientist; George Ayittey, a U.S.-based Ghanaian political scientist; Senegalese economist and thinker, Makhtar Diouf; and world-renowned historian Ali Mazrui, from Kenya (ibid). According to Mkandawire (2004), these African scholars exerted an influence on the World Bank, although the Bank and IMF later reduced their view of governance to the technocratic transparency-accountability mode it eventually assumed:

“Thus, the actual use of the concept of good governance sidestepped the central concerns of the Africans and rendered the notion purely administrative. And all too often, it looked like a fallback position for failed policies” (ibid p.3)¹⁰⁵.

Reaffirmation and Resistance (1990-1995)

Our historical analysis in this chapter concludes with a brief look at the first half of the 1990s. This period was defined by reaffirmation of SAPs, albeit revised, as the hegemonic development strategy of choice for African countries, and also by continued resistance, albeit largely rhetorical, by Africa’s trans-national policy- making community.

The 1990s heralded an era of intensified co-ordination by the international community of its development policies towards Africa. One aspect of this was the debut of a single European market in January 1993 and the emergence of regional economic blocs around the world. Together with the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), these emerging arrangements gave new cause for concern to African countries, whose own historic push for regional integration had been largely ignored, and who feared that their growing reliance on income from exports would be stifled by the emergence of protectionism. These fears were only partly allayed by the coming into effect of the Lomé IV Convention (March

¹⁰⁵ According to Mkandawire (2003), concern by the African intellectuals with state–society relations and position against foreign domination led two of Africa’s leading social science research networks – CODESRIA and Third World Forum (highlighted above with reference to Samir Amin) – to conduct research on social movements and democracy. This research suggested that the forces of democratisation would be internal to African countries, and signified an interest in democratisation at a time when African research was mired in Afro-pessimism that saw no internal sources of change in Africa (ibid). See, for example, Ake (1993). Note that CODESRIA is highlighted in the conclusion to this dissertation as an institutional complex of expertise worthy of in-depth study.

1990), which provided for preferential trade between Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries and the European Economic Community (Asante 1991).

As the development strategies and policies of multilateral and bilateral donors became increasingly co-ordinated and standardised, African governments found that wherever they turned they were faced by essentially the same conditionalities – inherent in revised SAPs with governance-related conditionalities added to the list (Bujra 2002). Further, the UNDP soon adopted ‘good governance’, followed by the rest of the UN system (ibid). The consensus was reflected in the first edition of UNDP’s Human Development Report (HDR), published in 1990. While affirming the importance of economic growth as a driver of development, the Report argued that what mattered most was how growth was managed for the benefit of the people. Reinforcing the consensus that development must be human-centred, HDR 1990 came up with a new composite index for measuring human development, which included social indicators that went beyond GNP measures and succeeded in entrenching the human development discourse in the development lexicon.

The World Bank published two studies reflecting the continued preoccupation with learning from the experience of SAPs, and revising them to make them more palatable to client countries whilst retaining their fundamental economic prescriptions. In *‘Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results and the Road Ahead’* (March 1994), the Bank sought to establish the extent to which the 29 African adjusters had changed their policies in line with the prescriptions, assess whether these policy reforms had restored growth, and chart the future of adjustment. It concluded that countries that maintained or ended up with fair or adequate macroeconomic policies did better than countries with poor or very poor policies. It also claimed that countries with limited government intervention in markets experienced positive growth, whereas countries where governments continued to intervene in markets suffered a drop in growth. The report re-emphasised the need to move ahead with aspects of adjustment on which there was consensus – notably getting macroeconomic policies right.

'Adjustment in Africa' also argued for a re-think on areas lacking consensus – identified as privatisation and prudent financial reform (World Bank 1994). It was therefore no surprise that the next Bank report, *'Bureaucrats in Business: The Economics and Politics of Government Ownership'* (1995), focused on privatisation of state enterprises. Arguing that privatisation was key to lifting people out of poverty, the report identified the most successful state enterprise reformers (Chile, Mexico and the Republic of Korea), the least successful (India, Senegal and Turkey), and those that fell somewhere in between (Egypt, Ghana and the Philippines). Predictably, the report ended by proposing ways in which the World Bank could help ensure more efficient and effective privatisation.

While these two reports reflected refinements of the World Bank's arguments, the Bank remained "...almost congenitally tied to the core argument of the Berg Report with its faith in the market and a minimalist view of the state" (Mkandawire 2001, p.292). According to this view, the Bank had retreated to its more familiar market-based ideological terrain (ibid).

Despite the clear acceptance by Africa of the need for its countries to continue to adjust in order to stand a chance of developing, Adedeji rued the failure by African countries to implement the provisions they signed up to in the LPA, APPER, AAF-SAP and other leadership plans. In his view, this was because of their "...excessive external dependence, their narrow political base, and their perennial failure to put their money where their mouth is" (Adedeji 2002, p.4). Adedeji had more or less reached the end of the road, burned out by the epic battle between the ECA and World Bank, and disillusioned by the fact that, while the ECA could offer only ideas, the Bank was able to back up its own ideas with funding (Adedeji 2006). In July 1991, after 16 years at the ECA's helm, he retired, left Addis Ababa and returned home to Nigeria.

With the end of the Cold War came pressure on African countries to adopt multi-party democracy, in many cases as a condition for future support. This was compounded by pressure from within – as African citizens demanded that their governments do something to arrest the socio-economic decline. As Shaw (1991) notes, democratisation in Africa took two forms:

formal participation, calling for state-sanctioned processes of organisation, election, decision and protection at the level of politics; and informal participation, involving the establishment of extra-state patterns of participation (ibid)¹⁰⁶.

Against this backdrop, the ECA and the UN system organised an international conference on *'Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development Process in Africa'*, held in Arusha, Tanzania (February 1990). An *'African Charter for Popular Participation in Development'*, issued at the end of the conference, asserted the crucial importance of people's participation in the development process (ECA 1990). Arusha took the ECA's ideas about people-centred development further by articulating what amounted to an African vision of good governance, according to which democracy was seen as a key prerequisite for, as well as the outcome of, development (Anyang' Nyong'o 2004).

It is no coincidence that the Arusha Declaration emerged at around the same time as non-governmental African intellectuals had taken an interest in democracy (as asserted by Mkandawire (2003) with respect to CODESRIA and Third World Forum). As the preamble to the African Charter states, more than 500 people took part in the Arusha Conference, many drawn from a wide range of non-governmental organisations (ECA 1990). It is therefore reasonable to assume that African intellectuals of all kinds were present at the Conference and influenced, as well as were influenced by, the proceedings.

In July 1990, African leaders meeting in Addis Ababa issued a *'Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World'*. The Declaration reflected the concern that Africa's economies continued to decline, and that a rash of conflicts, including civil wars, had broken out throughout Africa. Critically, it reaffirmed that "...Africa's development is the responsibility of our governments and people", adding:

¹⁰⁶ Since informal democracy occurs at the level of society and not the state, it exploits and encourages state shrinkage under adjustment, in the process reinforcing shifts in the political economy of Africa away from state-centrism towards more open politics and economics (Shaw 1991).

“We are now more than ever before determined to lay [a] solid foundation for **self-reliant, human-centred, sustainable development** on the basis of **social justice** and **collective self-reliance**, so as to achieve **accelerated structural transformation** of our economies (OAU 1990, p.3, emphasis added).

Therefore, while retaining its core structural underpinnings of ‘*collective self-reliance*’ and ‘*self-sustainment*’, Africa’s development regime, had evolved to take on ‘*human-centred development*’, ‘*structural transformation*’ and ‘*social justice*’. Each of these concepts can be traced back to the earlier development plans, prepared by African experts. The plans themselves influenced international development thinking, and were themselves influenced by ideas such as ‘Basic Needs’ and Dependency Theory.

The Declaration also stated: “democracy and development should go together and should be mutually reinforcing” (OAU 1990, p.4). This was the first time that an African leadership statement had made an explicit link between democracy and development and expressed a preference for the type of political system sovereign member states should adopt (Bujra 2002). This can be partly attributed to the wave of democratisation sweeping the world after the Cold War. Internal African demands from citizens in the face of the economic downturn also constituted a key point of pressure on Africa’s leadership.

In June 1991, African leaders signed the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC). The Treaty committed signatories to deepening sub-regional and continental economic co-operation in a six-stage process to take place over a period not exceeding 34 years. The Abuja Treaty, as it came to be known, once again reflected the strong desire among African policy-makers and experts, evident since independence, for a blueprint to advance regional integration –as both a bulwark against dependent capitalism, and an African development strategy. Barely a month later, the UN General Assembly passed the New Agenda for Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN-NADAF), the second in a series of UN-sponsored strategies to address Africa’s under-development. UN-NADAF included “...heavy doses of good governance as a *sine qua non* for Africa’s economic recovery” (Anyang’ Nyong’o 2004, p.3).

In 1995, African leaders issued the '*Cairo Agenda for Action for Relaunching Africa's Economic and Social Development*', which noted that for years the OAU had adopted many development plans, strategies and programmes that had not been adequately implemented by the majority of countries (OAU 1995). It emphasised the centrality of people and popular participation to development. Although it reaffirmed the OAU's commitment to the LPA, the *Cairo Agenda* reflected the leadership consensus of the 1990s¹⁰⁷.

Conclusion

Following from the theoretical framework laid out in Chapter 1, this chapter has interrogated key discursive moments in the evolution of Africa's development regime. In undertaking in-depth analysis of Africa's development strategies and plans from independence to the mid-1990s, I have sought to provide a clearer understanding the workings of development's power. As well as locating the key discursive continuities and shifts over time, I have also provided a window, through the testimonies of leading experts involved in developing these plans, into the agendas underlying the evolution of Africa's development discourse.

I have argued that, at the dawn of independence, African nationalists keen to assert indigenous agency nevertheless relied on external ideas as well as foreign expertise to help chart their development strategies. This largely explains the high degree of continuity between latter-day colonial policy and the development strategies of African nations in the first 10 to 15 years after independence. I have also highlighted the influence of the Cold War on the constitution of hybrid sites of African expert resistance – in the form of rival U.S. and USSR schemes to influence African students, and as evidenced by the repression of intellectual activity by states aligned to one or other tendency. In the process, Modernisation Theory lost its salience by the 1970s and was superseded by Dependency-influenced approaches – themselves largely

¹⁰⁷ This consensus encapsulated Democracy, Governance, Peace, Security, Stability and Sustainable Development; Food Security; Capacity Building and Human Resources Development; Structural Transformation of African Economies; Effective Mobilisation and Efficient Utilisation of Resources; and Regional Economic Co-operation and Integration (ibid).

discarded as the late 1970s and early 1980s marked divergent development directions, oil and debt shocks, and the onset of the African 'crisis' (Shaw 1991).

As evidence of the downturn grew, African leaders began to strategise continentally and to issue collective common positions, inspired by the idea of Africa as a regional bloc first imagined by the Pan-Africanists. African intellectuals and development experts worked to identify the causes of the continent's underdevelopment and propose solutions. The ECA, able to combine the capacity of its own staff with a wide network of national experts, emerged as the key ICE responsible for crafting an African development strategy. Informed by studies produced by the ECA and its network, Africa's leadership signed up to a series of development plans – including the LPA, APPER and AAF-SAP.

The LPA, heavily influenced by Dependency approaches, blamed external factors for the so-called African 'crisis', and advocated an increasing inward focus for Africa. In response, the World Bank's Berg Report blamed African governments for poor stewardship of their economies, and advocated a series of outward-looking policies, later the core of SAPs. This marked the start of a decade of polemical debate between the ECA and the Bretton Woods institutions, which finally ended when the two sides came to an apparent consensus, conditioned by structural factors. *Pace Mkandawire (2003, 2004)*, I have argued that independent African intellectuals mobilised around CODESRIA and the Third World Forum were able to influence the espousal by the Bretton Woods institutions of politics as a variable in the success or failure of economic policies, only for the idea of 'good governance' to be instrumentalised into technocratic governance.

To provide historical grounding in support of my argument about the nature of sub-hegemony, I have identified a number of key structural underpinnings of African's evolving development regime. These include '**collective self-reliance**' and '**self-sustainment**', which first surfaced in the Monrovia Strategy and LPA. '**Adjustment with transformation**' was a hallmark of AAF-SAP, reflecting Africa's recognition of the need for adjustment as a means to transformation, as

opposed to growth alone. **‘People’s participation’**, **‘human-centred development’** and **‘social justice’** were central to Adedeji’s evolving thinking as reflected in the *‘African Charter for Popular Participation in Development’*, as well as in the 1990 HDR. **‘Good governance’** was a phrase introduced into the development lexicon by the World Bank, leading to the birth of a new technocratic sub-discipline. The link between **‘democracy and development’** was given new urgency by African protests over the continued economic downturn, as well as by winds of change originating with the fall of the Berlin Wall.

On the basis of the evidence presented and reviewed, I have argued that the ECA, ostensibly a sub-hegemonic ‘centre of translation’ responsible for rendering the dominant development discourse more palatable to African countries, developed styles and ideas of its own. In the process, the ECA influenced significant revisions of the dominant development discourse. This is evident in the battle of ideas that started with the LPA and the Berg Report, and ended in the apparent meeting of minds evident in AAF-SAP and related documents. As will be seen in the next chapter, African experts continued to assert their agency after 1990 – albeit using a less confrontational approach.

Chapter 3:

His Master's Voice or 'Manufacturer of Minimal Hegemony'? The ECA's Tactical Shift (1995-2005)

Introduction

In Chapter 1 I highlighted how 'geographic blocs' of institutions exercise power through an interdependent process of articulation between globally hegemonic discourses and regional sub-hegemonic discourses. In Chapter 2, I sought to test my theorisation by identifying key discursive underpinnings of Africa's development regime over a period of nearly four decades, as well as the policy effects brought about by the contestation over ideas during this period. I documented how the ECA, a leading continental ICE, resisted as well as reaffirmed the globally hegemonic development discourse. In doing so, I showed the complex articulation between the ECA's role as a sub-hegemonic 'centre of translation' and its role as 'manufacturer of minimal hegemony' or, in other words, advocate for expanded African policy space in directing its development.

In this chapter, to deepen my arguments about the reaffirmation and resistance inherent in sub-hegemony, I examine how the ECA's approach to engaging and influencing the international development discourse shifted during the period 1995-2005¹⁰⁸. I show how the ECA of this period consciously moved away from the adversarial stance of the previous two decades and adopted a more overtly sub-hegemonic approach.

While such an approach could be read as reflecting the extent to which mainstream African development thinking had embodied self-discipline and fallen into line with neo-liberal governmentality, my main argument is that the ECA of 1995-2005 may have leveraged its sub-hegemonic position to create space for greater African agency in determining the continent's development path. In asserting this argument I am guided by Peet's (2007) definition of sub-

¹⁰⁸ My analysis of the ECA stops in 2005. However, the ECA's role in the APRM, which extends beyond 2005, is discussed in Chapter 5. References to the post-2005 ECA are also made in Chapter 4.

hegemony as “...a process of rewriting and modification, but also independent discovery and creative adaptation” (ibid, p.22). In my view, the ECA’s sub-hegemonic approach was predicated on an acceptance of the overwhelming force of neo-liberal governmentality as a fact of life¹⁰⁹, as evidenced by its intellectual output, which largely echoed the dominant ideology. However, in ‘translating’ the dominant discourse, opportunities arose for independent discovery, creative adaptation and the incubation of new styles and ideas. In the nexus between ‘rewriting/modification’ and ‘independent discovery/ creative adaptation’ lies the potential of sub-hegemony to recalibrate asymmetric power relations.

To understand this argument, it is necessary to place the ECA in context. For a number of reasons, the 1995-2005 decade is highly eventful. First, it was during this period that the notion of ‘good governance’ became entrenched as part of the technocratic discourse and practice of Africa’s development regime. This was reflected in the work of the ECA, which began a far-reaching programme of research to develop tools, standards and indicators for good governance in advancement of what it called the ‘*capable state*’. Second, the period marked the emergence of a new continental political organisation (the African Union), a new continental development plan (NEPAD), and a new trans-national governance and development framework (the African Peer Review Mechanism) – signalling an unprecedented shift in the discourse and practice of African development.

Third, the period saw the unfolding of what has been described as a ‘new aid relationship’ between Africa and the international community, catalysed in part by a widespread perception that aid was not working (cf. Moyo 2009, Glennie 2008). The 2005 *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* provided a blueprint for a new aid relationship between Africa and its donors, while the Monterrey conference on financing for development (2002) agreed to restore dwindling aid volumes. In parallel, the world’s adoption of the MDGs in 2000 heralded the arrival of a new global development consensus underpinned by poverty reduction and good governance.

¹⁰⁹ Cramer *et al* (2009) call this the T.I.N.A. (there is no alternative) syndrome.

Fourth, the decade also coincided with a period of profound change at the ECA, heralded by the appointment in 1995 of K.Y. Amoako as its chief executive. As highlighted in Chapter 2, Amoako had previously served as the only African member of the World Bank team that produced the *Berg Report*, and had visited the ECA with Elliot Berg in 1980 to put the Bank's case to the then ECA Executive Secretary, Adebayo Adedeji. Amoako's arrival at the ECA marked a major shift in the style of the Commission's engagement, as well as substantive changes to the ECA's programme of work.

In light of the above, and with a view to locating the key shifts in the Commission's tactics and arriving at new insights into the sub-hegemonic process, this chapter will review some key ECA initiatives during the decade in question. I will provide insights into the influential role played by the ECA in the advent of continental leadership initiatives, and reflect on the complex relationship between the ECA and AU.

As explained in the Introduction to this dissertation, I was a senior adviser in the office of the ECA Executive Secretary from April 1997 to September 2003. The insights contained in these pages are largely informed – either directly or indirectly – by this experience. Therefore, in addition to discursive content from interviews and data cited from secondary sources, this chapter includes first-hand insights into key events and processes.

A New Broom

By 1990, a series of institutional reviews painted a picture of an ECA in decline, sorely in need of restructuring and reform¹¹⁰. These reports raised concern at UN Headquarters in New York. Boutros Ghali, worried that the ECA was on the brink and keen as the first African UN Secretary-General to make his mark with respect to the continent, looked to appoint someone who could

¹¹⁰ Among them were: a 1991 task force report commissioned by Diallo which concluded that serious problems of quality and efficiency were limiting the ECA's impact; a 1993 report of the then UN Office of Inspections and Investigations confirming these problems; and an August 1995 UN Joint Inspection Unit evaluation which concluded that almost everyone agrees that ECA needs a 'thorough review' (ECA 1995, p.9).

turn the Commission around. K.Y. Amoako was a Ghanaian national recruited by the World Bank in 1974. He advanced rapidly in the World Bank's hierarchy¹¹¹ – an achievement few other Africans had been able to match in a difficult environment (Amoako 2004, Alibaruho 2006, Makonnen 2006). In his 21 years at the Bank, Amoako had gained wide-ranging operational experience in Africa and Latin America as well as in managing social-sector programmes. As Director of the Education and Social Policy Department (1993-1995), Amoako was responsible for leading the Bank's programmes on poverty reduction, education, gender, labour markets and social protection.

Amoako was considered a prime candidate for the ECA job and was invited to meet with Boutros Ghali in New York in December 1994. The Secretary-General told him he was the best man for the job but warned him that he would face a degree of resistance from a few African countries who had proposed their own nationals for the post (Amoako 2004). Amoako consulted widely within the World Bank on whether he should accept the job. People he spoke with included Africa Vice-President 'Kim' Jaycox, who recalled the battle of ideas between ECA and the Bank of the 1980s, and the antagonistic relationship with Adedeji. Jaycox told him:

"I had been thinking of you as one of my senior staff members in the Bank's Africa vice-presidency. However, ECA as an institution is broken, and if there is any one person who can fix it, it is you. So go. It is potentially a very important institution for Africa" (Amoako 2004).

Having worked in the World Bank for his entire career, Amoako says he was compelled to move to the ECA by the challenge of Africa, his long-held Pan-African beliefs and the recognition that, since the World Bank considered the ECA to be an important African institution, he could make a major contribution. Additionally, UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali knew that appointing Amoako would create controversy in some African policy circles. Although he appeared to be referring to African Heads of State who might have put forward their own candidates for the

¹¹¹ Positions held by Amoako during his 21 years at the World Bank included Special Assistant to the Vice President for Human Resources; Resident Representative in Zambia; Country Director for Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, Mauritius and Somalia; and Education and Social Sector Manager, Brazil, Venezuela and Peru.

post, there is a sense that, reading between the lines, Amoako's World Bank pedigree may have made his appointment anathema to those who had lined up to oppose the Bank's prescriptions.

Once Amoako's appointment was officially announced, and before taking up the job in July 1995, he travelled to Addis Ababa twice (in February and May 2005) to meet staff and senior managers. Although he was enthused by the reception he received, not everyone welcomed his appointment. On the eve of the 21st ECA Conference of Ministers of Planning and Economic Development (1-4 May 1995), anonymous notes were pushed under the doors of Ministers at the Addis Ababa Hilton warning them that K.Y. Amoako was being sent by the World Bank to ruin ECA and urging them to petition the UN Secretary-General to reverse the appointment. This was confirmed by an ECA official close to the organisation of the conference who witnessed the events at first hand, as well as by Amoako himself (Amoako 2004, Todaro 2009).

A group of ECA staffers was identified as being behind the campaign. Having worked with Adedeji, they were concerned that the arrival of Amoako would result in the ECA being subordinated to the ideas of the World Bank. This early resistance exemplifies the politics at play in a pivotal institutional complex of expertise in Africa's development regime. As a complex, it is a heterogeneous combination of expertise, institution and interactions. However, and as indicated in Chapter 1, a complex does not denote a unity. Politics within and around the ICE is fluid, dynamic and characterised by crossovers in allegiance which prompt power struggles both within the ICE and between the ICE and others.

Strategic Directions

On his arrival to take up the post of Executive Secretary in July 1995, Amoako wrote a two-page letter to ECA staff in which he outlined his ambitions to renew and re-tool the Commission. This letter provided the basis for wide-ranging consultations with staff, in town hall meetings as well as smaller focus groups. In the months that followed, these ideas developed into *'Serving Africa Better: Strategic Directions for the Economic Commission for Africa'*, a detailed reform

manifesto prepared for the Conference of Ministers in May 1996¹¹². The document articulated the desire by the new leadership to break with what it considered the polemics of the past while seeking to restore the ECA's intellectual leadership on behalf of Africa.

In *'Strategic Directions'*, the Commission sought to narrow its agenda strategically, based on its perceived priorities and comparative advantages – its regional focus and commitment as an organisation in and of Africa (ECA 1996). The reforms were to be guided by three principles: excellence, cost-effectiveness and partnerships. The new programme focus, aside from reflecting the scarcity of UN general budget resources amidst increasing responsibilities for the UN regional commissions, was informed by the international consensus that reducing poverty should be the overarching goal of development (ECA 1996, p.10). Two main policy priorities emanated from this consensus. The first was reducing poverty by promoting growth, investing in education and health, and safety nets for the poor. The second priority was to overcome structural problems, including distorted macroeconomies, weak capital markets, poor infrastructure, low skills base and regulations that discourage investment. The reform plan reduced ECA's nine programmes in 21 different areas to five programme themes and two crosscutting issues.

Two new issues were introduced to the ECA agenda: a focus on Development Management (which consisted primarily of work on governance but also on civil society); and Harnessing Information for Development. Issues that survived from the previous ECA programme, now given a different approach or renewed emphasis, included the advancement of women, long considered a priority but now elevated to the status of a full programme. Regional cooperation and integration, a long-standing ECA priority, also survived, as it "...offers tremendous opportunities for economic growth, enabling African countries to overcome the constraints of small national markets, increasing intra-Africa trade and providing dynamism. And it will bring economies of scale in production" (ECA 1996, p.10).

¹¹² Addressing experts at the April 1996 Conference of Ministers, incoming ECA Executive Secretary K.Y. Amoako said he believed that the continent was emerging from a period of stagnation and ECA needed to catch the tide (Amoako 1996).

Population, agriculture and environment, previously addressed as separate sectoral issues, were repackaged under 'sustainable development' and the ECA focus shifted to the nexus issues connecting the three. This was because the incoming leadership felt that separate organisational units for the different issues had duplicated the work of the UN's specialised agencies and created self-contained silos, constituting a less than optimal use of resources. Popular participation in development, emphasised by the 1991 Arusha Declaration, was retained, with a new focus on enabling civil society to act as a check and balance on governments. The strategy was underpinned by the intention for the ECA to streamline its working, holding fewer meetings and producing fewer reports of consistently higher quality¹¹³. There were to be new networking arrangements: rationalisation of some 30 ECA-sponsored institutions throughout the continent, increased interaction with member states, enhanced South–South cooperation, and development of strategic alliances.

The emphasis in *'Strategic Directions'* on *'good governance'*, *'safety nets'*, *'giving space to the private sector as an engine of economic growth'*, and *'civil society as a force for popular participation and democracy'* bore strong similarities to the dominant development approach espoused by the World Bank¹¹⁴. However, the ECA argued that its new priorities were in fact drawn from the OAU's 1995 *'Relaunching Africa's Economic and Social Development: The Cairo Agenda for Action'*, which it claims "...identified these priorities, and which reaffirmed Africa's primary responsibility for its own development" (ECA 1996, p.x). As discussed in Chapter 2, the *Cairo Agenda for Action*, though asserting the principles of *'self-reliance'*, *'self-sustaining development'* and *'popular participation'* enshrined in the LPA and subsequent African plans, largely reaffirmed the international development 'consensus' emanating from the Bretton

¹¹³ During the period in question, ECA radically streamlined its portfolio of publications, focusing on a series of flagship reports, among them a revamped Economic Report on Africa (ERA), a new African Governance Report (AGR), a new Assessing Regional Integration in Africa (ARIA) report, and an African Women's Report (AWR).

¹¹⁴ In a memo to the Board dated 21 January 1999 introducing his Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), World Bank President James Wolfensohn emphasised good and clean governance as a key prerequisite for sustainable growth and poverty alleviation. He identified civil society, in all its forms, as "...probably the largest single factor in development" (Wolfensohn 1999, p.25). Domestic and foreign private investment is seen as "the key to economic growth and employment" (ibid, p.27), and the privatisation of state-owned enterprises is advocated in many countries as "a significant element in sustainable growth and in balancing the budget" (ibid).

Woods institutions and the leading countries supporting African development. This being the case, the ECA's referral to the *Cairo Agenda* as the inspiration for its policy priorities is entirely consistent with the evolution of the African development discourse.

Some ECA experts were unhappy with the proposed shift in programmatic emphasis, and criticised '*Strategic Directions*' for ushering in a new pro-World-Bank era at the ECA.

"Rather than being identified with broad development paradigms, establishing institutions and putting in place the broad preconditions for development, the ECA shifted to where it could lead the charge based on its capacity. In doing so it ignored or replaced some of the heavy investment of the organisation intellectually and in terms of activities generated down the line by the member countries. These things seemed to be so fundamental that... the fact they were left out created something of a credibility problem for ECA. Whether it is really identifiable with a donor agenda, or because of lack of progress in the other areas, [the ECA] has abandoned its fundamental positions of the past – supporting regional integration, sectoral development, particularly infrastructure, energy, connectivity, technological transformation, sector institutions, higher education and so on. ECA withdrew even from there. So it looks like ECA was ignoring some issues and getting involved with others. And obviously that was not the correct thing". (Suliman 2006).

Nonetheless, in April 1996 the Conference of Ministers of Economic Planning and Development – in effect the ECA's Board of Governors – endorsed the proposals contained in '*Strategic Directions*'. Amoako viewed like-minded African Finance Ministers¹¹⁵, pivotal actors in a complex trans-national politics, as key to his influencing strategy, and felt that he could act on behalf of Africa only if he had leading African policy-makers on his side. This effort to cultivate a group of like-minded senior policy-makers highlights a key feature of ICEs in Africa's development regime. National linkages are critically important to substantiating and giving authority to continental development discourses, hence the constant need for the ECA to assert its relevance to its member states. While a detailed examination of the inter-play between national and trans-national actors, policy communities and expertise is beyond the scope of this

¹¹⁵ These included Donald Kaberuka, then Finance Minister of Rwanda and later President of the African Development Bank. Kaberuka holds a PhD in Economics from Glasgow University.

study, I touch on aspects of the dynamics in different parts of the thesis, notably in the concluding section.

Early Indications

The ECA was able to use its dual status as a UN regional commission and Africa's premier think tank to bring issues of African concern to the wider international community. In March 1996, the UN System-wide Special Initiative on Africa (UNSIA) was unveiled as a mechanism to coordinate all the activities of the UN system in Africa. As co-chair of the initiative, the ECA was designated to co-lead on two of the UNSIA's four core programmatic themes – Informatics and Governance (UNSIA 1997), reflecting the priority attached to these areas of work in the revamped Commission. The ECA jointly organised the first African Governance Forum (AGF) with UNDP from 11-12 July 1997, which adopted a programme of action to assess the progress of reforms in various countries, and agreed that annual forums should be held.

In the second AGF, held in Accra, Ghana from 25-26 June 1998, Amoako outlined seven steps to creating a capable state for a progressing Africa: ensuring sound economic management by fostering a leaner, more competent and effective public service; strengthening the institutional capacity of parliament; enhancing the independence of the judiciary; building stronger electoral systems; developing collaborative mechanisms to promote dialogue across parties; looking at how to rebuild collapsed states; and combating corruption (ECA 2000, p.157). In the same speech, he unveiled a new ECA governance initiative – *'Setting Goals and Monitoring Progress in Governance in Africa'* – to develop norms and indicators for monitoring progress by African countries towards good governance, to be published in a periodic *'African State of Governance'* report.

As will be discussed below, the ECA programme on good governance was to lead to the creation of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). At this juncture, the strong similarity is noteworthy between the ECA's technocratic discourse on 'good governance' and that of the World Bank. In my view, this was anything but coincidental. Indeed, an important plank of the

ECA approach was to try and influence the Bretton Woods Institutions as part of a wider strategy to articulate African views on the need to reform international aid architecture. Having come from the World Bank, and having maintained strong links with his former employer, Amoako retained privileged access to both the Bank and IMF. He was known to the Bank as a former employee and trusted by it. This knowledge of and insider access to the Bank enabled him to voice concerns in such a way that people in Washington D.C. would listen, and to wield significant influence.

The joint World Bank/IMF Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, announced in 1996, provided an early opportunity to show the ECA's leadership in this domain. Having worked behind the scenes to influence HIPC before it surfaced, Amoako went public in his criticism of the initiative. In a speech to the Sixth session of the Conference of African Ministers of Finance in Addis Ababa on 31 March 1997, the ECA Executive Secretary highlighted a number of concerns about the now-revised HIPC: its seemingly restrictive country-eligibility criteria, particularly the ranges of debt-to-exports and debt-service-to-exports ratios; its failure to consider the fiscal burden of debt as a central variable in debt sustainability analysis; the length of the work-out period, which could be as long as six years; and uncertainty about the commitment to adequate amounts of financing and appropriate timing, particularly on the part of key bilateral donors (ECA 1997).

The focus on debt relief was consistent with long-standing desire among Africa's leadership, discussed in the previous chapter, to address the debt crisis. However, whereas the past ECA approach had been openly confrontational, Amoako's style of advocacy involved choosing his words carefully, avoiding political posturing, and putting forward technical arguments that he believed stood more of a chance of being taken seriously. A former adviser summed up this change of nuance as follows:

“Our approach to engaging with the Bank and the Fund was that when we were discussing issues with them, we used words, channels and approaches that they would understand and respect. We could communicate with them through channels that were understood” (Makonnen 2009).

Such an approach can be categorised as sub-hegemonic, since the ECA's objective was not to reject HIPC out of hand, but rather to improve it, to get the World Bank and IMF to deliver more effective debt relief. This put the ECA firmly in the camp of those who believed in incremental debt relief, as opposed to debt cancellation – a more radical alternative espoused by the OAU. However, in line with my theoretical argument about the fluidity inherent in the sub-hegemonic process, it is possible to conceive of the ECA approach as creating the conditions for an eventual HIPC initiative that would provide significantly more debt relief for African countries – and on better terms for the recipients – than the Bank and Fund had themselves envisaged.

Claiming the Twenty-first Century?

These early initiatives clearly showed that the ECA under Amoako was positioning itself differently from during the Adedeji years. Its approach was to refrain from being confrontational. Instead, it was overtly sub-hegemonic and sought to advocate from within the frame of the dominant development discourse. Within the constraints imposed by a dominant political rationality it had accepted and internalised, the ECA sought to ensure that any resultant policy prescriptions were more realistic and appropriate to the different contexts and needs of African countries. In the process, it hoped to position the ECA as a constructive and credible advocate on behalf of Africa's development, one that could unlock access to the corridors of power and give Africa a greater say in determining its own development.

In 2000, the World Bank, ECA, African Development Bank (ADB), African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) and the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA) jointly published a research report provocatively titled '*Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?*' This argued that, whilst many African countries had successfully undertaken economic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, challenges such as deteriorated capacity, weakened institutions and inadequate infrastructure meant that major changes were needed if Africans and their children were to claim the twenty-first century. It called for 7% annual growth and a more equitable distribution of income to meet the

MDG goal of halving poverty by 2015. To arrive at this point, it proposed a 'business plan' conceived and owned by Africans, and supported by donors through coordinated, long-term partnerships (World Bank 2000, p.2). It highlighted a number of basic requirements for faster development: improving governance and resolving conflict; investing in people; increasing competitiveness and diversifying economies; and reducing aid dependence and strengthening partnerships (ibid).

One critic wrote that the Report:

“...essentially articulates the long term strategies of African development from the perspective of the World Bank and the rest of the donor community. It is expected to provide the intellectual inspiration to African policy makers when they formulate these development strategies” (Bujra 2002, p.20).

The Report claimed to represent not only the view of the World Bank, but of four other institutions as well. The fact that it bore the names of Africa's two leading development institutions as well as that of its leading network of economists seemed to indicate a clear coming together of the positions of African thinkers with those of the World Bank. However, the then ECA leadership insisted that the Commission had very little input into the Report, which therefore did not reflect an institutional position (Makonnen 2009).

To understand this apparent contradiction, it is worth taking a brief look at the main actors in the research process leading to the Report. Six names appear in the Foreword as signatories and members of the Steering Committee: Ali Gader Ali, the then ECA Chief Economist; Tesfaye Dinka, then head of the GCA; Ibrahim Elbadawi, World Bank senior economist; Augustin Fosu, then AERC Director of Research; Alan Gelb, then World Bank Africa Chief Economist; and Kupukile Mlambo, ADB Principal Research Economist. Ali and Elbadawi, both Sudanese economists, collaborated on various projects as part of the AERC network. In the late 1980s, Ali worked as an ECA consultant and was involved in work leading to AAF-SAP. While at the World

Bank, Elbadawi¹¹⁶ took a five-year sabbatical to serve as Research Director at the AERC. Fosu, who was AERC Research Director after Elbadawi, later became the ECA Chief Economist, after Ali Gader Ali's resignation and the dismissal of his successor.

The World Bank's Gelb was the overall head of the team that produced the Report. As highlighted in the previous chapter, the GCA, whose Dinka signed the Foreword, was created in 1990 on the initiative of then World Bank Africa Vice President Kim Jaycox as a forum to replace the polemical debate of the 1980s with a more productive dialogue on development between African leaders and the international community. Another key contributor was Charles Soludo, a leading African economist who consulted for the ECA, the World Bank and other institutions in the late 1990s before serving as Nigeria's Central Bank Governor from 2004 to 2009. Several other African experts peer-reviewed the Report. These included Tanzanian Benno Ndulu, who later became senior adviser to the World Bank Vice President for Africa; Louis Kasekende, later ADB Chief Economist; Delphin Rwegasira, later to become head of the AERC; Josue Dione, Director of Sustainable Development at the ECA; Abebe Shimeles, a leading Ethiopian economist and ECA consultant (who features in Chapter 4), and Lishan Adam, a well-known expert on ICTs in Africa, then at the ECA.

Even if the ECA leadership did not play a high-level official role in scripting the content and policy line of *'Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?'*, as has been claimed, senior ECA staff members and consultants were clearly involved, either centrally or as peer reviewers. A number of leading African economists with links to the ECA, ADB and AERC were similarly associated in one way or another with the Report. This demonstrates the extent to which a diverse group of ICEs could be 'enrolled' to provide the appearance of ideological convergence – another key characteristic of sub-hegemonic strategy.

¹¹⁶ Elbadawi worked for the World Bank before being seconded to the AERC for a period, and then returning to Washington and serving as a manager and lead economist before leaving in 2009 to join the Dubai Economic Council.

At the outset of the Amoako era at the ECA, it may have been a fair assumption for the Bank to assume that the ECA would be a compliant ally. However, I contend that Amoako – after nearly five years away from Washington D.C. and at pains to be seen as representing African as opposed to World Bank interests – had begun to view his and the ECA's role as going beyond moderating World Bank and IMF prescriptions to make them more palatable to African realities. This role extended to pro-actively shaping Bretton Woods and wider aid policy, as well as preparing the ground for significantly stronger African agency in setting its own agenda.

International Development Moves on

By the mid-1990s, policies derived from the so-called 'Washington Consensus' – which disciplined African countries into undertaking stabilisation, liberalisation and privatisation reforms – had palpably failed to bring about the promised growth and had instead wreaked a devastating socio-economic impact (cf. Mkandawire 2001, Stiglitz 1998, SAPRIN 2004). This failure brought about at least three significant effects: first, the recognition from within the World Bank itself that 'getting the institutions right' – in other words taking in account extra-economic factors – constituted an approach more likely to succeed; second, the understanding that developing countries must have much more say in determining their development strategy, leading to the phasing out of SAPs and the advent of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process; and third, the onset of aid fatigue in an increasingly competitive global economic environment.

The new international consensus was articulated in the Millennium Declaration, adopted on 8 September 2002 by all 189 member countries of the United Nations General Assembly. Shared responsibility among all nations for managing worldwide social and economic development was listed among fundamental values for international relations in the twenty-first century. The Declaration identified development and poverty reduction as one of the key objectives needed to translate the shared values into action, and laid down the basis for the eight MDGs, which are overwhelmingly focused on reducing poverty and advancing socio-economic development. Africa was singled out for special focus.

Nobel Laureate and former World Bank Chief Economist, Joseph Stiglitz emphasised extra-economic concerns when he conceptualised development as “transformation of society” (Stiglitz 1998). In a 1997 address to the World Bank Board of Governors titled *‘The Challenge of Inclusion’*, President James Wolfensohn stated:

“The message for countries is clear: educate your people, ensure their health, give them voice and justice, financial systems that work, and sound economic policies, and they will respond and they will save and they will attract the investment, both domestic and foreign, that is needed to raise living standards and fuel development” (Wolfensohn 1997, p.5).

On 21 January 1999, Wolfensohn proposed a Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF)¹¹⁷ to the World Bank Board and staff aimed at repositioning the Bank at the epicentre of efforts to reduce poverty and bring about sustainable development. The CDF was underpinned by four principles: long-term holistic vision; country ownership; country-led partnership; and a focus on results. As highlighted in this and the previous chapter, the World Bank was adept at accommodating dissenting ideas into its next-generation strategy – a key plank of its hegemony. In this case, and having learned from the Bank’s mistakes of the 1980s and 1990s, the CDF sought to replace the short-termism of SAPs with a long view that had long been advocated by the ECA and other institutions. The emphasis on country ownership and country-led partnership emanated from the lesson learned that development could not happen from the outside (Stiglitz 1999). The CDF principles captured key elements of the international development consensus, and the Framework was formally endorsed in January 2001 as the basis for all World Bank work.

¹¹⁷ Wolfensohn’s framework addressed four dimensions: structural, including good and clean government, an effective legal and justice system, a well-organised and supervised financial system, and a social safety net and social programmes; human, including education and knowledge institutions, and health and population issues; physical, including water and sewage, energy, roads, transportation and telecommunications, sustainable development, environmental and cultural issues; and specific rural, urban and private-sector strategies (Wolfensohn 1999).

Of major significance to African countries was the World Bank's introduction in September 1999 of the PRSP approach, which effectively replaced the SAPs of the 1980s and 1990s¹¹⁸. The PRSP was developed as the foundation for World Bank and IMF lending programmes as well as for the HIPC initiative discussed above. Poor countries wishing to access any new concessional funding from the Bank and Fund, and qualify for debt relief, now needed to prepare a national poverty reduction strategy in the form of a PRSP – which had to be approved by the World Bank and IMF Boards before any funds were released. The objective was to ensure that any additional resources going to poor countries would be used to reduce poverty. PRSPs were to involve wide-ranging national consultations including civil society¹¹⁹ and other non-governmental actors in recipient countries. The PRSPs are underpinned by five principles similar to those in the CDF: national ownership and country leadership; results or outcome orientation; comprehensive recognition of the multidimensional nature of poverty; partnership-orientation; and taking a long-term perspective (Bretton Woods Project 2003).

Even as the world rallied around the overarching imperative of tackling poverty, it emerged that aid, considered critical to making this happen, was on the decline. Relative to donor GDP, and since the mid-1990s, net disbursements of aid to Africa had dropped nearly 30% in real terms. As a result, the typical African country now faced a resource gap of more than 12% of GDP relative to the investments need of a growth rate likely to achieve the poverty reduction MDG for 2015 (World Bank 2000). The decline was attributed partly to the end of the Cold War, which led to a massive downturn in tied ideological aid, and partly to the recognition among donor and recipient countries as well as the multilateral system that aid was not working (Glennie 2008).

¹¹⁸ The advent of the PRSPs was accompanied by a rebranding. The IMF's Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) was renamed the Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF), while the Bank created a Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) to finance PRSPs and complement its traditional adjustment lending (Bretton Woods Project 2003).

¹¹⁹ Since my focus is on a mainstream ICE in Africa's development regime, I have deliberately refrained from engaging with the question of civil society in Africa. I discuss and provide an account of 'African civil society' in the Conclusion of this dissertation.

As a result, calls intensified for this trend to be reversed, leading the 2002 Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development to agree that, for poor countries to meet the MDGs, donors would need to increase aid volumes to 0.7% of their GDP¹²⁰. Added to this were calls for aid to Africa to be made more effective, codified in the Paris Declaration (2005), and for the international trading regime to be reconfigured to allow African countries to trade their way out of poverty. Put together, this signified a change in how global development was constituted, an effective evolution of the international development regime.

Influencing the Consensus

With a conviction that Africa needed a stronger voice in the world, the ECA intensified its efforts to engage with the international discourse and practice of development in a bid to position itself as a credible interlocutor for Africa. A key modality of the ECA strategy was its ability to convene African experts and policy-makers around key themes, and create an environment in which they could discuss and agree common positions on the way forward. Convening constitutes a powerful ‘political technology’, harnessed by ICEs in Africa’s development regime, to enable trans-national conversations (Cooper and Packard 1997). It can be deployed to achieve genuine consensus, or instrumentalised to manufacture consent. As a continental think tank, the ECA’s role was limited to generating, aggregating and transmitting knowledge. It had no mandate to implement development policies within countries, the exclusive preserve of the UNDP and other specialised agencies in the global UN division of labour. As such, the ECA relied heavily on its convening power as a means of setting agendas and influencing others to implement them.

Emblematic of this use of convening power was the ECA’s initiative on the PRSPs. In March 2000, and in collaboration with the World Bank and IMF, it organised a workshop for African countries to discuss the content, process and implications of the PRSPs on African countries. While welcoming the PRSP as a successor to SAPs, participants tabled a number of operational

¹²⁰ In 2005, calls for doubling aid to low-income countries would be repeated, first by the UN Millennium Project, then by the Commission for Africa, and by the G8 Gleneagles summit which agreed that this would happen by 2010.

challenges. Two months later, the ECA sent a high-level mission to several African countries at different stages of the PRSP process, to learn first-hand how these countries were adjusting to the process and addressing the practical challenges. The mission also met with Ministers and senior officials to discuss how the ECA might support African countries in the process (ECA 2001).

A key message emanating from the workshop and country visits was that SAPS had blunted the ability of African countries to systematically share experiences and articulate a strong African voice in the international community on the continent's experience (ECA 2001). As a result, and at the urging of African countries, the ECA established the African Learning Group on the PRSPs “as an African-owned forum that would facilitate African peer learning and serve as a mechanism through which Africans could ensure the relevance of the PRSP approach to Africa’s development challenges” (ibid, p.3).

The Learning Group brought PRSP practitioners together each year to share experiences, assess the PRSP process, and determine how best to address the concerns raised. A key objective was to operationalise the discourse of ‘country ownership’ deemed so central to the international development consensus and the emerging new aid relationship¹²¹. African countries that had undertaken to prepare PRSPs presented country studies at the meeting. Independent African experts and academics participated as resource persons or observers, as did donor representatives. Non-governmental experts attending included African economists working for independent national think-tanks who were considered important players in the wider PRSP community¹²². Invitees included both those identified with the mainstream, and those with

¹²¹ The Learning Group organised its work around five clusters of issues of concern to African countries implementing PRSPs: the content of growth strategies; PRSP-related financing and public expenditure management; legitimacy of the PRSP process; capacity requirements; and donor policies and modalities.

¹²² Presenters and discussants at the first PRSP-Learning Group meeting included Jalal Abdel Latif, executive director of Inter Africa Group, an independent think tank specialising in Horn of Africa issues; Joe Abbey, executive director of the Centre for Economic Policy Analysis, an independent Ghanaian think tank, albeit close to government; Oumou Toure Traore, executive secretary of the Mali Women’s Organisation; Marie Memouna Shaba, head of the Association of NGOs in Tanzania; Prof. Fantu Cheru of the American University and a leading Pan-Africanist technocrat who had written on issues such as the African renaissance; Dr Samuel Wangwe, executive director of the Economic and Social Research Foundation in Tanzania; and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, a

critical views – and the ECA used its convening power to encourage the airing of dissenting views. This is consistent with my argument that sub-hegemony goes beyond simple ‘translation’ to involve creative adaptation influenced by multiple perspectives.

The initial Learning Group meeting held in Addis Ababa from 5-6 November 2001 concluded that, for African countries to benefit from PRSPs, the process should be “focused on the articulation of growth strategies that are consistent with the broad development objectives of African countries” (ECA 2001, p.4). On off-budget aid, there were candid discussions on the largely political nature of such support, with a consensus that, in bypassing normal government-approval processes, such aid undermined accountability and transparency in the use of public resources. Subsequent Learning Group meetings took place in November 2002 (Brussels) and December 2003 (Addis Ababa), deepening the focus on the five core themes. The ECA also established an African knowledge network and community of practice on the PRSPs, to facilitate ongoing sharing of experience.

As a result of the studies and discussions associated with the first three Learning Group forums, African countries gradually shifted their emphasis away from the World Bank/IMF PRSP process *per se*, to advocate for second-generation national poverty reduction strategies (SGPRSs) which would be produced independently by each country. Furthermore, the Learning Group strategy had gradually evolved towards harmonising poverty reduction and MDG country strategies as reflected in the title of the fourth Learning Group meeting, in March 2006: *‘African Plenary on National Strategies for Poverty Reduction and Implementation of the Millennium Development Goals’*. The success of the Learning Group lay in its combination of country evidence and facilitation of African voice – with the ECA’s ability to convene and amplify African perspectives a key factor. African policy-makers and the Bretton Woods institutions alike considered the Learning Group to have added value (Makonnen 2009).

private equity manager who had formerly served as head of UNDP’s Africa bureau and was later to become Liberian head of state (ECA 2001).

Another factor characterised the ECA approach – opportunism. Asked by the Strategic Partnership with Africa (SPA)¹²³ to host a meeting of its Technical Group in Addis Ababa, the ECA scheduled the SPA meeting from 8-9 November 2001, a few days after the inaugural Learning Group meeting on 5-6 November. In between, the ECA arranged a one-day joint Learning Group/ SPA meeting on 7 November. The ECA thereby opportunistically created space for the African policy-makers and experts attending the Learning Group meeting to engage with the SPA donor representatives face to face. This created a precedent, with subsequent Learning Group and SPA meetings convened back-to-back.

The outcome of this dialogue exceeded the ECA's expectations. As a direct result of the meeting organised opportunistically by the ECA, the SPA agreed to restructure itself, from being a donor club to becoming a partnership involving African countries (Barder 2008). Its rationale was to ensure that the African voice on aid could be heard in a forum of equals that included the World Bank, European Union and leading bilateral donors. In 2006, the SPA changed its name from the 'Special Programme of Assistance to Africa' to the 'Strategic Partnership with Africa'. Donors, however, despite having agreed to the partnership, complained that the character of the SPA as an informal grouping was altered by the inclusion of African countries. Many began sending less senior technocrats to participate in SPA plenary meetings. This sent a signal to the African membership that donors did not like the idea of an equal partnership, and led to declining interest in the SPA among its African membership (Amoako-Tuffour *et al* 2008).

This reaffirms that power struggles do not end with formal, discursive agreements on equal partnership. The SPA's discourse on a 'partnership of equals' reflected gains made by the ECA and other ICEs in pressuring donor countries to move beyond rhetorical commitments to expanded 'African ownership'. However, African countries, having acceded to membership of the SPA, now had to fight for an equal stake and equal involvement within the forum. While proximity to the centre of power gave African SPA members greater leverage to determine aid

¹²³ Established by the World Bank in 1986 as the 'Special Program of Assistance to Africa', the SPA started out as a donors-only club with the mission of mobilising resources for cash-strapped African countries who has agreed to implement World Bank and IMF-directed reforms under SAPs.

policy on Africa, the threat by donors to de-prioritise the SPA as a forum for dialogue on aid policy also risked robbing Africans of a crucial and unique space in which to contest the power asymmetry in the discourse and practice of aid to Africa. This provides further evidence in support of my theoretical argument about the fluidity and inter-relatedness of resistance and reaffirmation in development regimes, resulting in no hegemonic claim ever being definitively or irreversibly actualised. Agrawal (1999) refers to this tendency towards fluidity as a 'moving equilibrium'.

The perceived success of the PRSP Learning Group and the reforming of the SPA led the ECA to launch the '*Big Table*', a one-day, informal closed-door meeting bringing together African Ministers of Finance with OECD Development Co-operation Ministers. The first edition, on 19 November 2000, brought together 11 African Ministers, 10 OECD Ministers and 5 high-level representatives from international institutions for a frank exchange on the international development goals and PRSPs (ECA 2000b). The second '*Big Table*', held in Amsterdam from 14-16 October 2001, focused on governance, making aid more effective, and African peer review (ECA 2001c). The third '*Big Table*' (Addis Ababa, 18-19 January 2003) discussed the concept of mutual accountability, while the fourth edition (Addis Ababa, 16-17 October 2004) focused on how to stimulate private investment to Africa. At all these meetings, attendance was at the highest level – indicating demand for genuine dialogue.

As well as attracting key policy-makers on development issues from both African and OECD countries, the '*Big Table*' was significant for two other reasons. First, the ECA's convening role meant it could use the forum to advance consensus on its key ideas – in the process inserting itself as a key interlocutor between Africa and its donors and creating the constituency for behaviour change. This again speaks to the power that convening confers on the convenor. Assembling others to dialogue implies a lead role for the convenor in preparing the agenda for discussion. Second, the '*Big Table*' became a key privileged space in which ideological differences between OECD countries were played out. As the ECA principal adviser recalled:

“The Big Table was a place where [donors]] could work out their tensions with other donors, in a frank and open manner. I remember [then Secretary of State for International Development] Clare Short found the Big Table exciting because she was at the forefront of thinking and wanted to engage Rwanda in a 10-year partnership underpinned by predictable Budget Support. The U.S. was against Budget Support and opposed the U.K. in the Big Table. There was a blow-out between Short and Andrew Natsios, the USAID Administrator” (Makonnen 2009).

In order to aggregate and represent the ‘African voice’ more fully, a different kind of forum was needed to bring a wider cross-section of actors to the table. This led the ECA to launch the African Development Forum (ADF) in 1999, an initiative designed:

“to establish **an African-driven development agenda that reflects a consensus among major partners** and that leads to specific programmes for country implementation” (ECA 1999, emphasis added).

The ADF’s objective was to foster new forms of partnership that could deepen and sustain emphasis on policy reforms and good governance. This was regarded as the reason for improvements in the economic performance of many African countries over the previous five years (ibid).

The ADF is a multi-stakeholder conference convened in Addis Ababa and dedicated to a key development theme. Dialogue is informed by in-depth research, undertaken by the ECA and collaborating institutions and networks, the results of which is presented to ADF participants – drawn from African governments, civil society, the private sector, researchers and academics, intergovernmental organisations and donors. Based on evidence presented, participants are expected to come up with shared goals and priorities, design action plans and programmes, and agree on how to implement them. Four editions of the ADF were held during Amoako’s tenure at the ECA, and two under the subsequent leadership. Space available here permits only brief reflection on how the first four ADF editions were conceived as part of a wider strategic approach to setting an African agenda.

The first ADF, held from 24-28 October 1999, focused on the *'Challenge to Africa of Globalisation and the Information Age'*. This reflected the ECA's strong espousal of information and communication technologies as a way for Africa to leapfrog some of its most intractable development challenges. ADF II (3-7 December 2000) zeroed in on *'AIDS: The Greatest Leadership Challenge'*. Although HIV and AIDS did not feature as a distinct work stream at the ECA, the selection of this theme reflected a widespread concern that the pandemic risked derailing Africa's development progress. ADF II directly influenced the adoption by African leaders of the Abuja Declaration on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and other Infectious Diseases and the accompanying Abuja Framework, agreed in April 2001. Inspired by the ADF II outcomes, the ECA conceived the Commission on HIV/AIDS and Governance in Africa (CHGA)¹²⁴, which was convened by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and chaired by Amoako. CHGA advocated scaling up the response to HIV/AIDS by combining data on macroeconomic modelling of its future impact on Africa's development with high-level advocacy by CHGA's commissioners, all leading figures in international development.

From 3-8 March 2002, ADF III convened on the theme *'Defining Priorities for Regional Integration'*, reflecting a continuing preoccupation with a strong African aspiration. Among other things, the ADF IV Consensus Statement called for the proliferation of regional economic communities and arrangements – identified as a key obstacle to advancing regional integration – to be rationalised. This informed the first edition of the ECA policy research report *'Assessing Regional Integration in Africa'* (ARIA), which undertook a detailed analysis of the impact of integration efforts to date and spelled out an agenda for accelerating progress.

'Governance for a Progressing Africa' was chosen as the theme for ADF IV (11-15 October 2004), reflecting the ECA's core focus on defining an African governance agenda. Those attending included World Bank President James Wolfensohn, future President of Liberia Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, and Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who in his opening statement described the ADF as "the leading Forum for serious and intellectually rigorous discussion and

¹²⁴ For more on CHGA, see <http://www.uneca.org/CHGA/>.

exchange of views on critical issues related to the development challenges of Africa,” adding: “Without good governance and the full respect of the democratic rights of citizens and all sectors of society, it would be impossible to put in place conditions for durable peace and stability” (Zenawi 2004). Among the invited participants were traditional African leaders such as the Asantehene, the monarch of Ghana’s Ashanti kingdom, who spoke passionately about the need to draw on traditional forms of governance in the African context.

In summary, the ADF sought to do four things: (i) provide a space for Africans from across the spectrum as well as for Africa’s development partners to meet and agree on a practicable African development agenda; (ii) aggregate the African voice on a given theme; (iii) demonstrate to Africa’s international partners that its countries had internalised good governance and the necessity of continuing policy reforms as African agendas; and (iv) recalibrate the power asymmetry in international relations to position Africa in a lead role in conceiving of and pursuing its own development. The ECA’s strategy was to bring together a wide range of stakeholders and allow them to engage and arrive at a consensus. While many stakeholders were from governments, a significant number were drawn from independent African organisations, including think tanks, policy advocacy NGOs, academia, and other associational forms usually referred to as ‘African civil society’ (briefly discussed in Chapter 5 and the Conclusion below).

His Master’s Voice?

As with much of the ECA’s strategy during the period under review, the ADF approach was to progress on the basis of ‘consensus among major partners’, and to focus on deepening ‘policy reforms and good governance’. This gives credence to the view of the ECA of that period as a Trojan horse for the international development consensus on how African development should proceed. Indeed, and over and above contributions to the UN General Budget, the ECA secured substantial extra-budgetary funding from several bilateral donors to support key modalities for delivering its agenda – including a grant from the UK Government of £2.25 million over three years starting in 2004 (ECA/DFID 2004).

The Commission was clearly able to extend the boundaries of 'ownership' by expanding policy space to foster stronger African agency in determining its future. I contend that this constituted part of a deliberate ECA strategy to move beyond a classic sub-hegemonic role by creating the policy space necessary for the emergence of an African-led development agenda. In Chapter 2, and drawing on Moore and Schmitz (1995), I argued that while in many cases development agency experts "must maintain their masters' legitimacy" (ibid, p.11), as they cannot not openly dissent from the dominant discourse, they are "...purveyors of passive revolution, the manufacturers of minimal hegemony" (ibid). It is my view that the tactics described in the pages above conformed to this approach.

In the period under review, the ECA sought to ensure that key multilateral and bilateral donors would support its ideas. It did this by ensuring its discourse echoed key structural underpinnings of the dominant international development discourse, effectively accepting that there was no longer any African effort to contest the modified neo-liberal Project. On this basis, it positioned itself as a credible interlocutor between Africa and its development partners. As a trusted institution able to take forward the international consensus on the need for 'greater ownership' of development among recipient countries, the ECA used its convening power to incubate and midwife strong African positions agreed by a cross-section of Africa's policy community. By facilitating the agency of a diverse range of African stakeholders, the ECA ensured that the 'passive revolution' implied in these positions came not from ECA experts alone, but represented the views of African experts and policy-makers across the continent. Thus, the emphasis shifted away from overt contestation on ideological grounds, towards a technocratic sub-hegemonic approach predicated on creating and opening up African policy space.

The ECA's role as 'manufacturer of minimal hegemony' emerged gradually over the period under review. From 1995 to 1998, Amoako iterated ideas he had developed as Director of Education and Social Policy in the World Bank. World Bank and other international experts

were often involved – alongside African technocrats – in the peer review of ECA research studies. Amoako also travelled to Washington D.C. several times each year to meet with World Bank President Wolfensohn – who he admired (Amoako 2006) – as well as with other senior officials. These included his friend Callisto Madavo, a Zimbabwean who like Amoako had joined the Bank as a young African professional, and risen to the rank of Vice President of the Africa Region¹²⁵.

However, as the ECA became more credible and trusted, it consciously began to steer a more independent course. As a senior ECA adviser (also a former World Bank employee) recalled, while the World Bank was skilled at engaging with other institutions to influence their thinking, its overtures were not always welcomed. As evidence of this, she offered the following anecdote:

“A delegation from the Bank came to ECA to work with us on the Commission on HIV/AIDS and Governance. The bone of contention was that they wanted to introduce anti-retroviral drugs in specific countries on a pilot basis. We at ECA argued that there would be no point in introducing anti-retrovirals on a pilot basis as the immune systems of those participating in the pilot would immediately suffer when the drugs were withdrawn. For us it was an ethical issue. [Amoako] had some very harsh words over the phone with a lady at the Bank who was leading the mission” (Makonnen 2005).

The Compact for African Recovery

The ECA had to maintain a delicate balance between its pro-active effort to influence the dominant development institutions and discourse, and the extent to which its work responded to the demands of its core constituents, Africa’s policy-making community. On 21 November 2000, at the opening of the ECA’s 8th session of African Ministers of Finance in Addis Ababa, Amoako took the balancing act to new heights. In a speech, he tabled a far-reaching proposal under which donors would provide aid, debt relief and market access in return for Africa putting in place the necessary reform to ensure economic take-off.

¹²⁵ Some of Amoako’s visits to Washington D.C. were of a personal nature, since his family remained in the U.S.

Two sets of developments indicated that the time was right for such a compact, he argued. On the one hand, there was:

“a growing recognition by international partners and reforming African countries that stabilisation policies are not the same as structural adjustment [and that] we [therefore] need to go far deeper to reposition poverty reduction at the centre of our development efforts” (Amoako 2000).

On the other hand, Africa was at a crossroads: five African countries had adopted sustainable reforms and shown signs of structural diversification; 14 countries showed prospects of a sustainable take-off in the next 15 years; and on the political front, there was a deepening of democracy, more participatory development and greater local responsibility. To entrench these positive yet fragile gains, Amoako argued for: “...a bold and comprehensive plan for Africa’s irreversible emergence from its current fragile state” (ibid, emphasis in the original).

On aid, Amoako proposed “a substantial, but carefully agreed and phased, injection of official development assistance, which would be linked to performance indicators agreed by both sides” (ibid, 2000). Since it was unlikely that donors would increase their aid overnight, he argued, progress would need to be made on debt relief. Trade was proposed as the third option for filling the financing gap and “as a critical part of moving from aid to self-reliance” (ibid). In return for enhanced market access, African countries would undertake to establish policies that encouraged exports, attracted private investment, and stimulated diversification.

On the other side, and in return for action by developed countries on all three financing fronts, African countries should acknowledge the need for political reform and “forge ahead, in line with international consensus, to move beyond counting ballots to making the link between voting, participation, accountability, transparency and good governance” (ibid). As a final element of the proposed compact, Amoako argued in favour of “a reformed international financial system which serves all nations, with increasing regard to the poorest” (ibid).

The ideas contained in Amoako's speech reflected how closely the ECA had adhered to the international consensus, whether on aid, debt relief, trade or 'good governance'. However, there were clear signs in the speech of attempts to secure a better deal for Africa. On aid, Amoako proposed that donors be more predictable in their giving, and be held accountable for how aid was disbursed and for the kind of support given. On debt relief, he argued that Enhanced HIPC, whose predecessor he had criticised for not going far enough, was also flawed. On trade, his argument in favour of enhanced market access was consistent with positions tabled by the OAU, which traditionally took more radical positions. A significant difference, however, was that Amoako proposed that, in return for enhanced market access, African countries should agree to meet certain policy conditionalities consonant with the neo-liberal reform agenda – such as building export-oriented economies and attracting private investment.

African Finance Ministers asked the ECA to develop the ideas outlined in the speech into a substantive document, and to consult with different actors to ensure that it could be implemented successfully. The result was the '*Compact for African Recovery*'. Published on 21 April 2001, the '*Compact*' was the ECA's most far-reaching policy statement during the period under review. "We are at a critical moment at which lessons learned can be put to the best use", the document stated, adding:

"The *Compact* is therefore a timely instrument, drawing upon existing modalities and developing emerging best practices, to draw up a comprehensive response to Africa's development challenges. The *Compact* does not propose any new aid modalities or instruments. Rather, the intention is to exploit to the full the scope of what already exists and, by providing an African vision for enhanced partnerships, to stimulate a transformation in aid relationships including fostering public-private partnerships" (ECA 2001, p.3).

The *Compact* builds on the proposals in the 2000 speech, spelling out in some detail the key areas for joint action by Africa and its development partners, areas for improvement by Africa, and areas for donor improvement.

The *Compact* contained four principles:

1. **African ownership** of visions and goals for national development, as well as policies and programmes for poverty reduction and the increased participation of African countries in the global economy;
2. **stable long-term resource flows** to Africa and the predictability of long-term donor support;
3. **a transformed partnership** based on mutual accountability to agreed development outcomes, including peer review and performance monitoring among both African countries and international partners;
4. **recognition of Africa's diversity**, meaning that some countries can immediately benefit from the full range of measures outlined, while others need to make progress in governance and economic management before they will qualify (ibid, p.25).

On African ownership, the *Compact* states:

“[African] ownership entails leadership and capacity to define and implement strategies that ensure the economic and social wellbeing of the country's citizens. National identification of development priorities and strategies is the first and most essential step. Elected officials should promote broad-based consensus around national strategies and related policy choices. Following from this, public officials should be committed and able to govern the affairs of the country in an efficient and accountable manner” (ECA 2001, par. 147, p.26).

Additionally, African ownership implies:

“...a willingness on the part of international donors to coordinate and channel their aid programmes **in accordance with African-led agendas and approaches**, support national institutions and processes that foster consensus-building and accountable economic management, and redirect technical assistance programmes towards long-term national capacity needs” (ibid, emphasis added).

This clearly locates the primary responsibility of Africa's own leadership in solving the continent's problems, resonating with the sentiment in African leadership plans even before the LPA. However, what makes this definition all the more far-reaching is that donors are also given a responsibility for enabling African ownership by aligning their support around African

priorities. A measure of the success of the ECA's sub-hegemonic approach between 1995 and 2005 is that it was able to press such a claim for expanded African ownership, and command attention.

On the second principle, stable long-term resource flows, the *Compact* cites trust as being central to a new aid relationship, which should involve a shift from excessive conditionality to longer-term predictable relations. To earn this trust, African countries should "[demonstrate] their commitment to manage their aid effectively for developmental outcomes and to take charge of their development efforts" (ibid, par. 161, p.28). In return, donors should be willing to:

"...realign their aid policies and practices consistent with the spirit of African leadership and ownership of its development. This should include a greater move away from fragmented project support [...] to long-term programme support channelled through the recipient country's medium term expenditure framework and a genuine commitment to prevent the diversions in aid relations that are triggered by *ad-hoc* incidents" (ibid, par. 162, p.28).

This principle is important, as it was later to emerge as a key aspect of the 2005 *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness*, which articulated a powerful agenda around stronger recipient-country ownership and leadership, and reflected a commitment by OECD donors, at least on paper, to reform the aid system. The *Compact* added to the pressure on donors to cut out duplication, move away from project support, use more flexible aid instruments (such as budget support), and harmonise and align their aid around national priorities. The ECA was at the heart of negotiations on these sensitive issues.

The third *Compact* principle calls for a transformed partnership, arguing that the phenomenon of upward accountability – whereby African countries are obliged to submit multiple reports to donors and undergo a proliferation of donor evaluations – must give way to a system of mutual accountability. This is described as "the shared commitment by African countries and donors to monitor progress towards agreed goals and to peer review" (ibid, par. 167, p.29). The idea that the two sides of the transformed partnership should be able to hold each other to account, and

should jointly develop mechanisms to do so, was an important proposal, as it forced a conceptual shift in how that aid was accounted for. In concrete terms, it led the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementing Council (HSGIC) to commission a review of donor performance, requesting the ECA to develop a framework for mutual review in collaboration with the OECD. This resulted in the annual Mutual Review of Development Effectiveness (MRDE)¹²⁶.

The fourth *Compact* principle recognises the diversity of countries and sub-regions, identifying three groups of countries: ‘enhanced partnership’, ‘limited partnership’ and ‘post-conflict’ countries. States labelled ‘enhanced partnership’ countries are those that fully meet criteria for governance, economic performance and commitment to poverty reduction “...and can therefore take full advantage of all the measures envisaged, and benefit from the resulting increase in quantity and quality of resource flow”. These countries “...should receive direct budgetary support in line with medium term expenditure frameworks towards agreed poverty reduction targets” (ibid, pp.5-6)¹²⁷ Few countries can initially meet the standards laid down for ‘enhanced partnership’, and these will “...need to make progress in governance and economic management before they will qualify” (ibid, p.4)¹²⁸.

Although the ECA refrained from publicly identifying which countries it considered to be in which category, the intention was clearly to promote the creation of an incentive-based system whereby Africa’s best-performing reformers would attract the lion’s share of aid. As will shortly be discussed, this selective approach set the ECA apart from the African Union, which staunchly pursued a ‘solidarity’ narrative predicated on all its 53 member states being given equal treatment and developing in tandem. The downside of such an approach could the effective

¹²⁶ The report looks at the policies and performance of both African countries and partner countries in seven chapters: progress of African countries towards the MDGs; achievements, constraints, and challenges in agriculture performance and trade; trends in political and economic governance in the region; capacity development; aid flows; aid quality; and policy coherence (ECA 2005).

¹²⁷ The IMF (2002) also notes the preference for partnership selectivity on the donor side.

¹²⁸ According to de Waal (2002), “the concept of ‘enhanced partnership’, which integrates the best practices of both recipients and donors in the aid relationship, was developed at the ECA, and provided the central plank of its Compact for African Recovery, the most intellectually substantive contribution to NEPAD” (ibid, p.469).

creation of momentum for a “two-speed Africa” (Griggs, 2003, p.80), whereby good performers are rewarded and poor performers lag even further behind. Adedeji (2002) describes this as a shift from an ‘entitlement’ to an ‘effectiveness’ approach, arguing that the new approach is biased in favour of performance in key areas of the consensus reform agenda – macro-economic policy, poverty reduction and the exercise of good governance. As I discuss below, the *Compact* tabled a series of innovative ideas that soon provided the basis for the next African continental development plan.

From MAP and OMEGA to NAI then NEPAD

As noted, the *Compact* document was developed at the behest of African Finance Ministers, who endorsed the idea at their Addis Ababa meeting in November 2000. The Ministers have also asked the ECA to consult widely with individuals and institutions inside and outside Africa on how best to deliver the proposals contained in the *Compact*. As the consultations got underway, news emerged that three African leaders – Presidents Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria – were working on a new African development plan called the ‘*Millennium Africa Recovery Programme*’ (MAP).

In a briefing at the World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland on 21 January 2001, Mbeki told participants that the MAP was a declaration of a firm commitment by African leaders to take ownership and responsibility for the sustainable economic development of the continent. Its focus was to be on: creating peace, security, stability and democratic governance; investing in Africa’s people; harnessing Africa’s natural resources to lead development of industrial strategy; closing the digital divide; developing transport, energy and other infrastructure; and arriving at a financing mechanism (Mbeki 2001). Through these initiatives, the three African leaders hoped to accelerate poverty reduction efforts on the continent and increase domestic as well as foreign savings.

As the prime mover behind the MAP, Mbeki used a series of speeches delivered from 1996 onwards to argue that a political, socio-economic and cultural ‘African renaissance’ was in the

making. Meantime, another African leader, President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, announced his '*OMEGA Plan for Africa*', an ambitious proposal calling the development of Africa's physical and human capital as the key prerequisites for sustained and balanced growth (Wade 2001). OMEGA – addressing the long-held aspiration of regional integration – would be presided over by a single international authority, and financed by foreign direct investment.

Recognising the need to rationalise the two initiatives, African leaders meeting at an extraordinary AU summit in Sirte, Libya in March 2001 decreed that the OMEGA Plan and MAP should be merged. The ECA saw the need for facilitation of the technical merger of the two initiatives, and dedicated its 25th Conference of African Ministers of Finance and Planning, held in Algiers from 8-10 May 2001, to the purpose. The '*Compact for African Recovery*' was published as the issues paper for the conference, with a revised title signalling the ECA's intent: '*Compact for African Recovery – Operationalising the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme (MAP)*'.

The Conference was highly charged. Senegal, under orders from President Wade to ensure his OMEGA Plan remained intact, sent a delegation of three Ministers, headed by Foreign Affairs Minister Cheikh Tidiane Gadio. It was the first time a member state had sent so many Ministers to an ECA Conference of Ministers, and the first time a Foreign Minister had attended a conference of Finance and Planning Ministers (Todaro 2009). There was tension about whose ideas would be most influential and decisive in reaching a new African development initiative. The first concern was the ECA's *Compact* amid concerns that its profile was too high. Simba Makoni, Zimbabwe's then Finance Minister and outgoing Chair of Bureau of the Conference of Ministers, made it clear that Africa could not afford three initiatives aimed in the same direction, with common development goals and the same noble intentions. He told the conference that, in the interest of achieving coherence, the ECA had agreed to "subsume the *Compact* into the initiative of the sovereigns" and offer the *Compact* as a technical implementation modality in support of the political vision as espoused by the MAP (ECA 2001d).

Amoako was even more tactful in his opening statement in Algiers:

“It is most fortunate that the development of the *Compact* has been carried out at the same time that Presidents Bouteflika, Mbeki and Obasanjo have shown bold leadership with their [MAP]. In meetings with Presidents Mbeki and Obasanjo and with leaders of our host Government, we quickly agreed that the *Compact* should serve to help operationalise the MAP. I have also met with President Wade who has developed a parallel initiative known as the OMEGA Plan. I see very high potential for the merger of the MAP and the OMEGA Plan so that at the political level, Africa can speak with a united voice. In fact, I think we are well on the way to this point” (Amoako 2001).

Due to sustained insistence by the Senegalese delegation that the OMEGA Plan constituted the most operational of the initiatives on the table, the conference was dominated by efforts to bring about convergence between the MAP and the OMEGA. The Conference Bureau, consisting of Algeria, Gabon, Mali, South Africa and Tanzania, reportedly met several times to discuss the problem, and there was a great deal of behind-the-scenes mediation (ECA 2001e). Although agreement was reached in principle, the actual merger of the two initiatives did not happen in Algiers. Instead, a process of negotiation was launched. Two planned workshops – in Abuja on the MAP and Dakar on OMEGA – were encouraged to proceed on the condition that they worked towards a merger. The ECA was handed an official role as facilitator and requested to convene a meeting, bringing together MAP and OMEGA technical experts as well as other African experts, “with the aim of arriving at a single programme that reflects the national, sub-regional and regional dimensions” (ECA 2001f).

Following the workshops, and shortly before the OAU Summit in Lusaka, Zambia, Wade and a team of Senegalese experts flew to South Africa where they sat with Mbeki and his team and finalised the merger of the leadership initiatives (Landsberg 2002) – which were officially merged on 3 July into what became known as the ‘*New African Initiative*’ (NAI). On 11 July 2001, the NAI was unanimously adopted by African leaders at the Lusaka Summit. While the document read in many parts like the MAP, the NAI strongly emphasised infrastructure,

remaining faithful to the OMEGA Plan¹²⁹. In July 2001, Presidents Mbeki, Obasanjo and Wade travelled to Genoa in Italy to present the NAI to G8 leaders – who responded by committing to working in partnership with Africa on the strength of the proposals in the initiative. African leaders also held meetings in the UK and Belgium to drum up support for the NAI. On 23 October 2003, at the inaugural meeting of its 15-member Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC), the NAI was renamed the '*New Partnership for African Development*' (NEPAD) and South Africa designated as the home for its Secretariat.

I will revisit critiques of the NEPAD Framework in Chapter 5. Here, it is sufficient to note that NEPAD proclaimed itself “a new framework of interaction with the rest of the world, including the industrialised countries and multilateral organisations” (NEPAD 2001, p.10). It advocated for Africa’s equal participation in the globalised economy through a set of mutually binding partnership commitments with developed countries, and proposed a new compact between Africa’s rulers and ruled. NEPAD was hailed by one commentator as “potentially... the most important advance in African development policy during the past four decades” (Hope 2002, p.401), initiated by “...a new generation of enlightened African leaders” who “have now decided to stake Africa’s claim to the twenty-first century” (ibid, pp.387-88). Another wrote that it was “...perhaps the boldest new initiative in recent times on the appropriate path [that] the African continent should be taking towards its long-term development” (Olukoshi, 2002, p.1). However, the ECA/NEPAD philosophy soon clashed with the solidarity narrative of the African Union.

Competing Narratives

In July 2000 in Durban, South Africa, the OAU was laid to rest and its successor organisation, the African Union (AU), was officially launched. The aim of the AU was to revitalise previous plans for political and economic unity, and accord them a higher priority. This marked a major shift –

¹²⁹ That said, it is significant that Senegal’s President Wade became highly critical of NEPAD over time, and was quoted by the Senegalese News Agency (APS) on 28 June 2006 as stating during a two-day visit to Tehran, Iran: “NEPAD has failed. We did not choose the right people; they are not managers able to complete projects. NEPAD has not built a single mile of road” (Reuters 2006).

enshrining the right of the AU to intervene in a member state, respect for democratic principles, human rights and good governance, and promotion of social justice and gender equality¹³⁰. The AU's expansive mandate, as specified in the Constitutive Act (11 July 2000) signalled the intent of Africa's leadership to position AU as the primary initiative not only on politics, but also on development (da Costa 2007).

For many, the AU constituted an unprecedented opportunity for Africa to overcome the constraints of its multiplicity of borders and to have a stronger voice globally. One commentator saw the AU as part of the African response to globalisation, arguing that, whilst most individual African states were becoming irrelevant globally, as a unit the continent could potentially have a bigger voice (Abdul-Raheem 2006). Another commentator conceptualised the transition from OAU to AU as a radical shift that changed the broad existential motivation for having a continental organisation and ushered in a stronger commitment to development (Le Pere 2006).

The AU and NEPAD shared the common goal of regional integration, and originated from the same pan-Africanist discursive imaginings highlighted earlier in this dissertation. NEPAD was launched a year after the Constitutive Act established the AU. Tension arose because, in a continent of 53 countries, characterised by multiple layers of supra-national structures with overlapping memberships and diverse agendas, both NEPAD and the AU stood out as totalising, hegemonic regional processes¹³¹. NEPAD's proponents ruled that all other initiatives promoted by individual countries must be subsumed under the NEPAD process, with a view to having Africa "...speak with one voice and collectively and effectively cooperate with its development partners" (Hope 2002, p.399). Similarly, the AU was mandated to supersede all previous political, economic, social and cultural efforts at regional integration.

¹³⁰ Critically, the sacred cow of sovereignty enshrined in the OAU's credo of non-interference and non-aggression was replaced by a new doctrine mandating the right to intervene to restore peace and security in specific circumstances – genocide, gross violations of human rights, national instability with cross-border ramifications, and unconstitutional changes of government.

¹³¹ Yet there is no mention in the Constitutive Act of NEPAD and hardly any references in NEPAD to the Constitutive Act (Adedeji 2002).

Formally, NEPAD was enshrined as a 'mandated initiative' of the AU. However, NEPAD's key proponents – in particular Mbeki – were keen that it should not become subject to the slow and cumbersome procedures of continental decision-making (de Waal, 2002). This fractious dualism emanated from competing and contradictory narratives. While NEPAD predicated the development of Africa on solidarity with rich countries, many of them former colonial powers, the AU narrative sought continental solidarity with the South as a means of increasing Africa's global bargaining power. The discursive dualism created divisions over development-policy options for Africa as a continent¹³² (Griggs 2003, p.77), sparking tensions between the AU Commission and the NEPAD Secretariat. As a result, African leaders that had signed up to NEPAD, meeting in Maputo, Mozambique in July 2003, agreed that the NEPAD Secretariat should move from South Africa to the AU's seat in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia within three years, or whenever the AU was ready to absorb the secretariat functions, whichever came first. Meantime, the AU granted the NEPAD Secretariat legal cover to operate temporarily from South Africa (AU 2003).

The tensions led the then UN Resident Coordinator in South Africa to urge that NEPAD seek to become an agency of change and restraint, as opposed to a continental Ministry of Planning or Governance (Ohiorhenuan 2003). Nevertheless, and to date, the agreed-to integration of NEPAD and AU structures has not yet taken place and the NEPAD Secretariat remains in South Africa. This is partly because of the cumbersome process associated with implementing any decision taken under the auspices of the AU, but also because of fears that moving the NEPAD Secretariat to the AU's Addis Ababa headquarters could expose the initiative to the AU's bureaucratic inertia.

¹³² Libya's President Muammar Gaddafi, a key proponent of the South versus North discourse, proposed a 'United States of Africa' at the 1999 Sirte Summit of the OAU, and subsequently contributed more than US\$1 million towards the OAU/AU transition. He was a vehement opponent of NEPAD, deeming it to be "a project of former colonisers and racists" (Griggs, 2003, pp.78-79). Zimbabwe's Mugabe and Namibia's Sam Nujoma were also vociferous in their rejection of any role in NEPAD for Africa's former colonial rulers (ibid).

ECA's Role Questioned

NEPAD was also seen as duplicating the work of the ECA, which was deemed to possess a comparative advantage in socio-economic policy analysis. This perceived duplication was ironic considering the high degree of consonance between the ECA's position, as stated in the *Compact*, and the NEPAD framework document. Nevertheless, and despite the ECA's strategic repositioning of its *Compact* to reduce its profile, questions began to be asked about why the ECA should be allowed to speak on behalf of Africa, given the existence of the AU and NEPAD.

These concerns represented a resurgence of older questions about the place of the ECA – an Africa-dedicated institution which was nevertheless a member of the UN family – in the institutional architecture of Africa's development regime. As noted in Chapter 2, this concern was manifest two decades earlier in rivalry between the ECA and OAU, leading to the development of two parallel drafts of the Lagos Plan of Action¹³³. However, in this instance it became clear that the ECA's prominent role in shaping key African and international initiatives during the period under review¹³⁴ had also pitted it against a handful of African leaders, who felt that it was their prerogative to take the lead in articulating Africa's development discourse. The campaign to discredit Amoako on his arrival in 1995, which continued throughout his tenure, had sought to influence a number of African Heads of State, some of whom were concerned that the ECA was overstepping its mark.

According to an ECA staff member close to the then leadership who attended the NEPAD HSGIC meeting on the sidelines of the AU Summit in Durban, South Africa, one of these leaders was Nigeria's President Olusegun Obasanjo. Obasanjo publicly stated: "the ECA is not an African

¹³³ The origins of this concern will be revisited in more detail in Chapter 4.

¹³⁴ This is evident in the numerous accolades bestowed on K.Y. Amoako during his tenure. These included: his naming as a member of several international commissions and task forces (including the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health chaired by Jeffrey Sachs (2000-2002); the Commission for Africa established by U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair (June 2005); Commissioner, the Commission on Capital Flows to Africa (2003); the Global Information Infrastructure Commission; the International Task force on Global Public Goods co-chaired by former Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo (2006); and the Commission on HIV/AIDS and Governance, established by then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (2003). In addition, Amoako was awarded an honorary Doctor of Laws degree by Addis Ababa University (2003); and an honorary Doctor of Letters degree by the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Ghana (2005). He was also invited by Tony Blair to 10 Downing Street to deliver the Millennium Lecture (2001).

institution”, and so should not be a major institutional player in implementing NEPAD (Jarrett 2009). Former ECA Executive Secretary, Adebayo Adedeji was appointed a member of the APRM Eminent Person’s Panel, which he later chaired; this fuelled the tension, as Adedeji was known to be close to Obasanjo and had openly opposed Amoako as his successor at ECA (Adedeji 2006).

During the Amoako era, the ECA maintained good relations with its smaller African member states, among them Rwanda, Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania. However, the bigger states, mainly Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt, were much more ambiguous about the extent to which the ECA should lead in informing African development strategy (Jarrett 2009). Nigeria and South Africa, the two most influential powers in Sub-Saharan Africa, possessed stronger technical capacity than the smaller countries, and often felt that they did not need continental institutions such as the ECA to do their thinking for them. In Nigeria, this was seen as part of the rejection of external expertise in the early post-independence period (as discussed in Chapter 2). In South Africa, this point is supported by the major contribution to MAP of South African economists, providing a strong developmental basis for Mbeki’s doctrine of ‘African renaissance’ (Maloka 2006, Landsberg 2006).

Despite these concerns, the ECA was mandated as one of the three strategic implementing partner institutions of NEPAD’s African Peer Review Mechanism (see Chapter 5)¹³⁵. To mitigate the growing tension with the AU, the ECA sought to ensure stronger collaboration, and to be seen to be working more closely with the continent’s premier continental organisation. This resulted in the AU being given a prominent role in organising and staging the third ADF held in March 2002. Similarly, the ECA’s first edition of *‘Assessing Regional Integration in Africa’* (ARIA) was co-signed by Amoako and AU Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konaré. The ECA and African Development Bank (ADB) also resolved to stage their legislative meetings back-to-back, and annual meetings of the chief executives of the ECA, ADB and AU were re-instated, to develop

¹³⁵ Alongside the UNDP and AfDB.

common positions. These initiatives notwithstanding, the rivalry between the AU and ECA intensified.

Beyond this, there was growing concern among senior policy-makers in a number of African countries – documented in a review of the ECA’s policy impact – that little was known of the ECA’s work (ECA 2006). This perceived loss of ECA brand recognition at country level can be largely attributed to the fact that, before 1995, the ECA’s work had been organised along sectoral lines, with annual conferences on industry, agriculture, science and technology and so on. These conferences were attended by sectoral ministers, rather than the Finance and Planning Ministers in the front line of the aid relationship following SAPs. Within their countries, these sectoral line ministries felt the frustration of no longer being able to determine their own budgets and expenditure, and directed their frustration at the Finance Ministry, which had now assumed a lead role in the management of the national economy. Amoako’s rationalisation of the ECA intergovernmental machinery to improve efficiency and reduce wastefulness had a direct impact on the line ministries who no longer met under the ECA’s auspices. As a former senior adviser to the then ECA Executive Secretary explained:

“The result was that although during Amoako’s tenure there was not a single Finance Ministry in Africa that did not know of him and of ECA’s work, it was hard to find name recognition of ECA in many of the sectoral ministries. When a team went into the field to conduct a review of ECA’s effectiveness in 2004, people told them ‘we don’t know what ECA is doing’. In addition, [since] the AU was now responsible for convening the sectoral ministerial meetings, many of which ECA had dropped, those sectoral Ministers naturally sided with the AU” (Makonnen 2009).

In June 2005, having served the statutory two five-year terms as UN Undersecretary General and Executive Secretary, Amoako stepped down from the ECA. Shortly before leaving Addis Ababa, he visited AU Chairperson and former Malian President, Alpha Oumar Konaré. As Amoako recalled:

“I said to Konaré that I had come to bid him farewell as I was leaving ECA. His response was to the effect: ‘good riddance. You have done Africa a great disservice and I am happy that you are leaving’” (Amoako 2006).

The ECA under Amoako had increased its visibility and profile on Africa to such an extent that it was considered a threat by Africa's premier continental political organisation. Konaré – whose staff had once told their ECA counterparts that the ECA should not issue any utterance or organise any conferences related to Africa without getting clearance from the AU first – clearly felt that the ECA had usurped the AU's sovereign right to speak on behalf of Africa and broker African positions. That Konaré should explicitly tell Amoako that he had 'done Africa a great disservice' implies that he believed the ECA under Amoako to have been a Trojan horse for the transmission of external agendas to African countries¹³⁶.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have sought to demonstrate how the ECA's tactics shifted significantly from 1995 onwards, and to shed light on its sub-hegemonic strategy. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the Commission openly confronted the World Bank and IMF. By contrast, from 1995 until 2005 it adopted an approach that involved building consensus within Africa around the continent's key challenges and securing international agreement on the basis of this consensus. Whilst the ECA under Adedeji harnessed its expertise to contest external ideas, the ECA under Amoako saw expertise as the key to building common ground between Africa and the international community, and to the ECA becoming credible and trusted. Despite these generational differences in tactics, it is my view that the ECA of the 1990s and the ECA of the New Millennium both operated as sub-hegemonic ICEs.

I have argued that the ECA's expected role during the period under review was to receive, repackage and transmit the dominant development orthodoxy to its 53 member countries. It adopted key tenets of the contemporary dominant development orthodoxy, notably the emphasis on 'poverty reduction' and the advocacy of 'good governance' as a key condition for

¹³⁶ Amoako stood for election for the post of African Development Bank president in August 2005. He was widely considered the favourite, but was voted out of the race early, losing the post to Rwanda's then Finance Minister, Donald Kaberuka. It later emerged that AU Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konaré had actively campaigned against Amoako, persuading a number of African countries to vote against him (Amoako 2006, personal conversation).

reducing poverty and accelerating Africa's development. However, while the ECA was clearly working within the frame of dominant ideas, and beyond its status as a sub-hegemonic ICE helping to manufacture consent, it consciously pioneered a new, more overtly technocratic African engagement with the international community – one it hoped would give Africans more of a say in external policies designed for implementation on the continent.

The ECA advanced this modified sub-hegemony by using its convening power to assemble a wide cross-section of stakeholders in African development, by packaging the consensus reached after discussion, and transmitting that consensus to international forums as evidence of a stronger and more assertive African voice that needed to be heard. In the process of convening, it exerted a strong guiding influence on the African positions it sought to incubate. Based on these positions, it exploited its status as a trusted and credible interlocutor to speak for and on behalf of Africa, and to advocate on the continent's behalf.

Through innovations such as the African Learning Group on the PRSPs and the '*Big Table*', the ECA was able to influence the content and future trajectory of the international development discourse. It did not bring about a decisive paradigm shift. Indeed, my argument is that it did not pretend to challenge the prevailing political rationality of modified neo-liberalism. Instead, it developed new political technologies in its effort to give voice to diverse groups of African stakeholders. For example, the ECA significantly influenced the shift away from the PRSP process led by the World Bank and IMF, towards nationally owned poverty reduction strategies. In doing so, the ECA sought to leverage the idea of 'African ownership', on the face of it a largely rhetorical discourse, into a concrete African strategy for redressing asymmetries of power.

The ECA's role therefore came to transcend that of simply a sub-hegemonic 'centre of translation'. Undoubtedly, the ECA also espoused and disseminated key tenets of the hegemonic development discourse. However, to dismiss the ECA of the time as a neo-liberal ICE (as happened with ECLAC in the 1990s) would be a grave over-simplification. In my view, the

ECA developed a creative new approach to challenging power, born of pragmatism. It understood that confronting the hegemonic development orthodoxy in adversarial ways would be unproductive. Instead, it believed that shifts in power could be better produced by intellectual output recognised by experts everywhere to be of consistently high quality, using this output to win recognition and credibility, becoming trusted by the powers-that-be, and then harnessing that trust to advocate for changes in the *status quo*.

The ECA saw the key struggle in Africa's development regime as the battle for 'African ownership'. Its success in appropriating this largely rhetorical discourse and pushing for its actualisation can be measured by the space it opened up in international forums, and the footprint of its technocratic arguments on changing donor behaviour in the *Paris Declaration* and elsewhere, plus the extent to which its ideas resonated within Africa.

By way of conclusion, it should be re-emphasised here that my conceptual framework is not deterministic. As argued in Chapter 1, an important characteristic of development regimes is that the outcomes of power struggles are often indeterminate. Accordingly, what I have not done in this chapter is to argue that the ECA's strategy led to a definitive and irreversible levelling of the playing field. As will be seen, while the locus may have shifted in recent years towards stronger African agency, a palpable asymmetry of power remains. As the ECA has demonstrated throughout its history, resistance and reaffirmation co-exist and no struggle over power is ever sewn up.

Chapter 4:

‘African-ness’ and the ‘West’: Identity as Techno-Politics in the Quest for Expanded Expert Agency

Introduction

In Chapter 1, I discussed the centrality of expertise to the generation of the development discourse, the exercise of hegemonic power and the reproduction of development regimes. I argued, following Mitchell (2002), that development regimes reproduce themselves by harnessing expertise to simplify complexity and counterpose science against nature. The tension emanating from this process creates two things: scientific expertise and politics. Thus, what Mitchell describes as ‘techno-politics’ produces and re-produces itself by representing the exercise of modern power as a neutral, objective technical field that sits apart from reality. Expertise maintains this illusion through a self-perpetuating cycle of legitimisation.

In discussing policy regimes, Peet (2007), argues that “...the ideologies that lend consistency, cohesion and believability to policy regimes are constructed over long time periods by experts residing in geographic centres of ideological power, with new regimes thought up in prestigious, elite institutions” (ibid p.5)¹³⁷. Based on this notion of ‘institutional complexes’ – influenced by the Foucauldian idea of the *‘development dispositif’* or *‘apparatus’*, and consonant with the Latourian view of agency as a composite of human and nonhuman factors in Actor Network Theory – I constructed the notion of ‘Institutional Complexes of Expertise’ (ICEs) as composites of experts, institutions and networks of relationships.

In Chapter 3, I showed how the ECA as sub-hegemonic ICE could simultaneously serve as a key agent of hegemony as well as an incubator of new styles and ideas. In the Introduction to the

¹³⁷ While old and new institutionalist theorists consider an ‘institution’ to be an organisational entity, located in a space, with a mission and declared purpose, backed by command over some kind of resource (ideas, expertise, money, connections), ‘institution’ can also be viewed in the Foucauldian sense of a ‘community of experts’, an elite group controlling an area of knowledge and expertise, and forming the base for a policy regime or discursive formation (Peet 2007).

thesis and in Chapter 2, I asserted identity as a key component of ‘techno-politics’ as pursued by experts in Africa’s development regime. I suggested that understanding how experts invoke identity – whether on geopolitical, epistemological or other grounds – is key to understanding sub-hegemony. I further asserted that African experts constructed and harnessed at least two significant identities – their ‘African-ness’ and their membership of an international community of development specialists – to argue that they are best-placed to forge technocratic policy solutions to Africa’s development challenges.

In this chapter, drawing on interviews with experts using life-history methodology, I explore and analyse the different constituents of these expert identities and draw a number of conclusions in relation to sub-hegemony and the quest for expanded policy space. I present life histories of some leading intellectual figures with particular emphasis on their intellectual make-up. This follows from my account of actor networks and the constitution of ‘actors’, as presented in Chapter 1. To provide critical context to the life histories and testimonies of the experts, I begin by briefly examining the ECA’s origins and locating some of the tensions that shaped its evolution.

Contested Beginnings

After the Second World War, a growing convergence of U.S. and European interests around the need to generate development through technical assistance programmes was important in fostering the creation of a series of international organisations during the late 1940s and early 1950s (Cooper and Packard 1997). The World Bank and IMF were established in the late 1940s, along with specialised agencies of the United Nations system (including FAO, WHO, UNICEF and UNESCO). The Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) and Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) were established in 1947, followed by the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE, later ESCAP) in 1948¹³⁸.

¹³⁸ ESCWA, The Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, was set up in 1973.

Whereas the advent of these regional commissions was uncontroversial, there was considerable political resistance to the idea of a regional commission for Africa from colonial powers, who felt such an entity would interfere in the management of their colonies (Berthelot 2004, D'Sa 1983). The ECA's establishment was contested on three grounds. First, it was argued, since the idea of the regional commissions had been to facilitate post-war reconstruction, and most of Africa had not been badly damaged during World War II, it therefore did not need a dedicated body. Second, North Africa and Ethiopia, the only African territories that had been severely damaged, could be covered by the regional commission for Europe. Third, it was argued that much of Africa was still under colonial rule and the region therefore did not qualify. France, Great Britain, Portugal, Belgium and Spain were strongly opposed to the idea of an economic commission for Africa, arguing that they did not foresee any rapid increase in the number of independent African states, which was only four at the founding of the UN in 1945 (Adedeji 2004, ECA 2008).

In 1947 at the 4th session of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), an Indian delegate tabled a draft resolution for the establishment of a special Economic Commission for North Africa and Ethiopia. The North African countries and Ethiopia had been placed on an interim basis under the Economic Commission for Europe. India's thinking was that, since most of these countries were independent, and since independence would eventually follow in the rest of black Africa, an Economic Commission for North Africa and Ethiopia would form the basis for an eventual economic commission for Africa. However, this resolution failed to gain traction, mainly because its geographic scope was limited. Doubt was expressed over whether North Africa and Ethiopia could be regarded as a region. Calls at the UN for a regional commission for Africa were repeated in 1950, 1951 and 1956, to no avail. Those opposing argued that, since Africa was not a homogeneous continent, a regional commission for the entire territory might not be able to cope with the complexities of the region (Adedeji 2004). It was only ten years later, at the dawn of its independence, that Ghana tabled a draft resolution – supported by 28 other UN member countries – for the establishment of the ECA. The resolution was adopted as

GA Resolution 1155 (XII) on 26 November 1957. This led to the establishment of the ECA on 29 April 1958 (ECA 2008).

As with ECLA in Latin America, It was agreed that colonial powers could be full members of the ECA, and their colonies associate members should they so desire. In Africa there were fewer than ten independent countries at the time of the ECA's creation. So the ECA's initial membership included eight independent African countries (Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia) as well as seven colonial powers (Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, the U.K. and the independent white settler colony, the Union of South Africa). As there was no continental political organisation at the time, the ECA's primary focus in its first decade was on the struggle for decolonisation (D'Sa 1983). The hostility of African members to apartheid in Southern Africa led to South Africa refusing to participate in ECA activities and meetings, and to its suspension from ECA membership in July 1965 – a situation that endured until the advent of majority rule in 1994 when it was re-admitted¹³⁹.

ECA membership of non-regional countries was another continuing tension. In 1961 the ECA considered a proposal that colonial powers should cease to be members of the Commission and instead participate in a consultative capacity. While this was rejected by the UN's ECOSOC, France, the U.K. and Spain later agreed to become associate members, along with their colonies (D'Sa 1983, Berthelot 2004)¹⁴⁰. Consequently, the ECA and ESCWA (the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia) are the only two regional commissions in which France, the U.K. and the U.S. are not full members today (Berthelot 2004). The battle over whether only African countries could be ECA members was consistent with the contemporary fight to end

¹³⁹ As discussed above, given the imperative of decolonisation in the late 1950s, the ECA took on a political agenda to end colonialism and bring about African self-rule. In this endeavour, and although decolonisation was on the UN agenda, the ECA acted as an exclusively African institution. Indeed, the inclusion of 'social development' in the ECA's mandate implicitly signalled its intention to oppose colonial and apartheid forces on the African continent. In economic terms, the struggle was against the practices of the colour bar and forced labour, both of which were widespread in Africa and were viewed as tools of colonial economic exploitation (D'Sa 1983).

¹⁴⁰ The three countries later ceased to be members when the African territories they had colonised attained their independence. Portugal was expelled from the ECA's membership on 24 July 1963 for refusing to accept a change in status from full membership to associate membership (D'Sa 1983).

colonisation. However, it also raises an enduring question: as part of the global UN system¹⁴¹, to what extent can the ECA be considered truly 'African'? This question has persisted despite the fact that the ECA membership became exclusively African, and its work is focused on Africa¹⁴². As highlighted in previous chapters, there has been episodic rivalry between the ECA and OAU, with some perceiving that the international community had worked through the ECA to impose a particular worldview¹⁴³.

Mandate

The regional commissions were created as regional arms of the UN. Their mandates derived from Articles 1.3 and 1.4 of the UN Charter, and initially responded to the challenge of reconstruction after World War II. The regional commissions were asked to:

"i) Initiate and participate in measures for facilitating concerted action for the economic reconstruction (and development) of [the region], for raising the level of economic activity, and for maintaining and strengthening the economic relations of the member countries of [the region] both among themselves and with other countries of the world; ii) Make and sponsor... investigations and studies of economic and technological problems and development [within the region]...; and iii) Undertake or sponsor the collection, evaluation and dissemination of such economic, technological and statistical information as the Commission deems appropriate" (from UN Charter, cited in Berthelot 2004, p.15).

¹⁴¹ The ECA is a UN agency, an organ of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) through which it reports to the UN General Assembly, which finances its regular budget. All ECA staff members are employees of the UN, appointed by the UN Secretary-General. As such, it is not simply a regional body but part of the global system, meaning that African governments do not have the last word in its affairs (Adedeji 2004)

¹⁴² Adedeji (2004) points out that, as a result of the stand-off over membership, the ECA is not one of the West's most popular regional commissions. In his view, the Cold War made it impossible to resolve this problem. Now that the Cold War is over, he proposes that the sensitive issue of membership be revisited with a view to putting the ECA at the same level as ECLAC and ESCAP – in other words to allow non-regional countries as full members. For a detailed discussion of the reasons why the ECA is not considered an independent African institution, see Adedeji (2004, pp.243-244 in Berthelot 2004).

¹⁴³ Within Africa, questions periodically arose as to whether the ECA was indeed committed to advancing African self-reliance, or whether it served as a Trojan horse for continued colonial dominance. As noted, this was because it was a UN institution which included former colonial powers among its membership until well after the OAU was founded. There were also concerns among a growing number of African countries as to whether its output – which consisted of gathering economic data, producing surveys and providing limited technical assistance – was adequate to meet the pressing demands of Africa's newly independent nation-states for concrete development projects (D'Sa 1983).

This generic mandate did not take into account the different contexts in each region, leading then UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, to confer a clearer mandate at the ECA's first session, held in Addis Ababa from 29 December 1958 to 6 January 1959. This was to: facilitate co-operation between and among member states; design strategies and plans for Africa's economic development; undertake research into questions of common concern; act as a hub for the generation and exchange of knowledge; and work in collaboration with other UN agencies and programmes (ECA 2008).

Although social development was not a UN priority after World War II, the ECA and ECWA (later ESCWA), were asked by the UN General Assembly to "deal as appropriate with the social aspects of economic development and the inter-relationship of economic and social factors" (Berthelot 2004, p.16). The ECA later began to provide technical assistance when it was invited (along with ECWA) to "perform such advisory services... as the country or region may desire", with the caveats that such services should be provided "within available resources" and on condition they did not overlap with the work of the specialised agencies (ibid). In the 1970s, the clamour for a NIEO (see Chapter 2) led the UN to embrace decentralisation, and in January 1979 the General Assembly passed Resolution 30/202 giving the regional commissions the status of executing agencies in their own right, for inter-sectoral, sub-regional, regional and inter-regional projects. They were later given the right to co-ordinate the UN's development work in their respective regions (ibid)¹⁴⁴.

Establishing Political Primacy

Pan-Africanism provided an important if somewhat understated ideological justification for the establishment of the ECA (Adedeji 2006). Early engagement with the battle for decolonisation also meant that from its very beginning the ECA was involved in explicitly political struggle. With the advent of the OAU, the emphasis would shift towards a technocratic politics focusing

¹⁴⁴ In practice, the regional commissions have been unsuccessful in co-ordinating UN activities in their respective regions. The ECA's efforts to assert itself as the regional arm of the UN system in Africa consistently sparked tensions, notably with the UNDP – which moved away from its original mandate of providing resources to other UN agencies to implement projects and programmes, and began to deliver technical assistance programmes of its own (ibid).

on the economic and social development of Africa and involving different tactics over time. Nonetheless, and particularly during the Adedeji era discussed in Chapter 2, the ECA as ICE sought to advance Pan-Africanism – viewed by the West with suspicion – as a technical field. Whereas the OAU explicitly embraced political dimensions of Pan-Africanism, the ECA focused on regional integration as a means of overcoming the constraints of the market size of Africa’s constituent states – many of which were considered geographic and economic absurdities.

The founding of the OAU in 1963 erased any doubt about which institution was to lead Africa’s continental political agenda. Significantly, it was in the ECA headquarters that African leaders met in May 1963 to establish the OAU. (The Summit Conference of Independent African States took place in the ECA’s Africa Hall, where there is now a stained-glass window entitled *‘The Total Liberation of Africa’* (1960), by Ethiopian artist Afewerk Tekle, commissioned for the OAU’s founding conference. Also in Africa Hall is a mural depicting Africa’s leaders at the moment of independence.) After early institutional rivalry, sparked by the inclusion in the OAU’s mandate of a strong focus on economic and social development objectives¹⁴⁵, the two institutions agreed to work together and began to co-sponsor a series of joint ministerial conferences addressing trade and industry, science and technology, telecommunications and other development issues. After 1965, and recognising its capacity limitations, the OAU focused primarily on political questions including ending apartheid in South Africa. The OAU therefore relied on the joint ministerial conferences, with ECA heavily involved in their organisation, to establish its policy on economic and social development (D’Sa 1983).

The inclusion in the OAU Charter of economic and social objectives sent a strong signal to the ECA that it should restrict its focus to the technical aspects of economic and social development issues. Nonetheless, a key part of the early ECA agenda was establishing the institutional

¹⁴⁵ The Charter emphasised the need for African countries “to co-ordinate and intensify our co-operation efforts to achieve a better life for the African peoples” (OAU 1963, Article II [1] [b]). Five specialised commissions, including an Economic and Social Commission, were set up. In addition, the OAU General Secretariat included an Economic Development and Economic Department (EDECO) and a department that dealt with education and health issues (ESCAS). Over the years, the OAU significantly increased the size and scope of its work on economic and social development (D’Sa 1983).

infrastructure to support a regional development strategy¹⁴⁶. The ECA was also instrumental in establishing a host of technical institutions, many in collaboration with the OAU (ECA 2008)¹⁴⁷. This demonstrated that, although the two institutions were competitors in some senses, they shared a common desire to develop Africa that made collaboration inevitable¹⁴⁸.

'Africanising' the ECA

Non-African experts featured prominently among ECA staff in the early decades. According to Samba Jack, who joined the ECA in 1967, this was because of the lack of capacity within Africa:

“We’re talking about some 30, 40 years ago. Most [African experts] who were trained abroad went home and worked in their national governments. But those who could came to regional organisations. But then [the ECA] needed the staff, and therefore expertise that existed outside Africa was brought in. And then of course the ECA was also a UN agency” (Jack 2006).

In its early years, the ECA was the most diverse of all the regional commissions (Senghor 2009). However, by the early 1970s, an explicit policy to recruit more African experts led to a growing number of African professionals joining the ECA’s ranks. Robert Gardiner, the then Executive Secretary, sought to arrive at a capacity of 75% of the Commission’s expertise being drawn from African countries (Jack 2006)¹⁴⁹. Over the years, it was common for a large number of professional staff to remain in the same duty station for their entire UN career. This was because the ECA began life as a headquarters-only think tank based in Addis Ababa, and for 25 years had no field offices. As part of the wider UN Secretariat, the ECA could source staff from

¹⁴⁶ The ECA was pivotal in establishing several regional institutions, notably the African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP, 1962), set up to train African planners and first headed by Samir Amin (discussed in Chapter 2), and the African Development Bank (AfDB, 1963), which was housed at the ECA Secretariat in Addis Ababa until it moved to its substantive headquarters in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire. The idea of setting up IDEP, the AfDB and indeed the OAU itself came from the Monrovia Conference in 1961.

¹⁴⁷ For a comprehensive list of the ECA-sponsored institutions and a detailed discussion, see ECA (2008, pp.33-39).

¹⁴⁸ According to Berthelot (2004), the ECA’s commitment to regional co-operation never wavered, although it was criticised for setting up too many institutions (for a list of these, see Adedeji 2004, p.250 in Berthelot 2004).

¹⁴⁹ An interesting sidebar to this discussion is the split between Anglophone and Francophone staff members at the ECA during Gardiner’s tenure. According to Magee (1971), the postcolonial split between former English and French colonies was reflected in tensions in the ECA Secretariat. Gardiner, a Ghanaian, was accused of discriminating against Francophone staff members and of using the ECA to promote Anglophone interests. On the other hand, Anglophone staff accused their Francophone counterparts of being largely incompetent and of being deliberate allies of France in its efforts to downgrade and sabotage the ECA and African unity (ibid).

UN headquarters in New York and rotate staff to either New York or other outposts of the UN Secretariat. However, the lack of a mandatory mobility policy meant that a large number of ECA experts did not leave¹⁵⁰. Given that new posts were scarce, this effectively limited opportunities for promotion, making career progression difficult for many staff members¹⁵¹.

In 2000, recognising that the mobility problem had created a pool of ECA experts no longer at the cutting edge of their respective fields due to their lengthy tenure in a single institution, the ECA management launched a far-reaching recruitment campaign to renew ECA staffing and embed a more merit-based human resources regime. Vacancy announcements were widely circulated in a bid to identify potential candidates. The goal was to ensure that by mid-2004 at least half of the ECA's professional staff complement of roughly 220¹⁵² would have been recruited in the past four years (ECA 2004, p.4). The recruitment campaign attracted an unprecedented number of experts of African descent, many previously working at universities and think tanks in Europe and the U.S.¹⁵³ This helped swell the ranks of African professionals at the ECA further, with the result that they currently predominate (Allimadi 2009). Many of these newer recruits feature prominently below.

Life Histories of African Expertise

I now turn to the perspectives of two generations of African experts currently or formerly working at the ECA. The selection of interview respondents (Annexe I) was random, in two

¹⁵⁰ The creation of five sub-regional offices (known as MULPOCS) by the time of the ECA's silver jubilee in 1983 did little to ease this problem, as only a handful of positions (25% of the overall professional staff complement) were available in these offices, a proportion of which were recruited locally (ECA 2008).

¹⁵¹ Mandatory staff rotation at the ECA was introduced only in 1997, four years after a report by the UN Office of Internal Oversight had identified professional isolation, the need for skills upgrading and staff rotation as key issues limiting the ECA's quality, efficiency and impact (ECA 1996).

¹⁵² The staff complement of the ECA in 2006 was estimated at 1,100, of which between 220 and 240 were professional staff (either economists or other social scientists) and the rest administrative support staff (Todaro 2009).

¹⁵³ Zeleza (2005, p.223) cites compelling data to show that African residents in the U.S. constitute the most educated population, trumping even native-born Americans. "The irony cannot escape anyone: Africa, perhaps the least educated and most underdeveloped continent in the world, has the most educated population in the world's most developed country" (ibid). This "gaping mismatch", he argues, can potentially be turned in Africa's favour if connections can be established between African migrant professionals and their countries or regions of origin (ibid).

categories. The first group consisted of senior staff members either still at the ECA, or recently retired. As older staff members or retirees, these respondents had greater liberty in reflecting on their work experience objectively, making their views highly credible. The second group was current staff members, whom I considered a key means of understanding the evolution of expert strategies of reaffirmation and resistance. Interviews were open-ended and effected with the aid of a semi-structured questionnaire (Annexe II). To represent respondents' perspectives as faithfully as possible, I use discursive content with limited paraphrasing. Mostly, I defer in-depth analysis of the views presented to the concluding section of the chapter.

Diverse Pathways to Addis Ababa

Samba Jack, a Gambian national, joined the ECA in 1967, after securing a BSc in Economic Geography from Cambridge University. He later obtained a Masters degree in Development Economics from Pittsburgh University in the U.S. and worked at the Commission for a total of 36 years, until his retirement as a Director in 2003. Jack recalls his views on development in Africa being initially shaped by theories and concepts designed in the West, including Rostow's 'stages of development' theory and Arthur Lewis's theory of 'development with unlimited resources'. On arrival at the ECA, Jack viewed his role as one of a planning expert implementing the theories he had learned:

"When I joined ECA at that time countries were just emerging from independence, and I couldn't but be influenced by thinking from within ECA itself. At that time we were concentrating on explaining the process of development, what it is all about, where it should be leading. The work of ECA was explaining the theory of development and how it should be applied to the urgent problems of the day. At that time there was a spate of development planning in most African countries. And [since] you cannot plan without statistics, the development of statistical capacity in the region was a major priority in the work programme. We also had the national development plans, four years, five years, and ECA was very much at the centre of helping African countries with this development planning, in the late 1960s, most of the 1970s. At that time the UN came up with development decades. And again that was an umbrella under which we worked to help member states" (Jack 2006).

In 1965, an ECA Training and Fellowships Programme for Africa was established to provide graduate and undergraduate training of short and medium duration for Africans in fields

considered critical to advancing progress. During the decolonisation period the programme was used to provide statisticians and planners from non-independent states with the skills required to manage a modern state (Adedeji 2004). Trainees were awarded fellowships for study in institutions within as well as outside Africa. In 1979, a special component of the programme was set up in collaboration with the UN Institute for Namibia to train Namibians in development administration and management skills. According to Adedeji (2004), trainees from this scheme later formed the top echelons of independent Namibia's administration. More than 3,000 Africans benefitted from the programme (ibid), including a number of young ECA professionals such as Jack (cited above), who went abroad on sabbatical for further study.

Owodunmi Teriba, a Nigerian national, obtained a BSc in Economics from the University of Ibadan (1962) before pursuing his MSc and PhD in Economics at the University of Manchester (1962-1966). After returning to Nigeria to teach at the university, and serving as Associate Professor at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor (1972-73), he arrived at the ECA for a one-year sabbatical (1980-81), was recruited as a regional adviser, later became a staff economist, and retired as a Director in 1998. Unlike Jack, who came to work at the ECA directly from university, the majority of national experts who had studied abroad returned home to work in their national governments:

"[At the University of Ibadan] every year, the top-level performers were sponsored to go abroad. The funds came from the university itself. My own Masters and PhD at Manchester were funded entirely from the University of Ibadan – you must of course remember the Naira [the Nigerian currency] was much stronger against the [British] Pound then. We were not made to sign any bond. I left Manchester three days after graduating – what would I be doing staying there? I went straight back to Ibadan. At that time, when I went back, I was being asked by the Central Bank to work there. The [Economics] Department [at Ibadan] had also asked me to come back. I had about three job offers. That is not the situation now. Whatever sector I wanted to work in I could make a contribution. The Central Bank was paying more than the University but I decided to stay in teaching and research. My generation more or less left [Ibadan] later on, but the majority of the [current] lecturers are the people we taught, and they have produced other students, PhDs and so on, and they are still there" (Teriba 2006).

Once home, African experts espoused varying degrees of radicalism. According to Teriba:

“You couldn’t divorce the economics, the public administration policies [or] the development policies, from the politics. In the realm of nationalists who were experts, intellectuals, academics, the debate went on as to how to rise up to the multilateral institutions [such as the World Bank and IMF] so that they stayed in the background – particularly in the realm of development. The ECA at that time was not known, and would have been seen by many as a colonial tool to keep Africans down. And that was why the OAU was principally [established], to fight and support African countries to become independent. The ECA therefore had to really justify its existence” (ibid 2006).

As a result, few experts in Africa’s independent nation-states considered the ECA as a potential employer (ibid).

Like Teriba, Yousif Suliman came to the ECA after a stint in his native Sudan. Before joining the ECA as an economist in 1980, he served as Director of the General Planning Administration of the Ministry of Planning of Sudan. He holds a BSc in Economics from the University of Khartoum (1968), a Postgraduate Diploma in Development Planning from the Kuwait Planning Institute (1972), a Postgraduate Diploma in Economics and Statistics from the University of Birmingham (1975), and an MSc and PhD in Economics from the University of Wales (1977 and 1989). Suliman, who was later involved in the drafting of AAF-SAP, believes his academic influences, far from limiting his ability to think independently, provided him with tools that enabled him to criticise structural adjustment and develop alternatives:

“I studied standard macro- and micro-economic theory. I did development economics, statistics, econometrics and also had some exposure to mathematical economics – to assist with the analysis, not in its raw form, but used extensively particularly in relation to input–output analysis. In the MSc I tried to explore the evolution of pricing systems. Normally it was handled as either a micro issue or something in general that prices are made because of demand. But then I tried to develop a system to figure out how prices evolve in an economy and their relation to technology. So I developed a large structure of price formation in Britain and subsequently tried to apply the technique for developing countries – [specifically] Kenya, again using statistical techniques and input–output analysis. This provided me with a good background [on] how an economy works, and under what conditions an economy responds to external shocks that have implications for price policies, and through that technique how the obsolescence of an economy will affect the price system. It helped me to understand... what the constraints

are of a developing economy, and how to handle the issues independent of the conventional wisdom” (Suliman 2006).

Patrick Bugembe, a Ugandan economist who joined the ECA in 1978 and served as a key member of Adebayo Adedeji’s team (see Chapter 2), attested to being profoundly influenced by his academic training – which included an undergraduate degree in Statistics and Development Economics (Makerere University, Uganda 1969) and a PhD in Econometrics from the London School of Economics (1973). He recalls being fascinated by time-series tools, which enabled him to use data from the past and present to project into the future. After a short time as a lecturer at Makerere – ended by the political crisis during the rule of Idi Amin – he was forced to leave Uganda in 1977, when he joined the secretariat of the East African Community (EAC), a regional economic community. He recalls:

“[At the EAC] I looked at industrial development in an East African context. That also had an impact on me. The EAC was actually dying – it had died, but the East African Development Bank (EADB), to which I went, had survived. It was the only Community institution that had survived. The issue in the EADB was why countries could not develop. We had the money to give to entrepreneurs, but the entrepreneurs were not there to credibly take these loans from the Bank and propose credible projects. This shook me. I had to think about the culture affecting development, on dimensions that had not featured in the development literature at that time. [This was] because most of the development literature was based on thinking from Latin America. We talked about various models – the Schumpeter model, the entrepreneurial model, the Arthur Lewis surplus model. We studied a number of models, but these models were always coming up to explain what never seemed to be captured” (Bugembe 2006).

George Alibaruho, also a Ugandan, earned his undergraduate degree in Economics at Makerere University, formerly a constituent college of the University of London (before Uganda’s independence in 1962), as a result of which its early curriculum was influenced by more philosophical ideas of economics associated with the British academy. However, during Alibaruho’s time at Makerere (1965-1968), a shift occurred:

“The situation began to change rather rapidly when I was an undergraduate, because we started getting American teachers and professors. So the orientation of the programme really changed, became more quantitative, more operational and less economic-history-focused. I should say it became less philosophical, more operational.

The development of American economics was influenced very much by hard science subjects. So as a result of exposure to the American orientation to economics, and having quite a few Americans on the staff, we started reading a lot of books... from top American economics schools – MIT, Berkeley, Harvard” (Alibaruho 2006).

Attracted by the more quantitative approach of American economics, Alibaruho applied to the University of California at Berkeley, where he was admitted to the doctoral programme in 1968 and awarded his PhD in 1973. Four of his lecturers were later awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences either individually or jointly¹⁵⁴, and he admits being deeply influenced by them. Like Bugembe, Alibaruho returned to Uganda to teach economics at Makerere, only to be forced out by the onset of political unrest in 1974. After a spell as a lecturer and researcher in agricultural economics at the University of Nairobi Institute for Development Studies in neighbouring Kenya, he joined the East African Community Management Institute in Arusha, Tanzania (1975), and moved to Washington, D.C. in the following year as a research fellow at the newly created International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). Alibaruho then joined the World Bank’s Africa Region as an agricultural economist (January 1979), spending significant periods of his career in African countries (notably a secondment to the Sierra Leone Government from 1985 to 1990). He left the World Bank in 1997 to join the ECA, where he worked as principal adviser to the Executive Secretary until his retirement in 2006.

Thoko Ruzvidzo, acting Director of the ECA’s African Centre for Gender and Development (ACGD) at the time of interview, holds a BSc in Sociology from the University of Zimbabwe, a Postgraduate Diploma in Agricultural Economics from the London School of Economics, and an MSc in Policy Studies from the Southern African Institute for Policy and Economic Studies (SAPES). Before Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, and after her graduation, she worked for the Women’s Affairs Bureau in the Ministry of Community Development, and later became a prominent NGO activist in the Zimbabwean women’s movement. She joined the ECA in the

¹⁵⁴ These were Alibaruho’s lecturer in mathematical economics Gerald Debreu (1983), game theory lecturer John C. Harsanyi (1994), second-year lecturer in advanced economics theory Daniel McFadden (2000), and first-year graduate adviser George Akerlof (2001).

recruitment drive that started in 2000, and is one of the few senior staff members who is not an economist by training.

Ruzvidzo recalls that, since no universities offered degrees in gender studies when she was a student, she was compelled to learn from practical experience. With respect to her discipline, the dominant framework of the time, the Women in Development (WID) approach, had emanated not from academic institutions, but from the United Nations, a pioneer in the move to empower women. However, Ruzvidzo soon questioned the WID framework and joined a movement of advocates who later espoused the more radical Gender and Development (GAD) approach that guides her current work at the ECA.

“We were not part of the UN’s [Third World Conference on Women, Nairobi, June 1985], but we were caught in the aftermath of the conference in terms of implementation. Nairobi was basically [influenced by] the WID approach, which at that time was the strongest external influence on [gender issues in Africa]. [Its focus was] on very specific women’s projects [such as] income-generating projects.[...] It was basically about community development. But then, we and other black African feminists started interrogating the gender relations of power, as our cultures subordinate women, albeit not totally. So the African feminist movement started revisiting our cultures and asking: ‘What is it that we can take from our culture that empowers the woman? What is it that disadvantages the woman? What are the social relations that exist between the male and female? How do we look at those and make them advantage the woman?’ So we started looking at Gender and Development. And by the time we went to [the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, 1995], the [imperative to] mainstream gender had become paramount. It’s a radical approach we are using to pave the way for promoting gender equality... not only for women. This really is the main difference between the GAD and WID approach. The GAD approach is more holistic and strategic. It includes addressing women’s specific needs, but it goes beyond. It addresses the social construction that is really at the heart of any gender inequality, which in fact hampers poverty reduction programmes and development prospects for Africa. And I think there is a lot of evidence, mounting evidence, showing the close linkage and interaction between gender inequality and poverty in Africa” (Ruzvidzo 2006).

‘No Room for Marxist Demography in our Class’

Amson Sibanda, 39 at the time of my fieldwork, is Zimbabwean. After pursuing an undergraduate degree in Geography and a Masters degree in Population Studies from the University of Zimbabwe (1993), he secured a Ford Foundation scholarship that enabled him to

study for a PhD in Demography at the University of Pennsylvania in the U.S. After obtaining his PhD in 1997, he pursued a postdoctoral fellowship at the same university, before becoming a research associate at Brown University. He then returned to Pennsylvania University as an associate professor, and joined the ECA in July 2003 – as a result of the expanded recruitment drive.

Asked whether, as a Ford Foundation grantee, he was ideologically influenced by American ideas of demography and population, he explained the subtle but real pressures facing students from developing countries:

“No. Not necessarily. But it is interesting because... most of the African scholars or Chinese scholars, who came to study at the University of Pennsylvania benefited from these scholarships. The United States, through USAID, was very much fascinated about trying to discover what was happening in Africa. We did not have any solid demographic statistics or population statistics. Some countries never had any... so [the U.S.] embarked on a massive data collection exercise through what is called the World Fertility Survey and the Demographic and Health Survey. Now, you find them on almost every continent. They do them in pretty much, in fact, in each country. That provided the wealth of information they needed to monitor the population issues, obviously [for reasons of] political interest. I remember a guy from the CIA who came to try and recruit us. He came saying they wanted to recruit demographers. They conduct recruitment drives at campuses. For us, we were all fascinated, and asked ourselves why. And obviously the take of the U.S., at that time, was... they were worried about youth unemployment in Southern societies and the revolutionary component that you find... obviously, that radical element, if you combined it with their high rates of population growth, it was perceived as a threat. Now, of course, they're looking at the same issue, but from the Middle East perspective” (Sibanda 2006).

It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which this ideology-motivated effort to enrol can be generalised. However, the pivotal role of U.S. non-profit foundations in proliferating demography in the post-war period, and influencing an American vision of population studies that eventually became a global vision, has been well documented (Sharpless 1997)¹⁵⁵. The

¹⁵⁵ U.S. foreign aid programmes rolled out into the developing world as part of Truman's Four Point Plan became increasingly concerned with 'the population problem' (Sharpless 1997). The Rockefeller Foundation, prompted by its founder, John D. Rockefeller III who led a small group of scholars and population activists, founded the Population Council in 1953 – a special purpose foundation that allowed Rockefeller, Ford and other foundations to fund research in demography and reproductive biology whilst remaining distant from any political controversy.

institutionalisation of population studies and codifying of demographic knowledge took place not only in the U.S. and Europe, but also across the developing world. The 1950s saw the development of a worldwide network of 'population experts', using a core body of knowledge and a common mode of discourse. These experts codified a shared set of assumptions about how population dynamics worked, how the phenomenon was to be studied, and most importantly the terms under which intervention was appropriate (ibid).

Sharpless (1997) also highlights how links between foundations, government agencies and university research programmes in the 1950s were exploited by U.S. Government security agencies, which all employed social scientists including demographers, during the Cold War. By enmeshing the language of social science with Cold War ideology, professional demographers were able to achieve "...the final link in the process of transforming social scientific knowledge into the discourse domain of foreign policy and political action" (ibid p.196).

According to Sibanda:

"The foundations never put pressure on the schools that we were aware of in terms of the ideological orientation of the programme. But to some extent, you would find that your professors wanted some kind of an image of the graduates they were producing. Most of these professors were Western. Literature from Marxist-leaning demographers was not popular at all... you [would] never find it in class. And if you espoused those views, you were more likely to end up not graduating. I grew up Zimbabwe, at a time when our country was socialist. If you look at the population programme in Zimbabwe, it was established by the Population Council [with funding from] the Ford Foundation. And they brought Western experts to come in to put the programme in place. And obviously, their key aim was to train a group of Zimbabwean experts who would go and work in the Family Planning field. So, as a population control thing, but obviously, if you believe in Marxism then that was perceived as trying to control the black population. So it wasn't popular" (Sibanda 2006).

Underpinning this research was the view, propagated by conservative elements including Rockefeller himself, that population growth posed a serious challenge to social and economic progress in developing countries (ibid). The Population Council and Ford Foundation sponsored a network of population studies centres in the U.S. This helped ensure that by the end of the 1950s, there were few major universities that did not have a programme in population studies (ibid).

Sibanda recalled that he and his fellow African researchers faced considerable pressure from their sponsors, and inducement in the form of small grants, to return to their countries – largely because there was an expectation that they would occupy their place as part of a global network of demographers advancing a particular worldview¹⁵⁶:

“What they had in mind was...they trained you and be an expert then you go back in to your country. They have never expected Africans to just stay and work in the United States or... anywhere else. So, the pressure for you to go back was so huge. And the reason was you became their local contact, expert. But all the major projects they want to do in Zimbabwe would be run by them, [via] their former student based in Zimbabwe. So, it's like they will encourage you to go, they give you small grant as a settling in research grant... things like that. But in terms of overall research they will be controlling everything... But you are their main entry point in that society. And they have done that well in most African countries. However, the new breed of demographers pretty much revolted against that. I refused to go to become somebody's [local representative]. I had my own ideas and I wanted to get a couple of years of experience in the U.S., teaching, doing research. Once I had [acquired a] some solid background, a solid reputation as an academician, then I could go home. But if I had gone to Zimbabwe [immediately after graduating] I really would just have been a consultant. And once you do that and you do not have the solid reputation, you cannot challenge the views of these guys. They are too influential in the field. You never become independent, and they call the shots. So, a lot of us, you know, the bunch of demographers who were trained in the '90s, whether from Nigeria or Ghana, we all revolted. We fraternised and refused to go back” (Sibanda 2006).

Sibanda successfully applied for the job of Population Affairs Officer at the ECA after being challenged to return to Africa by a student in a class on Population and African Development he was teaching at Pennsylvania. As an acknowledged demography expert, he could then leverage this status back in Africa to resist further the domination of global ideas in furtherance of an African demographic agenda. This mode of resistance is consistent with my theoretical conception of sub-hegemony. A worldwide system of expertise created to advance the

¹⁵⁶ Sharpless (1997) points to this emerging international division of labour in population science when he highlights a consistency in methodology, analysis and language formed by a small but impressive network of scholars located primarily in the U.S. but also in Britain, India and Asia more broadly. This network was extended to the far reaches of the Third World through scholarships awarded by Rockefeller, Ford and other foundations to promising young African scholars of demography. An important precondition for the success of this approach was that students returned home to take up their places at the periphery of the global network responsible for generating, developing, transmitting, circulating and thereby institutionalising a hegemonic worldview of demography.

hegemony of a particular system of thought must necessarily build expert capacity in the periphery as well as the centre, leaving it open to contestation from the inside.

Scholarships from U.S. foundations enabled students such as Sibanda to achieve the highest levels of education in the techniques of this system of thought. However, because of the context in which he was born and raised, he questioned the prevailing rationality of rule and worked himself into a position where he could challenge it and bring into play new ideas about demography in Africa. In this way, despite being schooled in the epistemes of the dominant demographic regime – indeed precisely because he had mastered the rationalities, techniques and technologies of power – he was able, as an ECA expert working for and on behalf of Africa, to transcend a classic sub-hegemonic role and help create increased policy space for African thought leadership.

Kavaeuza Katjomuise, a Namibian in his late 30s, joined the UN in 1999 after spending three years as an economist with the Bank of Namibia advising the Governor on the conduct of monetary policy. He started his UN career with ECLAC working in the Caribbean on trade policy issues, looking at the implications of multilateral hemispheric trade agreements. In 2000, attracted by the recruitment campaign, he applied for a lateral transfer and joined the ECA's Sustainable Development Division, before being promoted to the Economic and Social Policy Division in 2003. Katjomuise holds undergraduate and Masters degrees in Economics, the latter from the University of Western Michigan, focusing on international trade and finance. In Katjomuise's view, while U.S. universities emphasised classical economics in the 1970s and early 1980s, the orientation changed to become essentially neo-liberal, focusing on liberalisation, open markets and free trade. As such, he found himself in an uncomfortable position as a Masters student:

“Unlike most of my fellow students I was a bit critical, because I was an African. And at that time a lot of African countries were implementing neo-liberal policies. I went to the U.S. in 1989, finished my undergraduate in 1992, and then I went to do my Masters in 1993 to early 1995. Namibia became independent in 1990. To be honest, Namibia did not implement any IMF-supported programme. Because the paradigm had shifted, the

Soviet Union had collapsed, and no one was talking any longer about the Socialist systems as an alternative, everyone pretty much accepted that the only way to go was through market economics and liberalisation. So what Namibia did was implement what they called a home-grown macro-economic stabilisation programme. If you look at the elements, it was pretty much comparable to SAP, because it emphasised privatisation, reducing the role of the state in the economy, etc. The only difference is that countries that were implementing the SAPs had some indicators, some benchmarks, some targets to meet and financial assistance was conditional on that. Namibia fortunately did not have to meet any targets, because this was a home-grown programme” (Katjомуise 2006).

‘We Know Where the Shoe Pinches’

Experts interviewed during fieldwork were asked whether being African or of African origin made their engagement with development issues different from that of other international experts with whom they shared the same academic training.

Elene Makonnen, an Ethiopian, **began her** undergraduate studies at the Haile Selassie University in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia before being forced to move to the U.S. by student unrest. There, she earned her BA in Economics (1972) and MA in Economics (1975), both from Howard University. She subsequently joined the World Bank in 1977 as Advisor in the Office of the Executive Director. In 1986 she took a career break to attend the Harvard University Kennedy School of Government, where she was awarded a second Masters degree, this time in Public Administration with a focus on Economics (1987). After that she returned to the World Bank, where she worked in the Strategic Planning Department, Education and Social Policy Department, and Population and Human Resources Department as a policy officer. She left the World Bank in 1995 and served as principal adviser to the ECA Executive Secretary until 2006. In her view, the difference between African experts and their non-African counterparts lies in the fact that African experts are more sensitive to the concerns of African countries.

“The difference shows up in this way: when policy packages are being discussed, as an African you have more sensitivity to some of the constraints that the African governments are facing. In some cases, yes it’s emotional because you’re African. But in [other] cases a lot of these people have served in government ministries so they have practical experience as to what can and cannot happen in these countries. So they know where the shoe pinches. It’s from that. Now, on the other hand, in many of these

institutions that are offering these policy packages, for example the Washington Consensus, the high-fliers are guys who came in as Young Professionals. They have not sat behind a government bureaucracy.

“You and I know that we have a difference even in policies that we share with, for instance, our colleagues in DFID. But why does the difference show up? Because we feel the constraints much more than others do. To me that’s what it is. So I think it would be a wrong premise to say that you have the same beliefs. By definition you don’t. Why you can be effective is that you have proven yourself in the arena that they cherish. You have gone to their Ivy League schools. You have gone into these institutions that they cherish and done your best and demonstrated your capability. Therefore the power of your idea has some weight. There’s something that sets you apart. And in a sense it’s your African-ness” (Makonnen 2006).

Patrick Bugembe argues that the heated debate over structural adjustment revealed fundamental differences between African experts at the ECA and non-African World Bank experts:

“One was an issue of conviction, in that an ECA expert at that time was committed to the African development more than the World Bank was committed to African development. The World Bank person tended to be more committed to Bank positions. An ECA person was looking at Africa – whether in transport or other areas. Two, they had a global agenda which we did not have to have. You must know that by the 1980s Reaganomics and Thatcherism had come up front, and there was clear new thinking as to how economics should be run. All this was driven by a certain global view which constrained the World Bank and defined its vision, while it did not constrain us. Maybe, in hindsight, this is where we came to a head” (Bugembe 2006).

Demographer Amson Sibanda believes that the agendas of African experts are necessarily different from those of their counterparts because their reality is different:

“Some aspects of Western Family Planning ideology are good. However, being an African, having grown up [in] a family of nine, [with] the little money that my father had, how much of it would then go into better child quality issues – sending us all to school, graduating and so on? Obviously my sister suffered because [she had older brothers]. So it’s possible to believe in what some of the Western scholars say that if you reduce family size, then child quality goes up. But if you look at Namibia or Botswana... they are well-endowed in terms of resources, but they have less than two million people each. That’s less than the city of Philadelphia, right? So, will a couple of more million people be hurtful to the society? No!” (Sibanda 2006).

'These are Realities I have Lived'

Isatou Gaye, a Gambian national, applied in response to the 2000 recruitment campaign and joined the ECA as an Environmental Affairs Officer. She holds a BSc in Biology from the University of Lagos, Nigeria (1986), an MSc in Environmental Microbiology from the University of Benin, Nigeria (1987), and a Postgraduate Diploma from The Netherlands in Environmental Science and Technology majoring in Environmental Resource Management and Impact Assessment. She believes a better grasp of context is key to expert agency:

“As an African expert, knowing African realities, having worked in Africa at the country level and at the regional level, I have the comparative advantage, if I’m working anywhere else outside of Africa, to come to the table with the region-specific issues and realities. These are issues that I know, these are realities that I’ve lived, am engaged in, are involved in and are deeply convinced about. And there are issues I’ve worked on, that have been resolved, some wholly, some partly, some not resolved but still in the process of coming up with solutions to problems we have. But then the background information is there, a region-specific context” (Gaye 2006).

For George Alibaruho, his African background was instrumental in determining his PhD research topic and influencing his line of inquiry:

“I was working on a very exciting topic – supply responsiveness of cotton farmers in a multi-crop setting using dynamic expectations models developed by Mark Nerlove at Harvard. The idea was to establish the responsiveness of farmers not just to price – and you can see how they adjust to price when the other factors change. For example, with cotton farmers in Central Uganda you find a completely different reaction to farmers in the North where the crop is also grown, and in West depending for example on the infrastructure density, depending on crop substitutes, and also rainfall reliability. There was this view that Africans react adversely to price incentives. The so-called backward rising supply curve of labour – give them more money and they’ll work less. So there was a whole generation of research that was devoted, including mine, to showing that this was bullshit, that African economic agents engage as rationally as anybody. That if you fail to understand the factors that explain why they don’t do certain things, it’s your failing as a researcher. So don’t say that it’s a paradigm, and say ‘pay them less because if they get their target income they’ll go away to drink’. No!” (Alibaruho 2006).

In stark contrast to this stridency as a student, and as a World Bank official later on, Alibaruho was struck by the contrast between the sense of agency he felt as an African expert and the apparent powerlessness of experts in African countries he worked in.

“[It was very frustrating] working in the Bank and working on our countries, to see how helpless those countries that I worked with seemed to be almost resigned to the full power of the Bank. But at the same time you are in the Bank, and while the Bank is working for member states there is a contradiction because sometimes when you see the Bank taking a position which you think is really ridiculous, it’s like militaristic. You cannot go on the other side. You have to toe the party line. There was a mission I led to Liberia. As country economist for Liberia I could constitute a mission using staff from different parts of the Bank. There’s a fellow I had sourced from the Central Services Division. We as country economists have a relationship with the country officials, we’re always there. So this fellow was trying to talk down on people, and I said ‘no, you can’t do it’. So he said, in the midst of a meeting: ‘Are you working for the Bank or for Liberia?’ You know what I told him? ‘Please get out of this meeting and go back to the hotel – we shall talk later’. He thought I was joking but I got him out. It may sound anecdotal, but this is the truth. In Operations, there’s this [mentality] that ‘these people, we have to tell them what to do’. And you see, Africans being what they are, even when they know better, since there’s money they just keep quiet. I can tell you the sigh of relief many of us breathed when we came [to the ECA], recognising that we could now actually work with our people’ – They are the same African ministers of finance that the World Bank works with – and see whether we cannot really do the African thing” (ibid).

‘I Felt there was Something Missing...’

Emmanuel Nnadozie studied Economics, initially at the University of Nigeria and later at the Sorbonne in Paris, where he was awarded a PhD in Economics in 1987. Next, Nnadozie worked in both the public and private sectors before emigrating to the U.S., where he joined the University of North Carolina and then Truman State University in Missouri, rising from assistant professor to full professor. He joined the ECA in 2004, yet another African from the Diaspora that responded to the 2000 recruitment campaign:

“While I was in Europe, I remained interested in studying African problems from an economic perspective. I wanted to figure out how to solve these problems and how to make a contribution. So I remained African – not just in heart or by birth or by nation. I was also concerned about making an impact or making a contribution [to] the continent. So, that never left me. During nearly 20 years in the United States, I still was focusing and thinking about how to come back to the continent and make a contribution.

Because I felt that, that was where... it was my responsibility, number one, as an African-born person not to abandon my continent and its dejected condition. If I chose to study Financial Markets in the U.S., build some models and all that I would have made tons and tons of money. But instead, I just... didn't allow that to happen. I've had that sense of responsibility... [t]hat's really what made me come back. I was fired up by moving to ECA. I felt that it was a place where I could make an impact that would not just be simply concentrated on one particular area, but continent-wide. And that this would give me the opportunity to use the skills that I had developed over time, the knowledge that I had built over time, in a very productive and effective way" (Nnadozie 2006).

Kojo Busia, 43 years old at the time of my fieldwork, was recruited by the ECA as a governance expert, at around the same time as Nnadozie. Beforehand, he worked as a senior official in the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Of Ghanaian origin, he holds undergraduate, Masters and Doctorate degrees from Cornell University in the U.S. For him, what sets African experts apart is their agenda, the pressure to register impact, and their ownership of the problems and solutions at hand:

"At one level, I do not think there is anything African about development policy or someone's training or someone's expertise. We are no different from any Westerner because we are all schooled in the same theories and analytical work, frameworks and we have same mentors – I have colleagues whom I still keep in touch and we discuss issues at a very theoretical level and so on. But I think when it comes to agenda setting and prioritising Africa's development issues, and articulating the African position and the African interest... being an African does add some value. And my own situation is an interesting one in terms of my trajectory professionally and also educationally... from undergraduate to PhD in one of the best universities in the U.S. I worked for the U.S. government directly, USAID. After ten years, I felt that there was something missing; that somehow my contributions were not necessarily not valued, but were not relevant [to changing Africa's situation]. I questioned my own relevance in terms of contributing to African development from that angle of sitting in the West and enjoying otherwise very successful career, and I felt the need [to return to the continent].

"So the sense of commitment, the sense of fulfilment, the sense of relevance, I think these were the motivating factors for an African expert located in the West, feeling the urge and the need to relocate and come and help to reconstruct Africa. But in terms of technical background, in terms of competence and capabilities, I think we all have the same. But obviously they have different agendas, different interests, a different sense of impact, and ownership also. Because expertise and ownership should also be sort-of somehow linked! Because here you are, African, bright, and so on, but you feel the

sense of lack of ownership in some institutions. That somehow you do not own the agenda. You do not own the priorities and do not... you know, maybe it is a psychological sort of thing that we all go through, but you always feel the gap” (Busia 2006).

‘To be Respected within Africa You have to be World Class...’

Ethiopian economist Abebe Shimeles was awarded a PhD in Economics from Gothenburg University, Sweden in 2006, with his thesis focusing on poverty, risk and consumption dynamics in Ethiopia. Before this, he gained an MSc in Economics at the Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi, India (1991), and a BSc in Economics from the University of Addis Ababa (1986). At the time of my fieldwork he was working as a long-term consultant at the ECA. In his view, and with reference to the debates of the 1980s, ECA experts at that time may have had the right instincts about the need for structural transformation, as expressed in the LPA and AAF-SAP, but lacked the technical ability for rigorous data gathering, analysis and modelling on the basis of which policy recommendations could be made. This compared unfavourably with experts at the World Bank who could access significant resources for gathering and processing data. For Shimeles, agency comes with the quality of one’s ideas, the tools at one’s disposal, and from strong knowledge institutions:

“Economic policy cannot be done in the dark. And if you don’t do it, somebody else will do it for you, and that somebody else maybe takes you backwards” (Shimeles 2006).

Bartholomew Armah, from Ghana pursued his university studies in economics in the U.S., securing an undergraduate degree at Hope College, Michigan, and a PhD at University of Notre Dame (1990). Armah first took a three-month sabbatical from his post as tenure-track professor at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee in 1998, returning to his native Ghana to work at the Institute for Economic Affairs, a local think tank. Stimulated by this experience, he returned to Ghana in 2000 to work for the Government in the National Planning Commission. Based on this experience, he vowed never to return to teaching, which he found frustrating. While in Ghana, Armah applied for the post of ECA regional adviser on poverty reduction strategies, the first post of its kind and a reflection of the ECA’s growing preoccupation with helping its member

states build capacity to take greater leadership and ownership of their agenda. He joined the ECA in March 2005.

Armah agrees that agency and room to manoeuvre come from the intellectual capacity to produce high-quality work and the confidence to negotiate. In his view, influencing the discourse and policy of development is not about confrontation, but about good logic. Donors, he argues, respect Africans who are intellectually strong, and this is what allows African experts to push the frontiers and reduce the power asymmetry. He provides a concrete example from his experience with the poverty reduction strategy (PRS) process in Ghana:

“When Ghana was doing its PRS, the idea for HIPC was to forgive debts, externally owed debts. Well, we stood back and said look, our external debts are certainly higher than our domestic debts. But our domestic debts are short-term [meaning that they] carry higher interest rates, so they are in fact a bigger burden on us than the external debts. So, it makes no sense to talk about external debt reduction without talking about reducing domestic debt, [as] you want to free up some resources for poverty reducing actions. Then after a lot of bartering they agreed that 20% of HIPC resources [made available to Ghana] would go towards settling the domestic debt. That is the way we have to negotiate...” (Armah 2006).

While international academic training and international exposure are necessary, Armah believes that ultimately, for such experts to have optimal agency, they must work at the national level. For him, the difference between national experts who have never studied or worked abroad, and those who have, is the confidence that exposure brings. He believes that African experts have only begun to realise they hold significant potential to reverse the asymmetry of power in the struggle over who should lead the design of Africa’s development strategy:

“Donors often come to the table with a very negative view of Africans, [thinking that] we just want money. And when they come across people who can think with them, think logically and think more intellectually, they in most cases capitulate. Of course there are limits, but the question is: how deep are we within our production possibilities frontier? I think there is more scope to further shift this asymmetry” (ibid).

As Western-trained experts in the ECA, a UN agency in which Western nations have a say as members of the UN and as funders (even if they are not members of the Commission itself), it is expected that experts like Armah will serve as sub-hegemonic ‘translators’ of the globally dominant development ideology. To an extent, experts trained in the West inevitably reflect a shared epistemology with their Western counterparts in their work at the ECA. In some cases, they consciously set out to replicate Western best practice – as with K.Y. Amoako when he moved from the World Bank to lead the ECA (see Chapter 3). However, it is precisely this association with the West and the familiarity with its rationalities, techniques and technologies of rule that provides sub-hegemonic agents such as Armah with the legitimacy to contest policy space.

Sibanda also believes that, because many Africans have proven themselves in the most competitive arenas, this gives African experts significantly greater room to manoeuvre than in the past:

“In Western societies in academia, in development agencies, in the Population Council, in whatever organisation, you will find a group of Africans there. So they have proven themselves to be effective developing these ideas. If those same experts come and work in Africa, you cannot say they are not good. They are working for you. Look at Nigeria, their [then] Minister of Finance [Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala]. She worked at the World Bank as vice-president. So they excelled at these places. So, you cannot turn around and say they are not good. So, in a way because there are so many of those people now in so many positions in Africa... it has given us some room to say we can push our own agenda and get some respect from these big, powerful agencies. I am an expert on Southern Africa, so whatever I say on demography, they all seriously look at it and say... you know, I think it’s worth looking at. They cannot just brush it aside” (Sibanda 2006).

As I argued in the Introduction to this dissertation, Pan-Africanists, African leaders and intellectuals did not reject Western science, despite its having been harnessed to advance colonialism. Indeed, they recognised that the West offered the cutting edge of human technological progress. Where they differed with the West was that they sought to harness this science to advocate for Africa’s development on the basis of its own societal values and dynamics. This was the logic behind the search, beginning in the 1970s, for an African theory of

development. Thus, there was an implicit understanding that, in the reality of postcolonial relations, a degree of credibility and therefore legitimacy could be gained from the West, and then used to pursue a path convergent with the Western trajectory to development, while at the same time diverging from it in several ways.

'Out with Dominant Ideology. In with Pragmatism'

Governance expert, Busia believes that, while in previous decades experts were labelled by ideology, the current wave of globalisation allows for greater heterodoxy:

“[T]he old frameworks were very stuck in terms of positions. You were either neo-liberal or a structuralist, or neo-socialist or Marxist. But now I think globalisation really allows relativity and a sense of specificity in the context of globalisation – partly because no paradigm really is supreme and also partly because of the data we are getting from different countries’ experiments. The role of China in the world is debunking a lot of things about the neo-liberal framework. Countries like Brazil, countries like India and so on. Now, more than before, African experts have many more opportunities to hold onto things that work in a more pragmatic fashion than to be caught up in the ideological debate. Because really there is no dominant paradigm anymore” (Busia 2006).

Not all agree, however, that African experts have more agency than in the past. Some, for instance, believe that while African policy-makers maintain the appearance of having listened, they end up paying lip service to advice from experts in trans-national institutions within Africa, and ultimately toe the Bretton Woods line. According to Ugandan economist Alibaruho, who worked for the World Bank before joining the ECA, this is because the real power lies not with institutions that generate good ideas, but with those that are well-endowed with resources. In his experience, this ‘power of the purse’ frustrates African expert agency:

“This frustration that I’m expressing is expressed by technical staff in the Ministry in Uganda. You have a got a few key people – which is the way the Bank operates – they pick a few key ones in the Ministry of Finance, and really take care of them. Financially they are better off than the ordinary technical staff who do not come directly into dealings with the Bank. Because this happens on missions, they get DSA [daily subsistence allowance], they are talking to Kim Jaycox [former Africa vice president] and others, and this gives them a sense of power over the rest” (Alibaruho 2006).

Furthermore, Alibaruho insists that, while money determines which ideas predominate, this does not mean that the dominant institutions are ready to give credit to the originators of the different ideas that have forced them to revise their prescriptions:

“Most of these so-called new institutional economics that is embraced by the Bank – institutions matter, governance matters, capital is more than physical things, social capital, education, and so on – these are things we learned as undergrads. And it’s not that the profession forgot it. It’s just that the dominant political thinking, and particularly where research money is, determines what ends up as policy. If you do not couch your research proposal in a certain way, a framework that the funders are interested in, you are not going to get it funded. So in many ways, yes, our voices have found expression, but not in an agenda driven by us. It’s just that the dominant powers have in the end faced so much opposition and are alarmed at their own failure... that they are talking about the things others were talking about. But you see they’ll still not give credit that in fact they have turned around because of taking in these new ideas” (ibid).

Samba Jack, the ECA retiree, strongly feels that although capacity is no longer the constraint today that it was in the past, African agency continues to be overwhelmed by structure:

“We know about the African agenda, we know what needs to be done. We know that basically we should be working towards the fundamental transformation of our economies. But because of the way things are, that we are in this trap in the need for foreign aid, the debt issue, that there’s this stranglehold around our neck that forces us to look at the day-to-day instead of the long-term issues, we have not been able to come out of that box. That development should be home-grown as a vision, that we should be working towards a willed future, internalise the process of growth and development – whereas it’s there as a concept, something that we aspire to, the realities of the day have not allowed Africa and African experts to assert themselves, to redirect their programmes and to work purposefully towards that. It’s not a capacity problem. The capacity is there. We can do it, it’s do-able. It’s just the constraints of development, the way the process of development in this region is being influenced by outside forces” (ibid).

For Nnadozie, African expert agency is not always constrained by the exercise of power from outside Africa, but often by leadership politics within Africa. As an example, he recalls working on the African debt issue. He and other economists at the ECA wanted to present a nuanced analysis of Africa’s indebtedness along with proposals on how to manage the debt to ensure

the savings gained could contribute to reducing poverty. However, they were told firmly that what was needed from them was the economic rationale to support the policy message Africa's leadership wanted to communicate to the outside world, one of total debt cancellation:

"Even though we were in favour of debt cancellation, we wanted African governments themselves to recognise that they needed to really seize the opportunity to improve governance, so that the aid windfall would have a positive impact in our countries... rather than just basically help us recycle back into debt. You bring up these issues, but what you see working in this kind of institution is that you're faced with difficult constraints that sometimes limit what you can or cannot do or say. You are forced to present a technical blueprint in line with the political position of the African leaders. You can't openly say that this is not the direction that we should be moving in" (Nnadozie 2006).

'From Ivory Tower to National Level'

Patrick Osakwe is another of the young breed of ECA economists who joined after 2000. Of Nigerian origin, he moved to Canada after his undergraduate studies, and was awarded a PhD in Economics from Queen's University in 1997. He then worked as a senior analyst with the Bank of Canada in Ottawa. At the time of my fieldwork he was leading the ECA's work on Financing for Development. He believes African experts working trans-nationally are disadvantaged because their institutions lack the ability to affect national policy.

"Yes, we try to help African countries, but we don't have any bearing on national policy *per se*. And that's what is critical here. Most of the problems we face in Africa come from failures in national policy. There are little things that we can do for ourselves to make life more meaningful for our people that have nothing to do with Europeans or North Americans. These are little things [such as] getting access to clean water. We saw oil windfalls in the last two to three years in Nigeria. What is the 'Nigerian' government doing it with it?" (Osakwe 2006).

However, in some areas, it is possible to register an impact. An example cited is the ECA's work in strengthening the capacity of African trade negotiators. Osakwe and his colleagues have been able to respond to pressing national needs by bringing actors from different countries together to forge common positions prior to negotiating in global forums such as the WTO. This is consistent with Armah's view that continental African experts need to take their thinking to

national contexts if they are to make a real impact. Ultimately, he says, it is about “moving from the ivory tower to the ground, but not forgetting to take your ivory with you” (ibid).

Unpacking Western Credentialism

In support of my hypothesis on the co-deployment by experts of their ‘African-ness’ and Western academic credentials, a rich body of evidence has emerged from the oral testimonies of the experts interviewed. One significant finding is that respondents completed much of their advanced academic training in Western universities. Most studied in the U.S., several with scholarships from major U.S. foundations such as Rockefeller and Ford. Even those who completed their undergraduate studies in their home countries then pursued advanced studies abroad. Older respondents tended to favour the U.K., given colonial links with their countries of origin. Younger respondents favoured studying in the U.S. and to a lesser extent France and the Netherlands. The long-standing desire to study in the West – even among experts like Teriba whose parent university, Ibadan, was considered to have equal status to leading centres of academic excellence in the West – validates my hypothesis about Western credentials being seen by postcolonial African experts as necessary to effecting transformational change back home. The legitimacy conferred by Western education enhances the ability of African experts to exercise technocratic power – both within Africa’s development regime and internationally.

Those who studied economics and other ‘hard’ social sciences such as demography clearly value the growing emphasis, primarily but not exclusively in U.S. universities, on quantitative methods, as well on applying such methods in a more operational mode to elaborate and influence policy. The testimonies of Alibaruho, Sibanda and Bugembe bear out the growing importance of ‘hard’ economic tools such as regression analysis in the fields of economics and development studies during their time as students. Ngartando Blayo, a now-retired ECA staffer, also spoke of having attended courses in quantitative economics at CRED in Michigan to supplement his analytical skill set (Blayo 2006).

Respondents agreed that the tools, methods and other knowledge acquired in Western universities were formative and provided an important theoretical base to their future work in advancing development. However, there are also varying degrees of scepticism, informed by experience, about the real-world applicability of many of the theoretical frameworks learned at universities. Many felt strongly that the Western conventional wisdom on how development should happen in African countries did not often resonate with the reality. Alibaruho, for example, used his training to debunk rational-choice-influenced theories about the torpor of African labourers. Other respondents (cf. Jack, Bugembe, Sibanda and Armah) also actively questioned the received theoretical wisdom at different stages of their careers.

Some found the universities they attended in the West to be dogmatic and disciplinary in their approach to teaching, as discovered by Sibanda who found his university professors unwilling to brook deviation from the narrow confines of curricula that emphasised a Western worldview of science. Despite being in awe of his lecturers, four of whom later became Nobel laureates in Economics, Alibaruho strongly criticised the erroneous theoretical basis for some of what he had been taught, and maintained a stridently sceptical view of Western ideas – despite spending much of his career as a World Bank economist.

Many scholars funded by U.S. foundations were bound by the condition that they returned to their countries. This was seen as a ploy to embed them as sub-hegemonic agents of a hegemonic, expert-led, ideological and disciplinary U.S. approach to science. This emerged clearly in the testimony of Sibanda, who remained in the U.S. to strengthen his academic profile in prestigious U.S. universities. This strategy of resistance was later validated by Sibanda's recruitment by the ECA, considered by him and others to be a space in which an African agenda could be pursued.

The experts interviewed were evidently shaped by their engagement as development professionals. Bugembe, who admitted to being strongly influenced by theoretical macro-economic tools, began to grapple with the practical constraints of development only during his

first job working with the EADB. He was later compelled by what he learned as a young economist at the ECA to confront the Executive Secretary on the need to interrogate the impact of SAPs on African countries. These findings speak to the fluidity of sub-hegemony: Western epistemological training, combined with mastery of Western ‘political technologies’, serves to empower African experts to act as classic sub-hegemonists whilst simultaneously pursuing creative and multi-faceted ‘techno-politics’ with the potential to bring about power shifts.

A compelling finding – and one that bears out my hypothesis on the strategic leveraging of ‘world class’ expert status to push for increased policy space – is that today’s generation of African experts consider themselves to be widely respected, whether working in national, regional or global institutions. As Sibanda suggests, the growing number of Africans working in mainstream as well as alternative-thinking institutions speaks to their increasing presence at the cutting edge of development theory, policy and practice. This is supported by the rise of a number of Africans to senior positions at the World Bank and IMF; some of them have also gone on to lead economic and social policy-making in their countries of origin¹⁵⁷.

While such examples of African success in the dominant institutions of the international development regime speak to the growing legitimacy of African experts, such respect is earned, and not bestowed. Makonnen attributes this to the current generation of African experts excelling in the same ‘Ivy League’ academies as their counterparts. Armah agrees, arguing that the key to agency is a demonstrated intellectual capacity, combined with a proven track record. It is this capacity, and not the rhetorical espousal by developed countries of the importance of ‘African ownership’, that enables African experts to negotiate effectively the terms of Africa’s engagement with the outside world. As Shimeles asserts, it was a deficit of technical know-how and rigour that undermined attempts by ECA experts working under Adedeji to win the battle

¹⁵⁷ Most recently, Former World Bank vice president Ngozi Okonji-Iweala served as Finance Minister of Nigeria; while senior IMF official Antoinette Sayeh served as Finance Minister of Liberia. Ironically, both returned to Washington after stints in their country of origin to serve in even higher positions in the Bank and Fund respectively.

of ideas with the World Bank and IMF. Today, the assumption is that this technical know-how is now less scarce than it was in the 1980s or 1990s.

Alibaruho's insights on the paradigm shift in the teaching of economics – away from more philosophical approaches associated with European scholarship, and towards more quantitative techniques – resonates with the view on legitimacy. I found that younger ECA experts consider the mastery of such tools and techniques as key to more robust policy analysis. K.Y. Amoako, who joined the World Bank as a Young Professional, mastered regression analysis and related methods while pursuing his PhD at Berkeley. On his arrival at the ECA in 1995, he made it a hallmark of his tenure to improve the rigour of ECA reports (Amoako 2004, ECA 1996). As discussed in Chapter 3, this was because he believed that, in order for the ECA to gain credibility as an interlocutor between Africa and the international community, the quality of its technical work needed to be comparable to that of the leading ICs in the world – notably the World Bank, where he had learned and plied his trade before joining the ECA.

Overall, the testimonies garnered from the life-history interviews paint a picture of highly trained experts, fully conversant with Western theories and approaches to development. They possess the academic credentials, earned in the West, that legitimise their claim to membership of an elite community of 'internationally recognised global development professionals'.

Decomposing 'African-ness'

In concert with this identity as 'world class' experts, and according to my theoretical conceptualisation of Africa's development regime in Chapter 1, experts leverage their African identity, or 'African-ness', as a legitimising device to increase policy space. The testimonies featured above have provided compelling validation of this hypothesis, and thrown up various constituent dimensions of 'African-ness' worth unpacking here.

First, the interviews show the strong emotional attachment by these experts to their countries of origin. Older experts such as Teriba wasted no time in returning home after graduation, consonant with the strong nationalism common among Nigerian intellectuals in the immediate aftermath of their country's independence from Britain, and the strong demand for newly qualified experts. In contrast, younger experts such as Sibanda – who earned his PhD more than three decades after Teriba – took strategic decisions to gain more experience in the West before returning home. In many cases, and particularly after the collapse of many African economies in the 1980s, this desire to remain in the West was born of a frustration with the relative under-development of the experts' countries of origin and a conviction that they could make a better life away from home. However, some may have been motivated by the desire to return home equipped with tools to help develop their respective countries. Indeed, as has been shown in this chapter, many of my interview respondents had already succeeded in Western academies and returned home because they believed they could better contribute to the development of their continent by being there. Busia left a permanent position with USAID, which had taken him around the world, to join the ECA. Nnadozie left a lucrative teaching position in a U.S. university to come to the ECA¹⁵⁸.

In choosing to work at the ECA, Sibanda and his colleagues from the Diaspora, many concerned about the socio-economic and political problems in their countries, invoked their 'African-ness', appealing to the age-old notion of Pan-Africanism to justify their continued relevance not only to their direct country of origin but also to the greater African good. This speaks to the compelling imaginary power of the 'idea' of Africa discussed in the Introduction to this dissertation, and correspondingly of the 'West'. While the notion of Pan-African regionalism was paid lip service in the aftermath of independence, it has regained currency as awareness has grown of the need to harness the idea of Africa to contest power against an international

¹⁵⁸ In making this argument I concede that the benefits of being an international civil servant (including the payment by the UN of 70% of school fees of staff members up to the end of first degree, and generous allowances covering cost of living, hardship and home leave, among others) may have provided an inducement that some of the returnees from the Diaspora could not resist.

development regime that has objectified the continent as an undifferentiated, homogeneous mass characterised by backwardness and poverty.

Linked to this, a second dimension of 'African-ness' emerging from the life histories is the strong adherence by African experts to the ideology of development, and their desire to contribute to the development of their continent. As Busia notes, there is nothing intrinsically African about development or about the training and knowledge that experts possess, whether African or otherwise. The difference lies in the sense of commitment, fulfilment and relevance that African experts feel when working on issues pertinent to their continent. To this extent, and as evidenced by the fact that a large number of Diasporan Africans applied for posts at ECA in response to the 2000 recruitment campaign (Amoako 2004), 'African-ness' therefore emerges as a powerful force that impels development experts with a connection to Africa to return home. This emerges clearly in the testimony of Busia, Nnazodie, Bugembe and others.

Third, African experts see their solid experience of working in different African contexts, and in particular national-level experience, as a key constituent of their African expert identity. As Makonnen notes, African experts, whether working in the World Bank, at ECA or in other agencies, "know where the shoe pinches" because many of them worked in their countries as national experts before moving into the trans-national domain. This is in contrast to the non-African high-fliers in powerful institutions such as the Bank and Fund, many of whom were recruited as Young Professionals without experience of working in a government bureaucracy. In response, some might argue that there are many non-Africans with significant experience in African countries, and a number of Africans who joined international institutions with no national experience. On the basis of the above, a counter-argument would then be that, even in the case of young experts such as Sibanda, who never worked in Africa before joining the ECA, the fact that African realities are realities they have lived gives them the edge over their non-African counterparts.

A fourth dimension of 'African-ness' elicited from the life histories is that the agenda of African experts is different from that of their counterparts. This is well articulated by Bugembe, who recalls two aspects of divergence between experts at the ECA and those at the World Bank during the days of confrontation between Africa and the Bretton Woods institutions sparked by the stand-off between the LPA and Berg Report. The first difference is that while ECA African experts cared about establishing social and economic development infrastructure, such as roads or education, their Bretton Woods counterparts were more detached and therefore less likely to question the agenda of their respective institutions. Secondly, and paradoxically, while World Bank and IMF experts were constrained by the global context, African experts were much less so. As discussed in Chapter 1, the institutionalisation of development has led to today's specialised cadre of development professionals who have generated the international development discourse, and carved out technical domains of specialisation. Those working in the World Bank, even if assigned to a particular region, do not have the same room for manoeuvre as experts working at the ECA, which was established specifically to advance African development. This explains why, although it is part of a global system, the ECA is dominated by African expertise. These experts are as emotionally attached to the 'idea' of Africa as they are ideologically committed to development. In the World Bank, the first condition does not necessarily apply.

A final dimension of 'African-ness' emerging from the life histories is the fact that African experts tend to have a better knowledge overall of their continent and its countries. As sustainable development specialist, Gaye asserts, this is because professionals like herself can bring the region- and country-specific context to UN-wide and other global initiatives on African development. This knowledge of the different African contexts – discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 with respect to the shift from one-size-fits-all policy prescriptions to an understanding that development policy must be tailored to the specific context of each country and region – leverages all the other dimensions of 'African-ness' highlighted above.

Conclusion

In this chapter, with recourse to life histories gathered during fieldwork, I have sought to elaborate further my thesis on sub-hegemony by showing how experts leverage two constructed identities – their world-class credentials coupled with their ‘African-ness’ – to assert their primacy as the crafters and purveyors of technocratic solutions to Africa’s development challenges. According to my reading, ‘African-ness’ is not asserted by these experts as a corrective or alternative to Western ideas. On the contrary: the one constructed identity is not counter-posed to the other. They co-exist, being mutually constitutive and deployed in concert. Typically, the reasoning would be: ‘We are best placed to direct Africa’s development because we have world-class credentials and are well respected, and because we are of African origin’.

The claim to increased policy space is therefore not asserted on the basis of African origin alone; indeed, implicit in the notion of ‘African-ness’ is the attribute of globally recognised credentials. One cannot assert ‘African-ness’ without being world-class. Academic and technical excellence is considered a prerequisite for expanded agency and legitimacy. These credentials, gained mainly in the West, enable African experts to create increased room for manoeuvre, in relation to their non-African counterparts, in crafting solutions to African problems. This speaks to the enduring imaginary power of the ‘West’ as a source of credibility and legitimacy for citizens of the Third World.

The corollary to this has been the ‘idea’ of Africa, a powerful imaginary that has drawn on the power of Western science to objectify Africa, rendering its peoples and territory as powerless subjects and preparing the terrain for external intervention. I have shown how Africans took this Orientalist ‘idea’ of Africa and created its antithesis, a powerful vision of an independent Africa imagined by emancipating discourses of ‘*Pan-Africanism*’, ‘*African renaissance*’ and so on. In all this, the idea of the West as the apotheosis of scientific knowledge did not disappear. On the contrary, successive generations of Africans have considered the acquisition of Western

academic credentials as key to their future ability to challenge their Western counterparts and in some cases to win power struggles.

A final, reflexive word on Actor Network Theory (ANT) and its relation to the life histories featured in this chapter. A key motivation in documenting aspects of the life histories of the African experts interviewed has been to explore the intersection between individual agency and structural conditions. ANT provides important insights into the constitution of subordinate actors as sub-hegemonic agents advancing as well as minimising hegemony. In more rigid accounts of domination as governmentality and/or hegemony, regimes of modern power are populated by a host of successful actor-networks that eliminate all resistance in the pursuit of 'social ordering'. These actor-networks combine human and nonhuman agents to manufacture and enforce consent.

In Chapter 1, I explained theoretically why such consent is rarely, if ever, achieved. This is because, within a given actor-network, as in the pre-existing field of power inhabited by such networks or apparatuses, each actor is "renegotiating what the world is made up of, who is acting in it, who matters, and who wants what" (Latour 1984, p.40). Actor-networks seek to reinforce hegemonic power structures by overcoming resistance, but because structure itself is a site of struggle, it recursively reproduces itself in order to accommodate dissent and advance its hegemony. In doing so, it opens the door for various actors to resist. The power effects of 'ordering' are generated and distributed in a relational manner (Law 1992). As a result, effects and outcomes generated by actor-networks may be random, and are radically indeterminate. Hegemonic projects can therefore be disrupted and the balance of power reconfigured.

In this chapter, I have provided the evidence to support my hypothesis on the workings of power in actor-networks. I have done so by interrogating the sub-hegemonic strategies and tactics of individual agents who form part of institutional complexes of expertise, pivotal actor-networks in Africa's development regime. Through the life histories of the experts, I have shown how they seek to carve out increased policy space by invoking their 'African-ness' as well

as their Western credentials as a means of “creating... new sources of power and new sources of legitimacy, which are irreducible to those that hitherto coded the so-called political space...” (Latour 1984, p.40). Identity emerges as a key weapon in the complex game of ‘techno-politics’, one that affords these experts increased room to manoeuvre as they aspire to greater agency in directing Africa’s future development.

Chapter 5:

The APRM: A Political Technology of African Power

Introduction

In Chapter 1, I offered a theoretical framework to aid in the deconstruction of Africa's development regime. I identified two key dimensions of Foucault's (1991) governmentality: a set of *political rationalities* – the thoughts and discursive representations (or meanings) involved when authorities define the field of intervention; and a set of *technologies* to deal with problems defined by political rationality. While rationalities are embedded in governmental discourse, technologies involve various tools and forms of knowledge, promulgated and managed by experts and institutions in the quest for hegemony (Salskov-Iversen 2000). With this in mind, I argued that a potential outcome of contestation of sub-hegemony is the recalibration of asymmetries of power. In Chapters 2, 3 and 4, I have demonstrated in concrete terms how this can happen.

In this final chapter, and to provide further evidence in support of my hypothesis, I examine the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) – described respectively as “arguably the continent's most innovative and challenging experiment to date” (Herbert and Gruzd 2007) and “arguably the most unique and original aspect of the NEPAD initiative” (Masterson 2005). The APRM stands out as the most visible form of knowledge, or ‘political technology’ power, in Africa's contemporary development regime. Furthermore, its origins can be directly traced back to the ECA ICE, my case study.

I advance three central arguments. First, while there are grounds for the APRM to be cast as a classic sub-hegemonic political technology aimed at entrenching the power of the dominant discourse on ‘good governance’, it simultaneously embodies significant potential to expand African policy space. Second, much of this potential lies in its ability to open up space within and above the African state, enabling a plurality of voices to influence the outcome of the peer review process as well as the policies of governments. Third, and in line with my hypothesis on the radical indeterminacy of development regimes, I argue that key outcomes of the peer

review process have exceeded the intention of the APRM's founders. Before developing these arguments, I reflect briefly on the extent to which NEPAD, the APRM's parent, can be seen as a sub-hegemonic political rationality abetting continued external domination of Africa's development.

NEPAD: Shining the Chains of Global Apartheid?¹⁵⁹

A wide body of literature has highlighted NEPAD's reflection of key tenets of the neo-liberal international development regime¹⁶⁰. Many argue that it accepts globalisation as an inevitable process that must be embraced, uncritically supports the integration of financial markets and promotes global capital inflows. Tandon (2002), for example, has asserted that while the NEPAD document recognises the potential for losers as well as winners in the globalisation process, it embraces integration into the globalised economy on the basis of the liberalisation of markets and the free movement of capital as its key strategy. Griggs (2003) has concluded that the new partnerships discourse as enshrined in NEPAD "...bridges the gap between the narratives of the North and the South" because it is cast within a neo-liberal discourse and includes an acceptance of many of the conditions that go with multilateral aid (ibid, see also Loxley 2003).

While NEPAD acknowledges that reforms promoted by SAPs tended to remove serious price distortions, they gave inadequate attention to the provision of social services (NEPAD, 2001, p.5), critics have viewed this single substantive reference to SAPs as inadequate. NEPAD's support for private-sector-led growth (cf. NEPAD 2001 pp.46-47) has been seen as further evidence of the dominance of the neo-liberal economic paradigm. At the same time, NEPAD has been criticised for its ambiguity on the role of the state, with one commentator asserting that it advocates for a neo-liberal type of state dedicated to adjusting national economies to the dynamics of a largely unregulated global economy (Randriamaro 2002).

¹⁵⁹ "In sum, if international capital and its various institutional foundations, including the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO, represent the 'chains' of global apartheid, it is evident in what we have seen above that [NEPAD] has been reduced to shining, not breaking those chains" (Bond 2002, p.14).

¹⁶⁰ For NGO critiques, see, for example, TWN-CODESRIA (2002), and the Bamako Declaration, Africa Social Forum (2001).

In my view, the significance of NEPAD's advocacy of 'African ownership' as a new phase in Africa's power relations with the outside world is not diminished by its espousal of policies deemed to be neo-liberal. As argued in Chapter 3, accepting certain principles identifiable with the dominant ideology can serve as a pragmatic manoeuvre to win trust and open up expanded space for the exercise of power by weaker agents. Although the phrase 'African ownership' barely features in the NEPAD framework document, it is pivotal to the initiative¹⁶¹. Ownership remains a highly contested concept, regarded by some as a colonising sub-hegemonic discourse used to help 'normalise' African citizens as global neo-liberal subjects, and by others as a potential means of reconfiguring the balance of power in Africa's favour.

How and on what basis would such a sub-hegemonic strategy work? The first step would be to recognise that African ideas do not stand in binary opposition to the dominant rationality. As shown in Chapter 1, the ECA of the late 1980s, having vigorously opposed SAPs, agreed to work on the basis of a new synthesis of stabilisation (identified as a key neo-liberal policy construct advocated by the Bretton Woods institutions) and self-reliance (a consistent underpinning of Africa's development regime linked to Pan-Africanist discourses). By accepting that Africa's economies did indeed need to stabilise, the ECA was able to gain recognition and accommodation of its main argument on the need for long-term social transformation and development, eventually leading to modified iterations of SAPs.

In addition to signalling the desire for a recalibration of power between Africa and its external partners, NEPAD also implies a fundamental shift in the relationship between rulers and ruled within Africa. It offers the possibility of greater ownership by African citizens of state-led reforms, as well as "...participatory democracy, decentralisation of decision-making centres of power in both political and economic senses" (Amuwo 2002, p.8). According to this logic, ownership "...becomes a live political process, the product of contestations, bargaining and compromises which, once adopted, makes it easier for policy to be sustained and the populace

¹⁶¹ In par. 42 on page 9, and in par. 47 on page 10. The concluding section of the framework document also states "Africa recognizes that it holds the key to its own development" (NEPAD, 2001, p.57).

to be mobilised behind the national, sub-regional and/or regional development project” (Olukoshi 2002, p.12).

Ownership is thus a condition for legitimacy. Seen this way, the importance of citizen participation as a condition for progress, first acknowledged in the Monrovia Declaration, has remained a core structural underpinning of Africa’s development regime. NEPAD is also underpinned by appeals to ‘partnership’ and ‘mutual accountability’, notions that are problematic and require unpacking. Amuwo (2002) argues that because Africa’s structural crisis was initially engendered by a particularly debilitating external environment, there is too much of the West in Africa to allow Africa to design its future on its own terms, calling into question the notion of a “transformed development partnership” (ibid p.11).

Even in the absence of formal accountability structures, partnership frameworks come with conditions that tend to be asymmetrical – particularly in traditional aid relationships where they apply more to recipient than donor (Maxwell and Christiansen 2002)¹⁶². Symmetrical accountability would require the conditions applying to the donors to be spelt out in more detail, with enforcement mechanisms and penalties applying equally to donors and recipients. Such ‘mutual accountability’ is a central feature of NEPAD, which proposes a multi-layered institutional arrangement to monitor and learn from the ‘new partnership’ that includes a NEPAD ODA Forum (NEPAD, 2001, pp.38-39). This feature, in tandem with the more positive readings of ‘ownership’ discussed above, means that NEPAD, while clearly within the frame of the dominant development paradigm, can conceivably be read as aspiring to a definitive break with past coercive aid relations¹⁶³.

¹⁶² The Cotonou Convention is asymmetrical in the sense that, while the European Union is not subject to any binding conditions, the developing-country partners are (Maxwell and Christiansen (2002). This asymmetry is evident in the emerging contestation over the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) mandated by the Cotonou Agreement.

¹⁶³ Indeed, the renaming of the ‘ODA Forum’ as the ‘Africa Partnership Forum’ (APF) implies recognition that engagement between Africa and its development partners must necessarily move beyond a narrow focus on aid, to encompass wider African concerns and demands on the basis of equal partnership.

The APRM – Origins and Genealogy

In Foucauldian terms, NEPAD stands out as a ‘political rationality’ of power, embodying discursive thoughts and representations promulgated by experts and deployed by African leaders to define their field and scope of intervention. In tandem, the APRM, a voluntary mechanism established by NEPAD Heads of State in 2003 to review and track progress in good governance in participating countries, can be conceptualised as a ‘political technology’ of power’, an expert-initiated technocratic tool harnessing particular forms of knowledge to advance an African governance agenda as a critical dimension of the continent’s development strategy. Through a detailed examination of the evidence, I now interrogate the extent to which the APRM is classically sub-hegemonic, in that it serves to advance the dominant development discourse and embed its prescriptions in the increasingly technocratic practice of African development. To what extent it is paving the way for African policy agents to act with greater effect in determining the continent’s future development path?

The idea of African peer review was first broached in the ECA’s *‘Compact’* (discussed in Chapter 3), which proposed that the NEPAD governing body, in collaboration with relevant and capable continental institutions, “establish mechanisms for the broad-based buy-in by African governments to peer review performance on issues of governance and economic management” (ECA 2001, par. 244, p.41). The *‘Compact’* suggested the OECD DAC (Development Assistance Committee) reviews of development assistance in member states as a possible model for African peer review, and proposed a new forum of African leaders to secure the high-level commitment needed to ensure follow-up within participating counties (ibid).

At the request of the NEPAD Steering Committee, and in May 2002, the ECA published a document entitled *‘Codes and Standards for Good Economic and Corporate Governance in Africa: Summary of Key Issues and Declaration of Principles’*. The ECA sought to focus on economic and corporate governance – areas it considered to be within its competence – and to avoid overtly addressing political governance – which fell within the AU’s mandate. Nevertheless, the document asserted good political governance as a prerequisite for good

economic and corporate governance and recommended that “a single peer review encompassing both the political and economic/corporate aspects of governance for a given country should be conducted where required” (ibid p.11).

This informed the development of a continental peer review mechanism by the initiators of NEPAD. While existing mechanisms such as the OECD peer review process and IMF Article IV consultations¹⁶⁴ are bilateral, between the peer reviewing organisation and specific countries, the APRM is both bilateral and multilateral. As such, it is the first peer review mechanism to combine country reviews with a continental forum for holding countries to account.

The commitment by the initiating countries to good governance in all its dimensions was reflected in the *‘NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance’*, signed by NEPAD leaders on the margins of the inaugural AU Durban 2002 Summit. In the Declaration, giving the rationale for the APRM, the NEPAD leaders reaffirmed their commitment to a host of previous declarations, plans and strategies adopted by the OAU – including the LPA (1980), The African Charter for Popular Participation in Development (1990) and the Abuja Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (1991). Although the Declaration committed all African leaders to adhering to its provisions, it clearly stated that the NEPAD countries had “**separately agreed to establish** an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) on the basis of **voluntary accession**” (NEPAD 2002, par. 28, p.10, emphasis added).

Two things stand out from this text. First, the APRM, though established under the auspices of NEPAD, was created as a separate entity. Second, the APRM was designated a voluntary mechanism, meaning that only those countries wishing to be peer reviewed should sign up. According to the APRM Base Document, the Mechanism’s mandate is:

¹⁶⁴ Kanbur (2004) describes three other peer-review systems from which criteria for an assessment of the APRM can be drawn. The first of these is academic peer review. The second is the OECD peer-review process, which in his view comes closest to the APRM’s intention. The third is the IMF’s Article IV country consultations, which aim to hold countries to account for obligations entered into with the IMF. From these peer-review systems, Kanbur derives three criteria for assessing the APRM: competence, independence and competition.

“To **ensure** that the policies and practices of participating states **conform to the agreed** political, economic and corporate governance **values, codes and standards** contained in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance. The APRM is the mutually agreed instrument for **self-monitoring** by the participating member governments” (NEPAD 2003a, p.2, emphasis added).

The Base Document states that the APRM’s purpose is:

“...to **foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices** that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration through **sharing of experiences** and **reinforcement of successful and best practice**, including **identifying deficiencies** and **assessing the needs for capacity building**” (ibid, emphasis added).

Finally, the document asserts that each country review exercise must be “**technically competent, credible and free of political manipulation**” (ibid, emphasis added).

This text clearly signalled the intention of the APRM’s founders to ensure compliance by participating countries with the content and spirit of the Declaration. However, it was to be dedicated to the ‘sharing of experiences’, ‘reinforcement of successful and best practice’ and to ‘identifying deficiencies’ and ‘assessing the needs for capacity building’. At the same time, it was to be voluntary and self-selecting. Furthermore, the principles for peer review called for technical competence, credibility and the absence of political manipulation.

The desire to keep the mechanism free from political interference was born of a need to prevent politicking by participating countries that would interfere with the hoped-for impartiality of the APRM. However, this did not mean the APRM did not recognise the primacy of politics in national policy-making. As will be seen, the APRM country reviews, far from steering clear of previously sovereign issues, have directly engaged with political questions within countries. At the same time, as with all ‘political technologies’ of power, the APRM has been projected as a neutral, technical mechanism that does not engage in politics.

On the question of compliance, the APRM website clearly states that there is no conditionality attached to joining the APRM, although countries wishing to join must sign up to the mandatory principles laid out in the Declaration, as well as to the five stages of the review process. Experts closely involved in the APRM from its inception put forward two reasons for the voluntary nature of the APRM. One is that the political will for a more coercive mechanism simply did not exist (Nnadozie 2006, Busia 2006). Given the perennial difficulty faced by the AU (and the OAU before it) in compelling member states to meet their obligations, it would have been unrealistic to expect the APRM to include explicit compliance mechanisms. Added to this, and in light of the widely acknowledged failure of the externally imposed SAPs, Africa was keen to avoid new layers of conditionality imposed in return for new aid. As such, it was considered counter-productive for the APRM to apply force to ensure compliance from its membership (Busia, in Gruzid 2009, p.6). I will return later in this chapter to the question of the lack of an enforcement mechanism in the APRM.

Structure and Organisation

Countries wishing to join the APRM are required to sign a Memorandum of Understanding. This commits them to adhering to the codes, standards and principles for peer review as laid down in the Declaration. Four types of peer review are envisaged: the base review, which in theory should be carried out within 18 months of a country's accession to the Mechanism; ongoing periodic review, to take place two to four years after the initial base review; review requested by a member country (i.e. not part of the mandated process); and a crisis review initiated by Heads of State of participating countries to look into early signs of political and economic crisis in a member country (NEPAD 2003a, p.14).

So far, only base reviews have taken place, and these consist of five stages.

1. **Self-Assessment**, involving the preparation of background documents on democratic, political, economic, corporate and social conditions in the country under review, and conducted by the country itself with the assistance of the APRM secretariat.

2. **Country Review Mission**, a visit by a team drawn from the APRM Secretariat and selected experts to carry out consultations, clarify issues and build national consensus.
3. **Country Review Report**, prepared by the visiting team, based on information gathered during the visit as well as on independent issues papers developed by the APRM Secretariat. On the basis of the Self-Assessment Report and the Country Review Report, the country then finalises its APRM Plan of Action which is submitted to a Panel of Eminent Persons (NEPAD 2003a).
4. **Peer Review**, in a meeting of the APR Forum of Heads of State and Government, the highest body of the APRM. After a presentation of the Country Review Report by the Eminent Person responsible for leading the review in question, the leader of the country under review engages with his or her peers on key findings of the review, and a programme of action is agreed to correct problems identified (ibid).
5. **Publication** of the Country Review Report, National Programme of Action (NPoA) and appropriate recommendations of the Heads of State. After being tabled formally at the AU Summit, the report is made public and also tabled at all regional and continental organisations, including the Pan-African Parliament, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, the AU's Peace and Security Council and the regional economic community of which the reviewed country is a member (ibid). At this point, the findings of the peer review become public.

The peer review process is facilitated by a multi-layered organisational structure. The APR Forum of Heads of State and Government, which meets twice a year on the sidelines of the AU Summit, is the APRM's highest decision-making body. The Mechanism's technical work is led by a Panel of Eminent Persons (EPP) responsible for directing and managing the APR process on a day-to-day basis. The EPP consists of between 5 and 7 Africans who "...must be persons of high moral stature and demonstrated commitment to the ideals of Pan Africanism", and have distinguished themselves in careers considered relevant to the APRM (APRM 2003, p.3)¹⁶⁵.

¹⁶⁵ The Panel's mandate is to "oversee the review process to ensure the integrity of the process, to consider review reports and to make recommendations to the APR" (APRM Organisation and Process 2003, p.1). The Panel is nominated by participating countries, shortlisted by a Committee of Ministers and appointed by Heads of State of

Adebayo Adedeji, whose stewardship of the ECA's fight for an alternative development strategy between 1975 and 1991 was documented in Chapter 2, was appointed a member of the Panel from its inception, and serves as the current Chairperson. As will be discussed, the procedures for appointing the EPP have been criticised by civil society organisations, which question the lack of transparency in the selection process and suggest that some of the panellists do not meet the high standards laid out in the APRM Base Document.

An APRM Secretariat, based in Midrand, South Africa, serves as a technical hub and co-ordinates the day-to-day running of the process. The structure also includes three 'APR Partner Institutions' – the ECA, AfDB and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Their role is to conduct the country technical assessments, after consultation between the country to be reviewed and the APR Secretariat and Panel. The ECA's assigned role covers technical assessments in economic governance and management, while the AfDB focuses on banking and financial standards. According to the APRM Secretariat "[t]he two institutions will be the primary resource institutions in their respective areas of competence", while the AU would be responsible for conducting technical assessments on human rights, democracy and political governance (NEPAD 2003b, pars 6.1 and 6.2, pp.7-8).

This division of labour is instructive, particularly in light of the controversy over the ECA's role with respect to the APRM. Indeed, the ECA had hoped that its pivotal role in elaborating the concept of African peer review and its work in developing a series of indicators for good governance in Africa would make it the natural home for the APRM secretariat. At the third Forum of APRM participating Heads of State (held in Rome Italy, on 11 June 2002), it was agreed that APRM Secretariat would be located at the ECA. However, barely six months later, at the fourth Forum meeting, the decision was reversed and the ECA's role was limited to providing technical analysis (ECA 2008).

the participating countries. Panellists are supposed to serve for four years and retire by rotation. One member of the Panel is appointed Chairperson, to serve for a maximum of five years (ibid).

There were several reasons for this reversal. One was the view that had dogged the ECA since its establishment – that as a member of the UN family it was not a sufficiently African institution (Ikome 2008). Another was the perception, discussed in Chapter 3, that the ECA was pushing a neo-liberal agenda (ibid). A third reason may have been South Africa's own hegemonic agenda which positioned it as the leading advocate of an 'African renaissance' and harnessed South African expertise to provide the technical underpinning to the discourse, leaving no room for the ECA or other ICEs. A final reason may have been that African leaders such as Nigeria's Obasanjo and South Africa's Mbeki, the leading proponents of NEPAD, were concerned that the ECA and its Executive Secretary were occupying too much space.

Track Record

From inception in 2003 to date, 29 countries¹⁶⁶, accounting for more than two-thirds of Africa's population, have signed the APRM Memorandum of Understanding, indicating their agreement with the APRM principles and process and their desire to be peer reviewed. Of this number, 12 countries¹⁶⁷ have completed the five stages of the review process, including the examination of their country report in APR Forums. The remaining countries are undergoing various preliminary stages of review¹⁶⁸.

The APR Forum is a closed meeting, with only Heads of State and Government and a restricted number of senior officials observing the proceedings. Consequently, the accounts that follow were gleaned from a combination of sources, mainly official country review reports and APRM annual reports, reports conducted by non-state actors based on in-depth research, personal communications with involved actors, and media reports. Whilst the highlights presented

¹⁶⁶ Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia (Source, APRM website – <http://aprm.krazyboy.co.za>, 22 July 2009).

¹⁶⁷ In order of review, these are Ghana, Rwanda, Kenya, Algeria, South Africa, Benin, Uganda, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mozambique and Lesotho (Gruzd 2009).

¹⁶⁸ At the time of writing, Ethiopia and Mauritius and Tanzania had established national structures and were in the process of national sensitisation and data collection, but had not yet submitted their CSAR; Sierra Leone formally launched its APR Process in September 2008; and the following 13 countries that acceded to the APRM are yet to formally launch the APR process – Angola, Cameroon, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Malawi, Mauritania, Republic of Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sudan, Togo and Zambia (APRM 2008a, 2009).

during APR Forums are couched in polite, non-adversarial language, the main text of the country review reports themselves are in parts very explicit and detailed about the problems found in a given country, although some reports are more forthright than others.

Ghana, the first country to sign up to the APRM, was peer reviewed in late January 2006 at a meeting of the APR Forum held alongside an extraordinary AU summit in Khartoum, Sudan. Overall, Ghana was highly commended. The Country Review Report highlighted Ghana's three successful elections and transfers of power since 1996, as well as unique institutions for stakeholder dialogue such as an Annual Governance Forum, the People's Assembly, and National Economic Dialogue, as good practice in deepening democracy. A number of concerns were raised – including a lack of technocratic and institutional capacity, gender disparities, persistence of corruption, slow progress on decentralisation, land issues, chieftaincy problems, unemployment, external dependence, and brain drain.

Since the review, Ghana has set about implementing its NPoA. Several actions have been directly attributed to the APRM, including: the passing of a Whistleblower Act and Disability Act as well as the approval of a Freedom of Information Bill by Cabinet; a new Ministry of Chieftaincy and Culture; an upper limit on the number of Supreme Court judges; a slight reduction in the size of the Cabinet; a reduction in corporate tax; and efforts to integrate the NPoA with Ghana's national development plan and to track expenditure (Bing Pappoe 2007). Ghana's review and subsequent follow-up of the recommendations provides a good example of how the APRM has been able to create as well as entrench existing norms and good practice in African governance.

In its review, Rwanda's government was applauded for its dramatic recovery from the 1994 genocide, putting in place the foundations for sustained socio-economic development, low levels of corruption, and effective decentralisation. The *Gacaca* system of tribunals – a traditional form of transitional justice that also served in community dialogue, reconciliation and national unity – was held up as a best practice. Concerns were raised about the legitimacy

of the courts and their ability to win trust and confidence in dispensing justice while conforming to international human rights norms and standards. Rwanda was also criticised for maintaining an effective one-party system without sufficient space for different political groups to participate, and for a judiciary that lacked independence from the executive.

Before the official review, during the country-visit stage, Rwanda's President Paul Kagame questioned the composition of the expert review team, which included two ECA staff members. He enquired about the nationality of each of the experts, leading review team members to speculate that he was concerned the process may have been biased (Busia 2006). As will be discussed below, the Rwanda review highlighted the APRM's potential to raise national sensitivities, despite the insistence of its founders that it was a neutral, politics-free mechanism.

Kenya's review, which officially began in March 2003, suffered from delays due to protracted wrangling over the constitution of its National Governing Council, a problem that was resolved only when the government disbanded the structure at the end of 2005, replacing it with a mechanism that involved a more prominent leadership role for civil society actors (I revisit this below). At the APR Forum in Banjul in January 2006, the report on Kenya, presented by APRM Eminent Persons panellist Graça Machel, gave President Mwai Kibaki's government high marks for: the political freedoms enjoyed by Kenya under his watch (more than 80% of Kenyans surveyed agreed with this); a low level of aid dependency (only 8% of Kenya's budget was funded by external donors); consistent efforts at peace-making in Eastern Africa; kick-starting economic growth; and providing free primary education. However, Kenya was criticised for persistent corruption, economic inequality between regions, politics based on ethnic rivalries, and delays in constitutional reforms, for which Machel recommended AU mediation and support. Furthermore, and as discussed in more detail below, the APRM report identified a number of factors that fuelled the widespread political violence that was to erupt in December 2007.

South Africa's peer review process was dogged by controversy. One point of contention was the haste with which the government, on 13 September 2005, announced the start of the consultative process with only two weeks' notice, and declared that the process would be completed within two months (Herbert and Gruzd 2006). It later emerged that government ministries has been asked to work on elements of the country self-assessment a full seven months before the two-month deadline given for civil society consultations. In what was a patently state-led process, national focal point, Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, the Minister of Public Service and Administration, also served as Chairperson of the Independent National Governing Council, which included six government ministers. This raised repeated questions about government heavy-handedness. Fraser-Moleketi eschewed the research-based approach to peer review evident in Ghana and Kenya, instead opting for a broad-based country-wide consultative model and refusing to allow public scrutiny of the draft self-assessment report before it was finalised (ibid).

Experts intimately familiar with the South Africa peer review have confirmed that, while the process was exemplary in terms of sensitisation and broad-based public participation, the self-assessment exercise was not as thorough as Kenya's (Herbert and Gruzd 2006). As a result, and in order to present a more accurate picture, the team of African experts conducting the external review had to conduct further research to fill the gaps (ibid). Part of the problem was that the South Africa report did not include proposals on how concerns identified in the review would be addressed as part of the country's national development programme.

Despite Adedeji's glowing praise for South Africa during a visit in late 2006 in his capacity as focal point on the EPP directing the South Africa review, disagreements emerged between the EPP and the South African government. According to an authoritative media report, the draft country review report presented to President Mbeki's cabinet by the Panel in November 2006 highlighted violent crime as South Africa's number one priority, listing 15 key threats to the country's stability. Fraser-Moleketi was reported to be "spitting mad" at the report (Mbelle 2009).

The APRM rules, to which South Africa signed up, state that while governments being reviewed can comment on the Panel's report, they cannot alter it. The Report, presented during the APR Forum in Addis Ababa in January 2007, highlighted concerns that included high rates of violent crime, gender violence, unemployment, HIV/AIDS, land reform problems, brittle race relations, failures in the Black Economic Empowerment programme, and the enduring legacy of apartheid (APRM 2007). According to South African experts, a handful of issues raised by the APRM report – including the unregulated private funding of political parties and parliamentary floor-crossing – have been included among the Government's list of reform priorities. However, few of the review's recommendations have been acted upon, even as crime and gender-based violence, highlighted by the report, have continued to rise (Mbelle 2009).

Algeria, which signed up in March 2003, was one of the first countries to accede to the APRM alongside Ghana, Rwanda and Kenya. The review process was conducted in 2006, with the peer review held at the APR Forum meeting in Accra, Ghana on 1 July 2007. The country review report presented at the Forum noted a number of strengths, including: political will and commitment of the leadership to see through agreed-to institutional, political and economic reforms; the development of human resources through free and accessible education and health; the presence of immense natural resources, especially hydrocarbons; the implementation of most MDGs and the capacity to meet the commitments made for 2015; high life expectancy among Algerians; and the large number of universities.

On the downside, the Forum highlighted concerns including: the need for reform and modernisation of the Algerian state; the lack of gender equality and persistence of outdated socio-cultural traditions; high youth unemployment; poor stewardship of the environment; the need to extend the growth base, diversify economic sectors and contain inflation; the need to protect national reconciliation and consolidate peace; and the need to step up the fight against corruption and accelerate structural reforms. In January 2009, heads of state noted Algeria's progress in anti-corruption efforts and its strategy to reduce reliance on hydrocarbons.

Benin's peer review took place at the 8th APR Forum in Addis Ababa on 30 January 2008. The country was congratulated for instituting free pre-school and primary education programmes, and for plans to offer free healthcare to pregnant women and children under five. Benin also drew praise for its advances in economic development, sub-regional and regional integration, the President's personal commitment to good governance and peace and stability after years of military dictatorship, and the abundance of natural resources to be developed, especially in the agricultural sector.

Concerns tabled included: high levels of corruption; slow progress in the reform and modernisation of the state; the low level of women's political representation and involvement in decision-making; widespread poverty; child trafficking; an underdeveloped private sector; and excessively large numbers of political parties and civil society organisations. The heads of state also shared Benin's own concerns about the socio-economic impact of multiple political parties, the external financing of NGOs, corruption, the large size of the informal sector, and the exploitation of children. It was recommended that Benin focus on strengthening infrastructure, energy, agriculture and job creation for youth and women, as well as the role of women in decision-making positions (Badet 2008).

Uganda, one of the first signatories to the APRM MoU (2003), was peer reviewed at the 9th APR Forum held at Sharm-El-Sheikh, Egypt, on 29 June 2008. The country review report identified the following challenges: high rates of poverty and worsening inequality; high population growth; the adverse effects of geography which imposed an additional burden to the cost of doing business; policy implementation gaps; land-related problems; conflict in the North; corruption; and overdependence on aid. Uganda was commended for: the prompt handling of election petitions following the first-ever multi-party elections of 2006; sound macroeconomic management as reflected by strong economic growth rates; a highly consultative budget process; universal primary education; and its response to HIV and AIDS (APRM 2008a).

In response to the review findings, Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni highlighted additional positive developments, including the unprecedented growth rate averaging 6% per annum for almost two decades; single-digit inflation and economic liberalisation; the discovery of oil; industrialisation; transformation of the agricultural sector; and the promotion of gender equality. Museveni's peers urged Uganda to: improve its management of multi-party democracy; reduce aid dependence; and follow the example of Botswana in creating a political environment that enabled it to maximise the benefits of natural resource availability while avoiding the problems (APRM 2008a).

Nigeria was peer reviewed in two summits – at Sharm-El-Sheikh on 29 June 2008 during the 9th APR Forum, and on 25 October 2008 in Cotonou, Benin, at the First Extraordinary Meeting of the APR Forum. Key challenges noted by the country review report included: the management of diversity; oil dependency; ineffective implementation of policies and poor delivery of social services; management of elections and electoral reforms; discriminatory gender practices and the slow pace of advancement of women to key public sector positions. On a positive note, Nigeria was praised for: its role in conflict resolution in Africa; the provision of technical assistance to other African countries; and the establishment of the Council of State, the country's highest national advisory body provided for in the constitution, consisting of former Heads of State (APRM 2008a).

Nigerian President Umaru Yar'Adua agreed with the Panel's assessment on issues such as the management of diversity, which he admitted had been the cause of intra-state strife, questions over the conduct of elections, and endemic corruption. He underscored his country's commitment to promoting women's rights and advancement in society, and insisted that, since its resources are inadequate compared to the needs of its 140 million people, Nigeria was not a rich country, but rather a 'potentially rich country'. The Forum urged Nigeria to think about how best to ensure that oil emanating from Africa is refined within Africa, and argued for the need to increase domestic capacities. It also stressed the importance of corporate social responsibility, particularly for oil-producing regions such as Delta. Nigeria was praised for

signing up to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which seeks the review and audit of proceeds of the oil and gas sector, and for demonstrated political will on developing infrastructure needed to deepen regional integration (APRM 2008a).

Burkina Faso was reviewed in Cotonou, Benin, at the First Extraordinary Meeting of the APR Panel in October 2008. Best practices highlighted included: the nation's position as regional ombudsman and peacemaker in West Africa; anti-corruption committees in the police service; elements of sound public expenditure management; and the establishment of a National Youth Forum. Problems identified included: the dominance of the ruling party; widespread corruption; the lack of adequate involvement of women and youth in development; the absence of a long-term development vision; and the inability to maintain high and sustainable economic growth. The Forum stressed that the Burkinabe State should be focused on building institutions as well as its capacity to maintain law and order to protect the welfare of its people. It raised concern about classifying winning political parties in a negative light, and stressed that the promotion of a strong state and the process of ensuring a separation of powers were not necessarily mutually exclusive (APRM 2008a).

Despite the variation in review findings¹⁶⁹ between countries, the APR process highlights several common challenges. Analysis by the APRM Secretariat of the reports of the first five countries peer reviewed identifies the following cross-cutting challenges: managing diversity, unemployment, capacity constraints and poor service delivery, land reform and corruption (in four out of five countries); violence against women/ gender inequality (in three out of five countries); and poverty and inequality, and external dependence (in two out of five countries) (APRM 2008b). All the issues identified fall under the umbrella of development; although the APRM focuses on governance, its ambit stretches to monitoring advances and shortfalls in socio-economic development, making its agenda considerably more all-encompassing than

¹⁶⁹ Details of the review findings for Mali, Mozambique and Lesotho, which were peer-reviewed during the 11th APR Forum held on the sidelines of the AU Summit in Sirte, Libya in June/July 2009, were not publicly available when this chapter was being drafted. Nor had country review reports for Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Uganda been published – contrary to the APRM guidelines on the fifth and final stage which mandate the timely and widespread dissemination of the reports.

narrow measures of economic and corporate governance. This makes the APRM a political technology whose power is potentially significant.

Attributes of the APRM

Commentators identify the main attribute of the APRM process so far as being its ability to widen political space within the countries reviewed, leading to increased pressure for greater accountability, transparency and popular participation. An unprecedented number and range of non-state actors have engaged as part of the APR process on issues of governance in their respective countries. Civil society organisations – defined in the APRM Base Document (2003) as including the media, academia, trade unions, business and professional organisations¹⁷⁰ – have been involved in the process in all countries reviewed, although with varying level and scope of participation (see below)¹⁷¹. In Ghana, Kenya and South Africa, civil society experts working in think tanks have been intensively involved in conducting research, while civic groups, associations and networks have harnessed the APRM to advocate for policy and social change as key outcomes of the peer review process. In these and other countries under review, civil society significantly influenced the self-assessment reports, country review reports and national programmes of action.

From these reports, and largely because of the role of non-state actors, the APRM is able to touch upon fundamental governance and development issues – among them political reforms, corruption, natural-resource management, gender equality and state-building. While the technocratic language of the APRM reports is deliberately non-adversarial, they by and large constitute a detailed and accurate record of the challenges and constraints facing acceding countries, and provide the basis for different societal groups to make claims. This has the effect of putting pressure on governments to address these claims, many of which they had previously failed to act upon.

¹⁷⁰ The APRM MoU commits signatories to “[ensuring] the participation of all stakeholders in the development of the national Programme of Action including trade unions, women, youth, civil society, private sector, rural communities and professional associations” (APRM 2003, p.5).

¹⁷¹ The APRM’s emphasis on the participation of a wide cross-section of national actors in the preparation of the self-assessment questionnaire has been hailed as one of its strengths (AfriMAP 2007a).

A second attribute of the APRM has been the peer pressure placed on African leaders participating in the process. A number of Heads of State may have signed up their countries to the APRM as a means of improving their credibility inside and outside Africa without threatening their rule. While the OAU had been dismissed as a club of dictators providing cover for each other, the questions raised in the closed peer-to-peer review process held during APR Forums provide an indication that African leaders are prepared to criticise each other, however politely (Gruzd 2009). As such, the peer review process has at least two unintended consequences for Africa's leadership. One is to pressure leaders whose countries are under review to address issues they would otherwise not have dealt with as part of the follow-up process. Another is to apply pressure on the leaders conducting the peer review themselves. If a review report praises a given country for, say, making great strides in primary education, this sends a strong signal to reviewing Heads of State that they need to do better in their own countries.

Given that the final stage of review is conducted by Heads of State alone, critics have argued that it may be difficult for the APRM to avoid the perception that it is replicating existing power structures (Herbert 2006). The role of the EPP goes some way towards making the peer review less circumscribed. Experts familiar with the process assert that the competence and credibility of the Panel is central to the effectiveness of the peer reviews (AfriMAP 2007b). A member of the Panel is assigned as lead panellist for each country review, and is at the forefront of engagement with the country under review, throughout the process and in ensuring follow-up "to ascertain progress being made towards achieving mutually agreed goals" (APRM 2003a). As part of this role, the relevant Panel member leads discussions with the government of the country under review to establish among other things whether there is "the will on the part of the Government to take the necessary decisions and measures to put right what is identified to be amiss" (ibid).

During the Kenya process, lead panellist Graça Machel delivered a series of strong messages to the Kenyan Government on the need to tackle corruption and increase political transparency (Manby 2009). As lead panellist for the South Africa review, Adebayo Adedeji was publicly critical of the Government's reluctance to acknowledge the serious concerns tabled in the APRM country review report (ibid). The lead panellist is also responsible for presenting the highlights of the country review report to the participating Heads of State during the APR Forum, and it is on the basis of what is presented that the peer review takes place. Although the Heads of State make the final call, the eminent persons play a pivotal role in ensuring that the concerns in the report are discussed (Manby 2009). The credibility of the EPP is therefore crucial to the APRM's legitimacy.

In the event that "...the necessary political will is not forthcoming", the APRM Base Document spells out steps to engage in "constructive dialogue". If this dialogue turns out to be fruitless, as a last resort "...the participating Heads of State and Government may wish to put the Government on notice of their collective intention to proceed with appropriate measures by a given date" (NEPAD 2003a). While this text stands out as the strongest language in the document, there is no evidence so far to suggest that deadlines have been established or adhered to by the APR Forum to force reviewed countries to implement recommendations in the country review reports. Nonetheless, there is potential for the closed APR Forum as a space in which recalcitrant leaders can be persuaded to comply in a collegial manner, or be shamed.

The review by peers takes on even greater significance when issues of political governance are raised – as has happened in every peer review conducted to date. That questions of politics are discussed by Heads of State in the APR Forum stands out as one of the outcomes of the APRM perceived to be positive. Herbert (2006) argues that, by its very nature, and despite projecting itself as a non-adversarial technocratic process, the APRM creates the space for political discussion and contestation of the *status quo*. This is due to a number of factors. One is that, as highlighted above, the high-profile country reviews have the potential to embarrass governments and leaders. Another factor is that peer review proposes changes to political

systems and how economic goods are allocated in a given country. In addition, the nature of the APRM process weakens the executive's grip on power, as it allows a wide range of state institutions to participate in the debate about better government. Furthermore, the APRM's track record of highlighting corruption in countries reviewed means it has the potential to alter political fortunes (ibid).

The APRM has consistently addressed questions of politics. This is despite the fact that in October 2002, in response to mounting pressure from Western nations over the lack of collective African leadership action on the deteriorating political situation in Zimbabwe, then South African President Thabo Mbeki announced that the APRM would restrict itself to monitoring economic and corporate governance, and would not stray into sensitive political issues, which would be handled by existing mechanisms within the AU. In practice, this edict has not been adhered to – not least because the APRM questionnaire used to guide country self-assessments and review reports includes 'Democracy and Good Political Governance' as one of its four sections. The questionnaire includes detailed questions that serve as benchmarks against which countries can evaluate themselves and be evaluated, including in rule of law, democracy and other aspects of good political governance spelled out in the Declaration (AfriMAP 2007a).

A third perceived attribute is that the APRM is a useful tool for diagnosing problems in countries. Emblematic of this is the extent to which the APRM foresaw the conditions that led to the post-election violence in Kenya that erupted in December 2007 (Gruzd 2009). Among other issues, the country report for Kenya highlighted as key concerns the marginalisation of the regions, regional imbalances, competition for access to resources, and the mobilisation of ethnic identities in political and economic power struggles as well as the ongoing constitutional crisis (APRM 2006). To address these and other challenges, the report proposed a number of measures. One was that the Kenyan Government "...as a matter of urgency, [...] adopt and implement redistribution and reallocation policies to enforce equitable access to, and use of land" (ibid p.16). Another was the establishment of a high-level eminent persons' group under

the auspices of the AU, to facilitate a bi-partisan resolution of the constitutional crisis (ibid). As it turned out, the inability of the Kenyan Government to resolve the constitutional crisis and address enduring inequities, including over land rights, led to the outbreak of violence during the presidential and parliamentary elections of December 2007.

The peer review process also predicted xenophobic violence against foreigners in South Africa that erupted in May 2008 (Gruzd 2009). Some 12 years after the end of apartheid, the South Africa country report warned that racism, particularly against black Africans from other countries, remained a major concern for South Africans. According to the report, the legacy of apartheid "...has also impacted on how South Africans view and treat foreign immigrants within their borders. Xenophobia against other Africans is of serious concern and should be nipped in the bud" (APRM 2007, p.27). The xenophobia was attributed to pressure for scarce jobs and services, In addition to apartheid. The report urged South Africa to do more to combat xenophobia, including through civic education programmes (ibid). In May 2008, barely a year after the APRM country review report warned of the xenophobia problem, racially motivated attacks left 62 people dead and several thousand displaced – the majority of them foreigners (IPS 2008).

As noted in the summary of South Africa's peer review above, the Government was reluctant to acknowledge the extent of many of the challenges listed in the country review report. One expert close to the process attributed this to a sense of denial that in her view permeated the official South African engagement with the APRM:

"The Government simply didn't want to admit that a country as advanced as South Africa had serious problems such as gender violence, crime and so on. The attitude was very much that, 'although we were instrumental in establishing NEPAD and the APRM, peer review was not for us, but for those other African countries'" (Mbelle 2009)¹⁷².

¹⁷² Arguing that the APRM was not taken seriously by the South African Government, Bond (2009) notes that, six months after taking over from Fraser-Moleketi as Minister of Public Service and Administration, Masenyani Baloyi "had not tackled even the much-diluted task he inherited from his predecessor" (ibid p.8).

This demonstrates the extent to which the APRM, much like NEPAD, plays into the hegemonic politics of the post-apartheid South African regime. According to Habib and Selinyane (2006), South Africa's leading role in the creation of both NEPAD and the AU, and the promulgation of the 'African renaissance' discourse are all examples of the country's hegemonic behaviour, which has involved the deployment of a combination of ideological, military, economic and technological power. This perspective sees two ways in which a state can choose to be hegemonic: extractive and impetuous; or by being a pivot that is systemically powerful and beneficial. For the most part, Habib and Selinyane (2006) assert, South Africa has conformed to the latter form of hegemonic behaviour which, while benefitting South Africa in a number of ways, has also been systemically beneficial to the continent¹⁷³.

I agree that Mbeki's appeal to an 'African renaissance', and indeed South Africa's lead role in the development of NEPAD, formed part of a conscious strategy to project South Africa's power throughout Africa and beyond. The 'African renaissance' clearly emerges as a powerful discourse that responds to the perceived need for a creative ideology that can facilitate continental integration of African states (Murobe 2000, p.62). However, as Mbelle (2009) correctly implies, the South African approach to the APRM was conditioned by a sense of superiority derived from the country's wealth, relatively high levels of industrialisation, and entrenched culture (via the African National Congress) of participatory democracy and policy-making. As the evidence clearly demonstrates, this led to a singular reluctance by the Government to recognise many of the challenges highlighted by the APRM country review.

Another perceived attribute of the APRM, at least in theory, is that participating African countries are primarily responsible for funding it. On paper, the main source of funding for the APRM is assessed contributions from participating member states (APRM 2003, par. 27, p.6). Countries that signed the APRM MoU agreed to "contribute fully to the funding of the African Peer Review Mechanism **in order to affirm the African ownership of the Mechanism**. This

¹⁷³ In their view, hegemons behave in systematically beneficial ways under three conditions: a shared history; the prospect of profit; and the existence of a competing hegemon – in this case Nigeria, which until South Africa's independence in 1994 had been Africa's most powerful and influential power (Habib and Selinyane 2006).

includes sourcing funds from African people, businesses and institutions” (APRM 2003, pars 19 and 20, p.4, emphasis added). The rationale for this is to insulate the Mechanism from external influence, an important issue given the contested nature of ‘good governance’ – the APRM’s core concern. Nonetheless, the APRM’s initiators left room for external partnerships, stating: “...such partnerships could be welcomed if they are managed in a way that **clearly respects African ownership of the APRM and all its processes**” (ibid pp.16 and 17, emphasis added)¹⁷⁴.

At a minimum, countries under review are expected to fund the lion’s share of the in-country peer review process. As is to be expected, countries such as Nigeria¹⁷⁵ and South Africa¹⁷⁶, with sizeable economies that are not heavily dependent on aid, have had no major difficulties meeting this requirement. Smaller, more aid-dependent countries such as Rwanda¹⁷⁷ and Benin¹⁷⁸, which could afford to contribute only a fraction of the overall budget of their respective in-country processes, have tended to rely on funds channelled via UNDP Trust Funds. Funds channelled either via UNDP Trust Funds or UNDP projects have proved pivotal to the

¹⁷⁴ The document further states: “Support from external partners should be sought mainly for the implementation of the Country Programme of Action and capacity building to improve performance in the weak areas” (ibid).

¹⁷⁵ Despite bureaucratic problems that delayed release of some of the funds, Nigeria covered all the internal costs of the APRM process (2004-2008), amounting to an estimated US\$14 million, from the annual budget of the Presidency. Most of this was spent between 2007 and 2008, largely on the validation exercises and country review mission. UNDP also established a Trust Fund to support some of the national activities, though it is unclear whether this was eventually established and how much was raised (Jinadu 2008).

¹⁷⁶ South Africa covered an estimated two-thirds of the domestic APRM costs, although a small proportion (roughly ZAR 1.2 million) was contributed by UNDP to pay for communication and PR/awareness-raising activities (Mbelle 2009).

¹⁷⁷ A Trust Fund was set up by UNDP Africa bureau for Rwanda in August 2004. The local UNDP office created a project for activities to support NEPAD, which was used to finance the Rwanda APRM process. Of the UNDP budget for 2005-2007 of US\$426,050, only 50% was actually mobilised. The breakdown of contributors to Rwanda’s overall APRM process is instructive: US\$100,000 was contributed by the Rwanda Government; UNDP \$500,000; DFID \$540,000; UNICEF \$60,000; and UNIFEM \$16,000 (LDGL 2007).

¹⁷⁸ The initial budget for Benin’s APRM process is estimated at US\$450,000, broken down as follows: \$200,000 contributed by the AfDB; \$150,000 by UNDP; \$50,000 by the Benin Government; and \$50,000 by the ACBF. However, the actual amount raised, managed by a UNDP Trust Fund, was \$350,000, broken down as follows: \$150,000 (AfDB); \$100,000 (UNDP); and \$50,000+ (Benin Government). The German Hans Seidel Foundation contributed another \$50,000 which it managed directly, providing support for seminars and public education throughout the process. The Government also provided an additional amount (not quantified) to support the two review missions (Badet 2008).

process, even in better-endowed countries such as Burkina Faso¹⁷⁹, which financed more than 55% of its country review.

Separately from the individual country processes, the APRM Secretariat receives significant direct support from donor countries and institutions. The Secretariat's annual report lists African countries' contribution as US\$3.65 million¹⁸⁰ in 2008, compared to donor contributions of more than US\$6 million¹⁸¹. Indeed, of the total of \$9.88 million available to the APRM Secretariat on 31 December 2008, only 38% was contributed by member states, compared with 62% from bilateral donors (APRM 2008a). While the trends show a sharp increase in contributions from both African countries and international donors, what is striking is that, in 2008, international donors contributed nearly twice as much to supporting the operations of the APRM as did African member countries. This imbalance is attributed to the fact that African countries owe nearly \$6.5 million in arrears (ibid), a problem that has long been the bane of the AU. Nevertheless, the official APRM position, as implied in the original documents, appears to be that, regardless of the extent of external donor contributions to the peer review process, its very nature makes it more or less impossible for non-Africans to dictate the APRM's scope, purpose and implementation.

Challenges for the APRM

Experts following the APRM closely have identified a number of challenges as the process unfolds. These include fundamental weaknesses that, unless addressed, could ultimately undermine the practice of African peer review. One major challenge is how to deepen the

¹⁷⁹ Burkina Faso's process was funded by the Government and UNDP. The Government contributed roughly US\$860,414, while a UNDP project on capacity building contributed US\$668,000 between 2006 and 2008 (Natielsé 2009).

¹⁸⁰ The total received from African countries from 2003 to date is \$17,334,735. Predictably, the largest contributors from their date of accession to date are Africa's biggest economies: South Africa with \$5,946,914; Algeria with \$2,500,000; Nigeria with \$2,350,000; and Egypt with \$1,300,000. These are the only countries that are fully paid up to date, and have in fact significantly exceeded the minimum contribution of \$100,000 (APRM 2008a).

¹⁸¹ The largest bilateral donor is Canada, which has contributed \$5,692,169 from 2003 to date, via a UNDP Trust Fund. The next largest is the UK, which has contributed \$2,000,000 during the same period. Switzerland, which contributed \$896,241, ranks third. Germany, Italy, Spain and Switzerland have contributed less than half a million dollars each. Aside from its Trust funding, UNDP has contributed \$2,750,000, while the AfDB has donated \$200,000. The Secretariat has received \$315,426 from the W. Kellogg Foundation.

participation of non-state actors. Despite the various mechanisms stipulated in the APRM's design to ensure wide stakeholder participation, the process has tended to be state-centred and dominated by the Executive. Overall, critics believe that stakeholder participation in countries reviewed so far has been less than optimal. In Rwanda, a number of CSOs were relegated to the fringes of the review process while others were forced by the Government to tone down their demands so as not to suffer reprisals (Dème 2006). While this suppression of civil society is attributed by some to the post-genocide trauma affecting all national stakeholders (ibid), the example of Rwanda is typical of how some governments have instrumentalised the participation of non-state actors in the peer review process.

As Dème (2006) also notes, one distinctive characteristic of African civil society is the extent to which it overlaps with political society. In practice, civil society in Ghana, Rwanda, Kenya and Senegal has long been subject to co-optation by sitting governments (ibid). This tendency has replicated itself in the peer review process, with pro-government think tanks being selected to attend meetings during the country review process, at the expense of more rights-based CSOs (AfriMAP 2007a). The role of parliaments has also been less prominent than desired (ibid). Overall, this reflects an African civil society that is still a work in progress, although – as I argue in the concluding part of this dissertation – we should beware of trying to fit the diversity of African associational forms into narrow Western definitions of 'civil society'.

Herbert (2006) documents concerns among civil society actors in five countries¹⁸² that the government would fill positions on the national APRM governing council with pro-state nominees or sympathetic CSOs. Fombad and Kebonang (2006) have highlighted the challenges of involving civil society in the APRM, suggesting that African governments remain suspicious of NGOs and CBOs and find ways to neutralise their effective participation. In reality, the role of civil society organisations in the APRM process has varied from country to country. Policy-oriented think tanks have played an important role in Ghana and South Africa. In South Africa, and as documented, the consultation process was open to all interested civil society actors,

¹⁸² Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, Mauritius and South Africa.

albeit within a Government-directed frame. In Kenya, civil society pressure led the Government to dissolve and reconstitute to the national institutional architecture for the APRM to allow for greater civil society involvement.

A second challenge is ensuring that the key APRM institutions are optimally configured to act impartially and transparently. The APRM Secretariat is under-staffed, lacking in clarity in terms of its reporting lines, dogged by politics and at the time of writing was without an executive director (Gruzd 2009, Bing-Pappoe 2009, Tungwarara 2009). While the role of the EPP is officially to 'lead and direct' the process, panellists (and in particular the Chairperson) have in practice ended up involving themselves in matters that should have been led by the Secretariat (ibid). In light of the pivotal role of the EPP in driving the process, and the importance of an impartial Panel to the credibility, authority and legitimacy of the APRM, the Forum's recent decision to request that procedures for appointments to the Panel be clarified by the Panel itself has raised concerns around conflict of interest (Gruzd 2009).

In December 2008, three of the seven panellists – Dorothy Njeuma of Cameroon, Kenyan mediator Bethuel Kiplagat and Senegalese development activist Marie-Angelique Savané – stepped down at the end of their four-year terms. Savané's tenure had been clouded with allegations that, while still a member of the EPP, she accepted a position as adviser to Benin's President Yaya Boni starting on 1 January 2008 which included a monthly salary of US\$8,000, a monthly pension contribution of US\$1,102, expenses totalling US\$4,000 a month, and a monthly housing allowance of US\$800, even though she did not reside in Benin (Okungu 2009). There are concerns that replacement panellists are not sufficiently independent from government influence, with the appointment to the EPP in February 2009 of Domitille Mukantaganzwa, executive secretary of Rwanda's *Gacaca* courts system (mentioned above), raising questions due to her proximity to the Rwandese Government (Manby 2009)¹⁸³. Given

¹⁸³ Fombad and Kebonang (2006) suggest that some of the seven panellists were still active in politics in their respective countries at the time of their appointment. In their view, a sub-set of panellists are political appointees who are readily vulnerable to manipulation. They point to evidence of such manipulation during the Rwanda peer-review process, and assert that unless panellists are able to ensure accurate and independent assessments of the conditions in the countries being reviewed, the entire APRM could be compromised.

that the EPP's credibility is a key condition for the integrity of the APRM, rules governing how it is composed and operates need to be clarified (ibid). Another concern is that Lead Panellist Adedeji is going beyond his role. Upon the resignation of the previous Executive Director of the Secretariat, Adedeji is said to have stepped in, hired a consultant to develop a new organisational structure, terminated the contracts of all existing staff from September 2009 and ordered that the vacancies be posted on the APRM website and advertised in the media (Manby 2009).

Third, and despite evidence that the APRM is registering positive impacts in some countries, many critics consider the lack of an explicit enforcement mechanism as the APRM's most significant challenge. They argue that this omission makes the APRM process effectively impotent, as no country is bound to implement what it has agreed. In the eyes of some, the lack of a 'big stick' reduces the APRM to a fig-leaf for corrupt and authoritarian leaders to look good while maintaining their status quo. Bond (2009) argues that the African political elites responsible for implementing the APRM are non-democrats who were involved in legitimising neo-liberalism, and who seem to have no commitment to fixing their countries' economies. He asks: "Can the APRM help fix this, or is it just a vanity of politicians and middle-class NGOers but in reality a transmission line between Africa and neo-colonialism?" (ibid p.1).

Despite the democratisation wave of the 1990s, Bond (2009) argues, coups carried out between 1995 and 2001 have meant that most of the leaders currently in place are despots who have used democracy as a slogan to perpetuate their rule. According to one critic, and with the exception of Botswana, Mauritius, Senegal and South Africa, the majority of NEPAD Heads of State are leaders of neo-patrimonial regimes who do not regard their rule as temporary and do not adhere to institutional law (Taylor 2005, cited in Bond 2009). Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, appointed the current APRM Chair in 2007, is often held up as an example, as his government is accused of committing human rights abuses within Ethiopia in his bid to stifle political opposition, as well as sending Ethiopian troops to invade neighbouring Somalia (Bond 2009).

Earlier in this chapter I analysed the reasons why the APRM would have quickly arrived at an impasse had it included a coercive compliance mechanism. One of these reasons was the reluctance of Africa's leadership to replace external conditionality, as seen in SAPs, with internal conditionality via the APRM. I concede that many of Africa's leaders do not practice what they preach, and in some ways use continental initiatives such as NEPAD and the APRM to mask and legitimise their misrule domestically. However, this does not nullify my argument that, in line with my theorisation of the workings of development as governmentality, the APRM's self-projection as a non-coercive, neutral technical mechanism affords it considerable potential power to effect change.

Fourth, and related to the above, there is concern among observers that countries are not applying the lessons learned. Linked to this are questions about the extent to which acceding countries are committed to the APRM. In October 2008, only five of the 28 leaders who had at that time signed up for peer review attended an Extraordinary APR Summit in Benin (Gruzd 2009). A significant factor in this perceived lack of commitment is the departure from the scene of two African leaders. Mbeki's resignation as South African President in September 2008, and Obasanjo's earlier retirement as Nigerian President in May 2007 mean the two prime movers behind NEPAD and by extension the APRM are now out of the picture. At a more practical level, the lack of commitment was evident in the multiple problems in kick-starting the process in some countries¹⁸⁴. While the role of the EPP in driving reviews may have kept the momentum going and compensated to an extent, questions about variable leadership commitment continue to dog the APRM (Manby 2009).

A fifth challenge faced by the APRM is the overwhelming focus on the review process itself. This has meant that considerably less attention is focused on addressing the challenges identified by the reviews and implementing proposals included in the follow-up NPoAs prepared by countries themselves. The initiators of the Mechanism have been at pains to insist that a given country's peer review represents the beginning, and not the end, of the process. The APRM, they have argued, is an ongoing, rolling process that not only identifies governance deficits, but

¹⁸⁴ On Mauritius, see Bunwaree 2007.

works to rectify them. For this reason, in January 2009 the EPP proposed second reviews in Ghana, Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya. Given a change of Government in Ghana and a political stalemate in Kenya, some of these second reviews are considered to be over-ambitious (Gruzd 2009). Indeed, Kenya has reduced the scope of its second review and subsequently postponed it, and there are concerns that this will affect other countries marked for second reviews (Bing-Pappoe 2009).

Proponents see a key role for the APRM in focusing the national poverty reduction strategies of countries on key priorities. However, a sixth challenge is that the process has as yet failed to be authoritative in countries. This is because the process of developing and implementing NPoAs is still in its infancy. By and large, these NPoAs are seen as poorly costed, unrealistic and lacking in timeliness. As a result, countries are still grappling with a multiplicity of international instruments aimed at co-ordinating development actions at country level – among them the PRSPs, MDG plans and national development strategies. An ongoing study of six countries¹⁸⁵ in 2009 on behalf of the ECA is looking at the question of how the APRM can contribute to rationalising the multiplicity of planning frameworks at country level. The study finds that in some of the countries surveyed, existing poverty reduction planning commitments are reproduced in the APR NPoAs (Bing-Pappoe 2009). In Ghana, for example, some 50% of the country's NPoA consists of recycled existing plans (Gruzd and Herbert 2009)¹⁸⁶. The implication here is that the NPoAs need to be more firmly embedded as part of national development planning. This in turn requires that the APRM integrates NPoAs as a key element of the process.

Institutional politicking over where the APRM sits constitutes a seventh challenge identified by commentators. One aspect of this relates to tensions between the between the AU, NEPAD and

¹⁸⁵ South Africa, Kenya, Ghana, Benin, Burkina Faso and Ethiopia.

¹⁸⁶ If the assumption is that much of the content of NPoAs comes from existing plans, then it follows that funding should come from similar sources, such as income from domestic revenues, aid and investment. Nigeria's NPoA, costed at US\$20 billion (which is estimated at 12.4% of its GDP of \$161 billion) allocates 40% to socio-economic development, 25% to democracy and political governance, 20% to economic governance and management, and 15% to corporate governance (Jinadu 2008). The \$20 billion is to be apparently sourced from national and state budgets, contributions from the private sector and support from international development partners (ibid). In its NPoA, Benin, a much smaller country than Nigeria, has developed a budget of \$2.6 billion to address the four areas of governance between 2008 and 2015 (Bing-Pappoe 2009).

the APRM¹⁸⁷ over the continued location of the NEPAD and APRM Secretariats¹⁸⁸ in Midrand, South Africa. The AU has argued that, in order to avoid duplication, and as AU initiatives, the secretariats should be housed within the AU Commission in Addis Ababa. Others have suggested that the continued presence of the two secretariats in Midrand is evidence of South Africa's hegemonic intentions. Beyond administrative arrangements, a more significant point may be that the APRM has consciously tried to steer a course independent from NEPAD. From the beginning, argues one expert familiar with the debate, the APRM has tried to dissociate itself from the ideological content of the NEPAD Framework Document, and has instead focused on developing a technically sound APRM questionnaire (Manby 2009).

To address the apparent fragmentation between the AU, NEPAD and the APRM, the AU Summit in Sharm-El-Sheikh in June–July 2008 ruled that “...APRM Structures, namely the APRM Forum, the APRM Panel and the APRM Secretariat shall be part of the processes and structures of the African Union” (AU 2008), and requested that the AU Commission negotiate a host country agreement with the South African Government to facilitate the continued presence of the APRM Secretariat in Midrand. The host agreement was signed in October 2008, giving the APRM Secretariat legal status in South Africa while reinforcing that it is part of the AU system (Gruzd 2009). Added to a 2001 designation of NEPAD as a programme of the AU, this leaves no room for doubt, at least on paper, about the institutional link between the continental body, the development plan and the peer review mechanism.

Another dimension of the institutional politicking has been perceptions around the ECA's role as a strategic APRM partner, with some viewing it as not sufficiently African and too close to neo-liberal institutions (Ikome 2008). In the Addis Ababa APR Forum in January 2007, President Thabo Mbeki, then chair of the APRM, prevented the ECA, UNDP and AfDB from participating in the Forum. Representatives of AU member states who had not acceded to the APRM were also excluded. According to the APRM Secretariat, their exclusion was because the Forum decided

¹⁸⁷ See Gruzd (2009) for a detailed discussion of the functional aspects of the AU/NEPAD/APRM relationship.

¹⁸⁸ It should be noted here that the APRM Secretariat is in a separate building – signalling its aspired-to distance from NEPAD.

that the peer review should be a discussion only among peers, defined as Heads of State and Government. However, at the last meeting the Forum held in Libya in June 2009, this decision was partially reversed. Heads of the strategic partner institutions, as well as heads of delegations of countries whose heads of state are not in attendance, can now observe the meeting but will not be allowed to participate in discussions, which remain among peers (Change 2009).

Analysis: A Neo-colonial Mask?

In this section, I revisit my three key arguments, and discuss how external actors are seeking to instrumentalise the APRM as a means of entrenching the power of the dominant discourse on 'good governance'. I show how it embodies the potential for African experts to carve out expanded policy space in determining an African development strategy, albeit underpinned by a pragmatic acceptance of 'good governance'. I assert that much of this potential lies in the APRM's ability to open space for different actors, both within and above the African state. And I demonstrate that key outcomes of the peer review have exceeded the intention of the APRM's founders.

To what extent does the APRM help advance the 'good governance' consensus?

Critics argue that, at best, the APRM was established by African leaders to demonstrate to the industrialised countries that Africa was taking 'good governance seriously'. According to this view, the idea behind the APRM was for Africa to internalise conditionality previously imposed from the outside as a means of securing the additional resources (the US\$64 billion quantified in the NEPAD Framework document) needed to finance its development. At worst, sceptics cast the APRM as a sub-hegemonic entity intended by its proponents to advance and disguise the continuing disciplinary effect of neo-liberalism, albeit modified, on African countries.

Patrick Bond, a leading proponent of the second perspective, goes as far as asserting (after Fanon) that the APRM is a device to mask continuing neo-colonial relations between leading African powers and their former colonisers. In his view, "...if international financial institutions

and the 'donor' governments must continue to reproduce a neo-colonial system widely understood as damaging to the interests of the masses, then the first requirement is for elites to adopt good governance rhetoric" (Bond 2009, p.4).

The evidence presented in support of Bond's (2009) thesis that the APRM was set up with the explicit intention of perpetuating neo-colonial relations is less than compelling. I have argued earlier in this chapter that the dubious democratic credentials of many of Africa's leaders do not detract from the APRM's potential potency. That said, I do concur that spreading a credo of 'good governance' is at the heart of the rationale for the Mechanism. Indeed, over the past two decades, and as I have shown in preceding chapters, Africa's development discourse has consistently reflected a preoccupation with 'good governance'.

While I agree with Chabal's (2009) assessment that "[t]oday, the [good] governance agenda is conceived and conveyed by Western donors and institutions [and] consists of a programme of governance that seeks to replicate the key tenets of political accountability and transparency in the West today" (ibid p.11), I contend that 'good governance' in the sense of better government and states able to advance the continent's development agenda, has not always, and not exclusively, been a neo-colonial imposition. As highlighted in Chapter 2, African scholars articulated the importance of participatory democracy in the context of state-led development – a vision that the World Bank later instrumentalised to provide the basis of its technocratic, conditionality-based version of 'good governance'. There is no contradiction between wanting to replicate aspects of Western progress on the one hand, and asserting an African agenda on the other. Indeed, the two are in many ways co-implicated. This is further borne out by how ECA experts consider Western academic credentials and mastery of Western techniques of rule as key to seizing power (Chapter 4).

The assessments of Bond (2009), Chabal (2009) and others fail to elucidate the current and future pivotal role of the unfolding APRM process in redefining 'good governance' in and on Africa. I support the view that setting up an African mechanism for peer review was in part a

'home-grown' reaction by African leaders to what they considered as biased assessments carried out by donor countries with no participation from the countries being assessed (AfriMAP 2007b).

Nonetheless, I do concede that there is potential for external actors to influence and indeed capture the APRM. On the one hand, industrialised countries as well as international agencies are now providing sizeable resources to support the APRM process, both within countries and at the Secretariat level. In as much as they rely on the APRM to give the impression that governance reforms are taking place, the APRM thus runs the risk of becoming a tool in the hands of the donors, who instead of exerting pressure through direct conditionality do so via the APRM by advocating for it to be more effective, and by funding aspects of the peer review process. According to Gruzd (2009), some donors have now shifted their funding from supporting the NEPAD Secretariat to funding the APRM Secretariat – an indication that donors perhaps see more value in the APRM as a means of advancing their agenda¹⁸⁹. Despite the clear intention of its initiators to insulate it from external influence, the growing proportion of external funding could end up undermining the claim that APRM is African-only¹⁹⁰. So far, there is little or no evidence that this is happening.

However, evidence is emerging that donors are ready to instrumentalise African peer review to advance their own worldview of 'good governance'. The EU–Africa Joint Strategy, for example, adopted in December 2007 by the Lisbon Summit, strongly endorsed the APRM. A key objective, as stated in Priority Action 2 of the Strategy, is "...a more efficient African governance architecture through enhanced support for the implementation of the outcomes of the APRM process" (EU 2007, cited in Gruzd 2009, p.10). This includes better anti-corruption efforts, improved public services and administration, and "enhanced awareness of the APRM process in

¹⁸⁹ The view that NEPAD is moribund is widely shared within Africa. As one African expert working in a South African think tank wrote: "NEPAD is often said to lack focus, and is accused of being unable to roll out concrete projects – deliverables that are part of its core mandate of engendering development and social well-being on the continent. Indeed, some have concluded that NEPAD is dead and only requires a requiem mass ahead of burial" (Ikome 2008, p.18).

¹⁹⁰ To the contrary, it could also be argued that the AU, which unbendingly asserts African agency, similarly relies on the EU, DFID and other donors to finance a significant proportion of its budget.

African countries”. The plan expects as outcomes “the consolidation of an effective and functioning Pan-African governance architecture through ratification and enhanced implementation of its instruments; [and] improved cooperation on the implementation of the recommendations of the APRM process” (ibid).

The EU has established a €2.7 billion tranche of ‘additional financial support to countries adopting or ready to commit themselves to a plan that contains ambitious, credible measures and reforms’ based on an ‘enhanced dialogue’ about governance issues (cited in AfriMAP 2007c, p.1). This fund has gradually become more closely linked to the APRM. Furthermore, the EU has established governance profiles of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. While the African profiles rely heavily on data from the APRM, where they exist, there are concerns that the exercise will be conducted by EU civil servants with little participation from African constituencies (Gruzd 2009). In this way, the APRM does have some influence over donor priorities, albeit at a cost.

The EC’s proposals on governance in the EC Communication on Governance in the European Consensus on Development (adopted in 2006) imply a pivotal role for the APRM as an entry point for dialogue on governance issues between the EU and African countries. The EU is proposing dedicated support to the peer review process in each acceding African country, if requested. In addition the EU is prepared to support the APRM Secretariat and regional institutions responsible for disseminating APRM reports. Furthermore, the EU wants reforms proposed in the APRM NPoAs to be integrated in existing co-operation agreements. Critics argue that the EU approach, while drawing on the APRM, ultimately relies on an EU-led external scoring of African countries for eligibility for EU assistance. Instead, they argue, the EU should align its assistance behind the APRM plans of action (AfriMAP 2007c)¹⁹¹.

¹⁹¹ There are also concerns that the EU is instrumentalising the definition of ‘democratic governance’ in Africa to advance its own political agenda with respect to the ‘management of migration flows’. For a detailed discussion on the EU’s approach to migration and governance profiles in the context of the EU–Africa strategy, see AfriMAP 2007c.

In summary, and in the spirit of the shift from 'conditionality' to 'ownership' specified in the EC Communication on Governance in the European Consensus on Development, the EU is willing to put considerable financial resources into the APRM process and support structures. This is largely because it wants to use the APRM as a means of strengthening existing co-operation agreements – such as the controversial Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) – with like-minded content from the NPoAs. This effectively introduces, via the APRM, a new layer of conditionality. However, while the EU considers the APRM an important entry point for engagement with African countries on governance issues, it is not willing to rely on the APRM as an exclusive measure of 'good governance' in African countries that have been through the process. It is also unwilling to align its aid programmes on the basis of the APRM NPoAs. Instead, it is establishing a separate scoring system (albeit taking into account APRM findings) to determine which countries it will do business with.

A second example lies in the exchange of letters in November 2002 between former South African President Mbeki and the then Canadian Prime Minister and G8 Chair Jean Chrétien. The Canadian leader had written to Mbeki on 1 November 2002 lamenting the fact that African leaders had effectively chosen not to intervene to address the deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe, and implying that this constituted a litmus test for Africa's commitment to 'good governance' (Chrétien 2002). In a strongly worded response, Mbeki wrote that Africa remained convinced that good governance, in all its elements, was a fundamental condition for the achievement of the goals of NEPAD (Mbeki 2002).

Although Manby (2009) points out that Chrétien's letter was addressed to Mbeki as a key player in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), as opposed to an initiator of NEPAD, the Canadian Prime Minister's concern over Zimbabwe clearly speaks to the high expectations harboured by G8 countries that NEPAD and the APRM would relieve them of the need to pressure African countries such as Zimbabwe to improve their governance. The G8's expectation was clearly that African 'self-discipline' and 'self-rule' would imply a faithful

transmission of the Western credo of 'good governance' in the form of collective African pressure on recalcitrant states.

The APRM therefore stands out as a key site of struggle over African development. It provides compelling evidence in support of Foucault's argument that politics will increasingly be waged through political 'technologies', as opposed to 'rationalities', of power (Foucault 1980). As has been shown, these technologies are conceived of, managed and deployed by expertise. In recognition of this power of expertise, Mitchell (2002) dubs the kind of politics discussed in his dissertation 'techno-politics'.

How does the APRM fracture power?

In Chapter 3, I highlighted NEPAD's dual 'Compact' – between Africa and its development partners on the one hand, and between Africa's leaders and their citizens on the other. In similar vein, the potential of the APRM to reduce power asymmetries is closely linked to the fact that it has external and internal purposes.

Because the APRM is restricted to Africans only, this leaves limited space for external involvement and influence. Almost without exception, the reviews have been conducted by teams of African experts and eminent panellists. The APRM Secretariat is fully staffed by Africans¹⁹². As such it provides the basis for the conception and practice of a 'good governance' that is uniquely 'African'. A concrete example of this is the strong emphasis in the Ghana peer review on traditional institutions of governance, resulting among other things in the establishment of a Ministry of Chieftancy and Culture, with the mandate of harnessing traditional Ghanaian means of settling disputes in modern government. In line with my hypothesis, it is thus possible to view the APRM as a tool harnessed by Africa's leadership to claw back power from the continent's former colonisers as well as from other developed countries. By iterating an African version of 'good governance', the APRM has the potential to bring about fundamental shifts in the dominant international governance discourse.

¹⁹² The only exception to this rule has been the occasional non-African expert provided via the ECA and UNDP, both UN agencies open to citizens of every UN member nation.

As discussed above, sceptics have insisted that, since the APRM is voluntary and lacks a mechanism for enforcing compliance, it is unlikely to be effective in strengthening internal accountability, which it is argued should be its core function. According to this view, the APRM, with all the associated problems and politicking, represents the latest example of so-called ‘partial reform syndrome’ of the 1980s and 1990s, whereby the elites in African countries implemented only the economic reform prescriptions that would unlock additional donor funding. As evidence, proponents of this view point to the APRM’s heterodox membership, which includes states that are genuinely committed to reform, as well as states that barely pass as democratic and have joined APRM because they believe that paying lip-service to the core principles will elevate their credibility with donors and give them AAA ratings with private investors (Gruzd 2009)¹⁹³.

I do not dispute that a sub-set of countries that acceded to the APRM did so because they believed it would improve their image internationally. Because it is voluntary and open to all, the APRM lacks not only a credible threat of sanction, but also a means of selecting who can and cannot sign up. As discussed above, its initiators were keen to stress the non-adversarial nature of the APRM, which was deliberately marketed as a forum for ‘learning’ and ‘capacity building’. In my view, and given the dynamics of continental policy-making in Africa’s development regime and the continuing sensitivities over sovereignty, few countries would have signed up for peer review had the Mechanism included a threat of sanction. As it has turned out, 29 countries accounting for more than two-thirds of the continent’s population have acceded to the APRM, precisely because it is seen as a non-adversarial learning mechanism – a designation that paradoxically endows the APRM with greater potential power.

¹⁹³ Gruzd (2009) identifies the following weak or non-reforming countries, noting that they were among the first to sign up to the APRM: Angola, Cameroon, the Republic of Congo and Senegal. He notes that countries such as these took advantage of the fact that there was considerable political pressure on countries to sign up as a means of showing momentum behind the APRM. On the other hand, Botswana, considered a model democracy and economy, has refrained from joining APRM, arguing it has nothing to gain as it already attracts investment, manages its economy prudently and has low levels of corruption. According to Gruzd, in some cases, foreign ministers have signed up their countries for accession to the APRM, while their heads of state have not attended a single APRM summit (ibid).

Had membership of the APRM been restricted to countries able to satisfy a set of criteria (as the ECA 'Compact' proposal on 'enhanced partnership countries' discussed in Chapter 3, seemed to advocate), the Mechanism would have been severely limited. As things stand, since every country is free to join, there is room for a wider sample of countries to exert indirect peer pressure on each other. Furthermore, had the APRM included a means of enforcing behavioural change, impractical as this would have been, few countries would have signed up. Thus, a significant element of the APRM's potential lies in its self-selecting, unrestrictive and non-adversarial nature, which allows for unprecedented levels of peer pressure exerted between member countries, arguably introducing a new lateral dimension of competition leading these countries to act in ways they might otherwise have not.

How does the APRM open up space for contestation of the status quo?

In addition to institutionalising competition among member countries to improve their governance and development, another important element of the APRM's potential to redress power imbalances is the space it has opened up for non-state actors to participate in debates and decision-making about development. Overall, and despite a number of weaknesses (discussed above), each of the review processes completed to date has opened up space that did not previously exist for national dialogue. This has allowed both national and trans-national actors to engage in specific countries in a way that was virtually unheard of before the APRM.

As Herbert (2006) has noted, broad-based participation in the country review process is pivotal to building trust and consensus around national problems. In a review of lessons learned from the reviews of Kenya, Mauritius and South Africa, he highlights a wide range of approaches used in different countries to garner input from a range of constituencies, among them regions, ethnic groups, businesses, labour, religious bodies, women's groups, various levels and

branches of government, and special-interest organisations concerned with particular social or governance issues (ibid)¹⁹⁴.

In each country, the model for civil society participation has been different. Ghana's process was research-led, with independent think tanks commissioned to draft the country self-assessment report based on desk research, a household survey, expert survey, focus groups and public meetings (Herbert 2006). In Kenya, the process of determining civil society representation was considered to be more open and transparent than in any of the other countries under early review. In South Africa, despite widespread consultation involving civil society, the Government directed the process from start to finish. In each of these three countries, there were strong civil society protests demanding enhanced participation. This speaks to the wide diversity across African nations in terms of the internal constitution and capacity of civil society organisations. This again supports my argument that there is a need for an account of civil society that transcends one-size-fits-all theorisations found in Western conceptions.

Within acceding African countries, the APRM has created a new set of opportunities, however constrained, for non-state actors to engage on issues of governance and development, and to assert old and new claims. This is not to say that such engagement did not exist before the advent of peer review. Indeed, the past 15 years have seen the introduction of different mechanisms for public participation in national policy-making throughout Africa. For example, the PRSP process mandates the participation of civil society. In countries that have moved beyond the narrow confines of the PRSP *per se*, myriad national consultation and dialogue mechanisms have been established¹⁹⁵.

¹⁹⁴ These approaches have included: ensuring broad representation on the national governing councils; procedures for decision-making and designating alternate members; multiple representatives per sector; providing separate funding for CSOs; ensuring the report format allows for a multiplicity of views to be expressed; organising public consultations; requesting written submissions; and conducting citizen surveys (Herbert 2006).

¹⁹⁵ Before the PRSPs, during the wave of democratisation throughout Africa at the end of the Cold War, a number of countries, notably the DRC, saw the staging of elaborate multi-stakeholder national conferences.

The distinct feature of the APRM is that it is an African-designed and African-managed process. At the very least, this strengthens the arm of advocates within acceding countries, who are much more likely to assert their ownership of the APRM than, say, of the PRSPs. In the past, the focus was on advocating to external actors (the World Bank, IMF, donor countries) to push for change within countries. The APRM provides citizens with the means of pressuring their own governments, the key agents of social change, to meet their claims. In addition, and through participation in the country review process, citizens themselves assume increasing agency in determining what development path is best for their society. Indeed, some experts view the NPoA as a candidate future master-plan for national development, although it is still too early to assess whether the APRM and NPoA can indeed replace existing mechanisms for national elaboration and implementation of development policy.

Beyond enlivening struggles over development within countries, the APRM is opening up new space above the African state. A growing movement of CSOs has made a strategic decision to influence the continental Pan-African space as a key site of struggle in ending poverty. While working at the grassroots level remains critical, there is a growing belief that only by engaging in policy advocacy at the highest aggregate level of decision-making on the continent can real and sustainable impact be registered in addressing poverty and injustice in Africa (da Costa 2007). These movements operate as coalitions, bringing together national, sub-regional, continental and global civil society actors around key development themes or rights issues, to lobby the relevant organs of the AU system and other bodies.

Emblematic of such coalitions is GCAP, the Global Call to Action against Poverty, which declares itself as “the world’s largest civil society movement calling for an end to poverty and inequality” (GCAP website)¹⁹⁶. Since being established in 2003, GCAP has grown rapidly. In Africa, the GCAP network includes more than 25 national coalitions, which were instrumental in revising the movement’s policy platform to include a series of Southern demands¹⁹⁷. GCAP Africa’s

¹⁹⁶ <http://www.whiteband.org>

¹⁹⁷ These include debt repudiation, a focus on domestic in addition to external debt, a focus on repatriating stolen assets and funds, and a focus on the Economic Partnership Agreements (da Costa 2007).

members have been prominent among critics of NEPAD, which they have dismissed as a neo-liberal construct. Instead, they have focused their energies on influencing the AU system, as evidenced by the recent establishment of an Oxfam International office in Addis Ababa dedicated to facilitating the AU-directed advocacy efforts of African civil society (Houghton 2008).

For many of these CSO advocates, the commitment to helping to realise the AU vision of an independent, self-reliant and self-sustaining Africa implies a focus on influencing the APRM. For example, the African Governance Monitoring and Advocacy Project (AfriMAP) was founded in 2004 to provide space for African CSOs to shadow the APRM. AfriMAP monitors the compliance of African governments to their commitments in three areas: access to justice and rule of law; political participation; and effective public service delivery (Tungwarara 2006). AfriMAP publishes in-depth reports on the national peer review processes, researched and written by nationals of the countries in question.

The APRM clearly emerges as a site of struggle, from the above discussion. By allowing for external perspectives within Africa to link with forces for change inside participating countries, the APRM is facilitating the mobilisation of new, trans-national configurations of power. That the APRM has become a focal point for the formation and capacity enhancement of civil society points to dynamics unleashed by governmentality that exceed Foucault's formulation.

What have been the unintended effects of the APRM process so far?

In Chapter 1, I theorised that the outcomes of struggles over development are often indeterminate. This indeterminacy characterises both the ongoing struggle over whether external or internal policy actors should determine Africa's development path, and interplay between legitimising public action by African leaders and claims from African citizens. In my view, the APRM provides unique insights into the indeterminacy implied by both struggles. Here, I briefly highlight three examples of emerging unintended effects.

One unintended effect already highlighted is the extent to which the APRM is opening up access to national spaces, an outcome that its founders can surely not have anticipated. As described above, the Mechanism is creating engagement by national civil society as well as trans-national actors in territories that were previously considered sovereign. The country review reports and NPoAs create new knowledge and awareness that leads to old claims being restated and new claims arising. Furthermore, the APRM is throwing up fundamental questions about political governance and national politics in ways that may never have happened before.

A second unintended effect is the APRM's potential to displace or supersede the PRSPs, MDG plans, medium-term expenditure frameworks and other national planning mechanisms. As arguably the only framework in-country that can be said to be truly 'African' in the sense that it emanates from a uniquely African process, the NPoA could potentially serve as an overarching planning framework. This would see existing planning mechanisms dispensed with or merged with the NPoA to achieve coherence¹⁹⁸. Were this to happen, it would spell the return of central planning of national economies, dominant in the majority of African countries from independence until the onset of the so-called 'African crisis' – after which, as documented in Chapter 2, sovereign planning gave way to externally directed reform. While the APRM's initiators clearly had it in mind to redress the power asymmetry governing conditions for aid, it is highly unlikely that they anticipated such a potential outcome.

A third and final unintended outcome of the APRM is the effect it is registering on the continental architecture of leadership initiatives and institutions. As discussed, the advent of NEPAD sparked tensions among the membership of the AU, whose 'solidarity' narrative was threatened by a 'selectivity' narrative espoused by a select group among its membership. The establishment of the APRM raised similar concerns. The reaction of African leaders – to claim NEPAD and the APRM as AU initiatives – was intended to send a strong message about the need for continental coherence. In practice, it has paved the way for the APRM to become hegemonic. It is realistic to predict that, beyond the current list of adherents, and once more

¹⁹⁸ A multi-country study is currently underway, commissioned by the ECA, to look into the feasibility of the APRM NPoAs becoming the main planning instrument in African countries (Bing-Pappoe 2009).

country reviews have taken place, other AU member countries will be feel the peer pressure to sign up for review under what is now an official Mechanism of the AU. Those countries that refuse to sign up¹⁹⁹ will have to find good reasons to stay away. Assuming the strengths detailed earlier in this chapter are built upon, and the challenges addressed, there is a real prospect of African peer review evolving into an increasingly powerful agency of restraint.

Conclusion:

This final chapter has undertaken an in-depth review and analysis of the APRM, the most prominent form of knowledge in Africa's contemporary development regime. I have contended that the APRM is an African political 'technology of power', and have advanced and provided evidence in support of three main arguments to this effect. First, The APRM's preoccupation with 'good governance' gives it the appearance of a classic sub-hegemonic technology designed to embed external ideas within Africa. However, it is largely a home-grown tool born out of frustration among African countries at having to submit to external conditionality with a contested basis; it is further designed to build a culture of self-discipline and self-conditionality.

Second, the APRM has considerable potential to redress asymmetries of power – much of which lies in the Mechanism's designation as a voluntary, non-adversarial process of lesson-learning and capacity building. In the struggle between Africa and its donors over who determines Africa's future, the APRM has the potential to reinforce and strengthen African power. The APRM has also opened new space for non-state actors, both within the state and above it, to press old and new claims. Within the state, I have highlighted the pivotal role mandated for CSOs and other non-state actors in the country review process. Above the state, the APRM has helped fuel a nascent Pan-African civil society taking the form of trans-national coalitions, advocating for changes in continental norms and standards as a means of tackling the structures that perpetuate poverty and inequality within African countries. Furthermore, the practice of 'peer review', an apparently non-adversarial learning process, has had the effect

¹⁹⁹ These include Botswana, which argues that its performance in the domain of governance and development make it a leading African nation that has no need for peer review, and Libya, which rejects the APRM as neo-colonial.

of introducing competition between countries, be it in signing and ratifying the instruments to guarantee rights and rule of law, or in providing free universal primary education.

Third, I have offered examples of how the outcomes of African peer review are at odds with the intention of the APRM's initiators. One of these unintended effects is the way in which country review processes, far from resulting in the co-option of non-state actors in the forging of a national consensus, has created an environment in which more claims can be made and more struggles engaged in. Another is the potential that resides in the NPoAs as a hegemonic planning instrument. Yet another is the APRM's profound impact on the continental architecture of institutions and initiatives.

In the process of examining the APRM, I have provided compelling evidence in support of the Foucauldian assertion that politics will increasingly be engaged in through political technologies of power. The APRM holds significant potential to open up the policy space needed for a more 'authentic' African political rationality to emerge. This is not to say that the emergence of a new, African development ideology is at hand. On the contrary, my argument all along has been that ICEs in Africa's contemporary development regime have engaged in the battle to recalibrate power relations informed by a strong dose of pragmatism, eschewing ideological positions and preferring to iterate from within the dominant paradigm based on a sound grasp of the technologies of rule. The APRM manifests an important characteristic of Africa's sub-hegemonic development regime – the ability to internalise external rationalities as a pragmatic strategy to contest power.

Finally, it should be emphasised that the APRM has many flaws, a number of which have been discussed above. Furthermore, it is a relatively new process, with less than half the acceding countries reviewed thus far, and second reviews yet to take place. Its evolving nature thus renders the APRM a somewhat controversial political technology of power. Much therefore remains indeterminate, and my purpose has not been to make arguments set in stone. Rather, and building on my hypothesis, it has been to identify and decode the signs that point to

impending power shifts in Africa's development regime. Such an explanatory approach is necessarily at odds with accounts that characterise the APRM as 'neo-colonialism's mask' and dismiss it out of hand. Only through an objective and nuanced assessment of the contingency of power and the indeterminacy of struggles over development can we arrive at an accurate and meaningful account of Africa's development regime.

Conclusion:

Notes on Resistance, ‘African Civil Society’ and a Future Agenda for Research

Introduction

This dissertation has had theoretical as well as empirical goals. Theoretically, and to enable as nuanced an account as possible of the myriad struggles by a multitude of agents over development underway in postcolonial Africa, I have constructed a working conceptual framework of an African development regime. Empirically, I have sought to decode agency and agendas of experts working continentally, who play a pivotal role in this trans-national domain. I have interrogated the role of African economists and other social scientists working in the continental space in generating and giving authority to development ideas. In doing so, I have attempted to explain how institutional complexes of expertise shape the African development discourse.

This concluding part of the dissertation will undertake three final tasks. First, and drawing on the detailed literature review in Chapter 1, I summarise my key arguments relating to the workings of power in development regimes. Second, I revisit the African development regime conceptual framework, highlighting the supporting evidence provided in different chapters. Third, I reflect further on two important topics highlighted by the discussion – the positionality of resistance and ‘African civil society’. I will end by elaborating a potential agenda for future research.

Theoretical Foundations

In Chapter 1, and towards a better understanding of the workings of power in development regimes, I reviewed several blocks of distinct but inter-connected literature. These concerned: governmentality, development regimes and trans-nationality; the role of institutional complexes of expertise in generating the discourse, developing the policy and mediating the practice of development; explanations of agency as a complex of human and nonhuman elements; and African identity.

The review began with a discussion of Foucauldian governmentality. Two dimensions were highlighted: a set of *political rationalities*, or the thoughts and discursive representations involved when authorities define the field of intervention; and a set of *political technologies* to deal with problems defined by political rationality. Rationalities, embedded in governmental discourse, are not simply ideologies but embed themselves in our ways of thinking and acting, replacing discipline from the outside with self-discipline. Neo-liberalism-as-governmentality thus emerges as more than simply an ideology or political-economic reality, but as a political project aimed at creating a social reality it suggests already exists. Political technologies – tools, mechanisms and forms of knowledge, promulgated and managed by experts and institutions – help constitute ruling authority. Governmentality thus provides the basis for the modern exercise of power.

With this in mind, I drew on Ludden's (1992) argument that development is manifesting itself as regime or "institutionalised configuration of power within a [...] system ideologically committed to progress that draws its material sustenance from the conduct of development" (ibid. pp. 251-52). In addition to an official state apparatus, development regimes appear as a development policy mainstream constituted by institutions of education, research, media, technology, science and intellectual influence. For Ludden, as for Foucault, the regime's power and authority reside not only in government but also in "...physical instruments of power over nature and in cultural instruments of authority over people's minds and morality" (ibid).

Development regimes, I then asserted, are trans-national, meaning that they operate across spaces and scales, from the sub-national to the global. While state regimes may exist, they interact, overlap with and are influenced by sub-national, sub-regional, continental and global development regimes. In the African context, a significant spatial and scalar dimension of the trans-national development regime is continental. As discussed in Chapter 2, this regime emerged as colonial governmentality in the nineteenth century and gave way to postcolonial governmentality in the 1960s.

Discourse has been the main unit of analysis throughout this dissertation. Discourse forms a key part of Foucault's heterogeneous '*dispositif*', ensemble or apparatus. Power works through discourse to incorporate its subjects, as objects, by appearing as 'authorless', by hiding its intent. Understanding development's discourse, I have argued, is therefore key to understanding the power of development regimes.

I then drew on Peet's (2007) 'geography of power' to help explain how development sets out to achieve hegemony. I argued that the development discourse arrives in a pre-existing field of power, populated by different local agents with a host of agendas. Its hegemony is therefore contingent on persuading local actors to internalise its precepts. As such, and to embed it in particular localities, the globally dominant discourse is hybridised or 'translated' into more locally acceptable forms – a process known as sub-hegemony that involves constant renegotiation of interpretations and the incorporation of subordinate perspectives. In this engagement, I have argued, it is conceivable that local agency can produce new types of social and spatial differentiation, leading to reconfiguration of power relations.

I then asserted that experts play a key role in directing the development process, generating ideas and empirical knowledge that are compelling to leading development actors in specific places and times, and ensuring that the regime constitutes a documented historic formation (Ludden 1992). I showed how the institutionalisation of development helped operationalise a rationalised discourse and intentional international activity around development after World War II. On this basis I argued that Third World experts, trained in the West, working in influential institutions and part of far-reaching epistemic networks, play a decisive role in generating discourses of crisis that create the constituency for expert intervention.

Drawing on Mitchell (2002), I argued that the invocation of crisis triggers a self-perpetuating cycle of legitimisation, with failed policies 'producing' the rationale for more expertise, more calculation and more argument. I then asserted that these institutional complexes of expertise

are key agents of 'classic' as well as 'modified' sub-hegemony. Due to the disciplinary power of the dominant institutional complexes, sub-hegemonic experts often hide their contrary views as they cannot be seen to be openly dissenting from the dominant discourse. Nevertheless, they intentionally or immanently deploy tactics that can significantly alter the shape and trajectory of hegemonic projects.

The notion of an institutional *complex* of expertise is consonant with Actor Network Theory (ANT), which theorises that power, far from operating through individual agency, works through the actions of actor-networks, heterogeneous entities made up of human and nonhuman agents including machines, texts, institutions and organisations, animals, money and architectures. What ANT describes as social ordering – the act of overcoming resistance – is akin to my understanding of hegemony. In Callon's (1997) words, hegemonic projects are 'radically indeterminate'. Ordering and its effects are subject to contestation, with the result that a homogeneous social order is never achieved. Aside from validating the hypothesis on the fractured and contingent nature of power in a regime, ANT also accounts for the fact that, in a given field of power, some actors are more powerful than others.

Having established the theoretical foundations of sub-hegemony, I have argued that sub-hegemonic experts in Africa's development regime appeal to two constructed identities to legitimise their quest for expanded policy space: one is their 'African-ness' and another is their membership of a global community of accredited, Western-trained development experts. Theoretically, I described 'African-ness' as a socially constructed identity firmly situated in Africa's postcolonial historical and social context, one that is continuously under construction, and is by no means exclusively a function of race or geography. I identified the invocation by African experts of credentials afforded by the West as a second, key legitimising attribute in asserting agency. I argued that the education of these experts in Western academies confers added legitimacy in their quest to lead technocratic solutions to African development challenges. According to my theorisation, 'global expert' identity is deployed alongside 'African-

ness' as a strategic tool to carve out increased policy space. As such, identity stands out as a key tactical weapon in the exercise of 'techno-politics'.

In summary, my key theoretical arguments are as follows:

1. At variance with more rigid interpretations of governmentality and hegemony, my account has demonstrated the open-endedness of domination.
2. I have shown how the intent to achieve total domination necessarily involves accommodation of dissenting perspectives.
3. I have argued that, in the process of sub-hegemony, translational agents with contextual knowledge of, legitimacy, and credibility in their localities work to ease the hegemony of dominant rationalities.
4. At the same time I have shown how, in the course of classic sub-hegemony, precisely because power accommodates dissenting perspectives as a strategy of rule, hegemony is disrupted.
5. I have asserted that this happens immanently as well as intentionally as successive iterations empower subordinate actors with stronger valences of power.
6. I have attributed this iterative engagement between hegemony and sub-hegemony to the 'radical indeterminacy' of actor-networks, leading such networks to fail.
7. As a result – and precisely because of the slippery nature of domination in the first place – I have concluded that no totalising power project ever fully succeeds and hegemony remains a claim.

Matching Evidence to Theory

Informed by the above arguments, I offered at the end of Chapter 1, a working conceptual framework spelling out key characteristics of an African development regime. I now revisit elements of the conceptual framework reflexively, referring to evidence from Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5.

First, Africa is a 'geopolitical space' that is discursively 'imagined' by African leaders and intellectuals. In this space, development operates as a regime, or institutionalised configuration of power (Ludden 1992). The objects of the regime's intervention are Africa's geographic territory, the African economy, and the African population. However, 'Africa' is a lived reality, a 'field of power' that pre-existed the arrival of development as an ideology of progress. As such, hegemonic development regimes are subject to contestation.

In support of the above, I have shown how development, or the provision of welfare through governmental public action, has long constituted a powerful legitimising ideology, or political rationality of power. In the nineteenth century, development emerged immanently as a means of creating order from the disorder of rapid urbanisation, poverty and unemployment in the wake of the industrial revolution (Cowen and Shenton 1995, p.29). In the colonial period, it evolved into a trans-national mission aimed at 'civilising' colonies to optimise their contribution to the wider process of capitalist accumulation directed from the metropole. However, it was only after World War II that development became an intentional project underpinned by the ideology of Western science and aimed at improving the standard of living of the world's poorer nations and peoples (Cooper and Packard 1997).

In all this, and in past centuries, Africa has been an 'invention' of Western scholarship and an object of developers. It has suffered extreme forms of objectification and its discourses sidelined. Nonetheless, Africa has long aspired to the modernity of the developed world and sought to attain it through a politically distinct and culturally specific vision. Just as Europe is being constructed as an 'imagined community' (Shore 2000), so too have African intellectuals

re-imagined their continent as a distinct 'geopolitical space', deploying unifying discourses of 'Pan-Africanism', 'United States of Africa' and 'African renaissance' to project an alternative African geography of power.

My account of Africa's development regime in historical perspective (Chapter 2) exposed in some detail the discursive strategies and tactics of rule of the globally dominant development rationality seeking to achieve hegemony in Africa. I have shown how this hegemonic project has been reaffirmed and resisted. External theories, such as 'stagism' and Dependency Theory, influenced the development strategies of early postcolonial Africa, with the latter assuming centre stage in the 1970s as the Cold War polarised countries according to their ideological allegiance. I have documented how African intellectuals resisted and rejected what they called 'failed inherited theories of development' and sought to develop an African 'alternative'. As I have documented, while this resistance may not have led to paradigm shift, it has gradually conditioned tangible revisions to the dominant discourse on development, as well as the policies emanating from this discourse.

In Chapter 4, to explain the strategies and tactics deployed in the complex sub-hegemonic interplay between reaffirmation and resistance, and with reference to testimonies and life histories, I have demonstrated how experts harness their 'African-ness', along with academic and professional credentials earned in the West, to assert agency with a view to carving out expanded policy space and recalibrating asymmetries of power.

Second, the African development regime is a heterogeneous apparatus, an ensemble of elements, including "discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions" (Brigg, 2001, p.3). It is not simply the collection of elements per se but also the "system of relations... established between these elements", relations that can be conceptualised in terms of relations of knowledge, power, and subjectivity (ibid) The power of the dominant development discourse connects the elements of this apparatus and provides the

regime with continuity over time. This power does not overtly impose itself, but instead works in diffuse and complex ways.

I have highlighted and discussed various elements of the heterogeneous African development 'apparatus'. These have included: discourses that have structured the regime over time (including '*collective self-reliance and self-sustainment*', '*adjustment with transformation*' and '*people's participation*'); institutional complexes coalescing around the (O)AU and ECA; African development plans such as the Monrovia Strategy, LPA and AAF-SAP; influential expert documents, among them the ECA's '*Compact for African Recovery*' and the APRM Base Document; and landmark philosophical propositions, exemplified by the discourses of '*Pan-Africanism*' and '*African renaissance*'. I have sought to describe the system of relations between the different elements of the African development 'ensemble' – with particular focus on relations between actor-networks spanning the ECA and (O)AU, the ECA and specific African countries, and relations between the AU, NEPAD and APRM.

What has emerged is a complex and often contradictory engagement with the development project. I have shown how Africa's political and intellectual leadership, frustrated with externally directed development, sought to pursue a socio-economic development strategy underpinned by '*self-reliance*' and '*self-sustainment*', exemplifying how development, conceived of as primarily a national project, had now become an overarching continental aspiration. This appeal to Pan-Africanism constituted a strategic manipulation of the perception by the outside world of Africa as a homogeneous, undifferentiated mass. In this way, by appropriating its external image, Africa projected an alternative geography of power.

Yet, as has been clearly shown, Africa's development regime is no less complex and contingent than other modern forms of power. This dissertation has highlighted the different dynamics of contestation within Africa's regime – between ECA and OAU experts of the 1980s, between African experts working in the World Bank and those working in Africa, and between African countries with competing continental development visions. As the ECA's tactical shift from 1995

onwards and the discussion of the APRM have shown, there is a clear recognition within the African development regime that classic sub-hegemony by no means closes the door to struggles contesting power.

Third, Africa's development regime emanates from discourses of crisis, which objectify problems and provide scope for expert intervention. Because the language of 'crisis' and disintegration creates a logical need for intervention and management (Crush 1995), the invocation of discourses of 'failed states', 'chronic poverty' and so on, serve to prepare the ground for public action.

In Chapter 2, I described how the 'crisis' of latter-day colonialism led African leaders to espouse an ideology of 'developmentalism' that helped legitimise their stewardship of the newly independent former colonies. I documented how Elliot Berg, the lead author of the World Bank's 1981 'Berg Report', blaming Africa's complex 'crisis' mainly on poor domestic policies, advocated a rolling back of the state, arguing that welfare should be determined by the market. This invocation of 'crisis' prepared the terrain for the World Bank's introduction of neo-liberal SAPs, subsequently adopted by some two-thirds of African states.

In the same chapter, I highlighted how Africa's political and intellectual leadership harnessed the notion of 'crisis' to create the constituency for a continental response as well as to galvanise support from the outside world. From the 1980s to date, African development plans have routinely included phrases such as *'food crisis'*, *'escalating crisis'*, *'economic and social crisis'*, *'debt crisis'*, and *'from crisis to sustainable growth'*. Today, development institutions inside and outside Africa use discursive categories such as *'failed states'*, *'crisis states'*, *'least developed countries'*, *'low income countries under stress'*, *'enhanced partnership countries'*, *'limited partnership countries'* and *'post-conflict countries'* to justify the need for corrective, expert-led intervention.

Fourth, the regime is 'top-down', emanating from self-declared 'enlightened leaders' as well as development institutions that view progress as a goal and consider the delivery of development as key to gaining, or maintaining, legitimacy.

In conceptualising a trans-national development regime operating in a continental geopolitical space, I have sought to reflect the power of discourses emanating collectively from Africa's political and intellectual leadership. As has been demonstrated in Chapter 2, the idea of a collective identity has been central to African struggles for emancipation – as evidenced by the founding of the Pan-Africanist movement in the Diaspora, the establishment of the OAU in Addis Ababa in 1963, and the launch of the AU in 2001. As key African development plans – among them the Monrovia Strategy, LPA, APPER, AAF-SAP, Arusha Declaration on Popular Participation and NEPAD – have shown, Africa's leadership has honed the issuance of collective statements outlining the continent's development ambitions and strategies into a strategic tool²⁰⁰.

While some have dismissed such an approach as neo-patrimonial trans-state regionalism (Bøås 2002), and however valid the concerns over undemocratic, kleptocratic national leaders banding together in a 'club of dictators', I have shown how this recourse to a continental discourse has served to project an alternative spatial power manifested by the idea of a collective will to develop Africa. This politics of legitimisation is evident in NEPAD, which promises a more accountable relationship between Africa's rulers and the African people as one half of a dual 'Compact'.

²⁰⁰ African national leaders have long used the continental space as a forum for legitimising their national rule. Ideas personally developed or endorsed by particular African leaders have routinely been offered to the OAU and AU for endorsement and adoption. Among such initiatives has been the Conference on Stability, Security and Development Cooperation in Africa (CCSDCA, adopted by the AU as a special programme in 2000), an initiative of former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, who subsequently established his own think tank, the African Leadership Forum, to take his ideas forward. More recently, Ethiopia's Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has disseminated a monograph advocating for a new paradigm he calls 'democratic developmentalism' – underpinned by domestic rural democracy, predictable long-term aid, enhanced market access for African produce, and world-class institutional and physical infrastructure (Zenawi 2006). This is reminiscent of the immediate post-independence period (discussed in Chapter 2) when African's fledgling national leaders engaged in and contributed significantly to debates about ideas, and indeed developed political ideologies of their own.

As has also been demonstrated, the top-down African development regime is lent coherence by African institutional complexes, who are key sub-hegemonic actors in the production, transmission and circulation, reception and appropriation of knowledge – four key stages in the ‘knowledge continuum’ that underpins the process of hegemonic construction (Cooper and Packard 1997). The ECA has clearly been pivotal to development plans issued by Africa’s leadership from independence to the present day. Chapter 1 has documented the tensions between ECA and OAU experts that played out in the run-up to the summit that produced the LPA. Underlying such tensions, and as documented in Chapter 4, has been the fact that leadership politics has often served to constrain expert agency, in the sense that experts are often requested to provide technocratic justifications for approaches already decided at leadership level. This speaks to the central constitutive role that expertise plays in helping to advance certain forms of power. The rule of technocracy is bounded by a wider field of power in which expertise often reaffirms, as opposed to challenges, a hegemonic political agenda.

As I also document in some detail in Chapter 5 with reference to the APRM, political technologies conceived of at leadership level have the potential to exceed the intention of their founders and open up avenues for a wide range of agents to act. In this way, and by mandating civil society participation, the APRM country review process opens the door for African citizens’ groups to press old and new claims on national leadership and the state apparatus.

Fifth, and ostensibly, the regime is classically sub-hegemonic – working to institutionalise the dominant political rationality of rule (in this case underpinned by neo-liberalism) in specific African localities. The regime embodies and reflects global policy shifts in the discourse and practice of development while at the same time being context-specific in several ways.

In documenting the successive iterations of Africa’s development discourse I have shown how the ECA ICE both influenced and was influenced by the dominant development rationality. Initially, the ECA of the late 1970s to early 1990s fiercely resisted the imposition of neo-liberal policies in African countries, documented the failings of SAPs and proposed an alternative. Over time, however, ECA experts engaged constructively with experts from the Bretton Woods

institutions, as documented in Chapter 2, being closely involved in efforts in the late 1980s to work towards a “new synthesis of stabilisation and self-reliance” (Asante 1991, p.176). This synthesis was codified in the 1995 ‘*Cairo Agenda for Action for Relaunching Africa’s Economic and Social Development*’, which reflected the consensus of the 1990s around issues such as: democracy, good governance, peace, security, stability and sustainable development; structural transformation of African economies; and regional economic cooperation and integration.

Sixth, In Africa’s development regime, influential ICEs are sub-hegemonic, deploying hybridised iterations of the globally hegemonic development discourse to persuade local centres of power of their validity and applicability. In the process, these ICEs become actors in struggles against the very discursive and material orthodoxy they are themselves ‘enrolled’ to universalise.

In Chapter 3, which focused on the period 1995 to 2005, I have documented how the ECA changed tactics to become more overtly and ostensibly sub-hegemonic by pursuing a strategy aimed at gaining the international community’s trust whilst simultaneously deploying a series of political technologies aimed at giving meaning to the largely rhetorical notion of ‘African ownership’. I have shown how the ECA used its convening power to incubate and midwife strong African positions agreed by a cross-section of stakeholders. In this way, the ECA was able to manufacture ‘minimal hegemony’, restricting the hegemonic depth and extent of neo-liberalism whilst creating the space for greater African policy ownership and expert leadership of its development agenda.

To further elaborate sub-hegemony, and with reference to detailed insights gleaned from life histories gathered during my fieldwork, I devoted Chapter 4 to exploring the strategies and tactics employed by ECA experts in leading on crafting technocratic solutions to the continent’s problems. I found that these experts deployed two complementary identities towards carving out the required policy space. One, described as their ‘African-ness’, was found to have at least four dimensions: an emotional attachment to their continent of origin; an ideological commitment to ‘developmentalism’; superior knowledge of the African contextual reality; and a

difference in agenda from non-African experts. World-class technical capacity was found to be a second identity deployed towards expanded African expert agency. As the life histories clearly reveal, in positioning themselves as the best-placed technocrats to lead the design of African development strategy, and alongside their 'African-ness', these experts value their Western educational credentials for conferring legitimacy.

Beyond the ECA, there is a growing capacity, increasingly embedded within states but also positioned sub-regionally and continentally, to conduct the kind of iterative engagement with dominant development thinking that I have described. One such institutional complex of expertise is the African Economics Research Consortium (AERC), set up in 1988 with funding from Canada's International Development Research Centre (IDRC), to address a perceived lack of African institutional and human capacity to engage with the heavily technical agenda embedded by the World Bank and IMF from the early 1980s onwards (Rwegasira 2001). Its mission, underpinned by the belief that African development will occur only if there is sustained sound management of the economy, is to develop a strong cadre of professional African economists to conduct policy-relevant research in their respective countries. Headquartered in Nairobi, Kenya, the AERC conducts research and training, and serves as a leading network of national African experts learning and applying the most sophisticated macro-economic and micro-economic techniques²⁰¹.

In Chapter 3, I highlighted the role of the AERC as one of the three African institutions that in 2000 co-published *'Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?'* – an attempt to stimulate debate on the modified reform agenda. Many of Africa's leading economists cut their teeth with the AERC and remain active members of its network. While a handful of these AERC alumni have gone on to become leading critics of SAPs, scholars of heterodox economics and proponents of African alternatives, others have continued to work within the mainstream.

²⁰¹ Given the challenges of the time, the early AERC agendas focused on balance of payments management and domestic financial management. In the 1990s trade policy and regional integration were added to its priorities, and the AERC has gradually moved beyond a narrow focus on macroeconomics to embrace wider development concerns (Rwegasira 2001).

Overall, the AERC serves as an influential African institutional complex of expertise. Unlike the ECA, its experts are largely based within African countries, although it maintains strong links with economists outside Africa through collaborative research. Its approach is classically sub-hegemonic, as evidenced by the *'Explaining African Economic Growth Project'* (2008), a two-volume study covering nearly 30 countries which sought to identify and analyse the major impediments facing Africa's development. The study integrated conventional macroeconomic-focused cross-country growth approaches with three Africa-specific approaches focusing on the political economy of government, private agents, and markets. Thus, the AERC and its collaborators came up with a series of technocratic recommendations from within the dominant paradigm.

The ECA and AERC are among the dominant technocratic institutional complexes of expertise in Africa's development regime today, with the former playing a pivotal role in generating the continental development discourse, and the latter successfully elaborating a nuanced, context-specific approach from within the dominant development paradigm. Ironically, the need for policy based on context-specificity constituted a strident ECA demand during the stand-off over SAPs in the 1980s and 1990s. Linked to this, *'African ownership'* and *'self-reliance'*, aspirations evident in the ECA and AERC alike, have served as constant discursive underpinnings of the continental development regime for several decades. The difference lies in how *'ownership'* and *'self-reliance'* are being pursued within the African development mainstream today.

Resistance: False Dichotomy?

In this dissertation, I have used the term 'resistance from within' as shorthand to characterise the tactics and strategies deployed by experts in the hegemonic process. I have not attempted to address what may be called 'resistance from without', or struggles by social movements and other civil society actors who contest the hegemony of the development apparatus from a position they perceive to be 'outside' of its zone of influence.

I fully accept that civic associations, NGOs, community-based organisations, organised labour and social movements can play an important role in negotiating, appropriating and disrupting hegemony. In previous chapters I have referred to the riots in colonial West Africa after the Second World War, ultimately leading to the end of colonial governmentality. More recently, the emergence of different modes of public action across the African continent in response to the economic crisis of the 1980s has been well documented (cf. Olukoshi 1993, Beckman & Sachikonye 2001, Obadare 2004a)²⁰².

However, in positioning themselves in binary opposition to the dominant development rationality, in this case neo-liberalism, these 'civil society' formations are paradoxically resisting on the basis of the very ideas they reject. To oppose neo-liberalism they must understand how it works and attack it from an informed perspective. The tactics deployed to fight neo-liberalism are often the same tactics deployed to advance its hegemonic quest. In essence, and although the alternatives offered – such as a developmental state or equitable growth – are the very opposite of neo-liberal prescriptions, they in some ways reaffirm that neo-liberalism exists and is a force to be reckoned with.

This resonates with Foucault's argument that future resistance is more likely to be waged with political technologies, as opposed to rationalities. Linked to this is the Foucauldian notion of 'strategic reversibility', which enables 'dissenting conducts' or 'counter-conducts' throughout the history of governmental regimes of power. 'Strategic reversibility' implies that potential resisters, situated within the governmental regime, choose to align themselves with its political rationalities, and then use their proximity to and knowledge of the regime to challenge and disrupt it. By engaging with the dominant discourse, therefore, resisters are positioned within the sphere of influence of the development apparatus, not outside it.

²⁰² "One common factor in this remarkable upsurge was the role played by ordinary citizens who were partly inspired by developments in other parts of the world, particularly Eastern Europe, to challenge the existing economic and political order in their respective countries. Central to this radical momentum were women's groups, which emerged as a formidable aspect of what was a general social movement for change" (Obadare 2004, p.2).

Civil society critics of NEPAD (Chapters 3 and 5) are as much part of Africa's development regime as are experts working in the ECA. These critics include African intellectuals who, like ECA experts, have PhDs from Western universities, but who have chosen to work in civil society as opposed to an inter-governmental agency. These self-styled 'counter-experts' attend workshops and meetings organised by the ECA, AU, NEPAD, APRM, WTO, World Bank and other institutional complexes. In these engagements, they are able to influence as well as be influenced. Therefore, institutional complexes of 'counter-expertise' are within the wider sphere of influence of the ECA and other ICEs. While they may not be at the heart of the mainstream, they cannot credibly argue that they are positioned outside the African development regime²⁰³.

As Sinha (2003) has noted in his account of Indian social movements contesting World Bank global fishing policies, Indian fisher folk do not simply reject the development discourse – they use its logic productively to pursue their own projects. Domination and resistance are mutually implicated, necessitating a fluid reading of agency and agendas. If we accept this argument, the challenge then shifts from delimiting the precise positionality of resistance to decoding the multiple struggles taking place in and around a given development regime.

'African Civil Society'?

There is considerable theoretical scepticism regarding the applicability of the idea of 'civil society' to Africa (Obadare 2004a). From different perspectives, a number of scholars²⁰⁴ have pointed to the danger of transplanting Western views of civil society to Africa's complex and historically contingent reality. The notion of 'civil society' has been rejected by some as a foreign concept, and because it is not perceived to fit some basic elements of Africa's socio-cultural life (ibid). On this basis, Africa has been viewed as a cultural exception to the rest of the world.

²⁰³ Space precludes the provision of evidence to support this argument. However, key institutional complexes of counter-expertise in Africa of the kind referred to include Third World Network–Africa (www.twinafrica.org) and CODESRIA (www.codesria.org).

²⁰⁴ See for example Orvis (2001), Chandhoke (2003), Darnolf (1997) and Mamdani (1997).

Yet radical dissent, expressed in a variety of modes, has long formed a part of Africa's socio-political history. As Obadare (2004b) rightly argues, it is crucial to distinguish between civil society as an idea and as a functioning reality. For him, and in its purest form, civil society provides the critical physical and conceptual space for African citizens "...to become part of the process by which their *lifeworlds* are 'disciplined'" (ibid p.3). On this reading, the idea of African civil society, as well as its manifestation as a tangible movement, have emerged largely as part of the search for a more responsive social order by ordinary citizens in African countries. Obadare proposes an alternative genealogy according to which civil society is re-defined as "a space where groups and individuals can interact and organise social life"²⁰⁵ (ibid pp.13-14).

Consonant with this view, Orvis (2001) argues that any workable definition of African civil society must be sufficiently inclusive to convey the impression of a public sphere of formal or informal collective activity autonomous from the state and family. For Orvis, 'African civil society' should include the so-called 'traditional' or 'primordial' sphere of ethnic organisations, patronage networks and even some 'traditional' authorities (ibid). While neo-patrimonialists see patron-client networks as inimical to progressive modernity, and while these client networks are not based on liberal democratic norms, Orvis considers them legitimate and crucially important elements in African civil society. Such an inclusive definition, he argues, can provide a bridge between the traditional Western conceptualisation of the term whilst allowing its application outside the West.

Others have noted that civil society does not unanimously represent the public good, particularly in authoritarian states where civil society involvement is either severely constrained, or is instrumentalised and orchestrated from above (as in the Rwanda and South

²⁰⁵ This alternative genealogy is made up of the following conceptual elements: in all societies there are values and practices that stem from below, some of which hold latent egalitarian and democratic possibilities; values of mutual support and solidarity exist throughout human history and form the basis of a challenge to the predominance of individual accumulation in capitalist development; and civil society has always existed in different forms in other societies (Obadare 2004b).

Africa APRM processes, discussed in Chapter 5)²⁰⁶. It has further been argued that the global neo-liberal project enrolled a kind of 'organised civil society' to provide support for its hegemony (cf. Ferguson 2006, Oya 2007). In the same vein, Brigg (2001) views NGOs as 'political technologies' harnessed by neo-liberalism to discipline Third World subjects²⁰⁷. Another perspective argues that 'professionalisation' has created an African middle-class 'civil society comprador elite' for whom 'civil society' is an industry that provides yet another opportunity to gain a meal ticket (Obadare 2004a).

While I agree that NGOs are subject to manipulation by specific interests, my point is that they, along with other entities usually lumped together under the rubric of 'civil society', are themselves agents of manipulation and subversion, sometimes for their own ends and sometimes for the greater societal good²⁰⁸. Such behaviour can be seen in the proliferation of 'civil society' initiatives around NEPAD and the AU, prompting warnings to avoid being co-opted by "...agendas set by the new imperialism, which try to incorporate 'civil society' and 'other stakeholders' into mainstream programmes of domination such as NEPAD" (Nabudere, 2002, p.23)²⁰⁹.

²⁰⁶ Obadare (2005) offers a detailed and credible account of how, between 1993 and 1998, the military regime of General Sani Abacha created its own 'civil society' – either by explicitly creating associations dedicated to the regime's project of self-perpetuation, or by creating the enabling environment for the emergence of associations of kindred disposition.

²⁰⁷ Bond (2009), for example, urges that social movements avoid NEPAD and other such neo-liberally grounded initiatives. For him, resisting the neo-liberal project can only be effectively undertaken by coalitions of social movements. In contrast, Ngwane (2003) points out that ideas of NSMs and 'civil society' as leading the fight against globalisation can ring hollow. NSMs may lack a social base and suffer from distorted incentives, while 'civil society' can be even more problematic, extending to the business sector and to NGOs tendering for contracts for privatised government services.

²⁰⁸ In conceding that rent-seeking and the sustenance of patron–client networks are partly characteristic of African states, Zenawi (2002), for example, warns that much of the NGO and civil society community constitute "...a parallel network of patronage and rent-seeking activity that coincides and diverges from the state network depending on circumstances... oiled by funds and guidelines from abroad", with leadership positions in such organisations used for personal enrichment and for the establishment of patronage networks.

²⁰⁹ According to Randriamaro (2002), although NEPAD-related 'civil society' consultations did take place, these were sporadic and small-scale, a 'done deal' meant to support the claims of inclusiveness and democratic participation of the NEPAD promoters. Some civil society activists have been seduced by the language of NEPAD and have taken its 'pro-poor' and 'people-centred' claims at face value.

Indeed, some (cf. Muchie 2003) have argued that, since the ultimate goal of African 'civil society' should be to emancipate the continent, it must necessarily co-operate with governments. This perspective sees the revival of Pan-Africanism and pursuit of African renaissance as a multi-stakeholder project involving all sectors of society. Formations combining national and sub-national grassroots movements with regional and international NGOs have recently emerged as important actors in the revived Pan-African project. Their approach has been to influence the AU and other continental power structures, finding ways to domesticate trans-national advocacy gains in different local contexts²¹⁰. This view of the Pan-African project stands in contrast to traditional views of civil society as a 'third sector' positioned either on the periphery of the African field of power, or outside or above it. In reality, African 'civil society' operates in adversarial as well as collaborative modes. In reality, sub-hegemony embodies contradictory positions and dubious alliances marked by frequent crossovers in political adherence (Peet 2003).

Towards a Future Research Agenda

This dissertation has highlighted the ambitions of Africa's political and intellectual leadership to play a lead role in determining the continent's future development path. As discussed in Chapter 2, the ECA of the 1970s and 1980s responded to the demands of member states by working towards a development plan with an African philosophy of economic growth and social change. Over time, this quest for an African development strategy has given way to a more pragmatic approach, whereby African experts have more consistently sought to 'translate' the globally dominant development paradigm into more appropriate, context-specific and less disciplinary variants. Africa's political and intellectual leadership appear to have decided to work within the dominant paradigm of 'good governance' and 'poverty reduction' because they

²¹⁰ Emblematic of such formations is the Solidarity for African Women's Rights (SOAWR) Campaign, a coalition of 30 African CSOs spanning the continent. SOAWR's campaign around the AU Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa led to an increase in the number of African countries ratifying the Protocol from 1 to 15 in the space of two years (da Costa 2007)²¹⁰. The Protocol came into force in November 2005, making it the African human rights instrument that has taken effect in the shortest time. However, few trans-national civil society coalitions are as well organised and resourced as SOAWR. In any event, influencing continental standards and getting countries to ratify treaties and conventions marks only the beginning of the battle. The enduring challenge faced by such coalitions is how to domesticate the norms and standards and bring about social change within African states.

see no alternative. At the same time, they believe that pursuing a sub-hegemonic strategy may eventually provide opportunities for transforming the rhetoric of 'African ownership' into reality, and thereby to recalibrate power asymmetries between Africa and the developed world.

Because of this pragmatism, today's iteration of Africa's development regime largely conforms to the global consensus on 'good governance', 'poverty reduction' and the MDGs. While neo-liberalism has clearly not developed the continent, it is deemed to have become entrenched in countries that have registered economic gains after implementing neo-liberal policies (Harrison 2006)²¹¹. This contradictory picture is further complicated by the growing African ambition – seen in NEPAD and the APRM – for real, as opposed to rhetorical, 'African ownership'. I have argued that this discourse, while classically sub-hegemonic, holds the potential to reallocate power. Whether this will set the stage for an African alternative to the dominant development rationality, an aspiration dating from the 1970s, remains an open question and one I have not sought to explore in this thesis.

Nonetheless, important questions are implied by my study that could form the basis for future research, and my conceptual framework could serve as a useful signpost. There is a need to build a more comprehensive account of the power of development in Africa. This will necessitate further work towards understanding the power dynamics within Africa's development regime, including mapping the tensions, boundaries and fault lines as the regime continues to evolve. I end this dissertation by highlighting a few of these potential avenues for further research.

Following from life histories analysed in Chapter 4, there is need for further research into the dynamics of African expertise. What are the epistemological influences of the emerging

²¹¹ As Harrison (2006) points out, there are no signs that neo-liberalism has led to policy convergence among African states, and there are no neo-liberal success stories. However, he argues that a handful of African countries – notably Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda and to a lesser extent Ghana, Burkina Faso and Ethiopia – have achieved moderate economic development after internalising the neo-liberal agenda.

generation of African expertise? To what extent is today's expertise so well-schooled in neo-liberal techniques and technologies that the door to alternative thinking is closed? Within the African regime, how does African expertise legitimise leadership ideas, and how does it contest such ideas? Is there anything approaching a 'brain gain' or critical mass of African development experts? Can more be said about the interplay between 'African-ness', Western credentialism and the politics of the Diaspora? What are the emerging dynamics of the intersections between African expertise and international expertise? How far is African development now being directed by African expertise? What are the markers of this expanded agency?

Related to this, there is room for further study of the construct of institutional complexes of expertise in Africa's development regime. For example, the AERC (discussed above) mediates arguably the largest network of African macro- and micro-economists on the continent. An important dynamic of the AERC is its mastery of the techniques of neo-liberal accounting, and the capacity it has developed on this throughout Africa. What are the dynamics related to the heterodox community of non-African experts who participate in AERC plenary meetings and research projects? How far is the AERC's agenda being shaped by these foreign experts, and how far has the AERC been able to 'enrol' them to advance its technocratic worldview on the need for context-specificity in researching African economies?

Another important institutional complex in Africa is the African Development Bank (AfDB), which has ambitions to displace the World Bank as the premier African development financier. Originally an entirely African-owned and funded entity, the AfDB is now 40% owned by non-regional members which include Africa's main development partners. To what extent does this power dynamic affect the agenda and agency of the AfDB's increasingly assertive stance in favour of expanded 'African ownership'? How does its quest to be comparable to the World Bank play out in its discursive and operational strategies? To what extent does the AfDB's current continental preoccupation with trans-national African infrastructure reflect a technocratic engagement with the age-old Pan-Africanist regionalist discourse?

As implied by the above discussion, an important area for future research could be to explore the nexus between Africa's development regime and national as well as sub-national development regimes. My focus has been decidedly and intentionally on the continental dimension of Africa's trans-national development regime, as an imagined and real category. I have suggested that there are different modes and valences of power operating in this regime. One important dimension of this complex exercise of modern power is how leading African nations have instrumentalised the continental space to project their ideological power through Africa and beyond.

As Habib and Selinyane (2006) argue, South Africa's leading role in the creation of both NEPAD and the AU, and the promulgation of the 'African renaissance' discourse are all examples of that country's systemically beneficial hegemonic behaviour, which has involved deployment of a combination of ideological, military and economic power. In addition to the obvious hegemons (Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa), smaller African countries have also exploited their membership of the continental fraternity to overcome the constraints of their small size and limited influence. Further, there are strategic alliances between Africa and other countries or regions of the global South – for instance the Africa–China and Africa–Latin America axes. From a development perspective, decomposing the agendas and strategies of influence of such nations in wider fields of power is another important area for future research.

Finally, 'African civil society' represents an important emerging dynamic worthy of in-depth study. Earlier in this conclusion, I provided a snapshot of how formations of 'civil society' are increasingly viewing the Pan-African project as a strategic site of influence. With this in mind, African and international NGOs are organising trans-nationally to engage with the project, and are investing considerable resources in creating representative coalitions – including on a thematic basis (for example around women's rights). As argued, the concept of 'civil society' in Africa remains problematic and needs to be unpacked further. An important dimension of the phenomenon is the role of so-called 'counter-expertise' – highly trained civil society experts – in shaping Africa's development regime and informing a strategy of resistance against the

hegemony of global power. For example, counter-expertise is involved in mobilising African citizens, governments and regional economic communities to reject the EU's proposed Economic Partnership Agreements.

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Annexe I - Respondents²¹²

	Name	Title	Date & Location	Remarks
1.	Mr. Jalel ABDEL-LATIF	Executive Director, InterAfrica Group	25 May 2006 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Interview
2.	Dr. Tajudeen ABDUL-RAHEEM	Deputy Director, Millennium Campaign/ Former Secretary-General, Pan-African Movement	19 June 2006 London, UK	Interview
3.	Prof. Adebayo ADEDEJI	Former Executive Secretary, ECA	06 Sept. 2006 London, UK	Interview
4.	Dr. George ALIBARUHO	Principal Adviser, Office of the Executive Secretary, ECA	16 March 2006 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Interview
5.	Mr. Andrew ALLIMADI	Communication Officer, ECA	18 July 2009 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Personal Communication
6.	Dr. K.Y. AMOAKO	Executive Secretary, ECA	10 September 2003 01 May 2004 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Interviews
7.	Dr. Bartholomew ARMAH	Regional Adviser, PRSPs, ECA	22 May 2006 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Interview
8.	Mr. Owen BARDER	Director, Aidinfo	26 July 2008 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Interview
9.	Dr. Adotey BING-PAPPOE	Independent Researcher on Governance and Development issues	15 August 2009 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Interview Personal Communication
10.	Dr. Ngartando BLAYO	Senior Economic Affairs Officer, ECA	05 May 2006 Addis Ababa	Interview
11.	Dr. Patrick BUGEMBE	Director, ECA Southern Africa Office.	11 October 2006 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Interview
12.	Dr. Kojo BUSIA	Governance Officer, ECA	24 March 2006 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Interview
13.	Ms. Evelyn CHANGE	Coordinator for Corporate	20 July 2009	Personal

²¹² It should be noted that not all respondents listed in this table have been cited in the dissertation. Titles appended are valid at the time of interview or interaction.

		Governance, APRM Secretariat	Midrand, South Africa	Communication
14.	Dr. Jakkie CILLIERS	Executive Director, Institute for Security Studies (ISS)	23 August 2006 Pretoria, South Africa	Interview
15.	Ms. Isatou GAYE	Environmental Affairs Officer, ECA	23 March 2006 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Interview
16.	Mr. Steven GRUZD	Deputy Head, Governance & APRM Programme, South African Institute for International Affairs	21 August 2006 Johannesburg, South Africa	Interview
17.	Mr. Ross HERBERT	Senior Research Fellow, Governance & APRM Programme, South African Institute for International Affairs	21 August 2006 Johannesburg, South Africa	Interview
18.	Prof. Adam HABIB	Executive Director, Human Sciences Research Council	25 August 2006 Johannesburg, South Africa	Interview
19.	Dr. Abdalla HAMDOK	Deputy Director, International IDEA	30 June 2006 Banjul. The Gambia	Interview
20.	Mr. Irungu HOUGHTON	Pan-Africa Director, Oxfam GB	09 April 2008 Nairobi, Kenya	Interview
21.	Mr. Samba JACK	Director, Programming and Planning, ECA	21 May 2006 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Interview
22.	Mr. Maximilian JARRETT	Management Officer, Office of the Executive Secretary, ECA	15 February 2009 Addis Ababa	Personal Communication
23.	Prof. Iqbal JHAZBAY	Associate Professor, University of South Africa (UNISA)	24 August 2006 Pretoria, South Africa	Interview
24.	Dr. Basil JONES	Senior Programme Officer IDRC	24 November 2006 Nairobi, Kenya	Interview
25.	Ms. Nancy KACHINGWE	Economic Justice Advocacy Specialist, ActionAid	24 May 2006 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Interview
26.	Dr. Pascal KAMBALE	Deputy Director, African Governance Monitoring and Advocacy Project (AfriMAP)	18 September 2009 Kinshasa, DRC	Interview
27.	Dr. Chris LANDSBERG	Executive Director, Centre for Policy Studies (CPS)	23 August 2006 Johannesburg, South Africa	Interview

28.	Dr. Garth LE PERE	Executive Director, Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD)	24 August 2006 Pretoria, South Africa	Interview
29.	Ms. Bronwen MANBY	Senior Adviser, Open Society Institute (OSI)	10 August 2009 London, UK	Interview
30.	Ms. Elene MAKONNEN	Principal Adviser, Office of the Executive Secretary, ECA	17 March 2006 17 February 2009 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Interview Personal Communication
31.	Dr. Eddie MALOKA	Executive Director, Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA)	24 August 2006 Johannesburg, South Africa	Interview
32.	Ms. Nobuntu MBELLE	Coordinator, Coalition for an African Court on Human and People's Rights	15 August 2009 Johannesburg, South Africa	Interview Personal Communication
33.	Prof. Emmanuel NNADOZIE	Senior Economic Affairs Officer, ECA	21 March 2006 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Interview
34.	Dr. Francis NYAMNJOH	Head of Publications and Dissemination, CODESRIA	02 August 2006 Dakar, Senegal	Interview
35.	Ms. Rawda OMAR-CLINTON	Economic Affairs Officer, ECA	24 May 2006 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Interview
36.	Dr. Patrick OSAKWE	Economic Affairs Officer, ECA	22 May 2006 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Interview
37.	Ms. Thokozile RUZVIDZO	Acting Director, African Centre for Gender and Development, ECA	24 March 2006 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Interview
38.	Prof. Ebrima SALL	Head of Academic Programme, CODESRIA	02 August 2006 Dakar, Senegal	Interview
39.	Dr. Jeggan C. SENGHOR	Former Director, IDEP and ECA West Africa Office/ Former Chief of Staff to the Executive Secretary	June 2008 – November 2009 Kinshasa DRC and Rotherham, UK	Interviews Personal Communications
40.	Prof. Amson SIBANDA	Economic Affairs Officer, ECA	23 March 2006 Addis Ababa	Interview
41.	Dr. Abebe SHIMELES	Researcher & Consultant, ECA	24 March 2006 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Interview
42.	Dr. Yousif SULIMAN	Director, Planning & Human Resources/ Former Director, Regional Integration & Chief	25 May 2006 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Interview

		of Staff to the Executive Secretary, ECA		
43.	Prof. Owodunmi TERIBA	Former Director/ Senior Economist/ Adviser, ECA	24 May 2009 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Interview
44.	Mr. Ali TODARO	Chief, General Services/ Former Special Assistant to the Executive Secretary/ Secretary to the Commission, ECA	14 October 2009 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Personal Communication
45.	Mr. Ozias TUNGWARARA	Director, African Governance Monitoring and Advocacy Project (AfriMAP)	4 August 2009 Johannesburg, South Africa	Personal Communication

Annexe II – Sample Interview Questionnaire

1. Name, Age, Nationality, Institution or former Institution, Designation.
2. Tell me a bit about your academic background – where did you study at university level, what did you study, and what did you specialize in?
3. What about your professional career in development? Tell me about your role at ECA over the years.
4. How has the institution evolved, and what do you consider to be the highlights in terms of its engagement with African development policy?
5. How would you characterize the evolution of the African development paradigm since our countries achieved independence?
6. From your vantage point at ECA, are there any moments you would consider ‘defining’, in the sense of having a major impact on subsequent policy and practice?
7. Is there an extent to which it could be argued that African experts have a specific ‘African’ agenda, as distinct from international development agendas?
8. If so, and from your experience at ECA and from your observation of other regional and national policymaking institutions, how much room do you think African experts have had over the years in pushing a specifically African policy agenda?
9. Where would you say the current power lies in determining international development policy as it is applied in African and other developing countries? Has there been a shift over the years?

10. If so, in what ways has the locus of power shifted? Has the dominant development paradigm been imposed, has there been collusion, have African experts been at the centre of generating such policies, or is it a negotiation?
11. To what extent would you say African experts, whether in regional institutions or working at country level, are locked into the international development discourse and paradigm of the moment?
12. What are your impressions of the relations over time between ECA and the OAU/Africa Union? What would you say have been the major complementarities and the major tensions in the relationship?
13. How would you situate ECA's role with respect to the major African development plans of the past few decades (Lagos Plan of Action, UNPAAERD, etc, all the way to NEPAD?)
14. Are there any other insights you may want to share from your personal and professional life?